Thursday 8 December 2016

Book Review: Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk


Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk by Maj. Gen Bob Scales, USA (Ret.) ( 2016 Naval Institute Press ) is compulsory and compelling reading for military professions , concerned citizens and aspiring political leaders.

The author Major General Bob Scales (Ret.) delved into his experiences as a Vietnam Veteran and his background as a scholar to construct a thesis on the historical ups and down of the US Army and how to win future wars. In doing so the US Army will avoid bumps in the road which lead to perfectly avoidable battlefield causalities.

Direct quotes from the book will appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book. At the time of writing I have been unable to secure a interview with the author. Scales's underlying argument has multi facades. Each chapter represents a facades as he builds his case for how future US Army (hereafter Army) and Marine infantry units should be trained and equipped for the wars of the future.

In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I will in layman’s terms call nasty surprises. Nasty surprises equally unnecessary battlefield causalities. In Iraq and Afghanistan the enemy enjoyed the element of surprise in tactical situations. Reversing the situation so the enemy is caught unawares will prevent battlefield causalities. The reader will understand the significance of this in a moment. My reference to "nasty surprises" later on in the article is a tie into this fundamental underlying issue.


I am fascinated by how the author intellectually builds his case for the American Era of War, around Colonel Hiromichi Yahara (1902 - 1973 , other sources say 1981). Like the author I feel it is worthwhile to spend a moment on Yahara. Yahara was someone who was,intellectually gifted and deeply cerebral. His tall presence came with a patrician manner which along with his other traits set him apart form his Imperial Japanese Army contemporaries.

Scale's argues what he calls the American Era of War had it's beginnings towards the end of WW2. The year is 1945 and the scene takes place on Okinawa. Under the Shuri Castle in the Japanese Command Cave. Yahara is in the presence of 2 Lieutenant Generals Itsura Usijima the commander of the 32nd Army and Ismau Cho his chief of staff. Scales's describes Cho as arrogant , stupid, cruel and impetuous.

If Ned Flanders is the anti Homer Simpson ,Yahara was anti of Cho and other mainstream Japanese Army Officers of their day. Reinforcing his character was the fact Yahara had served as a military Attaché in the USA . The majority of the rest of his time had been spent as a Staff officer.

Cho was the atypical Japanese Army officer of his day. Arguing over Tactics Usijima is occasionally interrupted by Cho. The argument centred on the best tactical approach for defending Okinawa. Should the defenders meet the US onslaught from the outset or hunker down and defend the island from the bunkers , caves and tunnels?

By thinking about Okinawa as the springboard for the US invasion of Japan, Yahara mind was thinking on the strategic and not the lower tactical level. This will make more sense to the reader a bit later on. Yahara understood Japan stood no chance of a outright victory over the US's vast industrial and military muscle. So he turned to the enemy's weakness.

Yahara correctly perceived the American public's mood. For the American Public was growing wary of the causalities incurred during the advance on the Japan. Yahara reasoned if during the final reckoning (The Allied invasion of Japan ) if the defenders could inflict enough casualties , public support for for the war in the US would dwindle.

Once public opinion turned against the war , Japan would be in a position to secure to secure a favourable peace deal. Retaining the Emperor 's divine right to rule and avoiding American occupation would have been seen as decent peace deal in light of the military situation. The dropping of the Atomic Bombs brought the war to a close before Yahara's strategic thinking could play out , for now. Yahara lived long enough to see his intellectually laid out foresight play out during and by the US withdrawal from Vietnam.


In Chapter 4 the author touches upon how adversary’s successfully adapted to US Military supremacy. In a move off the beaten track the author turns his attention the Chinese Civil War in the years of 1946 – 1949. Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) and his Marshals undertook adapting the doctrine of the WW2 wartime guerilla war to fighting a conventional war against a numerical and technologically superior enemy. Mao divided his forces into small units and placed his focus on area control.Dividing his forces maintaining and small unit cohesion became a corner stone of Mao's small unit doctrine.

The Chinese would put the lessons they learned during their civil war to good use in Korea. After the Chinese Army was hammered and their logistical bases destroyed by American Air Power they faced the need to evolve again. Logistical facilities were moved to north of the Yalu River putting them out of the reach of American air strikes.


On the ground the Chinese soldiers avoided daytime movements and they remained dispersed until it was time to attack the stagnate American lines. What was an acceptable human
toll to China was unacceptable to the United States. The result was operational
and strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled victory.
(emphasis mine).

In the next 20 years the Vietnamese operational and tactical hand book came from Mao's forces methods in Korea and the Chinese Civil War. Against their Round 1 opponent the French the Vietnamese scatted their small unit forces which also had the benefit of allowing them to live off the land. To bring about victory the Viet Minh did need to mass their forces under the umbrella of fire power (The Battle of Dien Bien Phu). By timing the build up of troops correctly the Viet Minh were able to bring their build up and make the first move before the French could bring their advantage in fire power into play.


The other intellectual heartland of the book is the historical evolution or shifts in warfare. As the reader will have noted I have chosen to take my review in this direction. In the chapter entitled : The New Age of Infantry the author furthers his argument by outlining historical periods and shifts in warfare. The general reader will find this section to be very useful background information. For reasons of space I will mostly move my focus to the latest epochal in warfare.


In terms of the historical shifts in warfare on page 54 the author makes the following point which I feel is critical. Epochal shifts in warfare are rare and don't happen overnight.

The arrival of the atomic age heralded the end of the age of industrial warfare , citizenly military and conscript armies. As the author points out WW2 was the last war of the industrial age warfare. I will come back to WW2 in a moment.

Precision long range weapons like missiles are gradually ending the era of Blitzkrieg or mass armoured columns and infantry support in vehicles. The author does back up his assertion by sighting a couple of notable incidents involving tanks. For the sake of space I will leave these incidents to the reader.

Coming back to Vietnam precision weaponry started the process of eroding the era of Blitzkrieg era of warfare. The last hold outs of the inter state and technologically updated and localised versions of the aforementioned era came in the Middle East. The Israeli victories in the First Arab–Israeli War , Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War tells the story , so to speak. If one is looking for the icing on the cake the US lead coalition defeat over Iraq during the first Gulf War will do nicely.

Now I come to the kicker. In unconventional conflicts Vietnam, UN intervention in Somalia, Post 9-11 Afghanistan , Post Saddam Iraq the US ended up on the losing side. Israel became a cropper in Lebanon.


War in Two Epochs McChrystal And Patton is the chapter which brings my attention back to WW2. The author sets out to demonstrate how the wars Generals Patton and McChrystal fought were as different as their personalities. The reader who is familiar with military history will already be familiar with Patton. If not I do feel the more general reader will soon catch up at lighting speed (Pun intended.)

No two generals could possibly be more diametrically opposite than George Patton and Stanley McChrystal. Both graduated from West Point and shared a passion for reading military history, but similarities end there. Patton was an acerbic, bombastic, narcissistic, self-promoter whose skill
as a warrior made him immortal. In contrast, McChrystal’s personal life and active service accentuated the motto of his special warfare clan: the “silent professionals.” As different as they are in time and temperament, both generalssymbolize transformational epochs of the U.S. military art. Patton is the past; McChrystal represents the new age.


For reasons of space I have chosen mostly to focus this review on the future of warfare and not the sound historical cases and arguments made in the book. Hence McChrystal's command of US Special Forces in Afghanistan will take up most of my written ammo supply. McChrystal's war was non-linear and fought in and around local populations.

By comparison under Patton the Third Army saw the US Army finally master Armoured Warfare. In pathering the road for the crushing of the German War Machine , Patton's GI's took causalities as per par the course. McChrystal had to over come the weakness in the US capacity to wage war first identified by Yahara.

In 2003 McChrystal was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command (hereafter, JSOC). McChrystal united a whole host of Special Operations entities including the CIA and US Marine Special Operations under the same roof. In order to bring about the unified command structure , McChrystal was a victorious in a old fashion turf war.


Interestingly the author's description of how JSOC forces took down enemy infrastructure reminded me of the Vietnam War Phonenix Program. The seeds which grew into the JSOC taking down terrorists networks took years to reach fruition. I will split the fruit in half. In one half is the pinnacle of small-unit warfare. A serving member of US Special Forces is like good wine and cheese the product of years of development.

