Luke Herbert
The Lens of History blog and podcast
contthelensofhistory@gmail.com
http://lensofhistory.blogspot.com/
Below is my public submission for the 2015 Defence White Paper. This submission will be reproduced in The Lens of History blog.
Unless otherwise stated the time frame for my outline is the next 10 -15 years. My submission will offer a broad look at the subject matter covered by the 2015 Defence White Paper. The need to stay topical means means I will only touch upon on the reasoning behind international events.
For instance China's recent history ( the Chinese civil war , WW2 and the Boxer Rebellion) are all the key to understanding Chinese foreign policy. Yet for my purposes of this submission I must leave it to the reader to consider such factors in greater depth. I welcome any correspondence from the reader (see above for contact details).
Below I chosen to classify the central pacific as the general region Philippines , Wake , Guam and Borneo. I feel the strategic importance of this area to New Zealand justifies my decision. Further breaking down the central pacific and Asia as a whole would have served to bog down the reader.
Under the General Conclusions sub heading I will round out my thoughts on most of the sections below.
What are the major threats or challenges to New Zealand's security now and in the future?
The
Defence Assessment 2014 correctly identifies the challenges to New Zealand Security. The Assessment is incorrect in its assessing the threat of New Zealand facing global conflict.
What changes in the international environment, including the relations between states, nonstate actors and international institutions, will affect New Zealand's interests and what might this mean for the Defence Force?
Note to the reader
I have chosen to structure the following section around Geography. Structuring this section around geography avoids it becoming a jumbled mess.
My methodology is to forecast a likely role for the NZDF around the global. This will allow me to make a reasonable projection of the capabilities the NZDF will require in the coming years. In some cases the NZDF will need to acquire new or past capabilities.
Broad Global Outlook
The United States is retreating from its responsibility as the last super power. As the USA further retreats in a 21st century version of isolationism the international situation will continue to deteriorate. Non State and State actors are filling the vacuum left in the wake of isolationist America.
By 2020 the full extend of cutbacks to the US military budget will be in full force. The full effects of the cutbacks are in the
public domain. The NZDF force structure and doctrines will need to reflect the new reality of greater global instability , American Isolationism and greatly reduced US military capabilities. More on this below.
The so called Rules Based International Order is failing to either contain or stop the spread of Islamic extremism in the Middle East , a resurgent Russia and keep Chinese territorial claims in check. The Rules Based International Order will fail leaving New Zealand to stand alone to face global conflict.
Geographic Strategic Assessment Asia
Broadly speaking the aim of Chinese foreign policy is to implement its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. The implementation of this doctrine requires the removal of US influence and presence from the Asia Pacific region. A part of this doctrine is settling regional territorial disputes in there own favour.
China doesn't recognise the Rules Based International Order. As such As such the Chinese see military force as the foremost means of resolving territorial disputes and implementing their foreign policy. Trade/commerce takes part between nations for reasons of mutual convenience. New Zealand's trade/commerce relationship with China is in no way a guarantee of security.
The Chinese perceive Australia and New Zealand has being a part of the US sphere of interest. As such they will not hesitate to declare war on Australia and New Zealand.
The NZDF needs to be prepared three scenarios in Asia. The first is a medium intensity/limited war breaking out. Such a conflict could take place in the next 3-5 years. The participants would likely be China and Vietnam. The NZDF role would be to protect commerce in the area of conflict. In effect New Zealand would be practising Armed Neutrality.
The second scenario is the Chinese launching an invasion of the central pacific. It is probable that the Chinese southwards military drive would include Indonesia. The role of the NZDF would be the defence of New Zealand , Australia and the South Pacific. Look for this to occur around 2025-30.
North Korea's nuclear and missile testing programs are continuing unabated. North Korea aims to use a nuclear weapon as a precursor to invading its southern neighbour. Any NZDF personnel/equipment deployed in South Korea would be at risk either from nuclear fall out.
The evacuation of New Zealand citizens and other nationalities as per international agreements. Emergency logistical/resupply of South Korean and US forces would be the NZDF primary roles at the onset of the war.
