Note to the reader: For the sake of this article I am going to simplify the norms/process of policy making into three stages. Stage one Norm emergence/Norm Entrepreneurship , Norm Cascade/Norm Diffusion and Internalisation/Socialisation. In layman terms somebody or a group of people come up with a new idea to meet (enter the issue here) , the matter is debated and lastly the concept is implemented. (Source , P15 .)
I hope Political Science graduates will forgive my oversimplification. My goal is to bring the subject matter of this article into the public arena. I am not out to earn a degree in Political Science. Also I want to explain to the next generation why they bore the brunt of the mistakes that are being made today.
I have to thank a twitter conversation with @SarahRoseNZ for the idea to write this article. It is fair to say that I don't always agree with Sarah on current events and issues. What I can say is that she has a good gauguage on the dairy farming sector in New Zealand.
Tim Groser has let the cat out of the bag by stating New Zealand is a policy taker and not a policy maker. Groser was talking in relation to the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The readers feelings towards New Zealand joining the TPP, will play a role in how they feel about taking and not making policy. My perspective is the New Zealand government would jump into a lake if all its friends (fellow members of the TPP) were doing so.
Those who in favour of New Zealand joining the TPP argue , not signing on the dotted line will see has excluded from the projected economic benefits the deal will bring in the long term. Surrendering ground on Medical Patient laws to US drug companies is the trade off we make for the claimed benefits. I have a few beefs with this argument to put it in mild and polite terms.
There are two underlying issues for me that I will touch upon. Firstly the supporters of the TPP act under the assumption no other routes exist for New Zealand to booster access (lower trade tariffs or removal tariffs) to overseas markets. I believe this is a false hood because of the availability of forums like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC ) and the Cairns Group.
New Zealand's political leaders and policy makers have become lazy. In there laziness they have neglected the opportunities to present our case for unimpeded access to overseas markets. The New Zealand economy effectively liberalised in the 80's and 90's. So New Zealand should have gone to the negotiating table/ existing forums without having to make any concessions. I don't know if this is can be called policy making or just good sense.
My other objection to the TPP is how the agreement throws away New Zealand's sovereignty and national ID. Certainly I believe the TPP is a step towards a Asian style European Union. As such New Zealand runs of risk of becoming the next Greece , after becoming locked into a eventual single currency Union. Space constraints prevent me from going into the matter of a Asian style EU any further.
In the past when New Zealand governments have overseen the implementation of policy they made two mistakes that have gone unrecognised. The first mistake was the Fourth Labour Government failing to explain the Free Market reforms (known as Rogernomics in New Zealand) to the public. Rogernomics was the right policy medicine for the economic ills of the time. The public who was a recipient of the medicine felt they were bystanders who hadn't been consulted.
Political instability plagued the Labour Party/New Zealand government during this time and was a contributor to its flaws. The legacy of the Fourth Labour Government has been tarnished by its failure to bring the public along with them in difficult social and economic times. New Zealand never fully embraced Rogernomics until the people born in the 1980's and 1990's grew into adulthood. Today the majority of Kiwis wouldn't go back to the interventionist school of economics.
The Fourth National Government would go onto to repeat the mistakes of its Labour predecessor. The full impact of the Fourth Labour and National Government's on the public's minds is reflected in New Zealand's electoral system. At the 1992 Referendum on New Zealand's electoral system , Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) was the winner. The majority of the public's support for MMP was reaffirmed by a comfortable margin in the 2011 Referendum.
Critics of MMP have sighted the fact the nature of proportional representation/minority governments prevent the implementation of reform or even just maintaining good policy. According to the critics minor political parties (who National and Labour need to form a government) can block legislative changes. Evidence for this claim can be said to go both ways.
In the 90's New Zealand and the ACT Party and New Zealand First opposed the RNZN obtaining a third frigate , the effects of which are only now just being felt. So this may be said to be an example of how MMP directly had a negative effect on defence policy. The introduction of Charter Schools a ACT Party policy is an example of how MMP has had a positive effect on policy making.
Now I wish to move onto the second mistake successive governments have made. No instruments were put in place to measure the projected outcome or the actual outcome after a policy has been implemented. How the Resource Management Act (RMA) caused a nation wide shortage housing shortage/unaffordable housing illustrates this failure perfectly. No thought was given to reforming or scraping RMA until the cost of housing became a national crises.