Before his earning his stripes a special forces solider will have undergone specialist training and psychological refinement. He will also know his buddies like no one else. In Afghanistan McChrystal's small special forces teams successively operated at specks on a seemingly vast map.

The other half of the apple is the growth of McChrystal's career from West Point to JSOC. I must say the author gets points from me for invoking one of my historical figures in T.E. Lawrence. Lawrence is referenced in relation to the 19th Century British Army practice of dispatching offices to overseas outposts. In the day these postings may well have been to the far reaches of the British Empire.

Lawrence was one such individual. Pre  WW1 Lawrence's time spent Middle East gave him knowledge and the experience which would later to serve him in good stead. For as history so duly notes Lawrence became the famed leader of the Arab Revolt. Modern American Army Officers like McChrystal gain much from overseas postings not unlike their international historical forefathers once did.


Effectively the sweetest fruit ripening was McChrystal's JSOC overcoming what the author call's the Curse of Colonel Yahara. US causalities in the Vietnam and Korean Wars had reaped a bitter harvests. I will come back to the sweet fruit in a moment.


The future belongs to the next Yahara , Petraeus or McChrystal and not a Douglas Haig . The business of practising war belongs to professionals and not gentlemen who like to play the role of British or other nationalities Army Officers.

Identifying and growing the next McChrystal is some of the author's strongest works in the book. Come chapter 19. Scales's lists and gives examples of the kinds of leadership genius styles which can be exhibited by Army Generals. The leadership styles are strategic, Combat , Political, Institutional , Anticipatory and Seers And Doers. Combat and Anticipatory geniuses win wars , hence they occupy the narrative.

The Anticipatory genius forecasts the next war accurately. In doing so they make their force ready for the next war. Anticipatory genius are the seers with the Combat Geniuses being the doers. The doers employ the crafted forces without incurring unacceptable high casualties rates to the American Public.

I believe how the author proposals to rectify the Army's institutional flawed method of selecting junior officers for stardom is one of the most important parts of the book.. At the rank of Captain Platoon and Company Commanders is where tactical geniuses are identified as being destined for higher ranking stardom. The underlying problem is great tactical skills (e.g reading the battlefield) and strategic genius are not related.


A skilled strategic or Anticipatory thinker won't make convoys of trucks run time in the way someone like General William Westmoreland (1914-2005) once did in support of Patton's Third Army (My comparison). In a short the tactical genius will fight the current war in a brilliant manner. At the same time the Anticipatory thinker will be preparing for the next war. By identifying and promoting Anticipatory geniuses , the Army can avoid the pitfall of planning to fight the next war like the last one!


The other forms of leadership shouldn't be discounted. If a sporting team needs a balanced and complete roster the future health of the Army needs the best of all the leadership geniuses. These people must also be strategic thinkers.


Future talent identification should take place in the search for the pool of officers in line for promotion to the rank of Major. Selecting officers on the basis intellectual merit and who show a genuine interest in scholarship early on in their careers is a part of Scales's prescription. The Army must filter out officers who undertake higher education for getting their “ ticket punched” for the purpose of advancing their careers.

Someone like General David Petraeus who takes to academia like a duck to water should be the gold standard for promotion. Intellectualism can not be the sole judge of character. Other characteristics must be taken into consideration to ensure the next General Douglas MacArthur isn't climbing the ranks (my Comparison). 

My interest was peaked on page 116. Once again early identification is on the menu. Only the focus is on successful command relationships and operational staffs. Historical command peers/relationships have spanned from Lee – Jackson , Grant- Sherman in the Civil War to Hindenberg - Ludendorf in WW1. Despite spanning 40 odd years of warfare common denominators can be found in all the examples of successful Command Peer relationships.

The denominators are synergy stemming from communications and understanding reaching a perfect level in the channels of the great Command Peer relationships. How to harvest the sweetest fruit at the Small-unit/Battlefield level is covered through out the book. A successful harvest would mean the Army would no longer fight wars in a fair manner. For reasons of wanting to retain a workable structure I will summarise below what is proposed below.


Adopting Special Forces methods of selection , training and psychological preparation for regular infantry is the foundation of the author's proposals. Crap canning the Army Policy of rotating personnel on a standard basis would allow for greater levels of unit cohesion. Non Commissioned Officers and junior officers benefit from a masterful understanding of their peers. In this manner a developing Command Peer Relationship shares much in common with sweetening small-unit combat.

Off the shelf technologies available from Walmart and not works of Sci-Fi would make swing the tactical advantage back to the small-unit infantry of the future. The use of cameras providing live feeds of the battlefield from the perspective of the infantrymen would be useful in real life. The more causal reader may associate such a idea with the hours they spend playing Call of Duty (my comparison).

In real life if those in Command and Control centres saw the battlefield literally through the eyes of the participants they may make better decisions. These decisions surround making the speedy and correct decisions concerning the employment of supporting artillery and air power.


Sensors found in home security systems detect movement. The same kind of sensors which set off car and house alarms could also prevent ambushes. Radio Controlled Drones with cameras in use by hobbyists controlled by soldiers is the way seek out every hiding place from above.

In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I called “nasty surprises” above. I hope veterans and anyone currently serving in the military will forgive me using a layman’s term. By reversing the Tactical Situation in favour of the infantrymen of the future the level of unnecessary battlefield causalities will be greatly reduced.


Scale's gently points out why Army Generals performed poorly in the Post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . Generals McChrystal and David Petraeus aside , why did under perform? The answer lays in a old edict. Armies will always prepare to fight the next war like they did the last one. In short a host of otherwise able senior military Army figures had spend their careers preparing for the next Gulf War. Naturally such preparation failed them in the counter insurgence , security focused environments.

Chapter 10 entitled The Human Dimension is where I will next turn my focus on. Some aspects of the chapter are best left to the reader and for discussions among Military Professionals. Bearing this in mind I feel the best idea is to cover what the author deals with The Crucible of Courage. Scale's informs the reader how small units can individually and collectively maintain a strong tank full of courage. Below is a few points of interest I have selected a few points around the tank of courage.


Soldiers must see and sense in such a way that there are no surprises.
Know Your Enemy. Knowledge of the enemy is enhanced by on the battlefield by courage, audacity, cohesion and the ability to manoeuvre freely. Advantages can be gained by a soldier’s ability to intuitively read body language and the surrounding battlefield. Some soldiers will have a gift which allows them to “see” the battlefield. Others will be excel at correctly reading the body language of local populations.

Small-unit leaders must possess “cognitive clarity.”
 A well tuned ability to make sound decisions under pressure and ignoring the urge to wait for information before acting on a decision are factors in cognitive clarity. Deadening emotional highs and lows permits a individual to make decisions in ambiguous situations caused by the nature of the battlefield/what I just mentioned a moment ago.

My Commentary

I wish to applaud the author having a writing style which deeply engrossed me as the reader. The ultimate compliant I can pay the author for his writing style is as follows. I felt like I was in the cave with Colonel Yahara witnessing his bosses argue in a rage. The way the author packs in so many different factors through out the narrative without adversary effecting the narrative is the other great strength of the author.

My commentary also reflects the fact I was unable to secure a interview with Scales. Not securing a interview affected the highlights I selected from the book and my commentary. Not being able to raise questions with the author left me to form my own thoughts about the book. One point I wish to make is my below commentary is in no way meant as any disrespect to the author.

The following question are what I will build my commentary around. How might the American Era of War play out specifically for Australia and New Zealand? Assuming for a moment the author is incorrect about the future of Warfare , does his thesis still hold value? Let me explain how the 2 questions tie in with each other.

I will refine my second question to kick off my thoughts , as they relate to a future inter state war in Asia. Once the worst has happened what happens to the intellectual , strategic and tactical school offered up in the book? Don't throw away Scales's book , just yet. For the sake of discussion I will assume events have unfolded in a way most people never expected.

Fundamentally I believe the paradigm would shift to where Australia and New Zealand (hereafter ANZAC ) become the underdogs. As the underdogs the aims of the ANZAC military forces would be undercut the advantages of a numerically superior enemy who can project fire power on land , sea and in the air.