Geographic Strategic Assessment South and South West Pacific
I ask the reader to forgive me for diving into a possible scenario involving East Timor. I have chosen to take the risk of going beyond the scope of the question in order to raise , what I feel is a matter that needs more discussion.
The risk of East Timor falling prey to Non State actors is an unforeseen risk. East Timor's proximity to Indonesia could deter any would be terrorist organisations from entering the country. I believe that if East Timor ever was in danger of becoming a terrorist haven Indonesia would not hesitate to reoccupy the country.
This must be balanced out against how East Timor's growing pains make the country an attractive target for Non State Actors. In the event East Timor became a target for Non State Actors (likely Isis) Australia and New Zealand would assume responsibility for security in East Timor. The NZDF would assume a front line combat role along with a training and mentoring role like the ADF undertook in Afghanistan.
Islamic extremists attempting the take over of East Timor may not be as likely as other events in New Zealand's immediate backyard. Coups , civil unrest and civil wars could lead to a failed state in the South/South West Pacific. Logic follows that if the NZDF acquires the capabilities to combat Non State Actors in East Timor it will be able to deal with lesser eventualities.
Looking closer towards 2040 rising sea levels (assuming current trends remain) will continue to overtake vulnerable nations. The NZDF would be at the forefront of evacuating people from the effected areas.
Logistically the NZDF could be called upon to support the transportation of 10,000 people or the equivalent of an army division. Such an operation would be done along side civilian agency’s. This would be akin to how the NZDF takes part in disaster relief at home and abroad.
Geographic Strategic Assessment Europe/NATO and Central Asia
A resurgent Russia is fulfilling the role Nazi Germany played in WW2 . Between now and 2020 the Russian's will complete the take over of the Ukraine. The Baltic States will fall to the Russians via peaceful means (agitators and low voter turner out at referendums).
Russia will deploy land forces to Central Asia (commonly known as The Stans). The Russians will use Central Asia as a barrier between them and the Middle East. The Barrier will serve to keep Isis and other Islamic extremist groups away from the home land.
In between 2020-25 Russia will launch a war against NATO. I have documented the economic background to the war
elsewhere . The land component of the war will see the Russians invade Western Europe. The Russians will look to
shut down the Atlantic.
New Zealand would look to send non lethal aid and supplies of food to the UK. The RNZN and RNZAF could be called upon to escort the shipments of food and aid. The UK government would request direct military assistance from New Zealand. The UK will be screaming out for any ASW assets.
Whether or not the NZDF will be in a position to take part in the Third Battle of the Atlantic or should do so is open to question.
Geographic Strategic Assessment Middle East/North Africa
Isis and Iranian backed Islamic extremists groups like Houthi are in a race to make territorial gains in the Middle East. By 2020 Houthi and any other Iranian backed elements will either completed the take over of Saudi Arabia or be in the process of doing so. The same goes for Isis and Jordan.
From a strategic stand point the closure of the Suez Canal is to be expected. The causes of the closure may be due to the risk posed by Islamic extremists to ships. Alternately a future Egyptian government run by Islamic extremists may close the Suez Canal outright.
The closure of the Suez Canal would see commerce exposed to greater distances/time at sea when travelling to the UK/Europe. The closure of the Suez Canal has the potential to apply more demands on the NZDF resources. In the event the RNZAF and RNZN is called upon to escort our sea bound commerce to Europe the distance travelled will be much greater. The longer distance increases the risk or exposure to the events outlined in this submission.
Iraq will disintegrate along tribal and religious lines. Isis and Iranian backed militias will contest the real estate. The Iranian backed forces will come up trumps . The Iranians are supplying them with arms and training. Republican Guard units virtually serving in the open will be acting as advisors/trainers to militias. Isis doesn't enjoy any such backing from rogue regimes like North Korea.
Iran's nuclear weapons
Program just like North Korea is continuing unchecked by the international community. In the time frame covered by this submission Iran will gain Nuclear Weapons. Iran's aim is the annihilation of Israel via the use of Nuclear Weapons. Iran will also go to war against secular Turkey.
After the fall of Saudi Arabia and before the outbreak of the wider war in the Middle East , what might be the NZDF role in the region? The probability of the NZDF deploying the region in this time period is low. The US will pull out of the region as isolationist sentiment will demand.
