Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk by Maj. Gen Bob Scales, USA (Ret.) ( 2016 Naval Institute Press ) is compulsory and compelling reading for military professions , concerned citizens and aspiring political leaders.
The author Major General Bob Scales (Ret.) delved into his experiences as a Vietnam Veteran and his background as a scholar to construct a thesis on the historical ups and down of the US Army and how to win future wars. In doing so the US Army will avoid bumps in the road which lead to perfectly avoidable battlefield causalities.
Direct quotes from the book will appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book. At the time of writing I have been unable to secure a interview with the author. Scales's underlying argument has multi facades. Each chapter represents a facades as he builds his case for how future US Army (hereafter Army) and Marine infantry units should be trained and equipped for the wars of the future.
In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I will in layman’s terms call nasty surprises. Nasty surprises equally unnecessary battlefield causalities. In Iraq and Afghanistan the enemy enjoyed the element of surprise in tactical situations. Reversing the situation so the enemy is caught unawares will prevent battlefield causalities. The reader will understand the significance of this in a moment. My reference to "nasty surprises" later on in the article is a tie into this fundamental underlying issue.
I am fascinated by how the author intellectually builds his case for the American Era of War, around Colonel Hiromichi Yahara (1902 - 1973 , other sources say 1981). Like the author I feel it is worthwhile to spend a moment on Yahara. Yahara was someone who was,intellectually gifted and deeply cerebral. His tall presence came with a patrician manner which along with his other traits set him apart form his Imperial Japanese Army contemporaries.
Scale's argues what he calls the American Era of War had it's beginnings towards the end of WW2. The year is 1945 and the scene takes place on Okinawa. Under the Shuri Castle in the Japanese Command Cave. Yahara is in the presence of 2 Lieutenant Generals Itsura Usijima the commander of the 32nd Army and Ismau Cho his chief of staff. Scales's describes Cho as arrogant , stupid, cruel and impetuous.
If Ned Flanders is the anti Homer Simpson ,Yahara was anti of Cho and other mainstream Japanese Army Officers of their day. Reinforcing his character was the fact Yahara had served as a military Attaché in the USA . The majority of the rest of his time had been spent as a Staff officer.
Cho was the atypical Japanese Army officer of his day. Arguing over Tactics Usijima is occasionally interrupted by Cho. The argument centred on the best tactical approach for defending Okinawa. Should the defenders meet the US onslaught from the outset or hunker down and defend the island from the bunkers , caves and tunnels?
By thinking about Okinawa as the springboard for the US invasion of Japan, Yahara mind was thinking on the strategic and not the lower tactical level. This will make more sense to the reader a bit later on. Yahara understood Japan stood no chance of a outright victory over the US's vast industrial and military muscle. So he turned to the enemy's weakness.
Yahara correctly perceived the American public's mood. For the American Public was growing wary of the causalities incurred during the advance on the Japan. Yahara reasoned if during the final reckoning (The Allied invasion of Japan ) if the defenders could inflict enough casualties , public support for for the war in the US would dwindle.
Once public opinion turned against the war , Japan would be in a position to secure to secure a favourable peace deal. Retaining the Emperor 's divine right to rule and avoiding American occupation would have been seen as decent peace deal in light of the military situation. The dropping of the Atomic Bombs brought the war to a close before Yahara's strategic thinking could play out , for now. Yahara lived long enough to see his intellectually laid out foresight play out during and by the US withdrawal from Vietnam.
In Chapter 4 the author touches upon how adversary’s successfully adapted to US Military supremacy. In a move off the beaten track the author turns his attention the Chinese Civil War in the years of 1946 – 1949. Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) and his Marshals undertook adapting the doctrine of the WW2 wartime guerilla war to fighting a conventional war against a numerical and technologically superior enemy. Mao divided his forces into small units and placed his focus on area control.Dividing his forces maintaining and small unit cohesion became a corner stone of Mao's small unit doctrine.
The Chinese would put the lessons they learned during their civil war to good use in Korea. After the Chinese Army was hammered and their logistical bases destroyed by American Air Power they faced the need to evolve again. Logistical facilities were moved to north of the Yalu River putting them out of the reach of American air strikes.
