The Lens of History: Episode Eight author interview Andrew Carr Winning The Peace Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific

Author Andrew Carr joins Luke Herbert on the Lens of History couch for a chat about his book Winning The Peace Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific. Winning the Peace (published January 2015 by MUP Academic) is available to order (hardback, paperback and ebook) from mup.com.au

Winning the Peace is based on the author's thesis on Australia’s foreign policy from 1983 to 2013. In 2013 Australia’s National Security Strategy declared that 'active middle powers are increasingly influential in the region” And set to a national ambition “to influence and shape our regional and global environment to be conductive to advancing Australia's interests and values. In the book the author sets to test out those claims.

Winning The Peace Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific is an excellent read. The book will appeal to both the general reader and students of Political Science and International relations. I applaud the author for opening the inner workings of Australia’s foreign policy to keen observers such as myself.

The introduction and Conceptual Framework chapters are the book's starting line. The following chapters cover History of Australian Foreign and Defence Policy;Australia and Irregular Migration and Australia,Weapons of Mass Destruction and Trade Liberalisation. The “answers” to what Andrew Carr set out to find are found in Chapters entitled Can Middle powers promote Norms? and Conclusions.

I found the section of the book covering History of Australian Foreign and Defence Policy to be of greater value than its size or intended role in the book. One historical nugget I didn't know about is: Billy Hughes being labelled a “Pestiferous Varmint” after he influenced the discussions on reparations from Germany, the fate of Germany’s ex colonial possessions in the Pacific and Australian representation at the League of Nations at the Versailles conference in 1919.

The issue of the Australian government policy of dealing with Irregular Migration will remain controversial for the foreseeable future. If you have strong feelings positive or otherwise towards the so called Pacific Solution or just the issue I would invite you to put aside your biases before you read on.

My own impression starts with the Keating Government role in starting to develop the regional framework that was starting to become the Norm. After a policy back flip which the Howard government would execute the regional approach would be the Hall Mark of preventing the arrival of Irregular Migrants via sea to Australia.

During the Hawke government Australia’s National security concerns were focused on the Cold War and Irregular Migration wasn't a concern. By the time Keating becomes Prime Minster Irregular Migration is on the radar. Some ASEAN nations sought to Securitise transnational crime. While drug trafficking was recognised as an issue requiring regional co-operation since the 1970's. In the mid 90's ASEAN began to expand the agenda to include ,terrorism ,piracy, money laundering,human trafficking and people smuggling.

So what of the policy back flip by John Howard that perhaps went rather unnoticed? After he was elected Howard stated.

“ If there is any difference on the part of my government with our predecessors in government, it lies in my objection to the impression that was sometimes given in the past that Australia had to pursue an Asia-only policy and downgrade the weight it gave to associations with Europe and the United States. My own view has always been that Australia does not need to choose between her history and her geography.”

Essentially Howard put the regional framework and the foundations for its expansion to one side in favour of the historical alliance with the USA. The events of 9-11 would coincide with a rising number of irregular migration arriving by boat capturing the publics attention.

Since the called “Pacific solution” will be well known to the reader I won't cover it in this review. Rather I will touch on the 2002 Regional Ministerial Conference on people smuggling,trafficking in Persons and related Transnational Crime more commonly known as the “Bali Process.”

Spearheaded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and foreign minster Alexander Downer the Bali Process was the regional forum that shifted Australian foreign policy back towards the foundations of the regional framework that I mentioned above. A number of important policy success such as the extradition of people smugglers from Sweden and Egypt were gained from the first meeting of the “Bali process”.

I feel the approach of the Kevin Rudd , Julie Gillard and Tony Abbott government's towards Irregular Migration is well documented in the book. The Kevin Rudd , Julie Gillard and Tony Abbott government's are fairly contemporary. In this book review my desire to avoid commenting on the current Australian political scene. This is why I will now leave the topic of Irregular Migration.

Australia's role in the prevention of the proliferation and possession of chemical weapons signifies the country role as a middle power. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1992 had humble origins. Its origins lay in the Australia group. The Australia group started out in 1985 with representatives from twenty five nations meeting regularly at the Australian embassy in Paris. At these meeting Australian officials set out to persuade other nations of there agenda .

By 1992 negotiations had stalled. Foreign Minster Gareth Evans took the bold and risky step of tabling the Australian draft of the text for the Convention. Australia had secretly negotiated the text with the US government. After some good work from the unheralded heroes otherwise known as diplomats and the support of governments in South East Asia , the Chemical Weapons Convention was cemented.