Geographic Strategic Assessment Sub Saharan Africa
Islamic extremist groups like Boko Haram and Al Shabaab will continue to grow in strength. Al Shabaab will continue to threaten Kenya. Al Shabaab is operating from neighbouring Somalia.
The growth of Islamic extremism and the presence of UN peacekeepers may open up a training role for the NZDF. Despite having the highest numbers of peacekeepers worldwide deployed to the region , violence and instability is ongoing.
The NZDF may be called upon to train peacekeepers in the region. This would be part of a multinational coalition efforts to improve the level of peacekeeping operations as a whole. The same kind of mission may be undertaken in countries like Kenya or Nigeria Instead of training peacekeeping forces the NZDF and coalition partners would working with the Army in question.
On going multi national efforts to combat piracy (Combined Task Force 150) off the Horn of Africa will be on going. It should be noted the People's Liberation Army Navy is a participant in Combined Task Force 150. The People's Liberation Army Navy is using its role in Combined Task Force 150 to further develop their Replenishment at Sea capabilities. The deployment also offers the Chinese a chance to collect intel on the USN and other navies in a fairy benign environment.
In the past the RNZN has been unable to participate in Combined Task Force 150. The reason for this was the unavailability of the Navy's Two Anzac Class frigates. As the RNZN displays its weaknesses the People's Liberation Army Navy will continue to mature.
Ross Dependency/New Zealand area of Antarctica
The Chinese have an active Antarctic Program. Establishing bases in the Australian and New Zealand area's of Antarctica is on going aspect of the Chinese Antarctic Program. Indicators point to the Chinese are planning to undertake
mining in the Antarctic.
The NZDF may have a role in representing the New Zealand government's official protests at the Chinese violating the Antarctic Treaty (mining is outlawed in Antarctic by the treaty) . An outside chance exists that the NZDF could be called to evict the offending elements from Ross Dependency/New Zealand area of Antarctica.
General Conclusions
A number of global hotspots are going to flare up into a fire storm. The fire storm will be global conflict on a scale not seen since WW2. The scale of the coming conflict will mean that New Zealand will be fighting for the survival of western civilisation. Fighting for democracy and our fundamental values will replace looking after our overseas interests.
The opening act of the coming fire storm will probably be Russia's moves against NATO. Iran may trigger a wider war in the Middle East around the same time. The US will initially sit out the conflict. Various factors that fall beyond the scope of this submission , will see the US enter the conflict on the side of NATO.
The eyes of the world will be fixated on events in Europe and the Middle East. The US will withdraw forces from Asia to meet the crises in Western Europe and the Atlantic. The Chinese will take advantage of the situation to launch their southward military drive.
What are the roles that the Defence Force should perform to keep New Zealand secure and advance our interests abroad?
At present the roles assigned to the NZDF are appropriate.
What are the emerging security challenges that New Zealand is likely to face in its immediate' territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, the territory of the Realm Nations and the Ross Dependency?
Like above I will spit this section into Geographic regions.
Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf
Chinese Anti Access/Area Denial operations will be the main threat to New Zealand and the South West Pacific.
Ross Dependency/Antarctica
Chinese mining in the Antarctic (see above).
How should the Government prioritise the Defence Force's efforts between ensuring New Zealand is secure, supporting the security and stability of our friends, partners and our ally Australia, and contributing to international peace and security globally?
I have chosen to structure this section in four parts. I will rank the NZDF roles in providing security and maintaining relationships with allies and partners into 2 category's. The category's will based on the importance to New Zealand 's security.
In category 3 I will look the NZDF relationships with the UK and the USA. Category 4 will look the foundation of the doctrine the NZDF should adopt out to 2040.
Category 1
The fundamental duty of the NZDF is the defence of New Zealand,Australia and the South West Pacific from any threat from the threat of a State Actor/Non State Actors who would pose a threat to security.
Also the NZDF needs to be able to support natural and man made disaster relief and recovery in New Zealand , Australia and South Pacific and the South West Pacific.