On the ground the Chinese soldiers avoided daytime movements and they remained dispersed until it was time to attack the stagnate American lines. What was an acceptable human
toll to China was unacceptable to the United States. The result was operational
and strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled victory. (emphasis mine).
In the next 20 years the Vietnamese operational and tactical hand book came from Mao's forces methods in Korea and the Chinese Civil War. Against their Round 1 opponent the French the Vietnamese scatted their small unit forces which also had the benefit of allowing them to live off the land. To bring about victory the Viet Minh did need to mass their forces under the umbrella of fire power (The Battle of Dien Bien Phu). By timing the build up of troops correctly the Viet Minh were able to bring their build up and make the first move before the French could bring their advantage in fire power into play.
The other intellectual heartland of the book is the historical evolution or shifts in warfare. As the reader will have noted I have chosen to take my review in this direction. In the chapter entitled : The New Age of Infantry the author furthers his argument by outlining historical periods and shifts in warfare. The general reader will find this section to be very useful background information. For reasons of space I will mostly move my focus to the latest epochal in warfare.
In terms of the historical shifts in warfare on page 54 the author makes the following point which I feel is critical. Epochal shifts in warfare are rare and don't happen overnight.
The arrival of the atomic age heralded the end of the age of industrial warfare , citizenly military and conscript armies. As the author points out WW2 was the last war of the industrial age warfare. I will come back to WW2 in a moment.
Precision long range weapons like missiles are gradually ending the era of Blitzkrieg or mass armoured columns and infantry support in vehicles. The author does back up his assertion by sighting a couple of notable incidents involving tanks. For the sake of space I will leave these incidents to the reader.
Coming back to Vietnam precision weaponry started the process of eroding the era of Blitzkrieg era of warfare. The last hold outs of the inter state and technologically updated and localised versions of the aforementioned era came in the Middle East. The Israeli victories in the First Arab–Israeli War , Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War tells the story , so to speak. If one is looking for the icing on the cake the US lead coalition defeat over Iraq during the first Gulf War will do nicely.
Now I come to the kicker. In unconventional conflicts Vietnam, UN intervention in Somalia, Post 9-11 Afghanistan , Post Saddam Iraq the US ended up on the losing side. Israel became a cropper in Lebanon.
War in Two Epochs McChrystal And Patton is the chapter which brings my attention back to WW2. The author sets out to demonstrate how the wars Generals Patton and McChrystal fought were as different as their personalities. The reader who is familiar with military history will already be familiar with Patton. If not I do feel the more general reader will soon catch up at lighting speed (Pun intended.)
No two generals could possibly be more diametrically opposite than George Patton and Stanley McChrystal. Both graduated from West Point and shared a passion for reading military history, but similarities end there. Patton was an acerbic, bombastic, narcissistic, self-promoter whose skill
as a warrior made him immortal. In contrast, McChrystal’s personal life and active service accentuated the motto of his special warfare clan: the “silent professionals.” As different as they are in time and temperament, both generalssymbolize transformational epochs of the U.S. military art. Patton is the past; McChrystal represents the new age.
For reasons of space I have chosen mostly to focus this review on the future of warfare and not the sound historical cases and arguments made in the book. Hence McChrystal's command of US Special Forces in Afghanistan will take up most of my written ammo supply. McChrystal's war was non-linear and fought in and around local populations.
By comparison under Patton the Third Army saw the US Army finally master Armoured Warfare. In pathering the road for the crushing of the German War Machine , Patton's GI's took causalities as per par the course. McChrystal had to over come the weakness in the US capacity to wage war first identified by Yahara.
In 2003 McChrystal was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command (hereafter, JSOC). McChrystal united a whole host of Special Operations entities including the CIA and US Marine Special Operations under the same roof. In order to bring about the unified command structure , McChrystal was a victorious in a old fashion turf war.
Interestingly the author's description of how JSOC forces took down enemy infrastructure reminded me of the Vietnam War Phonenix Program. The seeds which grew into the JSOC taking down terrorists networks took years to reach fruition. I will split the fruit in half. In one half is the pinnacle of small-unit warfare. A serving member of US Special Forces is like good wine and cheese the product of years of development.
Cho was the atypical Japanese Army officer of his day. Arguing over Tactics Usijima is occasionally interrupted by Cho. The argument centred on the best tactical approach for defending Okinawa. Should the defenders meet the US onslaught from the outset or hunker down and defend the island from the bunkers , caves and tunnels?