What bothers me is that things didn't have to be this way at all. In 1983 Bob Hawke became the Prime Minster of Australia. Hawke's great strengths were everything his Kiwi counterparts in this era would never even strive to. Hawke enjoyed a great affinity with voters. Hawke's had a great talent for explaining the nature and need for economic reform to the Australian people.
A lot can be said of Paul Keating during time as Treasure under Hawke and his subsequent time as Prime Minster. Certainly the Hawke government never shoved reforms down the throats of the electorate overnight , like Finance Minster Roger Douglas (he bears his name to Rogernomics) did in New Zealand. I believe Hawke understand the pre-set conditions that were required for the implementation of a successful reform agenda while carrying public support with them.
Firstly the need for reform had to be around and secondly a comprehensive policies that can solve the issues at hand. Thirdly the public had to understand how the reforms package would work , lend their support to the package and fundamentally perceive it as being fair. Hawke left a template for future Australian political leaders (including current Prime Minster Malcolm Turnbull) to follow in times of major reform. New Zealand's current and future political leaders have no such template to follow.
At the time of writing Local Government New Zealand is advocating for the RMA to be replaced or rebooted. The RMA must be one of the worst bits of legislation that was ever enacted in New Zealand. Current or future governments will have to tackle RMA reform. The question in my mind is can they avoid the terrible mistakes of the of their predecessors?
Elements of the socialist left in New Zealand have never accepted Rogernomics and would like New Zealand to return to the Muldoon era. National is still scarred by the electoral unpopularity of their government in the 1990's. How will the current and future governments overcome these obstacles? Watch this space.
Four years ago the New Zealand government unveiled the first of its ‘NZ Inc’ Country Strategy Papers ‘Opening Doors to India’, which set the goal of having India as a ‘core trade, economic and political partner’ by the end of 2015. That time is now up but it is clear the intended goal remains far from met. Indeed, it’s not even close. As a participant in a recent track two dialogue organized by the New Zealand India Research Institute and the Observer Research Foundation put it, the relationship today is warm but ‘a little bit empty’. For all the platitudes about a shared tradition of parliamentary democracy and Commonwealth heritage, and our mutual love of cricket, the relationship looks shallow almost across the spectrum.
I have been wanting to cover New Zealand's relationship with India for a while. David Capie's very good article provides the opening for my below commentary. My prediction is even if Capie doesn't realise it yet , the subject material of his article will be of some historical importance. I will split my commentary into two parts . In part one, I will give my take on defence ties between the two nations. In the same vain part two will see me take a glance at the trade and diplomatic relationship.
India faces the same challenges as many developing countries. What sets India apart is the scale of the challenges due to the countries population and landmass. Corruption , a civil service who operates like it did before globalisation and extending education to poverty stricken areas. India discourages or deters foreign investment. The lack of foreign investment is a handicap India will have to address if they are to achieve sustainable economic growth.
Some people would view these challenges as negatives. I take the view they present New Zealand with opportunities for the private , Non Government Organisation (NGO) and government sectors to play a small role in Partnering with India in what has been termed the Asian Century. India's emerging middle class is at the Coal Face of the world's largest democracy.
Geography sees India sandwiched between Pakistan , Central Asia and China. Pakistan is a unstable if not a border line failed state. Central Asia/”The Stans” act as land route or barrier to the Middle East. China looms large both on India's borders and as a rising economic and military power. India's emerging middle class is coming into this backdrop as I write this article.
One of the many lessons from the International Force For East Timor (INTFERNET) is the value of mutual understanding between the New Zealand and Australian armies. 1RNZIR under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Burnett ONZM , plugged seeming less into the Australian lead INTFERNET Command Structure. Burnett's battalion common understanding with the Australian Army and not common protocols and procedures was why 1RNZIR was Plug n Play ready. The years of the two armies Officer exchanges , attending each others Staff Colleges and so on , paid off handsomely.
India is a emerging Naval Power and a large contributor to UN Peacekeeping operations. India can said to be expanding its footprint globally and in Asia. Aside from greater levels of mutual understanding , other clear benefits are to had by deepening defence ties between the NZDF and the Indian Armed Forces. Joint training exercises, sharing of operational experiences and improved capabilities (E.g. Indian Armed Forces Peacekeeping and NZDF Anti submarine warfare.) would be on the menu.