Following on from this the NZDF relationships with its counter parts in Asia : Singapore , Japan , Indonesia , Republic of Korea , and the Solomon Islands are the most important to New Zealand's security. Note this list is indicative and not exhaustive.
Strategically any convention military threat to New Zealand from a nation state will come from Asia and the South West Pacific. This is why I believe the NZDF most important ties are with Australia and figurative speaking with nations in our backyard and local neighbourhood.
Category 1A
The importance the NZDF ties with the ADF warrants its own sub category in this submission. A number of factors has seen New Zealand neglect its defence relationship/alliance with Australia.
Successive governments over the past 20 – 30 years have reduced the size and capabilities of the NZDF to its present scope. The consequences of this from the stand point of Trans-Tasman defence relations has been a greater reliance on Australia for capabilities the NZDF is lacking. New Zealand's influence on Australia's defence posture has declined or remained the same.
As a response to rising tensions in Asia , Australia is shifting its defence ties and relationship's towards Japan. Australia is moving away from its traditional partnership with New Zealand . In order for New Zealand to have more influence on Australian defence posture we have to bring more to the table in terms of capabilities and integration with the ADF.
The goal of the New Zealand government should be to align Australian defence policy with the South West Pacific. In other words in a worst case scenario (read China's South ward’s military drive) it is in New Zealand's interests for ADF to withhold its forces from the Central Pacific.
By doing so the ADF will stand a higher chance of preserving naval and air units. The reader needs to consider the implications of this Chessboard move. Australia will abandoning the Central Pacific and Japan in the short to medium term.
The reader may be asking the following: Should the NZDF and the ADF not try and prevent a would be enemy from reaching the South Pacific by engaging them in the Central Pacific? In brief the concentration of enemy forces would make this unwise. The enemy also enjoys the advantage of operating fairy close to its logistical base . Once the enemy moves towards the South Pacific they will stretch their logistical supply chain .
Category 1B
As a part of its military build up China is developing disaster/humanitarian relief capabilities. Ensuring interoperability with the People's Liberation Army , Navy and Air Force disaster/humanitarian relief capabilities is a sound objective. NZDF planners and senior commanders will need to bear in mind how China is a future adversary.
Category 2
New Zealand's
ties with NATO were facilitated because of the NZDF role with the International Security Force in Afghanistan. The NZDF ties with NATO will continue to be important.
Category 3
In the area of natural disaster and humanitarian relief the NZDF ties with the UN and international NGO will remain important , until the failure of the Rules Based International Order. New Zealand's bilateral relations with Australia , United States , UK and other partners are of greatest importance to the NZDF. New Zealand's ties with the UN are of a secondary importance.
Category 3A
The value of the NZDF ties to the British Armed Forces will continue to be as outlined as below. For this reason I have placed the NZDF ties with the British Armed Forces in its own sub Category.
The nature of the NZDF relationships with its UK counterparts is unusual in that it isn't necessary dictated by geography or joint operational deployments around the globe. The NZDF has historic links with the UK armed forces. The NZDF will continue follow the structural and operational handbooks of the UK armed forces.
The effects of budgetary cutbacks to the UK armed forces will need to be taken into consideration by NZDF planners. What affect will the RN reduced presence in the Indian Ocean have on New Zealand's interests?
What effects have budget cutbacks had and will have on the British Armed Forces handbooks as I term it?
Category 3B
Valid arguments exist for placing the New Zealand's defence ties with the United States of America in Category 1 or 2. I decided against doing this because of the US retreat from global affairs and defence cutbacks that I have previously mentioned in this submission.
Participation in joint exercises with the US military will continue to test, develop the NZDF capabilities and interoperability. In spite of cutbacks considerable scope still exists for the NZDF to participate in training exercises with the US military.
The New Zealand government aim should be to maximise the number of opportunities the NZDF has to train with Marines ( Marine Rotational -Darwin) and other US forces that are stationed in Australia. The same goes for any US forces that arrive in Australia for training purposes.
In the same vain the NZDF should be in a position to train with US forces that are stationed in the likes of the Philippines. These mostly naval forces have been deployed as part of the US pivot to Asia.