There is every reason to think the small-unit tactics successfully employed by our enemies could be used against the Chinese. Consider the following. The need to tie down large number of enemy troops , gather intel and cutting enemy communications could be meet by guerilla warfare. Ironically the tactics employed by ANZAC lead guerilla movement would mirror those of our Post War adversary’s. In other words the strategy of fighting not to win via a decentralised small-unit guerilla war.

The reader may be thinking I have misunderstood the Curse of Colonel Yahara , not so. I chose my words in the above paragraph with deliberate care. I think it is fair to say a dictatorial regime like China doesn't worry about the public's reaction to battlefield causalities. To encapsulate my point. The same power/state authority which allows Chinese leaders to ignore their citizens could prove their undoing.

For Chinese civilian and military leaders could succumb to the blood lust of conquest. So if like Hitler Napoleon and the Imperial Japanese Empire in WW2 the Chinese over extend their reach , a new page in history will be written. The Australia and New Zealand era of warfare will have began. 

I would consider General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885- 1946) fighting not to win on Luzon to be a historical parallel. In 1945 Yamashita had withdrawn his forces to the mountains on Luzon. The nature of the terrain favoured the defenders. Yamashita was successful in his aim of tiring down large numbers of US troops so they couldn't be used elsewhere. I do wonder if Yamashita was ever a associate of Yahara?

Note to the reader: I am in no way suggesting what I have outlined replaces the strategic requirement to secure the Air and Sea Lanes in the South West Pacific. The conventional warfare aspects of future inter-state wars in Asia or elsewhere fall beyond the scope of this article.


The strategic logic behind the Australia and New Zealand era of war could equally apply to the next war in Europe. If one doesn't put all their eggs in the Nuclear detergent basket , that is. And when Russian conventional land and air forces would overwhelm the NATO defenders by their sheer numerical advantage. I am sure the reader is intelligent enough to work out the rest for themselves.


Before I return to the contemporary New Zealand Army a slight diversion is in order. What I have coined as the Australia and New Zealand era of War isn't confined to land lovers. There is every reason to believe the fierce underdogs would also look give the enemy a blood nose beyond the sea shore. If the reader is looking for some inspiration Naval wise I do have a book recommendation for them. The book is entitled The Sea Devils Operation Struggle and the great raid of World War Two by Mark Felton.

For the next section I invite the reader to assume Scales's thesis about the future of warfare is correct and I am clearly in the wrong.

I now come back to the contemporary New Zealand Army. I came across a fascinating article in the NZ Army Journal (Third Edition November 2016) entitled Disruptive Thinking in the NZDF – Yeah right! By Staff Sergeant Matt Aslett.

Aslett attended a informative presentation from the US CENTCOM Asymmetric Warfare Group , hosted by the NZDF Adaptive Warfighting Centre (hereafter AWG). 1 of the presenters commented on how the AWG is comprised of disruptive thinkers. Aslett asked himself, what is disruptive thinking? Where does disruptive thinking fit in with today's military?

Not unlike Scales, Aslett opinion is traditionally disruptive or unorthodox thinkers struggle in the military. A in build conservatism, conformism and rigid rank structures (all military norms) work against against unorthodox thinkers. Career advancement stems from fitting into a narrow mould which stems from selection boards and training courses who turn out students in the image of their instructors.

Aslett points out those who are unorthodox thinkers are perceived as “rebels” or “revolutionaries”. David Stirling the founder of the SAS ,. T.E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate the founder of the Chindits were all “rebels.” As such these men would not fare well in present day military. The status qua will remain unless those who select military leaders shift the emphasis creative thinking over more conservative process thinking.

I now leave Aslett's article and return to my commentary. What are the main risks to the New Zealand Army on future deployments? Does rebuffing “rebels” increase the risk of Kiwi troops taking battlefield causalities? Space and time doesn't permit to go fully into these questions. In short the answer to the first question is fairy straight forward.


I believe the greatest risk to kiwi troops on a overseas deployment (enter location here) would be a sudden shift from a low- medium to high intensity warfare environment. Let's use New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team formerly deployed to Afghanistan as the template for a future overseas deployment. The environment will probably urban instead of the rugged undeveloped terrain of Afghanistan/Central Asia.

The cause of the shift is less important than what the consequences would be for the troops on the ground. My argument is a force which is trained and equipped for low – medium level peacekeeping would be nigh on wiped out once the shift has taken place. If such a occurrence takes place the number of causalities would exceed those from the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars put together.

For the sake of not wanting to get bogged down in analysing the New Zealand Defence Force I have chosen to leave issues like the RNZAF lack of "air strike" capability for another time. I in no way wish to diminish the importance of air cover and artillery support. The subject matter is covered by the author in the book and as such is best left to the reader.

I believe 2 factors would greatly negate the risk of Kiwi troops facing a military disaster. Both factors are shared with the Australia and New Zealand era of war. Ensuring the next T.E. Lawrence prospers in the NZDF will ensure better understanding of future wars from the root causes to how to find the road to victory. Secondly Scales, Special Forces orientated prescription must be adapted for the New Army.

Once prescribed , not only would Kiwi infantry be better prepared for unexpected turn of events they would break the curse of Colonel Yahara. New Zealand's political and military leaders would have a greater range of options available to them . In a conflict along the lines raging in Syria or Iraq terrorist networks could be brought down during or after a conflict has taken place. Put another way Kiwi Troops could switch between combat and peacekeeping roles as a situation demands.


Didn't I just say the factors were shared with a worse case scenario war in Asia? SAS type Commandos/Special Forces type troops deployed in small-units would be ideal for waging a guerilla warfare against enemy occupation troops. To encapsulate my point the Army which intimately knows counter insurgency/terrorist network doctrines will equally know how to turn the chess board around. By turning the chess board around additional time may gained to prepare defences in the South West Pacific and Northern Australia.

In conclusion I believe the value of the book goes far beyond the author's thesis and even the Curse of Colonel Yahara. We can only fail to learn from history at our peril. If New Zealand fails to prepare for future storms in our backyard or in the wider world the price paid will be in blood. The sheer cost of the price will be beyond what the majority of people ever envisioned.





















































Tuesday 4 October 2016

A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part 2


Full report

Welcome to part 2 of my article entitled A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part1 allowed me to provide the reader with a overview of the source material from which I made select commentary. My commentary was aimed at energy security from a Japanese perceptive. I also touched upon other topics including fossil fuels and the rise of Liquefied natural gas (hereafter LNG).

In part 2 I will turn my attention to Deep Sea Mining (hereafter DSM) . I am going to take the liberty of shifting much of my focus away from Asia to the South Pacific. When I do turn my attention to Asia how DSM will effect the dynamics of the region will be my focus. My thanks go to Anna Powles for pointing me the right direction when I was researching DSM.


Note to the reader I had originally planned to cover Timor – Leste and alternative energy sources in this article. For space considerations I will cover those topics in the next 1 or 2 instalments of the A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood series. I ask the reader to forgive me for not breaking down the South Pacific into more accurate geographical regions. As DSM will take place in all the regions I have chosen to take a broader perspective.

If the reader isn't very familiar with DSM I would invite them to check out the following resources on minerals found on the sea bottom: Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts ; Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides and Manganese Nodules.


Generally speaking the South Pacific will be vulnerable to legal and illegal DSM practices. Australia and New Zealand's neglect of our collective backyard will become more stark. Space doesn't permit me to go into more details concerning the neglect. , My thoughts on the entrance of China and other non traditional state actors into the South Pacific can be found in a earlier article .

A look at how DSM operates is in order. Starting from the sea floor the extraction of minerals is as follows: disaggregating mineralised material ; transporting the material to the surface and dewatering the material. The effect of the filtered sea water return to the ocean will extend beyond the mining site. Transportation via ship to a processing plant or market place is the end point.

Environmental management plans/regulations will serve as any nations framework for dealing with DSM. 2 factors are now worth a mention. A good regulatory frame work will or does balance out commercial and environmental issues. A lack of enforcement of regulations has numerous effects from environmental pollution to undermining a nations sovereignty.