Naval and maritime patrol operations is where I foresee New Zealand and India military cooperation/Joint Operations taking place. The NZDF and law enforcement could conduct training exercises with its Indian counterparts. New Zealand's contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations is at its lowest levels in over twenty years. Specialist Peacekeeping Operations is the NZDF's niche capabilities that no other military in the world can match. Surely it would make sense for New Zealand to develop India's Peacekeeping capacity and capabilities?
I do now need to shift my focus to New Zealand's economic ties with India. A more in depth look at the potential benefits of improved defence ties is for another time.
New Zealand's main exports to India are commodity products. In my opinion this reflective just how reliant New Zealand remains on dairy exports. Although they have been lowered trade tariffs still remain a barrier to Kiwi commodity exports. Why hasn't New Zealand looked for other export market opportunities to India? What non traditional areas could New Zealand look to set exploit in such a populous country?
New Zealand prides itself on producing innovations in areas like IT or design fields. To the best of my knowledge Kiwi innovation has yet to find its way to tackling issues like sanitation and access to clean drink water in India and the other parts of the developing world. It's not like the issue of expanding sustainable levels of sanitation hasn't been highlighted and discussed in recent years. In 2011 the Bill Gates Foundation ran a competition that sought the best design of toilet that would deliver safe and sustainable sanitation to billions of people who don't have it world wide.
Do Kiwis have the business sense to couple with the culture of innovation to meet the market for sustainable sanitation? What kind of business model will be employed? Who will work with the Indian government and NGO's to roll out the products to urban and outlying areas? Unlike with dairy exports the New Zealand government won't be making much effort to open other doors. Individuals with a wide ranges of skills, backgrounds and values will have to lead the way in breaking down the doors that open to India.
In my view the neglect New Zealand's ties with India is reflective of how successive government's have viewed Asia. New Zealand views of Asia are predominantly centered around China's role as being Fonterra's number one customer. By the same token Kiwi's see India through the same kind of mirror.Sure Indian students provide revenue for high education outlets in New Zealand. Intrepid Kiwis travel to India as part of their Big Overseas Experience.
Beyond scholarly circles New Zealand engagement with India isn't discussed. Unless the general public takes a greater level of interest ,New Zealand's relationship with India won't improve in the areas of military ties and diplomatic relations. Public discussion of New Zealand foreign policy , diplomatic relations and military posture is by in large absent. The lack of public/voter awareness has permitted successive governments to make monumental blunders.
The current state of New Zealand relationship with India is one of those blunders. New Zealand cannot find any measure of security or a meaningful place at the diplomatic table until the blunder is recognised and corrected. New Zealand must find its security within the Asia-Pacific region. The security of New Zealand's maritime trade routes against threats from piracy , terrorism and medium to high intensity conflicts is depended on our relations with countries like India.
Another blunder made by the New Zealand foreign policy establishment is putting all their eggs in the UN Security Council basket. New Zealand wasted a decade of diplomatic resources on securing a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. The expense of pandering to the League of Nations , err I mean the UN is demonstrated by the lack of foundations in the New Zealand engagement with India. New Zealand could have accomplished a lot by building the foundations. Instead New Zealand will accomplish nothing, but blowing hot air while sitting on the Security Council.
This article follows on from Part 2 in the series that covers New Zealand's role in the war against Isis. In this instalment I will look at the second alternative strategy that was open to New Zealand when joining the coalition's military efforts to combat Isis. The down and upsides of New Zealand joining in the defence of Jordan against tidal wave of Isis is covered below.
I will begin the article with the clear advantages offered by the “Jordanian option.” The first distinction that I believe is worth making is the fact Jordan is a internationally recognised state. Now the reader may be wondering why I would make such an obvious statement. From a diplomatic stand point the New Zealand government would have an easier time with the Jordanian option. Coming to the defence of a internationally recognised state fits comfortably within international law.
On the other hand arming and equipping the Kurds makes good military sense. In diplomatic/political terms Turkey and the Kurds are yet to reach an accord. In short Turkey and the Kurds are yet to realise that Isis is the real and common enemy. In part 3 I will cover this political migraine in greater depth.
The Jordanian Armed Forces has undergone the transformation from a conscript to All professional , well trained and motivated force. The Iraqi Army melted away at the first sight of the enemy. Instead of trying to revive a dead patient (the Iraqi Army) the NZDF would have become a junior coalition partner with one of the stronger military in the region.
Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.
Unknown
Logistics could well be the one reason why the Jordanian option wasn't ever open to the NZDF. When the NZDF deploys outside of the Pacific Islands region they plug into coalition partners logistical supply chain. If the logistical supply chain isn't available the means to keep air , naval and ground units resupplied isn't available.