Historically the US has offered logistical support to Australia and New Zealand military operations. The effects of cutbacks on the US military capacity to provide logistical support to the NZDF operations will need to be examined in depth.
The US will remain an important supplier of military hardware to both the NZDF and ADF. As such the New Zealand government focus should be on taking chances to secure US military hardware as circumstances arise. Securing the hardware at reasonable or affordable price should be the other goal.
Its not certain if the US government and relevant agency’s would be willing to deal with New Zealand in good faith. The cancellation of the planned purchase of F-16's for the RNZAF by the last Labour government may have caused a level of distrust towards New Zealand.
In summary the US will continue to provide the NZDF with training opportunities , doctrinal knowledge and (hopefully) military hardware. New Zealand Defence and diplomatic ties with the US still hold great value.
Category 4
Note to the reader: The capabilities referred to in Category 4 are covered below.
Will the NZDF be deploying stand alone or along side coalition partners and allies?
Excluding training exercises and short term disaster relief. Will the deployment place the NZDF resources outside of Asia ,South Pacific?
Who will the NZDF be deployed along side?
Would the deployment come at the expense of developing and improving the capabilities outlined below?
The NZDF will rarely deploy overseas as a stand alone force without coalition partners because of its small size. For instance the NZDF was a part of the International Security Force in Afghanistan. The reader shouldn't confuse the NZDF having its own area of operations (As was Bamiyan for NZ PRT in Afghanistan) with a stand alone deployment without any coalition partners and allies.
Beyond 2020 the NZDF would be better to maintain its resources close to home , so to speak. This would ensure the NZDF is more able to meet its fundamental obligations as the international situation unfolds as outlined above.
Priority is to be given to continuing to develop and upgrade the NZDF new and existing capabilities. Training exercises with the US,Australia and partners in Asia/South West Pacific may be the most beneficial to the NZDF.
Australia should be the first preference as a partner in any joint task force. If Australia isn't taking part in (enter mission here) the next preferences are the USA and the UK.
Greater care and consideration is required when considering the impact would be coalition partners would have on the security of NZDF forces in an overseas deployment.
In Afghanistan Kiwi troops were exposed to greater risk of causalities by Hungarian forces in a neighbouring province. How the Hungarian troops didn't patrol at night was well documented. The NZDF relied on our coalition partners to provide air support to our troops on the ground. The NZDF must never be placed in such a situation again.
How should the Defence Force operate as part of the all-of-government effort to protect and advance the nation's interests?
The NZDF should operate with the capabilities and doctrines outlined in this submission.
What is the Defence Force's role in contributing to New Zealand's national resilience to unforeseen events and natural disasters?
As it does now.
What should be the Defence Force's role in the development of New Zealand's youth?
This area is in conjunction with recruitment (see below). New Zealand will benefit if a greater number of young people enlist in the NZDF. The pressures on the NZDF manpower resources will be eased. After the people in question leave the military for civilian life they will have a skill set/qualifications that will leave them in good stead.
What capabilities does the Defence Force need to carry out its roles effectively, now and in the future?
By having the capabilities to counter Area Access/Area Denial operations the NZDF will be able operate effectively in the years ahead.
Anti Submarine Warfare , Mine Clearance Warfare and Amphibious capabilities will replace peacekeeping as the NZDF core missions. Small to medium sized militaries tend to specialise in selected capabilities. Providing sound decisions are made based on New Zealand defence requirements , specialisation can be an asset to the NZDF.
Below is the kind of force structure/capabilities the NZDF will need to adapt to meet its new roles. Also I will take a glance at the doctrines the NZDF will need to develop with Australia.
New Zealand Army
Base the structure of the army on Multi-role Combat Brigades (See
Plan Beersheba) would ensure the Army is an integrated force. Integration with the Australian Army naturally comes with the Multi-role Combat Brigades model.
In general the Army would look to emulate the capabilities of the United States Marines Corps. All the Army's equipment including tanks and artillery would have to be suitable for transport by a C-17 or equivalent aircraft.
Replacing the IW Steyr Assault Rifle
The operational experience from the NZDF and our partners and allies in Afghanistan and Iraq must factor in the replacement of the IW Steyr Rifle. The salt water environment's of amphibious operations should factored in.
