In other words, the requirement for sea control is not necessarily or just about projecting military power, it is also about sustaining an economy by getting vital supplies to where they are needed: into, out of and around a country as well as allowing the movement of both exports and imports for trade and profit. In other words, sea control has a domestic aspect as well as being about our survival.
Even if we consider a defence of Australia scenario alone, this fixation on sea denial, which is central to White's thesis, fails. If Australia's general dependence upon the movement of shipping for exports and imports for trade purposes were to be discounted – and it cannot – the nation's substantial dependence upon imported petroleum, to name only one commodity, is still something that has to be borne in mind.
Article part 1
Article Part 2
Article part 3
New Zealand is a maritime nation. All maritime/island nations are depended on sea routes for conducting commerce. New Zealand like Australia is depended on imported oil. New Zealand and Australia are are within the same scale as Maritime nations. Australia and New Zealand are both food producing nations whose economic well being and security is depended upon being able to project sea and air power. I will by in large leave air power for another article.
The United Kingdom and Japan can be found further up the scale of reliance on the maritime environment. Japan and the United Kingdom relay on imports of food to feed their populations. Japan exemplifies the characteristics of a maritime nation. Japan is completely devoid of natural resources leaving them completely reliant on imports of food , oil and other raw materials.
If the reader is just starting out in the field of sea power they will find a wealth of material written by historians and commentators. As a starting point I would recommend The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare from Trafalgar to Midway by John Keegan (1934-2012) . The book has stayed in my memory as a very informative and well written title.
As I have
touched upon any direct threat of invasion to Australia and New Zealand will come though the South West Pacific. Denying the enemy access to the sea lanes around the South West Pacific will prevent any expeditionary force from threatening northern Australia. Preventing enemy forces from threatening Australia naturally contributes to the defence of New Zealand.
Now I will bring my focus back to New Zealand. The greatest threat to New Zealand sovereignty and trade interests would be the outbreak of a war in Asia. In the event of a medium intensity conflict the
RNZAF and
RNZN will be called upon to escort oil tankers that are bound for New Zealand. New Zealand could get by without consumer goods made in China. The country would ground to a halt if or when the supply of fuel ran out after the loss of one or more oil tankers.
New Zealand's maritime environment dictates the importance of amphibious capability and capacity. Amphibious operations will be the back bone of future NZDF operations. This applies to future medium to high intensity conflicts in the Asia-Pacific or Peacekeeping operations closer to home. In line with New Zealand military thinking the
Joint Amphibious Task Force is only intended for humanitarian and other emergencies that don't involve combat.
New Zealand has two world wars and East Timor to draw lessons from when making defence policy and future contingency plans. East Timor presented a chance for the New Zealand government/defence planners are chance to assimilate lessons in what proved to a low level operational environment. New Zealand never displayed any interest in learning the strategic
lessons from East Timor or WW2. In the years since INTERFET the RNZN and RNZAF capabilities have been
downgraded .
Notable the RNZN suffers from a shortage of combat capable warships. A four frigate navy is the bare minimum to ensure that one frigate is available in the event of a emergency. As of 2015 the RNZN's two Anzac Class Frigates are due for
replacement closer to 2030. There are no indications of any plans to return to a four frigate navy. Nor has any thought been given to replacing the Protector-class offshore patrol vessels with multi role vessels. Multi role vessels that are capable of operating as Offshore Patrol Vessels in peacetime and Anti Submarine and Mine Clearance Warfare in a pinch would serve as a useful backstop.
By relying on land based air power Australia is taking a strategic risk. One of the lessons from the Pacific Theatre in WW2 was that land based air power is vulnerable to roaming Aircraft Carrier task forces. In the present day I would add land or sea based missiles into the mix. By not being able to project air power New Zealand is sitting upon a future strategic catastrophe.
The force structure of the NZDF is geared for peacekeeping. A air and sea Maritime Strategy has been absent. The 2015 Defence White Paper looks set to have been
delayed . The reader could very reasonably expect the coming White Paper to begin the process of correcting the deficiencies in New Zealand defence policy. Reasonable thinking went out to sea a long time ago.
At the time of writing no serious discussions about New Zealand being Sea Powerless are taking place in academia , defence circles and with the general public. Any serious and realistic discussion about New Zealand's strategic defence outlook must begin with naval and air power. Following on from this the NZDF must act as a force multiplier for its Australian counterparts as opposed to requiring baby sitting.
How can naval and air power best be utilised to counter Chinese Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities? What will the effects of the Joint Amphibious Task Force inability to participate in a opposed landing be in a emergency? How can the NZDF be best equipped to defend the South West Pacific from a would be invader? What happens in the event of an emergency and the RNZN has no combat capable warships available?
New Zealand clearly won't take part in discussions and debate around these points until the answers are no longer theoretical.