By thinking about Okinawa as the springboard for the US invasion of Japan, Yahara mind was thinking on the strategic and not the lower tactical level. This will make more sense to the reader a bit later on. Yahara understood Japan stood no chance of a outright victory over the US's vast industrial and military muscle. So he turned to the enemy's weakness.
Yahara correctly perceived the American public's mood. For the American Public was growing wary of the causalities incurred during the advance on the Japan. Yahara reasoned if during the final reckoning (The Allied invasion of Japan ) if the defenders could inflict enough casualties , public support for for the war in the US would dwindle.
Once public opinion turned against the war , Japan would be in a position to secure to secure a favourable peace deal. Retaining the Emperor 's divine right to rule and avoiding American occupation would have been seen as decent peace deal in light of the military situation. The dropping of the Atomic Bombs brought the war to a close before Yahara's strategic thinking could play out , for now. Yahara lived long enough to see his intellectually laid out foresight play out during and by the US withdrawal from Vietnam.
In Chapter 4 the author touches upon how adversary’s successfully adapted to US Military supremacy. In a move off the beaten track the author turns his attention the Chinese Civil War in the years of 1946 – 1949. Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) and his Marshals undertook adapting the doctrine of the WW2 wartime guerilla war to fighting a conventional war against a numerical and technologically superior enemy. Mao divided his forces into small units and placed his focus on area control.Dividing his forces maintaining and small unit cohesion became a corner stone of Mao's small unit doctrine.
The Chinese would put the lessons they learned during their civil war to good use in Korea. After the Chinese Army was hammered and their logistical bases destroyed by American Air Power they faced the need to evolve again. Logistical facilities were moved to north of the Yalu River putting them out of the reach of American air strikes.
On the ground the Chinese soldiers avoided daytime movements and they remained dispersed until it was time to attack the stagnate American lines. What was an acceptable human
toll to China was unacceptable to the United States. The result was operational
and strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled victory. (emphasis mine).
In the next 20 years the Vietnamese operational and tactical hand book came from Mao's forces methods in Korea and the Chinese Civil War. Against their Round 1 opponent the French the Vietnamese scatted their small unit forces which also had the benefit of allowing them to live off the land. To bring about victory the Viet Minh did need to mass their forces under the umbrella of fire power (The Battle of Dien Bien Phu). By timing the build up of troops correctly the Viet Minh were able to bring their build up and make the first move before the French could bring their advantage in fire power into play.
The other intellectual heartland of the book is the historical evolution or shifts in warfare. As the reader will have noted I have chosen to take my review in this direction. In the chapter entitled : The New Age of Infantry the author furthers his argument by outlining historical periods and shifts in warfare. The general reader will find this section to be very useful background information. For reasons of space I will mostly move my focus to the latest epochal in warfare.
In terms of the historical shifts in warfare on page 54 the author makes the following point which I feel is critical. Epochal shifts in warfare are rare and don't happen overnight.
The arrival of the atomic age heralded the end of the age of industrial warfare , citizenly military and conscript armies. As the author points out WW2 was the last war of the industrial age warfare. I will come back to WW2 in a moment.
Precision long range weapons like missiles are gradually ending the era of Blitzkrieg or mass armoured columns and infantry support in vehicles. The author does back up his assertion by sighting a couple of notable incidents involving tanks. For the sake of space I will leave these incidents to the reader.
Coming back to Vietnam precision weaponry started the process of eroding the era of Blitzkrieg era of warfare. The last hold outs of the inter state and technologically updated and localised versions of the aforementioned era came in the Middle East. The Israeli victories in the First Arab–Israeli War , Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War tells the story , so to speak. If one is looking for the icing on the cake the US lead coalition defeat over Iraq during the first Gulf War will do nicely.
Now I come to the kicker. In unconventional conflicts Vietnam, UN intervention in Somalia, Post 9-11 Afghanistan , Post Saddam Iraq the US ended up on the losing side. Israel became a cropper in Lebanon.