The regular New Zealand Army remains a UN peacekeeping force at the time of writing. Barring any major policy shift in the coming Defence White Paper this policy will remain in place. Not having high intensity combat capabilities would rule the regular army out from front line duties in Jordan , Syria and Iraq. The NZ SAS would bear the combat load like they did in their first couple of stints ( 2001 and 2005) in Afghanistan.
The Royal New Zealand Air Force lacks air strike or combat wing capability (last seen with the Skyhawkes.) The SAS would be reliant on the Jordanian Air Force for air cover. I for one am opposed to the NZDF deploying anywhere overseas without native air cover.
The final obstacle is the lack of previous ties between the NZDF and the Jordanian armed forces. Interoperability between the NZDF and other nations defence forces is depended on policy decisions made by the New Zealand government. New Zealand devoting resources to winning a temporary seat on the UN Security Council was ill-advised. New Zealand would have been better served furthering diplomatic and military ties with a country like Jordan.
For having said of this I will still come back to Jordan in the last instalment of the series. Considerable diplomatic manoeuvring from the USA and the rest of the international community will be needed if a wider war in the Middle East region is to be avoided.
The book has no single author. Each chapter covers a separate topic in the same way toppings are on a pizza. Each topping is provided by a separate contributor. The book is a free publication. As such the reader can download the title as a whole or the chapters individually as they wish.
For the sake of maintaining readability my commentary will appear separate from the overview of each topic. The overview is intended to act as a highlights package. Quotes directly from the book appear in italics.
Highlights Package
Chapter 1 Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region: Rummaging through the
Blueprints Richard Herr
This chapter offers the reader a overview of the regional architecture from 1944 to the present. Really the regional architecture becomes important in the 1970's. Around this time the region was being decolonised.
The matter of the regions geographical boundaries was defined in 1962. Historically, the post-1962 ambit of the South Pacific Commission (now the Pacific Community, but still known as the SPC) has defined the boundaries of the Pacific Islands region. It should be noted that the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum) did not redraw its borders to include Australia and New Zealand despite their status as Forum founding members
The development of regional systems has been ad hoc. In short the beginning was with the South Pacific Commission (Now known as the Pacific Islands Forum) would become the framework for the regional system. In the 1980's Pacific Island groups/organisations took on more of a regional flavour. Significantly in response to being Frozen out of the Pacific Islands Forum Fiji formed the Pacific Islands Development forum.
The divergence of the Australia and New Zealand's interests from those of the Pacific Islands raised many eyebrows. Australia and New Zealand's interests in the Cold War were to use the region as a strategic barrier against invasion and preventing the spread of Communism. In the post 9-11 years the focus has been on preventing a failed state scenario.
The perceptive of the Pacific Island Nations has been motivated by their own local interests. For the first twenty years after decolonisation the aim was to take control of the security agenda. By doing so the new nations were seeking to assert their own national sovereignty. From 1988 to 2004 building bridges to strength the system was the aim.
Institutionally and Economically, Pacific Island nations are unable to support regional security without outside assistance. At the time of writing China is changeling Australia's and New Zealand's monopoly in this area. Adapting the region's pathways and forums to this new reality is the focal point in the present day.
Chapter 2 The Regional Security Environment and Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region Michael Powles
The Pacific Islands are not immune from the geopolitical effects of China's rise as a world power. The central questions are can China emerge as world power peacefully? Can China and the United States peacefully co exist in Asia and Oceania? What are China's ambitions for the Pacific Islands region?
One group of observers, the so-called “realists,” see real grounds for extreme nervousness in the present international security situation. John Mearsheimer, of the University of Chicago, drawing on lessons from history, not least the run-up to the first World War, asserted emphatically, “To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.” Not everyone agrees, however. Some countries in Southeast Asia, which have generations of experience dealing with competing major powers in their region, are less pessimistic. Singapore’s foreign minister has said: “The world and Asia are big enough to accommodate a rising China and a reinvigorated United States.”
For small powers the region's security is depended on a couple of factors. The extend to which China respects International law and the International Order . Developments in the East and South China seas are reason for concern. To what degree the United States is willing to share power in Asia with China . The Republic of Korea hasn't shown any interest in helping the USA to contain or obstruct the rise of China.