The Treaty of Rarotonga ( more commonly know as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone )was born out of the Hawke government's aim of promoting anti nuclear proliferation while maintaining good relations with the Reagan admin and future US political leaders.

Australia set out to reassure the United States that the treaty wouldn't restrict the passage of nuclear weapons. The goal of the Australian government was to prevent nuclear weapons from being stationed and tested in the South Pacific. As a middle power Australia was able to override the objections of small South Pacific nations who desired to follow New Zealand's lead on banning Nuclear Powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear weapons.

The notion that Australia bullied the smaller South Pacific nations into ratifying The Treaty of Rarotonga is unfounded. IMO the fact that those countries would rely on Australia for there defence in the event they were threatened by a foreign power suggests they had nothing to bring to the bargaining table.

In 1984 the Labour government lead by David Lange outlawed nuclear powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand waters. As a response the Reagan admin cut defence and intel ties with New Zealand. New Zealand was left out in the cold (no pun intended) until New Zealand contribution to the War in Afghanistan saw defence and intel links restored.

For the rest of this section of the review I will touch upon how I feel about the issue as someone who lives in New Zealand. I wish to convey to the reader what effect the death of critical thinking has had on New Zealand foreign policy. New Zealand's UN centric and anti Nuclear foreign policy has been accepted has a kind of religion. Anybody who applies rational logic which inevitable leads them to question one of the country unofficial religions (the other one being Rugby) is seen as a heretic.

I believe that the history books will outright condemn New Zealand foreign policy for sacrificing the country's security for what is at best misplaced principals. The assertion that there is no evidence that New Zealand actions had any notable impact on global or even regional Non Proliferation or Non possession is factually correct.

I will leave the final word to Alexander Downer: “nuclear weapons still exist in spite of the Canberra and Rudd Commissions. I'm a bit sceptical about what they can ever achieve. They're good domestic politics,it makes you look as through you here in Australia are going to rid the world of nuclear weapons. If you believe that , than clearly you'd believe anything.”

The chapter on and Trade Liberalisation offers the reader a valuable insight into Australia's economic interests. Reading about the foundation of the APEC forum brought back memories. The memories of first learning of APEC via the six o’clock news reporting on the attendees wearing the fashions of the host country.

The Hawke government undertook a two prolong approach to promote and frame trade liberalisation as the norm. By unilaterally liberalising trade Australia could be seen as a credible advocate or in other words leading by example. Hawke arguments for promoting trade liberalisation were pragmatic and based on the fact it suited Australia's economic interests. This can been seen in contrast to the moral/idealogical arguments made by Reagan and Thatcher.

As a middle power the task of persuading the USA and the EU to remove agricultural trade barriers was seen as near impossible. The Hawke government would take the coalition building approach by developing the Carins group.

In 1986 the Australian government invited fourteen countries to Cairns (Australia) to discuss forcing agriculture back onto the agenda at the Uruguay round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks. Exceeding any expectations the Carins Group placed agriculture liberalisation on the table and obtained significant reductions in export and other subsides.

Can middle powers promote Norms? The question falls into two three categories Acting alone, Coalition and multilateralism and Cooperation or a conflict with a great power. Afterwards the author covers how Australia's foreign policy performed within the conceptual frame work explained earlier on in the book.

What sprung to mind as I read about Australian foreign policy promoting norms by Coalition and multilateralism is how as a middle power Australia could act as the founder or leader of a international lobby groups. The Australia group would help to lay the seeds for the Chemical Weapons Convention without undue expense to the Department of Trade and Foreign Affairs and by logical extension the tax payer.

The role Australia played in negotiating Chemical Weapons Convention is a clear example of Australia playing the role of a lead actor at a institutional forum. The willingness of the United States Government to work with a junior partner is acknowledged. Credit should go to Australia for undertaking the role of drafting the text and kick starting the stalled negotiations.

I found the impact of the Cairns group efforts on Trade Liberalisation to be a good example how a middle power can promote a Norm by forming a coalition of like minded nations. Its kind of like if someone was to have badly cut themselves and you set out to stop the bleeding. Australia unilateral approach was like placing a band aid on the cut. The coalition approach is akin to stopping the bleeding with bandages. Sufficient pressure was placed on the cut by the multilateral/bandage to stop the bleeding.

In the period covered by the book successive Australian governments enjoyed strong relations with the USA in spite of differences surrounding Trade Liberalisation and stopping the proliferation of Weapons of Mass destructions.