War in Two Epochs McChrystal And Patton is the chapter which brings my attention back to WW2. The author sets out to demonstrate how the wars Generals Patton and McChrystal fought were as different as their personalities. The reader who is familiar with military history will already be familiar with Patton. If not I do feel the more general reader will soon catch up at lighting speed (Pun intended.)
No two generals could possibly be more diametrically opposite than George Patton and Stanley McChrystal. Both graduated from West Point and shared a passion for reading military history, but similarities end there. Patton was an acerbic, bombastic, narcissistic, self-promoter whose skill
as a warrior made him immortal. In contrast, McChrystal’s personal life and active service accentuated the motto of his special warfare clan: the “silent professionals.” As different as they are in time and temperament, both generalssymbolize transformational epochs of the U.S. military art. Patton is the past; McChrystal represents the new age.
For reasons of space I have chosen mostly to focus this review on the future of warfare and not the sound historical cases and arguments made in the book. Hence McChrystal's command of US Special Forces in Afghanistan will take up most of my written ammo supply. McChrystal's war was non-linear and fought in and around local populations.
By comparison under Patton the Third Army saw the US Army finally master Armoured Warfare. In pathering the road for the crushing of the German War Machine , Patton's GI's took causalities as per par the course. McChrystal had to over come the weakness in the US capacity to wage war first identified by Yahara.
In 2003 McChrystal was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command (hereafter, JSOC). McChrystal united a whole host of Special Operations entities including the CIA and US Marine Special Operations under the same roof. In order to bring about the unified command structure , McChrystal was a victorious in a old fashion turf war.
Interestingly the author's description of how JSOC forces took down enemy infrastructure reminded me of the Vietnam War Phonenix Program. The seeds which grew into the JSOC taking down terrorists networks took years to reach fruition. I will split the fruit in half. In one half is the pinnacle of small-unit warfare. A serving member of US Special Forces is like good wine and cheese the product of years of development.
Before his earning his stripes a special forces solider will have undergone specialist training and psychological refinement. He will also know his buddies like no one else. In Afghanistan McChrystal's small special forces teams successively operated at specks on a seemingly vast map.
The other half of the apple is the growth of McChrystal's career from West Point to JSOC. I must say the author gets points from me for invoking one of my historical figures in T.E. Lawrence. Lawrence is referenced in relation to the 19th Century British Army practice of dispatching offices to overseas outposts. In the day these postings may well have been to the far reaches of the British Empire.
Lawrence was one such individual. Pre WW1 Lawrence's time spent Middle East gave him knowledge and the experience which would later to serve him in good stead. For as history so duly notes Lawrence became the famed leader of the Arab Revolt. Modern American Army Officers like McChrystal gain much from overseas postings not unlike their international historical forefathers once did.
Effectively the sweetest fruit ripening was McChrystal's JSOC overcoming what the author call's the Curse of Colonel Yahara. US causalities in the Vietnam and Korean Wars had reaped a bitter harvests. I will come back to the sweet fruit in a moment.
The future belongs to the next Yahara , Petraeus or McChrystal and not a Douglas Haig . The business of practising war belongs to professionals and not gentlemen who like to play the role of British or other nationalities Army Officers.
Identifying and growing the next McChrystal is some of the author's strongest works in the book. Come chapter 19. Scales's lists and gives examples of the kinds of leadership genius styles which can be exhibited by Army Generals. The leadership styles are strategic, Combat , Political, Institutional , Anticipatory and Seers And Doers. Combat and Anticipatory geniuses win wars , hence they occupy the narrative.
The Anticipatory genius forecasts the next war accurately. In doing so they make their force ready for the next war. Anticipatory genius are the seers with the Combat Geniuses being the doers. The doers employ the crafted forces without incurring unacceptable high casualties rates to the American Public.
The other half of the apple is the growth of McChrystal's career from West Point to JSOC. I must say the author gets points from me for invoking one of my historical figures in T.E. Lawrence. Lawrence is referenced in relation to the 19th Century British Army practice of dispatching offices to overseas outposts. In the day these postings may well have been to the far reaches of the British Empire.
Lawrence was one such individual. Pre WW1 Lawrence's time spent Middle East gave him knowledge and the experience which would later to serve him in good stead. For as history so duly notes Lawrence became the famed leader of the Arab Revolt. Modern American Army Officers like McChrystal gain much from overseas postings not unlike their international historical forefathers once did.