Tanks
A medium size Amphibious tank design. A gun carrier than can plough through jungle and support infantry.
Reconnaissance vehicles
An Amphibious reconnaissance vehicle.
Army equipment and other vehicles
I hope the reader will forgive me for not including a complete list of equipment the Army would need to acquire (such anti tank and aircraft weapon systems e.t.c) under my ambitious plan. I am doing this because of space constraints and the need to stay topical.
Royal New Zealand Navy
The RNZN Off Shore and In shore patrol vessels withdrawn from service. The crews can be transferred to help man the navies new frigates. HMNZS Canterbury to be withdrawn from service and replaced by a more suitable vessel.
Anzac Class Frigates replacement
Building the core capabilities around Anti Submarine Warfare ;Mine Clearance Warfare; Air/ Missile defence and Anti Surface Warfare would provide the core of the future RNZN.
In total 6 high end frigates or destroyers would serve as replacements for the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates.
HMNZS Manawanui and Off Shore Patrol Vessels replacements
A vessel capable of Anti Submarine and Mine Clearance Warfare in Littoral Waters. A multi role vessel capable of Mine Clearance Warfare and acting as a Off Shore Patrol Vessel.
HMNZS Canterbury replacement
A Landing Helicopter Dock Ship with the capacity to transport a Multi-role Combat Brigade. The vessel will need defence measures against torpedos and anti shipping missiles .
HMNZS Endeavour replacements
2 vessels capable of replenishment at sea and providing logistical support to amphibious operations.
Royal New ZealandAir Force
Tactical/Strategic Air lift
The reach and capacity of the Air Force's Tactical/Strategic Air lift capabilities will need to expand. Now is the ideal time with the RNZAF C-130's due for replacement. As an estimate 10 -12 aircraft will be required. By expanding the RNZAF will be able to resupply NZDF forces stationed overseas and have greater role in disaster relief.
Air Combat Wing
What is commonly refereed to as the RNZAF combat wing is to be resurrected. The RNZAF and the New Zealand government shouldn't be afraid to think outside the square (
example) when rebuilding the foundations of the combat arm of the RNZAF.
The aircraft's capabilities would be to provide air cover for the RNZN. As such the aircraft will be “ship and missile killers.” Sufficient Air to Air combat capabilities to ensure survivability in a high intensity combat environment is also a fundamental requirement.
The design could either be vertical/short takeoff and landing or a conventional aircraft. By design any conventional aircraft will need to be able to operate from rough air strips.
Two possible design variants come to mind, Close Air Support and Dedicated air to air combat .
P-3 Orion replacement
An aircraft whose primary mission is anti submarine warfare/Anti Surface Warfare . Maritime patrol would be the aircraft secondary role.
Unmanned Vehicles/blimps
A number of roles exist for Unmanned Vehicles Anti Submarine Warfare/Maritime patrol , Close Air Support and a general reconnaissance role.
Unmanned blimps could fill the role of monitoring New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone. Tracking Submarines and illegal fishing vessels.
Close Air Support
Close air support capability could be performed by Manned Aircraft , attack helicopters, Unmanned Vehicles or a mixture of these platforms.
Doctrine and other Notes
In size the Royal Australian Navy's surface fleet will shrink . By 2020 the RAN surface fleet will be build around 8 Anzac Class Frigates and 2 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers . No direct replacement for the Adelaide Class frigates exists (A total of 4-6 Adelaide Class frigates are being replaced by 2 AWD)
The RNZN will need to cover the gap left by the reduction in the RAN surface. By including the missile/air defence role in the Anzac Class Frigate replacements will plug the capability gap. The RNZN will have 3 frigates available for operational service at one time.
The NZDF doctrine is to be based on amphibious operations and protecting commerce. A key part of this doctrine is that the NZDF shouldn't deploy ground and naval forces without native (RNZAF) air cover.
Resurrecting the convoy system is the basis for defending sea bound commerce. The RNZN partners with the RNZN in defending New Zealand's commerce. By adopting the convoy system the NZDF will be better prepared than the RN and USN for future conflicts/sea warfare.