Notable with the Treaty of Rarotonga Australia went against the wishes of the USA without steeping on its core interests. I believe that the policy stance of the Lange government in effect removed New Zealand from the round table of policy discussions. Rather than join our Australian cousins in a constructive diplomatic relationship with the USA Lange sold out to the anti nuclear movement.

Below is my commentary on the author's conclusion's. My commentary is diffusion on the subject material covered in the book. I have included the reluctance of Australian government's to act as a Norm stabiliser below for the purposes of this review. In the book Australia's role as a Norm stabiliser is covered in the chapter preceding the author's conclusions. I don't dispute the author's assertion that Australia is a regional power. My commentary is build around this assertion. I now invite the reader to have a cup of tea and read onwards.

In the time period covered by the book Australia's alliance with the United States acting as the foundation of the country security was and is a long accepted Norm. Any discussion has to take place within the frame of work of Australia relying on the United States of America as a security guarantor.

Even before I read the book I found John Howard's notion that Australia doesn't have to choose between its geography and history, to be a head scratcher. In my opinion the fact Indonesia and not the United States was Australia's key partner in the Bali Process is proof that geography trumps historical military and diplomatic ties.

I do understand that the reader is bound to argue that domestic politics in the United States was the reason for their lack of Norm entrepreneurship and diffusion in Irregular Migration in the Asia-Pacific regions. Domestically in the United States the debate around securing the country's border with Mexico and immigration controls is a contentious issue.

The reader can avoid the controversy surrounding Irregular Migration and examine my argument from the stand point of other policy issues . The drugs trade; terrorism and environmental issues all appeared on the Keating Government's Cooperative Security menu. Fill free to order what ever meal takes your fancy.

I concur with the author reasoning that during the time period covered by the book Australia's peacekeeping efforts in East Timor ,the Solomon Islands and Bougainville were driven pragmatic necessity. Australia is the only country in the region who can respond as they lead nation or stand alone to security challenges in the South Pacific. Indonesia developing military capabilities would be best covered in a separate article.

The sanctions imposed on Fiji after the 2006 amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. The failure to punish Fiji for the coup may be due to the fact that no threat was posed to Australia by the events that took place. Australia may be willing to talk tough but is unwilling to back it up with punitive action.

In the years since East Timor's independence from Indonesia the country has remained institutionally weak . Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers have never remained in the country long enough to allow for the country to develop the institutions and constitutional framework the backbones of flourishing stable democracy's .

Behind the scenes the Australian and New Zealand governments policy aim should have been to facilitate the foundations of East Timor as a nation.By permitting East Timor's political leaders to take credit for political progress they would have gained public confidence. At present the people of East Timor are at risk of succumbing to factional infighting. Factional infighting could undermine the government of East Timor in events that would mirror what has occurred in Iraq , minus the Islamic extremist elements.

A scaled down version of the Marshal Program should have been the template for the construction of the infrastructure such as schools , roads , ports and railway lines. Infrastructure such as ports and airports can also double as military installations. Australia and New Zealand would have reaped considerable economic benefits from old school nation building in East Timor.

Strategically East Timor is ideally situated to provide Australia and New Zealand greater access to its neighbourhood via a permanent military presence. By operating out of East Timor the NZDF and ADF would have faster response times to any unexpected events in Asia. Australian military planners have long sought to ease the challenges of protecting Australia's interests in the event of a local conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.

The risk of East Timor falling prey to Non State actors has yet to be discussed at least publicly by the governments of East Timor , Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand .East Timor's proximity to Indonesia could deter any would be terrorist organisations from entering the country. I believe that if East Timor ever was in danger of becoming a terrorist haven Indonesia would not hesitate to reoccupy the country.

This must be balanced out against how East Timor's growing pains make the country an attractive target for Non State Actors. As Mali showed the world in 2013 countries with weak government's make easy prey for Islamic extremists. Only a French led military intervention (Operation Serval) prevented the Islamic extremist take over of Mali.

Ultimately Australia and New Zealand unwillingness to project economic and military power fits into the norm of political correctness. The fear of being ignorantly labelled “imperialists” by the radical left wingers has prevented a successful frame work for a stable democratic and pro western East Timor from being created and implemented.

The fact that Australia and New Zealand have lacked the political will to ensure East Timor becomes a stable pro western democracy will have unforeseen consequences. I believe Australia and New Zealand reluctance to act as Norm stabilisers in East Timor is a historical turning point. Non state actors and foreign powers (read the Chinese) will perceive Australia and New Zealand as being weak for following Politically Correct Norms.