Tying into these considerations is revenues from mining taxes and royalties. Corruption , illegal mining and a poor tax regime can play roles in the ups and downs of nations gaining the economic benefits from any kind of mining.


The merits of mining in tourism areas has been debated in New Zealand. If Open pit mine would be a eye to foreign tourists in New Zealand the same will apply to Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. The energy security and economic independence offered by DSM may act like a lure. If the lure is to great , Rarotonga's reputation as pristine tourist destination may well be ruined. Since this is a no brainier I will now shift my focus northward.


Asia provides different dynamics to the South Pacific. In Asia the abundance of natural resources at the sea bottom looks set to harden China, the Philippines , Taiwan , Vietnam , Brunei and Malaysia's competing territoral claims in the South China Sea. Whereby in the South Pacific states will wrangle with matters such as environmental regulations , in Asia defining nation states borders is already the order of the day.

I believe any consideration towards the outcome of the South China Sea's dispute must factor in energy security. The sovereignty of the nations involved , the natural resources on offer and national pride are all on the line. DSM and other forms of mining look set be a test of national sovereignty in sometimes contrasting ways.


New Zealand will face the coming challenges directly and on a strategic level. In the direct sense preventing illegal DSM in territorial waters , forming sound environmental regulations and tax regimes are all obvious stand outs. I will come back to a local perspective in 1 tick.

The biggest unspoken risk is if New Zealand is caught completely off guard and unable to police our own territorial waters including Marine Reserves. If New Zealand's defence outlook wasn't so half baked the risk would have been largely migrated by sound defence policy.

I fear New Zealand in general is ill prepared to accept the reality of rising tensions in Asia. Ignoring the effects of DSM would be perfectly in line with people burying their heads in the sand. Kiwi's from the person on the street to Prime Minster John Key are living in fairy land , when it comes to a meaningful discussion around the emergence of China as a economic and military power.


I believe the abundance of natural resources made unlockable by DSM may influence the course of a future war in Asia. A case in point is the reserves of Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides (hereafter SMS) minerals in the Bismarck Sea. If the Reserves of SMS could turn Papua New Guinea into a mini Saudi Arabia China will have a reason to cast their eyes beyond the South China Sea.

If a wartime scenario in which the Bismarck Sea becomes a factor eventuates , events will overtake Australia and New Zealand. Military the Chinese would include controlling the Bismarck Sea as a objective along with blockading or invading the Indonesian mainland and Papua New Guinea. If the worst happens New Zealand's failure to come grips with energy security in the South Pacific will have had consequences beyond most people's wildest imaginations.


In part 1 I mentioned Geoeconomics being a factor in the global LNG Market. There is every reason to think China will use DSM as a means of exercising Geoeconomic levers. Chinese State Own Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) will legally or illegally establish DSM sites at the bequest of their government. I would urge the reader to factor in the MO of Chinese SOE's into their thinking around energy security.

In New Zealand SOE's are expected to run on a commercial basis. China uses SOE's for aims that in no way involve making a profit. 2 instances of how China uses SOE's is worth highlighting. The first is taking over a strategic asset in the Port of Darwin with the intent of weakening Australia's ties with the USA. In a less subtle move China has placed a Oil Rig in Vietnam's territorial waters . China's motives for the placement of the Oil Rig appears to be something along the lines of possession of real estate is nine tenths of the law.


Now for this next section I am going to assume New Zealand will be able to weather the DSM storm. What options are available to New Zealand and Australia to ensure our South Pacific neighbours can do the same? Clearly the ideas I present below will not form a complete answer. As per usual I do want to provide the reader with food for thought and matters for debate.

Is the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (here after PPB) and it's planned replacement a token gesture or a program that never overcame obstacles like so few days spend by vessels at sea? In a near empty tool box the PPB sits at the disposal of participating nations. More on these points below.

My argument is the PPB is one of the core capabilities which should be expanded to strengthen the participating nations maritime capabilities. Law enforcement and maritime surveillance are also examples of core capabilities. By building up the capabilities of smaller states to defend their sovereignty New Zealand can kill two birds with the same stone. Improved relations with our neighbours and a more stable backyard would be the benefits.

Turning the PPB into a ocean going program would be no small feat. Logistical support in the form of Replenishment and repair at sea would fall onto the RAN and RNZN. The number of patrol vessels in the PPB would be increased as to ensure one is always available to meet any unexpected contingencies. To summarise under my kind of plan the PPB would be modelled on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (hereafter RFA). If the reader would like me to expand upon my thoughts on a South Pacific RFA , feel free to leave a comment below.

The reader may be wondering how on earth Australia and New Zealand could ever fund the capital and operational costs of a South Pacific RFA? Reorientating foreign aid budgets away from ad hoc infrastructure projects in the region and towards the PPB wouldn't require any new additional spending. Japan has the financial muscle to pay for the new PPB bases and supporting infrastructure. The historical irony of Australia and New Zealand urging Japan to invest in defence related infrastructure in areas they tried to conquer in WW2 is not lost on me (think the Battle of the Bismarck Sea).

Effectively my expanded PPB/RFA would give the participating nations excellent maritime patrol capabilities. The new maritime patrol capability would act as the centre piece of efforts to build a sense of self reliance among South Pacific nations. By playing a role in providing greater levels of security and stability the conditions for a South Pacific renaissance will be in place. Successfully dealing with DSM and illegal fishing operations/management of Fisheries would be all positive by-products of the new age.  


In offering my thoughts on DSM's role in energy security in the Asia- Pacific I have only really scratched the surface. I will leave the reader with my final thoughts. If the New Zealand government and foreign policy establishment leave our engagement with the Asia – Pacific as the status quo there will be a heavy price to pay.

In terms of DSM at best the price will see our Pacific Islands cousins pillaged by legal or illegal means. At worst combined with strategic blindness New Zealand will stumble into a war. The war starts as a high intensity conflict in the South China and sea and soon engulfs Indonesia , Australia and New Zealand.
















































Sunday 11 September 2016

A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighborhood Part 1



link to full report


A good overview of energy security in Asia turned out to be well timed. The report was authored by Andrew Pickford of the Perth USAsia Centre. Incidentally I listen to the Perth USAsia Centre Podcast . I recommend the reader tune into the podcast if they are interested in the prevailing winds carrying us into the Asian Century. For some time the topic of energy security in Asia- Pacific has been fermenting in my mind. I will come back to my thoughts , below. As per usual quotes from the report or other external sources appear in italics.

On page 2 the author sets out a definition of energy security. For space considerations I will mostly leave this section to the reader. I do feel sticking with the idea of uninterrupted availability of appropriate forms of energy at affordable prices is very sensible. The general reader who watches the price of petrol at the pumps may empathises with the author's straight forward approach.


I appreciated reading the historical background to Oil's role as a commodity in 20th century history. As a kid I first read about the value of Java (now a part of present day Indonesia) as the key Oil producing area of the world. My reading was naturally related to WW2 history. Staying with the influence of my early reading : the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a oil exporting nation planted seeds in my mind.


The seeds had me wondering. How did the US go from a exporter of oil to a net importer? Why did Saudi Arabia emerge as a oil power house after and not before WW2? My intent isn't to answer these questions. The point I wish to make is how history books grabbed my attention. I hope the coming generations are captivated in the same manner I was and still am today by the ties between historical and current events. Enough of my of tangent.

My commentary will follow the structure of the report. I believe the author has done well in forecasting likely strategic shocks which could affect energy markets. Outside of foreign policy circles the reader may be wondering just what consists of a Strategic Shock?

In a essay entitled Strategic Shock: Managing the Strategic Gap by Colonel Peter Jarrell Lane United States Army; the following definition appears on Page 9 : If such scenarios are sufficiently plausible and sufficiently worrisome— posing a credible and serious threat to American security—then senior national security decision makers should devote time and resources to address them. —Andrew Krepinovitch1 Military Futuris

Now I turn to themes for the next 20 years. In my opinion the forecast concerning fossil fuels remaining the dominant source of energy is sound. For now I will stick with Liquefield natural gas ( hereafter LNG or natural gas). In today's Geoeconomics , Geopolitical and energy markets natural gas is the big mover. For reasons of space I will conserve LNG for part 2 of A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood.