Effectively the sweetest fruit ripening was McChrystal's JSOC overcoming what the author call's the Curse of Colonel Yahara. US causalities in the Vietnam and Korean Wars had reaped a bitter harvests. I will come back to the sweet fruit in a moment.
The future belongs to the next Yahara , Petraeus or McChrystal and not a Douglas Haig . The business of practising war belongs to professionals and not gentlemen who like to play the role of British or other nationalities Army Officers.
Identifying and growing the next McChrystal is some of the author's strongest works in the book. Come chapter 19. Scales's lists and gives examples of the kinds of leadership genius styles which can be exhibited by Army Generals. The leadership styles are strategic, Combat , Political, Institutional , Anticipatory and Seers And Doers. Combat and Anticipatory geniuses win wars , hence they occupy the narrative.
The Anticipatory genius forecasts the next war accurately. In doing so they make their force ready for the next war. Anticipatory genius are the seers with the Combat Geniuses being the doers. The doers employ the crafted forces without incurring unacceptable high casualties rates to the American Public.
I believe how the author proposals to rectify the Army's institutional flawed method of selecting junior officers for stardom is one of the most important parts of the book.. At the rank of Captain Platoon and Company Commanders is where tactical geniuses are identified as being destined for higher ranking stardom. The underlying problem is great tactical skills (e.g reading the battlefield) and strategic genius are not related.
A skilled strategic or Anticipatory thinker won't make convoys of trucks run time in the way someone like General William Westmoreland (1914-2005) once did in support of Patton's Third Army (My comparison). In a short the tactical genius will fight the current war in a brilliant manner. At the same time the Anticipatory thinker will be preparing for the next war. By identifying and promoting Anticipatory geniuses , the Army can avoid the pitfall of planning to fight the next war like the last one!
The other forms of leadership shouldn't be discounted. If a sporting team needs a balanced and complete roster the future health of the Army needs the best of all the leadership geniuses. These people must also be strategic thinkers.
Future talent identification should take place in the search for the pool of officers in line for promotion to the rank of Major. Selecting officers on the basis intellectual merit and who show a genuine interest in scholarship early on in their careers is a part of Scales's prescription. The Army must filter out officers who undertake higher education for getting their “ ticket punched” for the purpose of advancing their careers.
Someone like General David Petraeus who takes to academia like a duck to water should be the gold standard for promotion. Intellectualism can not be the sole judge of character. Other characteristics must be taken into consideration to ensure the next General Douglas MacArthur isn't climbing the ranks (my Comparison).
A skilled strategic or Anticipatory thinker won't make convoys of trucks run time in the way someone like General William Westmoreland (1914-2005) once did in support of Patton's Third Army (My comparison). In a short the tactical genius will fight the current war in a brilliant manner. At the same time the Anticipatory thinker will be preparing for the next war. By identifying and promoting Anticipatory geniuses , the Army can avoid the pitfall of planning to fight the next war like the last one!
The other forms of leadership shouldn't be discounted. If a sporting team needs a balanced and complete roster the future health of the Army needs the best of all the leadership geniuses. These people must also be strategic thinkers.
Future talent identification should take place in the search for the pool of officers in line for promotion to the rank of Major. Selecting officers on the basis intellectual merit and who show a genuine interest in scholarship early on in their careers is a part of Scales's prescription. The Army must filter out officers who undertake higher education for getting their “ ticket punched” for the purpose of advancing their careers.
Someone like General David Petraeus who takes to academia like a duck to water should be the gold standard for promotion. Intellectualism can not be the sole judge of character. Other characteristics must be taken into consideration to ensure the next General Douglas MacArthur isn't climbing the ranks (my Comparison).
My interest was peaked on page 116. Once again early identification is on the menu. Only the focus is on successful command relationships and operational staffs. Historical command peers/relationships have spanned from Lee – Jackson , Grant- Sherman in the Civil War to Hindenberg - Ludendorf in WW1. Despite spanning 40 odd years of warfare common denominators can be found in all the examples of successful Command Peer relationships.
The denominators are synergy stemming from communications and understanding reaching a perfect level in the channels of the great Command Peer relationships. How to harvest the sweetest fruit at the Small-unit/Battlefield level is covered through out the book. A successful harvest would mean the Army would no longer fight wars in a fair manner. For reasons of wanting to retain a workable structure I will summarise below what is proposed below.