China's hunger for resources that sustains it economic growth may place pressures on the environment and sustainable resource management. The sustainability of Pacific Tuna is coming under the spot light as Chinese , Japanese , Taiwanese, European and American fishing fleets all harvest the regions stock pile. Generally China has observed it's obligations under the Western and Central Pacific Fishers Convention.
If the worst was to happen and China doesn't take a peaceful road to it's rise the region will naturally feel the impact. Yet for all the risks Pacific Islanders remain optimistic about the future.
China's role in the region underwent a transformation around the time they started to flex there muscle as an emerging power. China and Taiwan were engaged in Cheque book diplomacy . Both countries sort to buy diplomatic recognition. The “China Question” as it was once known is currently on the back burner.
Apart from its aid program, China’s growing presence is further reflected in its expanding economic and trade ties with the region. Between 2000 and 2012, China’s trade with the eight Island countries with whom it has diplomatic ties7 rose from $248 million to $1.767 billion, a more than sev-en-fold increase. In 2009, China became the second-largest trade partner in the region, after Australia. According to a report by China’s Ministry of Commerce, based on 2012 Chinese customs statistics, China’s total trade with all Pacific Island countries, including those having no diplomatic ties with Beijing, was as high as $4.5 billion. Additionally, China has become an important export market for some Pacific Island economies. For example, around 45 percent of Solomon Islands’ 2013 exports went to China. For Papua New Guinea, China has become the largest market for its timber exports over the last decade.
The more pressing issues relate to how Chinese developmental aid comes with no strings attached. When countries like Australia and New Zealand provide such aid it comes with the expectation of better levels of governance. Other OECD donors tie aid to economic and political reforms.
Make no mistake. The Chinese are proud of there differing approach to foreign aid. The Chinese are the 5th largest donor to the Pacific Island Region. Their no strings attached approach is seeing them become an increasingly attractive source of foreign aid. Fiji showcased this very well. After the 2006 coup, Australia and New Zealand led the way in imposing sanctions , cutbacks in aid and diplomatic isolation. Beijing chose to continue business as normal with Commodore Frank Bainimarama's regime.
So far, China’s increased regional engagements have generated considerable concerns and criticisms in countries like Australia and the United States, which have exercised significant regional influence. Many critics target China’s aid policy. According to China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper, key features of this policy are: • Unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity • Imposing no political conditions • Adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development
The impact of Chinese foreign aid is becoming noticeable in other ways. Tonga has been the recipient of a number of “concessional loans” worth 100 million dollars. Tonga has accumulated debt that is equal to 32% of the country's GDP.
Opinions that deal with what is driving China's engagement in the Pacific Island's Region are almost tribal in nature. Some would argue China's appetite for natural resources, trade and economic interests are the driving factors. Another school of thought states that what is unfolding really represents the microcosm of the US-China rivalry.
China enjoys very diverse interests from development , trade to promoting their own culture via the Confucius Institute at the University of South Pacific in Fiji. 2000 scholarships per year are available to students from South Pacific Countries who wish to study in China.
Yet for all of this China's developmental efforts remain uncoordinated. Heck some of their activities even go as far to undercut the effectiveness of others. Chances for New Zealand to coordinated infrastructure projects with China are limited.
The reality of China's presence in the Pacific Islands region will grow over the coming decades needs to be accepted. Simply requesting China to conform to Western practices and norms in developmental aid would be a waste of time. Resisting/trying to contain China's expanding influence would be for zero gain or in effect banging one's head against a wall.
Assimilating the merits of the donor countries practices and norms is the way to formulate policy in coming decades.
Chapter 4 Still Missing in the Rebalance? The United States and the Pacific Island Countries Eric Y. Shibuya
The geopolitics of the Cold War determined how the USA engaged with the Pacific Islands Region. In a sense the Pacific Islands region was underneath a sort triangle of US allies in South Korea , Philippines,Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.
The heart, however, of U.S. influence in the region, was, in fact, among Pacific Island nations, particularly island states in free association with the United States. These included the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau. Along with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, they formed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
The TTPI was under a UN trusteeship system administered by the USA up until the 1960's.
Parts of the Pacific Islands region were sealed off for Nuclear Tests . The populations of Bikini and Enewetak were displaced by nuking testing. Efforts by the Americans to bring Universal Education and a system of government were unsuccessful. These efforts were compounded by the Kennedy administration throwing more money at the existing problems. LBJ's Great Society programs didn't prove to be very great if you lived in the Pacific Islands.