Coal remains the energy source of choice in India. Will coal become obsolete as a energy source? I expect coal will become obsolete in a time period 50 – 70 years beyond the time frame covered by the author. I make this prediction on the basis of 2 factors. The amount of time India will take to evolve as a first world country is the first factor.

Alternative Energy is the wild card in future energy markets. If alternative energy matures as a technology before the time frame I mentioned above the apple cart will be over turned. If the apple cart is overturned not only India but the rest of the globe will experience a energy revolution. A alternative energy revolution is naturally the second factor. I will return to Alternative Energy sources in part 2 of this article.


Technological Innovation isn't confined to efforts to weaning energy sources off fossil fuels. The reader may have come across instances of Smart Grid technology without giving even thinking about it. I count myself in the category of coming across the use of Smart Grid tech at work and not blinking. My electricity provider plans to move towards a automated reader system. For the customer/power consumer the only noticeable change will be never seeing someone employed as a meter reader again.

Such instances of automation offer clear advantages (more accurate power bills) and come with the risk of technical faults. Under the banner of technical faults I would include IT failures and deliberate disruptions caused by hacking or other means.


I now return to Strategic Shocks. In this commentary I am going to combine Strategic Shocks and Structural/Economic Shocks. I hope Foreign Policy nerds will forgive this trespass in the name of maintaining a reader friendly style of writing.

Outside of Japan and Germany Nuclear Power is very radiant (Pun intended). In Asia China leads the charge of adopting Nuclear Power. Logic would suggest the charge will play a role in the next generation of Nuclear Power reactors going from a laboratory to power plants. Since by the nature of a dictatorial regime public opinion is a non factor , I will leave China for part 2 of this article.

The questions in my mind is the effects of Japan closing down Nuclear Power Plants. Will Japan be more susceptible to the perils of relying on imported Energy Sources? Will Deep Sea Mining make Japan more or less energy independent? These are only some of the questions which come to mind. My commentary now becomes Japan centric. Dealing with Saudi Arabia and Iran would have taken the topic away from New Zealand's extended backyard.

I believe Japan's history is worth revisiting for a moment. Below is my take on modern Japanese history from the stand point of energy security. Japan's history from Commodore Matthew Perry (1794 -1858) arrival to the present day has undergone several distinct periods. In the space available, I would say Perry trigged the law of unintended consequences on a grand scale. As historical events turned out the consequences wouldn't be felt in Perry's lifetime.

Following Perry came the Meiji Restoration period which included rapid industrialisation. The sudden burst of the industrial revolution brought about a thirst for natural resources. As the reader will be well aware Japan is a country completely devoid of natural resources. Historians regard the Russo – Japanese War as the turning point which marked Japan's late entrance in the race for empire.

By the time of The Great Depression, simultaneous occurrences were taking place which are relevant to my argument. A growing population was placing additional pressure on imported resources whether it be supplies of food , oil and coal to list just a few examples. The process of radicalisation a by product of the dire economic conditions was in full flight.

These factors would culminate in Japan' entry into WW2. How the Imperial Japanese Empire rose to great heights and fell between Pearl Harbour and the dropping of the Atomic bombs has been well documented elsewhere. For all the blood shed and rubble (formerly known as Japanese cities) the same fundamental problem remained unsolved. As a nation state Japan was still entirely depended upon external sources/imports of natural resources including those for energy security.


For obvious reasons the coming of the Atomic Age is best remembered for the Mushroom Clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I would argue the value of Nuclear Power to Post War Japan has gone widely under appreciated. Let me explain my reasoning. People outside of Japan may not understand the extent of just how far that country is devoid of natural resources. The Baby Boomer and later generations of Japanese are to young to remember the ruin WW2 brought to their country.

In the case of Japan Nuclear Power's is more than just a source of clean renewable electricity.
Indeed as a energy source which is not reliant on a continuous external fuel supply , Nuclear Power is very valuable! Consider for instance how Japan or for that matter New Zealand's source of petrol would cease if the supply of fuel oil was interrupted or ceased. I do not mean to suggest Nuclear Power has made giant leaps in Japan achieving energy independence. As the saying goes a small amount of progress is better than none.


I now come to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster (more commonly known as Fukushima ) and how it will effect the future of Nuclear Power. Can public opinion sustain a downturn in the use of or complete removal of Nuclear Power?

I believe the answer to this question must be taken over the long term. Before I offer the reader my answer to the above question I will make a detour. The detour will relate to my personal experiences during and after the Canterbury Earthquakes. My intention is avoid the reader thinking I am trampling over Japanese public opinion in a heartless manner. I ask the reader to bear with me for moment.

A strong range of emotions still come to mind when I ever think about the earth moving under my feet. The trauma from the string events leading up to and after February 22 2011 has long since subsided. My memoires of meeting people who were adversely effected are never far from my mind. What stood out for me is how trauma was a shared experience with countless other people.

I would also argue options or “luxuries” undertaken in the wake of the quakes wouldn't be available in Japan. The Zoning Decisions undertaken by the New Zealand government were one such luxury. Japan's topography and population density would have probably made the same kind of approach to post disaster recovery impractical if not impossible.


So my following conclusion/forecast is done with the utmost respect to the Japanese people. Phrasing out Nuclear Power isn't a luxury available to Japan. For any replacement of Nuclear Power would increase Japan's dependency on imported energy sources. I expect the Japanese government will eventually approve the use of next generation Nuclear Power technology.

Perhaps it could be said Japan's politicians aren't in a position to govern by opinion polls. Current New Zealand Prime Minster John Key has turned governing by opinion polls into a art form. Only time will tell us what ill side effects New Zealand will suffer from our politicians having the option of governing in such a poor fashion.

























































Tuesday 23 August 2016

Jeremy Corbyn welcomes the next war

Jeremy Corbyn has called for Nato to be "closed down", it emerged today as defence chiefs warned his comments about the organisation are "weakening western civilisation”.
Lord Roberson, the former Labour defence secretary and Secretary General of Nato, said: "It beggars belief that the leader of the party most responsible for the collective security pact of Nato should be so reckless as to undermine it by refusing to say he would come to the aid of an ally.
"Even in its darkest, daftest days in the past the Labour Party stuck to its commitment to Nato and to the defence of any ally attacked.
Full article 
Article 

Why am I doubling down on Jeremy Corbyn and have yet to so on Donald Trump? Trying to avoid any sense of political favouritism is why I will start this article by answering such a question. For a while I have been considering what Donald Trump's foreign policy would resemble in practice. I don't yet have a treatment for Charles Lindbergh , err Donald Trump and the America First Movement MK2. My treatment program for Trump will have to wait for another time.


Now I will come back to Corbyn's comments concerning NATO. How can I best sum up my immediate reaction/thoughts to what Corbyn had to say ? In polite terms, unkind would be a apt description. Before writing this article I took upon some time for reflection. I wasn't very successful in the sense of finding constructive way of expanding upon my below thoughts.

The only conclusion I can draw is Corbyn's comments are recklessly irresponsible on a grand scale! Inviting the next European War is the only realistic consequence of Corbyn and his supporters mindset. Like other reasonably minded people I view such recklessness in a broader international context.

Vladimir Putin and his military advisors must be gleeful at a would be UK Prime Minster advocating for the dissolution of NATO. I would say Corbyn actions have reinforced my forecast for a coming European War. I will come back to my forecast in a moment. Beyond the invasion of the Ukraine going unchecked , Corbyn is providing the greatest incentive for the Russians to commit future military aggression against Western Europe and the UK.


As to why Russia is on a war footing the reader can find my reasoning in past articles. I covered the historical/present day motivations behind Putin's aims in a previous article . Is history doomed to repeat in the wake of unlearned historical lessons? What should more moderate and responsible Labor MP's do to repute Corbyn's foolishness?