By showing weakness Australia and New Zealand have sent out party invitations to Non state Actors and the Chinese. In the time frame of 2020-25 the Chinese will bring Area Access/Area Denial to the party. Non state actors are already making their presence felt across the ditch.

A comparison of Australian and New Zealand government between 1984 and 1990 is useful when examining Trade Liberalisation in a Trans Tasman light. I selected the 1984 – 1990 time frame because it covers the time the fourth Labour government was in office. Under the fourth Labour government New Zealand would have three prime minsters David Lange,Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Mike Moore.

I would admit to be being unfair towards New Zealand for selecting such a narrow time frame. Considerations of space and my desire to compare the Australian and New Zealand governments at that time are behind my decision to select the 1984-1990 time frame.

As Prime Minster Hawke led a consensus government. When Hawke argued for Trade Liberalisation he did so from the stand points of Australia’s economic interests. If the arguments Hawke made to the Australian public and the international community in favour of reducing tariffs were a tree , than the roots and the trunk were his formidable intellect.

Hawke understood the Australian public would accept Trade Liberalisation if they understood why the need for reform existed and they believed that in the long run the outcome would be fairer on them. Fortunately the Australian voting public was able to take this norm for granted until the Howard Government's industrial relations reform package (known as Work Choices) and the ensuring years up to the present.

In the Shaky lsles Lange would be the first Prime Minster in the chaotic fourth Labor government. Finance Minster Roger Douglas was the architect of Trade Liberalisation and the other free market economic reforms of the 1980's. Since Lange had more influence over the menu in parliament's cafeteria than he did his own Minster of Finance he can take little credit for Trade Liberalisation in New Zealand.

Douglas motives were purely ideologically. When it came to undertaking economic reforms the distance between the norm undertaken by Hawke and the way the Kiwi voting public were just by standers is the distance from the Sun to Pluto. In the arena of foreign affairs, Lange successors in Palmer and Moore can said to have been care taker Prime Minsters and as such fall beyond the scope of the book.

Diplomatically New Zealand never positioned itself as a world leader in Trade Liberalisation until the Helen Clark government secured the New Zealand – China and other bilateral Free Trade agreements. Did the political instability of the fourth Labour government prevent New Zealand from promoting itself as a leading example of Trade Liberalisation? The author's Kiwi counterparts and historians have yet to address this question.

I would certainly argue that in between the years 1984 – 1990 New Zealand cashed in on the efforts of the Hawke government. New Zealand had nothing to do with the foundering of APEC and the Cairns group. A series of fortunate circumstances allowed New Zealand foreign policy to have an opening in the field of Trade Liberalisation.

The APEC Forum allowed New Zealand to act as a Norm Diffuser at the Ministerial level. By joining the Cairns Group New Zealand participated in lobbying the USA and Europe to reduce agricultural subsides.

For the benefit of the international since the 1990's dairy exports have been the back bone of the New Zealand economy. Up until the 1990's New Zealand main exports had been wool and lamb. Reducing and the outright removal of tariffs and agricultural subsides was and continues to be of far greater importance to New Zealand than it does Australia.

Lastly I wish to raise a point that hasn't been discussed in the book or in Australia. What occurs in the event a foreign power are in a position to or have military threatened Australia and the United States fails to meet its obligations as a security guarantor?

The absence of Norm entrepreneurship and diffusion on this question is worth examining. The signing of the ANZUS Treaty saw the Australian foreign policy establishment begin to frame the country role in the new post war order. The challenges of the Cold War/Nuclear Age had already emerged and were at the forefront of the Australia’s mind.

At the same time historians were beginning to document the events which saw John Curtain's government switch its security focus from the UK to the USA (see chapter 3). The fall of Singapore would leave a bitter legacy in the annuals of Australian military/political history that would last until the new millennium.

The divided between the Norm entrepreneurs ,diffusers and Norm stabilisers in foreign policy and historians in and outside of academia was in place. Had such a divided not been in place would the Fall of Singapore have served as the catalysis for Australia’s foreign policy? Put another way could the bitter legacy from the Fall of Singapore acted as the catalysis for Australian foreign policy alongside or in the place of ANZUS? I will leave the reader to consider the implications of these questions.

As we enter what has described by as the Asian Century , Winning the Peace is essential reading for understanding Australia's role as a Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific region. Reserve a place for Winning the Peace on your book shelf or in your Kindle.