Adopting Special Forces methods of selection , training and psychological preparation for regular infantry is the foundation of the author's proposals. Crap canning the Army Policy of rotating personnel on a standard basis would allow for greater levels of unit cohesion. Non Commissioned Officers and junior officers benefit from a masterful understanding of their peers. In this manner a developing Command Peer Relationship shares much in common with sweetening small-unit combat.
The denominators are synergy stemming from communications and understanding reaching a perfect level in the channels of the great Command Peer relationships. How to harvest the sweetest fruit at the Small-unit/Battlefield level is covered through out the book. A successful harvest would mean the Army would no longer fight wars in a fair manner. For reasons of wanting to retain a workable structure I will summarise below what is proposed below.
Adopting Special Forces methods of selection , training and psychological preparation for regular infantry is the foundation of the author's proposals. Crap canning the Army Policy of rotating personnel on a standard basis would allow for greater levels of unit cohesion. Non Commissioned Officers and junior officers benefit from a masterful understanding of their peers. In this manner a developing Command Peer Relationship shares much in common with sweetening small-unit combat.
Off the shelf technologies available from Walmart and not works of Sci-Fi would make swing the tactical advantage back to the small-unit infantry of the future. The use of cameras providing live feeds of the battlefield from the perspective of the infantrymen would be useful in real life. The more causal reader may associate such a idea with the hours they spend playing Call of Duty (my comparison).
In real life if those in Command and Control centres saw the battlefield literally through the eyes of the participants they may make better decisions. These decisions surround making the speedy and correct decisions concerning the employment of supporting artillery and air power.
Sensors found in home security systems detect movement. The same kind of sensors which set off car and house alarms could also prevent ambushes. Radio Controlled Drones with cameras in use by hobbyists controlled by soldiers is the way seek out every hiding place from above.
In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I called “nasty surprises” above. I hope veterans and anyone currently serving in the military will forgive me using a layman’s term. By reversing the Tactical Situation in favour of the infantrymen of the future the level of unnecessary battlefield causalities will be greatly reduced.
Scale's gently points out why Army Generals performed poorly in the Post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . Generals McChrystal and David Petraeus aside , why did under perform? The answer lays in a old edict. Armies will always prepare to fight the next war like they did the last one. In short a host of otherwise able senior military Army figures had spend their careers preparing for the next Gulf War. Naturally such preparation failed them in the counter insurgence , security focused environments.
Chapter 10 entitled The Human Dimension is where I will next turn my focus on. Some aspects of the chapter are best left to the reader and for discussions among Military Professionals. Bearing this in mind I feel the best idea is to cover what the author deals with The Crucible of Courage. Scale's informs the reader how small units can individually and collectively maintain a strong tank full of courage. Below is a few points of interest I have selected a few points around the tank of courage.
Soldiers must see and sense in such a way that there are no surprises.
Know Your Enemy. Knowledge of the enemy is enhanced by on the battlefield by courage, audacity, cohesion and the ability to manoeuvre freely. Advantages can be gained by a soldier’s ability to intuitively read body language and the surrounding battlefield. Some soldiers will have a gift which allows them to “see” the battlefield. Others will be excel at correctly reading the body language of local populations.
Small-unit leaders must possess “cognitive clarity.”
A well tuned ability to make sound decisions under pressure and ignoring the urge to wait for information before acting on a decision are factors in cognitive clarity. Deadening emotional highs and lows permits a individual to make decisions in ambiguous situations caused by the nature of the battlefield/what I just mentioned a moment ago.
My Commentary
I wish to applaud the author having a writing style which deeply engrossed me as the reader. The ultimate compliant I can pay the author for his writing style is as follows. I felt like I was in the cave with Colonel Yahara witnessing his bosses argue in a rage. The way the author packs in so many different factors through out the narrative without adversary effecting the narrative is the other great strength of the author.
My commentary also reflects the fact I was unable to secure a interview with Scales. Not securing a interview affected the highlights I selected from the book and my commentary. Not being able to raise questions with the author left me to form my own thoughts about the book. One point I wish to make is my below commentary is in no way meant as any disrespect to the author.