Saturday 13 August 2016

New Zealand Defence White Wash 2016

But ‘Asia’ isn’t a single actor wielding power. It’s a grouping of many states with conflicting strategic objectives. ‘Power’ isn’t a measure of size but rather a state’s willingness to use it. The White Paper points to the enduring nature of terrorism, resource competition, WMD proliferation and information technology as features shaping New Zealand’s strategic outlook. It’s an odd list, producing policy gems like ‘the adoption of technology has a number of advantages in the military context’, but missing other factors such as the rise of Asian nationalism, climate change and any serious discussion of military technology trends.
ASPI Article  



This blog entry was delayed by a combination circumstances including yours truly moving house. I have been wanting to address the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2016 (hereafter White Paper) since it's release 2 months ago. I feel Peter Jennings offers the best analysis of the White Paper's failings. My intention is to summarise my thoughts on why the White Paper is a white wash.

In previous articles I have covered deficiencies in the NZDF concerning a lack of high end combat capabilities. For this reason I have chosen to cover other matters in this article. The same goes for for more specific topics like roles of Air and Sea Power in New Zealand's security. My intention as per usual is to to offer the reader a fresh perceptive they won't find anywhere else. If the reader would like me to expand upon any of the issues I have raised , please feel free to leave a comment below.


From my standpoint: New Zealand lacking a coherent defence strategy is what shines through the contents of the White Paper. For a moment I will follow this line of thinking. What reasons/symptoms of the aforementioned lack of strategy? Space doesn't permit me to provide a detailed and complete answer. Some glaring symptoms can be examined in brief.

The refusal to acknowledge China's role in heightened tensions around territorial disputes in Asia is glaring. To what extent denial is behind the blinkers worn by the New Zealand Government as opposed to a lack of strategic thinking is worthy of debate. In writing this article I hope to spur on such a debate amongst the public and academic circles.

Staying with nation states, did anybody else notice how the contents of the White Paper defied New Zealand's geography? Let me explain my point: Any threat conventional military threat (read China) to New Zealand will come from Asia. Put another way interstate warfare is unlikely to originate from the Antarctic in the time frame covered by the White Paper.


I believe defending New Zealand in the event of a wartime emergency is a blind spot in current defence thinking. It is only fitting that I finish up with a symptom of such a dangerous blind spot. New Zealand's defence ties with countries like India , Japan and Indonesia either barley rate a mention or they don't at all. In fact Indonesia is omitted all together.

Who in their right mind would think neglecting defence ties with our security partners in Asia is a good idea? Has New Zealand placed a over reliance on the International Rules Order at the expense of diplomatic and military ties with the Asia – Pacific region? Certainly I would make the case , New Zealand has placed all it's cards in the falling house known as the International Rules Based Order.

The contents of the White Paper is a reflection how little public and political interest there is in New Zealand's defence and foreign policies. There can be no no doubt the lack of debate around the White Paper stems from disinterest. I can only foresee the level of interest increasing in the event of New Zealand facing a wartime emergency at which times all of our chickens will be coming home to roost.

Thursday 21 July 2016

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 2

Invest in forces housing and ‘value added’ benefits for service personnel

As public sector pay restraint appears to be here for good, the RN needs to find other ways to offer the best possible quality of life for its service personnel to aid recruitment and retention. Ensuring that new service housing is built or existing stock brought up to a consistently high standard should be a priority. At the same time this investment would provide work for a construction sector that may face challenges as the economy adjusts to Brexit. The MoD should be able to get the best possible prices for work which would need to be carried out at some point in the futures in any case.
Save The Royal Navy Campaign Article 



Welcome to Part 2 of my look at what issues would be faced in the event the Royal New Zealand Navy was expanded. In Part 1 I covered the potential pitfalls when acquiring new vessels. I have covered why the RNZN is to small in previous articles. For the reader who isn't familiar my reasoning can be found concerning the importance of Sea Power to New Zealand security. And why Warship numbers and capabilities are also vital to the RNZN.

In Part 2 I will turn to the issues of Recruitment and Retention of RNZAF personnel. Compared with part 1 the reader will find a more general approach to the topics at hand. I won't make the claim of covering every aspect of maintaining and in the event it happens expanding the RNZN. As per usual I welcome any feedback from the reader.


To what ratio current personal and new recruits would crew new vessels is depended on a number of factors. The type of vessel entering service and the proportion of current members of the RNZN required would be some of the factors involved. A more precise analysis won't be possible until the day comes when Kiwis wake up to how much they really needed the RNZN before a emergency broke out. The same goes for financial costings involved with what this very article covers.

I now come to the matter of Recruitment and Retention. Fundamentally I believe the Recruitment of new and retention of current personnel has been overlooked by the current RNZN and New Zealand Governments. I can not stress enough the importance of this matter to the RNZN whether or not expansion ever takes place or not.

Let me make a slight side diversion. When I read the article from The Lens of History's friends at the Save The Royal Navy Campaign, the way the issues crossed over with the RNZN stood out to me. I whole heartily endorse the view of John Dunbar raises. For the sake of remaining topical I will focus on Defence Force housing.

For the sake of the international reader I would like to point out house prices in Auckland hover around the 7 hundred thousand to the 1 million dollar mark.  Members of the RNZN based at the Devonport Naval Base are at the coal face of unaffordable housing in New Zealand. I find it hard to believe Auckland housing prices aren't having a negative effect on the RNZN ability to retain personnel.

I believe there is a mandate for for a renewed focus on Defence Force housing. The New Zealand Government and the NZDF drifting away from providing housing is very short sighted. Exposing members of the defence force to the forces of “market” rents and housing prices may well take the cake for short sighted-ness!


Recruitment is a area I feel is lacking in attention in debate and discussion. The RNZN like the RNZAF and the Army compete with the private sector for the best and brightest people. I believe a 2 fold approach should be taken to NZDF recruitment and promoting awareness/benefits of a military career.

The first measure would be to expand the Limited Service Volunteer Program. The expanded program would be in placed in Universities , Polytechs and other training providers. Students placed in the program would be introduced to military life and undergo a fitness program. At the end of the program students would be given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or the regular full time military.

1 or more charter schools modelled on the Australian Army Apprentice Scheme would form the 2nd measure. The schools would be open to individuals who are unemployed as well as secondary students. Under the charter school model school leavers would have the assurance of a secure military military in the years ahead of them.



Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 1

There is an urgent need to resolve delays in the Type 26 Frigate building programme. Clearly, the MOD needs to ensure value for money – but increasing the flow of money into shipbuilding in the short term to support the economy is a real consideration. Bringing forward construction of Type 31 frigates in parallel with the Type 26 construction to enable a sustained increased level of shipbuilding would also be beneficial, and see an increase in surface escort numbers which can be sustained in the longer-term.
Save The Royal Navy Article



This article is angled towards a reader @GardinerWira who thought rightly Kiwis would want to know the cost of bringing the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) up to a adequate strength . I was delayed in writing this article by circumstances on my home front. On the positive side of things the article by John Dunbar proved to very timely and topical.

I am going to break the topic into 2 parts. Part 1 will covers some of the pitfalls the New Zealand Government and the RNZN would need to avoid. In Part 2 I will take a look at issues around crewing the new vessels and retaining personnel.

The reader will note how I am not offering precise figures/costings. A outlay of costings would have meet with difficulties due to the variables involved. Such variables include up front capital costs , ongoing operational costs , choice of vessels , cost overruns at the construction stage and so on. The reader can take the matters I raise and apply them to the RNZN of today even if they don't support my ideas.


Now I will turn attention to the pitfalls that can apply to buying naval vessels or even new acquisitions for the Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force. The New Zealand government's record in the area of defence acquisitions is lousy to say the least. Space doesn't permit me to go into detail around the debacle around Project Protector and Army LAV's . Suffice to say the public should question the competence of the current and future governments/defence bureaucracy to be entrusted with tax payer dollars and the future of the armed forces.

Clearly a return to basics involving acquiring the right kind of and volume of equipment is desperately needed. A suitable number of vessels that can meet operational requirements isn't a given. Nor is avoiding cost over runs at the construction/purchasing stage guaranteed. I am now going to turn the matter of avoiding cost over runs.

My intention isn't to pick on the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) I do want to highlight how a potentially good selection of design isn't the same as getting a vessels delivered on time and on budget. Essentially the Hobart Class AWD have been a classic case of mismanagement and a terrible Corporate/Business Corporate/Business model.