A joint amphibious task force with Australia serves as the bedrock of amphibious doctrine. New Zealand has a unique opportunity to develop a refined amphibious doctrine. The US Marines concept of Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea is the basis of the Anzac amphibious doctrine.
In addition to the above questions, New Zealanders are also invited to comment on any other defence-related issues they regard as significant.
Recruitment in Universities and other higher training providers
The way the NZDF recruitment operates can be refocused to reflect today's society. Today many people who would be an asset to the NZDF escape the net , so to speak. Many people are also very unfamiliar with military life.
The Limited Services Volunteer scheme provides the basis for the new direction in recruiting. Adopting the scheme as a way of introducing military life and fitness standards to would be recruits.
Integrating the scheme to universities , polytechnics and other training providers is the new focus of recruiting. The aim of the scheme is to target people who will have suitable backgrounds/qualifications for service in the NZDF , after they have completed their course of study (see below).
Students would enter what is akin to the current Limited Services Volunteer scheme. If they find military life is to their liking they are given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or in the regular full time military. The people who opt to become a reservist's would enlist before they have graduated.
To ensure they meet the NZDF fitness standards the trainees would be placed on a fitness program before they enter basic training. Additionally screening and testing of officer candidates would take place as per the current NZDF practices.
By taking a more direct approach in recruiting the NZDF can go a long way to filling in man power shortfalls. A career in the NZDF would provide a greater number of young people with a sound career track.
High Schools/ Charter Schools
A number of Charter Schools based on the former Australian Army Apprentice scheme (See
info) .The scheme would encompass all three services. The scheme would also be open to Adults and youth who are currently unemployed.
General Conclusions/Notes
Dedicated Charters schools devoted to a NZDF Apprentice scheme would be cater for the blue collar trades. They could also cater for electronic , IT qualifications e.t.c geared towards the NZDF requirements.
Recruiting from the Universities/other training providers students allows the NZDF to recruit people with suitable attributes and qualification's. For instance someone with a law degree may have the “right stuff” to become an Army officer. Seen at face value the Army wouldn't have a great need for law graduates amongst its ranks and the person would be overlooked.
Someone with industry IT qualifications (e.g Cisco Career Certifications) would make a logical recruitment target. The person in question already has a suitable skills to enlist as a Communications Warfare Specialist in the RNZN.
Bean counters will argue that my plan for NZDF recruitment may not be justifiable on the grounds of cost. My answer is short and simple. The cost should be weighed against the social and economic costs of New Zealand's high youth unemployment rate. New Zealand can't afford to have the NZDF facing a manpower shortage. The issue of manpower cannot be disputed.
Private Military Contractors Post War Construction and miscellaneous thoughts
The NZDF is presented with the opportunity to study the use of American Private Military Contractors (PMC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adjusting the NZDF force structure based on the lessons from the US military experience with PMC is one of the most important policy shifts that can take place , over the next 10 years.
The policy shift would see the use of civilian contractors/private sector phrased out from roles within the NZDF. Repairing or build infrastructure after a future war has finished is the correct role for private sector contractors.
I have been unable to locate a single comprehensive resource on this topic. I will include a couple of sources below for the reader who is seeking a starting point in this area.
Future Reading
PMC and Nation Building
A look at PMC
General Conclusions
PMC will remain a main stay of the US military. The role of PMC in the US military will be a contributing factor to its ill preparedness for coming wars.
In summary the monetary investment that would be required to bring up individuals in the private sector to the standard where they could operate in a war zone , would make PMC uneconomical.
The New Zealand government would also incur a number of legal headaches relating to the legal status of PMC.
The role of the NZDF in the coming global conflict will be the outright defeat of our enemies in ultra high intensity inter state warfare. Reconstruction of the defeated nations will only begin after their unconditional surrender.
After the Surrender the NZDF will assume responsibility for security (enter location) while private sector contractors begin the work of nation building (AKA the Marshall Program and Post War West Germany and Japan MK2). By accepting the fact that reconstruction can only take place after an enemy has been defeated the NZDF will be able to focus on its core mission.