The following question are what I will build my commentary around. How might the American Era of War play out specifically for Australia and New Zealand? Assuming for a moment the author is incorrect about the future of Warfare , does his thesis still hold value? Let me explain how the 2 questions tie in with each other.
I will refine my second question to kick off my thoughts , as they relate to a future inter state war in Asia. Once the worst has happened what happens to the intellectual , strategic and tactical school offered up in the book? Don't throw away Scales's book , just yet. For the sake of discussion I will assume events have unfolded in a way most people never expected.
Fundamentally I believe the paradigm would shift to where Australia and New Zealand (hereafter ANZAC ) become the underdogs. As the underdogs the aims of the ANZAC military forces would be undercut the advantages of a numerically superior enemy who can project fire power on land , sea and in the air.
There is every reason to think the small-unit tactics successfully employed by our enemies could be used against the Chinese. Consider the following. The need to tie down large number of enemy troops , gather intel and cutting enemy communications could be meet by guerilla warfare. Ironically the tactics employed by ANZAC lead guerilla movement would mirror those of our Post War adversary’s. In other words the strategy of fighting not to win via a decentralised small-unit guerilla war.
The reader may be thinking I have misunderstood the Curse of Colonel Yahara , not so. I chose my words in the above paragraph with deliberate care. I think it is fair to say a dictatorial regime like China doesn't worry about the public's reaction to battlefield causalities. To encapsulate my point. The same power/state authority which allows Chinese leaders to ignore their citizens could prove their undoing.
For Chinese civilian and military leaders could succumb to the blood lust of conquest. So if like Hitler Napoleon and the Imperial Japanese Empire in WW2 the Chinese over extend their reach , a new page in history will be written. The Australia and New Zealand era of warfare will have began.
I will refine my second question to kick off my thoughts , as they relate to a future inter state war in Asia. Once the worst has happened what happens to the intellectual , strategic and tactical school offered up in the book? Don't throw away Scales's book , just yet. For the sake of discussion I will assume events have unfolded in a way most people never expected.
Fundamentally I believe the paradigm would shift to where Australia and New Zealand (hereafter ANZAC ) become the underdogs. As the underdogs the aims of the ANZAC military forces would be undercut the advantages of a numerically superior enemy who can project fire power on land , sea and in the air.
There is every reason to think the small-unit tactics successfully employed by our enemies could be used against the Chinese. Consider the following. The need to tie down large number of enemy troops , gather intel and cutting enemy communications could be meet by guerilla warfare. Ironically the tactics employed by ANZAC lead guerilla movement would mirror those of our Post War adversary’s. In other words the strategy of fighting not to win via a decentralised small-unit guerilla war.
The reader may be thinking I have misunderstood the Curse of Colonel Yahara , not so. I chose my words in the above paragraph with deliberate care. I think it is fair to say a dictatorial regime like China doesn't worry about the public's reaction to battlefield causalities. To encapsulate my point. The same power/state authority which allows Chinese leaders to ignore their citizens could prove their undoing.
For Chinese civilian and military leaders could succumb to the blood lust of conquest. So if like Hitler Napoleon and the Imperial Japanese Empire in WW2 the Chinese over extend their reach , a new page in history will be written. The Australia and New Zealand era of warfare will have began.
I would consider General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885- 1946) fighting not to win on Luzon to be a historical parallel. In 1945 Yamashita had withdrawn his forces to the mountains on Luzon. The nature of the terrain favoured the defenders. Yamashita was successful in his aim of tiring down large numbers of US troops so they couldn't be used elsewhere. I do wonder if Yamashita was ever a associate of Yahara?
Note to the reader: I am in no way suggesting what I have outlined replaces the strategic requirement to secure the Air and Sea Lanes in the South West Pacific. The conventional warfare aspects of future inter-state wars in Asia or elsewhere fall beyond the scope of this article.
The strategic logic behind the Australia and New Zealand era of war could equally apply to the next war in Europe. If one doesn't put all their eggs in the Nuclear detergent basket , that is. And when Russian conventional land and air forces would overwhelm the NATO defenders by their sheer numerical advantage. I am sure the reader is intelligent enough to work out the rest for themselves.