Casting a glance beyond Australia how the Royal Navy's Type 26 Frigate Program could said to be struck in the mud. Space and the need to stay topical means I won't go into the issues faced by the Type 26 Frigate Program. What I want to convey to the reader is how beyond Australia huge issues exist with Navies acquiring new vessels.

Essentially I would argue whether it be the replacement of the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates or undertaking a restructure of the navy the choice of ship builders shouldn't automatically follow on from the design choice. I believe old fashion saying of buyer beware applies to the situation.


The main pitfall that nobody is talking about is how New Zealand is solely reliant on Military Off the Shelf hardware. The failure to develop shipyards and strengthen the local defence industry over the last 2 decades is coming with a heavy price. A localised defence industry with a focus on Research and development would have place New Zealand well as global events take a trend for the worst.

The New Zealand Defence Force could have had access to lower cost high end military equipment that is interoperable with our allies/coalition partners. The same military equipment would have also found ready export markets around the world.

Questions hang around like the smell of seaweed drying out on a beach. For me at least one question is how the RNZN/Department of Defence could take a design like the Type 26 Frigate from the design table to operational service without any major hiccups?



















Wednesday 13 July 2016

Book Review: War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft

War by Other Means by Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris (Harvard University Press 2016) . War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft is a examination of Geoeconomics squarely aimed at Policy Makers and Academia. The primary focus of the book is China's use of Geoeconomics as a tool of State Craft.

Quotations from the book appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book.


The opening of the book is a look at the definition of Geoeconomics. The term of Geoeconomics is used extensively in US foreign policy circles. Scholars aren't in agreement concerning a precise definition of Geoeconomics. On page 20 the authors urge the following definition: The use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations' economic actions on a country's geopolitical goals.

The remainder of the chapter 1 is devoted to how there hasn't been a great deal of debate among scholarly circles around Geoeconomics. As far back as 1970 Susan Strange recognised in the studies of international economic relations were focused on politics and not economics.

Nation states as varied as China and Qatar have seen Geoeconomics take a resurgent path in international relations. I will come back to China a fair bit in this review. My take from current events/opening of the book is Russia's actions in the Ukraine is representative of the resurgence of Geoeconomics as a tool of foreign policy.

I feel the point or discussion around Geoeconomics not being a Zero Sum ( Winners and losers) game could have received more attention from the authors. Put another way the outcome of a Nation State use of Geoeconomics isn't always Black and White. The use of military action to achieve a objective can be said to be successful or failure.

The Iraq War is widely regarded has having been a gross miscalculation . Viewed from the standpoint of achieving the objective of turning Iraq into a democracy , the war was a failure. I believe a historical parallel to the Vietnam War. The political and public fall out from the Vietnam War is akin to what has occurred in the wake of the Iraq War. As the reader all of this sprung to mind. As such the fall out is for another discussion.


Historical examples of the successful use of Geoeconomics by the US have been forgotten. Chapter 6 is entitled US Foreign Policy And Geoeconomics in Historical Context. I will leave Chapter 6 and much of the other content to the reader. For the purpose of this review I will touch upon the role State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) have in Geoeconomics. SOE's can be used as a tool of State Craft in the Geoeconomics Chess Board.


Geoeconomics is distinct from foreign (or international) or economic policy, mercantilism and liberal economic thought.

Early on I was struck by how relevant this passage of the book is to New Zealand. In the manner of Academia the authors argue Geoeconomics is confused with a reinvented form of Mercantilism . Others mix up Geoeconomics with the liberal (Market orientated) economic school of thought. Adam Smith a noted liberal economic thinker understood the limits of economic logic: what was/is mutually beneficial in economic terms might not be so in political terms. According to Smith , “the wealth of a neighbouring country “ might be dangerous in war and politics. “


From page 37: The emergence of new generation of state capitalists- significantly larger , wealthier, more global, less democratic and more sophisticated than their predecessors – raises important questions for US Foreign Policy.


And from page 54: Twenty years ago state owned enterprises (SOE's) were little more than domestic employment vehicles. Ten years ago there was wide spread scepticism about whether these firms, saddled with bad debt debt and inexperienced leadership, could succeeded beyond home markets. Today they include some of the world's biggest companies , backed by some of the globes largest pools of capital and can claim over half the world's top ten IPO's over the last six years.


In the present day state backed firms account for 30% of foreign direct investment ( hereafter FDI) in emerging markets. SOE's remain grossly inefficient in comparison to their private sector counterparts. Efficiency and operating on a for profit basis is in no way the aim.


Now I can turn to the thread of SOE's. In April of 2011. President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff made Beijing her first overseas trip. Strengthening ties with Brazil was on the mind of Chinese President Hu Jintao and SOE airlines were his means of doing so. The stated owned Chinese airlines placed orders for 30 Brazilian Embraer planes plus options for option for 5 more with 3 airlines.


The above example is only mentioned briefly in the book. I feel the brief mention is never the less very illustrative of how the Chinese make use of Geoeconomics in foreign policy circles.  Could the Kiwi reader ever imagen their government exercising the same Geoeconomics lever via Air New Zealand?!


For the second thread I will move away from SOE's. In China's arsenal the use of SOE's isn't the most brazen lever they employ from their Geoeconomics tool box. The Chinese government understands only the use of military force to resolve territorial disputes will invoke the US – Japan Alliance. China's relationship with Japan is described as “Politically cold and economically cool. “ China Geoeconomics aims are to back up their claims to the Diaoyu/SenKaKu Islands and weaken the US – Japan Alliance.

 Economic retaliation is the name of the Chinese game. In 2001 China reduced the import quota for imported Japanese Cars by 40 to 60%. Specifically China was objecting to Prime Minster Junichiro paying his respects in the Yasukuni Shine. Testimony concerning Japan's Gem Warfare experiments in WW2 had also taken place at this time.


The Kiwi reader will find the references to the Trans Pacific Partnership (hereafter TPP) to be very topical. The TPP is covered in the chapter entitled America's Geoeconomic Potential. To summarise: the TPP was conceived to revive a dying round of Doya talks at the World Trade Organisation. Using the TPP to combat China's use of Geoeconomics was never a consideration.

The original name for the TPP was Trans Pacific Economic Partnership. The newly minted Obama Administration changed the agreement name to what it is known as today. In changing the name the Obama Administration signaled to China and the rest of the globe the TPP wasn't a foreign policy objective.

The book covers how from the time of Nixon admiration to the present Geoeconomics slipped away from the American Foreign Policy establishment/Policy Makers minds. I feel the reader is best served taking in this when they read this and the other material in the book. The book will succeed in reaching the planned target audience and as such the authors will have achieved their aims.

















Wednesday 27 April 2016

France wins the bidding for the Collins Class Submarine replacement program

Only last month, the Joint Committee for Parliamentary Accounts and Audit examined yet another multi-billion dollar project that was delayed by 3–4 years when paper-based down-selection proved inadequate. At the hearing Defence officials advised that the lesson on preview T&E had been learnt, the new T&E policy would ensure a repeat was unlikely, and that, interestingly, the current restructure of Defence should only strengthen use of this preview T&E policy.
Keith Joiners's article 


DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, a derivative of its Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine currently under construction in France, has turned out to be the winner.
Because of the endurance and long range stipulated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the French have selected the Barracuda as their design reference. The Shortfin Barracuda will be equipped with four diesel alternators to generate electricity, a >7 megawatt permanent magnet motor and ample battery storage. 
Article 

Article 



I just wanted to touch upon the announcement of the chosen bidder for the Collins Class Submarine Replacement at this time. I do want to give a brief look at the Japanese failed bid. Overall I will leave the details for future blog entries. Also I am aiming to avoid a technical/geeky discussion around the merits of each design that was submitted to the Competitive Evaluation Process (hereafter CEP).

My aim as always is to provide content for the general reader as much as the military enthusiast. Note to the reader Keith Joiner's article was written before the outcome of the CEP was made public.


I will start off with my glance at the Japanese Bid. Did then Prime Minster Tony Abbott's support for the Japanese option undermine the later CEP Process? Let me explain my reasoning behind the question. How could have the Department of Defence selected a version of the Soryu Class submarine without the appearance of political favoritism overriding the CEP process?