Before I return to the contemporary New Zealand Army a slight diversion is in order. What I have coined as the Australia and New Zealand era of War isn't confined to land lovers. There is every reason to believe the fierce underdogs would also look give the enemy a blood nose beyond the sea shore. If the reader is looking for some inspiration Naval wise I do have a book recommendation for them. The book is entitled The Sea Devils Operation Struggle and the great raid of World War Two by Mark Felton.
For the next section I invite the reader to assume Scales's thesis about the future of warfare is correct and I am clearly in the wrong.
I now come back to the contemporary New Zealand Army. I came across a fascinating article in the NZ Army Journal (Third Edition November 2016) entitled Disruptive Thinking in the NZDF – Yeah right! By Staff Sergeant Matt Aslett.
Aslett attended a informative presentation from the US CENTCOM Asymmetric Warfare Group , hosted by the NZDF Adaptive Warfighting Centre (hereafter AWG). 1 of the presenters commented on how the AWG is comprised of disruptive thinkers. Aslett asked himself, what is disruptive thinking? Where does disruptive thinking fit in with today's military?
Not unlike Scales, Aslett opinion is traditionally disruptive or unorthodox thinkers struggle in the military. A in build conservatism, conformism and rigid rank structures (all military norms) work against against unorthodox thinkers. Career advancement stems from fitting into a narrow mould which stems from selection boards and training courses who turn out students in the image of their instructors.
Aslett points out those who are unorthodox thinkers are perceived as “rebels” or “revolutionaries”. David Stirling the founder of the SAS ,. T.E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate the founder of the Chindits were all “rebels.” As such these men would not fare well in present day military. The status qua will remain unless those who select military leaders shift the emphasis creative thinking over more conservative process thinking.
I now leave Aslett's article and return to my commentary. What are the main risks to the New Zealand Army on future deployments? Does rebuffing “rebels” increase the risk of Kiwi troops taking battlefield causalities? Space and time doesn't permit to go fully into these questions. In short the answer to the first question is fairy straight forward.
I believe the greatest risk to kiwi troops on a overseas deployment (enter location here) would be a sudden shift from a low- medium to high intensity warfare environment. Let's use New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team formerly deployed to Afghanistan as the template for a future overseas deployment. The environment will probably urban instead of the rugged undeveloped terrain of Afghanistan/Central Asia.
The cause of the shift is less important than what the consequences would be for the troops on the ground. My argument is a force which is trained and equipped for low – medium level peacekeeping would be nigh on wiped out once the shift has taken place. If such a occurrence takes place the number of causalities would exceed those from the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars put together.
For the sake of not wanting to get bogged down in analysing the New Zealand Defence Force I have chosen to leave issues like the RNZAF lack of "air strike" capability for another time. I in no way wish to diminish the importance of air cover and artillery support. The subject matter is covered by the author in the book and as such is best left to the reader.
I believe 2 factors would greatly negate the risk of Kiwi troops facing a military disaster. Both factors are shared with the Australia and New Zealand era of war. Ensuring the next T.E. Lawrence prospers in the NZDF will ensure better understanding of future wars from the root causes to how to find the road to victory. Secondly Scales, Special Forces orientated prescription must be adapted for the New Army.
Once prescribed , not only would Kiwi infantry be better prepared for unexpected turn of events they would break the curse of Colonel Yahara. New Zealand's political and military leaders would have a greater range of options available to them . In a conflict along the lines raging in Syria or Iraq terrorist networks could be brought down during or after a conflict has taken place. Put another way Kiwi Troops could switch between combat and peacekeeping roles as a situation demands.
Didn't I just say the factors were shared with a worse case scenario war in Asia? SAS type Commandos/Special Forces type troops deployed in small-units would be ideal for waging a guerilla warfare against enemy occupation troops. To encapsulate my point the Army which intimately knows counter insurgency/terrorist network doctrines will equally know how to turn the chess board around. By turning the chess board around additional time may gained to prepare defences in the South West Pacific and Northern Australia.
In conclusion I believe the value of the book goes far beyond the author's thesis and even the Curse of Colonel Yahara. We can only fail to learn from history at our peril. If New Zealand fails to prepare for future storms in our backyard or in the wider world the price paid will be in blood. The sheer cost of the price will be beyond what the majority of people ever envisioned.