My concerns are 2 fold at this point in time. Firstly I wonder how sound the CEP was in light the political climate in Australia? There is every reason to think the Malcolm Turnbull was under all sorts of pressure to announce subs would be build in South Australia. The announcement would have been intended to shore up votes at the Federal Election which is due sometime this year. Could the timing of the announcement sacrificed a sound CEP?

Secondly my concerns are fairly in line with avoiding the problems that were encountered with the development and construction of the Collins Class Submarines. I like the case made by Keith Joiner for a sound Testing and Evaluation (hereafter T&E) Process. The process must take place early on in the development of the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A before the first of the class enters sea trials.


I believe the focus of public discussion and debate should be around the way to establish and operate the best T&E process in the world. Also with the 12 Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A's to be build locally the focus must be on modernising  shipyards and associated industries. I would make the argument for 3D Printing and Robotics being at the heart of the technological revolution around civilian and military industries.


Lastly I would say restoring public confidence is equally as important implementing a sound T&E process. In order to restore public confidence I would first bring to the public's attention the strategic value the Collins Class Submarines have offered Australia. I would do the same for the Collins Class Submarines accomplishments such as "sinking" United States Navy Aircraft Carriers during exercises.   Despite the well documented issues , I believe Australians should take great pride in the RAN's fleet of Collins Class Submarines.

I would bring forward the launch of the first new submarine by around five years. This would negate the need to upgrade the Collins Class Submarines , give Australia more military options in the Asia – Pacific and ensure the project remains in the minds and eyes of the public.










Thursday 14 April 2016

A look at why Warship numbers and capabilities matter


As ships cannot remain on station indefinitely, a small navy cannot sustain long-term operations with sufficient numbers on the frontline. Many naval operations last months or even years and require a sustained rotation of vessels. An approximate rule of thumb says 1 ship on station requires 3 vessels; one on the frontline, one in transit and one in refit or undergoing training. Supposedly less maintenance-intensive new platforms and creative approaches to crew rotation may mitigate this slightly but not enough.
Full Article


Fundamentally I believe Peter Sandeman and The Lens of History's friends at Save The Royal Navy Campaign have written the kind of article that will be of historical importance. I would argue the historical importance comes from in light of how Russia is on a war footing. In Asia the People's Liberation Army Navy will exceeded the United States Navy in size by 2020. In the lead up to 2020 and beyond tensions around China's territorial ambitions, which are to numerous to document here will be on going.

I am going to orientate my commentary towards the Royal New Zealand (RNZN) and Royal Australian Navies (RAN). On this basis I may detour slightly from the points made in the original article. In a break from normal departure I will adapt the main points from the source article under subheadings.

The argument I would make is the ability of the RNZN to operate in medium to high intensity environments out to 2030 will be a large determining factor in New Zealand's security and future. Geography dictates how sea based commerce destine for the South Pacific and New Zealand must pass through Asia.


Capabilities / Sword Point of adversaries
Chinese Anti - Access/Area Denial (hereafter A2/D2) capabilities must be at forefront of Australian and New Zealand naval planners thinking. The Sword Point of Chinese technology and A2/D2
doctrine is anti shipping missiles. Sea Mines are also a key force multiplier in the Chinese arsenal. A more detailed look at Chinese A2/D2 capabilities and how they can be counted is for another day.


Only one vessel can be in one place at one time

I will now turn my attention to the RAN. No direct replacement exists for the Adelaide Class Frigates. 3 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) will enter service around 2017 – 2020. The AWD do represent a huge leap forward in operational capabilities and technology. However 3 vessels cannot take the place of what was originally half a dozen Adelaide Class Frigates.

On the basis of two vessels being in port for maintenance only one AWD will be at sea or available for operational duties. The reader may want to consider for instance how a single AWD can't be on convoy duty and be apart of a amphibious task force at the same time. From the Kiwi stand point the Air/Missile Defence role is a specialty capability the RNZN doesn't and won't posses in the foreseeable future.


Murphy's Law can happen / Forces in reserve

I would venture the RNZN has a shortage of frigates/ vessels that can operate in medium to high level warfare environments. So I think it could be said that Murphy's Law isn't even required for New Zealand naval planners to be caught off guard. If a unexpected event in Asia was to occur there is a very good chance the RNZN would be in no position to respond.

Explaining the necessity to keep naval forces in reserve would demean the reader and mean I would have to cover the same ocean I just did in the above paragraph. Instead I will make the following argument: the structure of the RNZN is more geared towards the role of a Coast Guard than deterring a foreign power from undertaking military aggression and for combat purposes. The RNZN has a critical shortage of frigates and Sealift/amphibious vessels.

For a moment I will place the focus on HMNZS Canterbury . The RNZN entire Sealift and amphibious capacity/capabilities rest with a single vessel. In the event HMNZS Canterbury is lost in combat or laid up in dry dock a vacancy sign will hang on-board the navy's Sealift and amphibious capabilities.

One of the fundamental issues the RNZN faces is a shortage of combat power. Out of the entire surface fleet only the HMNZS Te Mana and HMNZS Te Kaha the navy's 2 Anzac Class frigates are capable of operating in hostile seas. At the time of writing HMNZS Te Mana is undergoing a planned upgrade making her unavailable for operational service for a considerable amount of time. The absence of a 4 frigate navy is inexcusable and I will come back to this point later on in the article.

The reader may be wondering how a small force like the peacetime RNZN could be large enough to have vessels in reserve? I would regard this as a text book military question. I believe one answer lies in having multi role vessels instead of dedicated Off Shore Patrol Vessels (hereafter OPV). Multi role vessels could perform Mine Clearance and Anti Submarine Warfare and act as sort back stop that could be called upon in a emergency.

At present the RNZN's OPV's and HMNZS Canterbury are only suitable for operating in low level environments like peacekeeping , fishery patrols and disaster relief. The essential issue in my mind is the requirement for vessels to be able to switch from low level to high intensity environments. By not having this underlying requirement successive New Zealand governments and naval planners have made yet another epic bungle.

Planning for Combat Losses

I will now come back to the RAN. The decision to only opt for only 3 AWD's indicates there is no consideration given to the effects of loses in a future war. In all but the kinds of low level environments mentioned above losses from enemy action are inevitable. Such inevitability was shown in the Battle of the Atlantic and later on in The Falklands War.

The Australian government will have the opportunity to avoid making the same mistake when a decision is made on the number of replacements for the 8 Anzac Class Frigates currently in service with the RAN. 8-10 vessels would be the optimal number to ensure there isn't another short fall in vessels and would allow the RAN to sustain modest losses to enemy action. 


Maintaining a Deterrence/ Presence

The value of the RNZN being able to dispatch and maintain a frigate on station was demonstrated in recent history. In 1973 HMNZS Otago was dispatched to act as a presence/protest against French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific. HMNZS Canterbury (a Lender Class Frigate) also performed the same duty. In effect the Labour Government of the day was willing to give the French the proverbial middle finger and rightfully so.

Current and future governments would only be able to mount such a presence/protest subject to the availability of HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha. Sending a OPV to perform the same role would only see New Zealand laughed at on the International Stage. I would suggest to the reader the RNZN undertaking a Freedom of Navigation Patrol in the South China Sea would be the current day equivalent of protesting French Nuclear Testing.

Incidentally I believe the perfect example of not having a presence and or suitable vessel available is the RNZN's absence from Exercise Bersama Shield . Put another way Exercise Bersama Shield and other like it can demonstrate the effects of the RNZN not maintaining the bottom line of having four frigates in service at one time. If the scenario of China invading Malaysia/South East Asia happens for real surely sending a single Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion is as good as leaving the country at the mercy of events?

As a final thought , I would point out that the fact Chinese military planners will be fully aware of the issues covered in this article. To what degree the RNZN partnered with the RAN is failing to provide a sufficient deterrent to future Chinese aggression is a subject and debate by itself. However I would note the RN is facing the same kind of question over its head. Russian military planners like their Chinese counterparts will be just as aware of the their potential adversary’s (the Royal Navy) shortfalls. The only question can be just how severe will the consequences turn out to be for a country like New Zealand?