The late 1960s signaled the end of the colonization era, and the beginning of TTPI members’ work to re-shape their relationships with the United States. The Congress of Micronesia (COM) was established in 1965 to further the political development of the TTPI, though the U.S. high commissioner still held much of the governing authority. In 1967, the COM set up a political status commission to explore varying options towards terminating the trusteeship. The COM advocated “free association” (a new status developed between New Zealand and the Cook Islands) and entered into negotiations with the United States in 1969.
In time The Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Federated and States of Micronesia would all enter Free Associations with the USA. In exchange for on going financial aid , access to the US Postal service at domestic rates and American Visa's , the US kept the right to operate military bases in those places if they ever felt the need arose.
The years that awkwardly fell between the end of the Cold War and 9-11 saw the USA neglect the Pacific Island Region . After 9-11 attention turned to preventing fragile states from becoming the Afghanistan of the South Pacific. The Australian lead intervention in the Solomon Islands sought to avoid a failed state scenario. Now we come to the Obama's administration “Pivot to Asia”.
Certainly, the rebalance announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has been a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high-level U.S. participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. Significant disagreements within the U.S. government led to a government shutdown that brought into stark relief the fiscal realities the Obama Administration and its successors will confront. This reality also generally dampened expectations around the region of a massive influx of military personnel and equipment, and their associated economic benefits.
The Compact States (Those who have Free Associations with the USA) are yet to act as staging posts for US military assets. Such an occurrence would raise social and environmental concerns. Balanced against these concerns would be the benefits of improved infrastructure and economic benefits. Pacific Island nations may be better off without the increased American interest in their region.
Greater engagement improves cultural understanding, and greater cultural understanding leads to better, more effective engagement. Ultimately,greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of more, but rather better engagement. From issues spanning conflict resolution to resource management, Island cultures have a lot to teach us; we need to learn how to listen.
The Pacific Islands are off the international radar.. The UN Security Council and international commentators around the world are focused on the Ukraine, The Middle East and China's activities in East Asia.
Australia is the largest aid donor to the Pacific Island Region. As the dominant donor to the region Australia contributes a significant amount of Security aid in the region. The majority of the funding is spend in Melanesia (More specifically Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.) New development assistance is coming from Russia, South Korea, India, United Arab of Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar.
China’s growing engagement in the Pacific Islands has fueled talk of a power struggle in the region. But viewing China’s regional activities in geostrategic terms is inappropriate and potentially counterproductive. China has not been disruptive — in a security sense — in Pacific Island countries; it has been a largely constructive partner, with its aid and investment largely concentrated in building infrastructure.
The most glaring instance of Australia dominating the security agenda in the region is the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The total cost of RAMSI over a decade has been $2.6 Billion. The Australian tax payer has footed 95% of the bill.
At the time of writing The Pacific Patrol Boat Program is about due for replacement. Support for the program has come in financial and human resources terms. 24 Royal Australian Navy and 2 Royal New Zealand Navy personnel are supplied as maritime surveillance and technical advisers.
Illegal/unregulated fishing is hurting the regions fish stocks. Australia has cooperated in fisheries surveillance, largely through the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and in monitoring the exclusive economic zones of respective Pacific Island countries through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, now known as the Pacific Maritime Security Program . Among Pacific Island nations, only Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga have their own military forces, although the Vanuatu Police have a paramilitary wing. These militaries are small and lightly equipped; none would be capable of defending their nations against a foreign military force. In Fiji, the military itself has been a major contributor to domestic instability. In Papua New Guinea, certain undisciplined forces have instigated violence against civilians.
Australia's lack of response to Climate Change has disappointed Pacific Island nations. Australia has not done as well as it could in this area. Restoring peace/law and order in the Solomon Islands has been successful. Australia may not always be the Pacific Islands region’s most influential player from an economic perspective, but is the Pacific Islands region’s indispensable power from a security perspective.
Chapter 6 Finding Common Ground: New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation
in the Pacific Anna Powles
The paradox of New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is that New Zealand sits both within the region, but also on the periphery. A colonial history, current constitutional obligations, and its role as a development donor to the region, places New Zealand alongside Australia with the regional periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States.
New Zealand most important relationship historical and in the present is of course with Australia. Of late, New Zealand has been uncomfortable at times with Australia's sphere of influence approach to the Pacific Islands region. Differencing views on the rise of China and understanding the region underscore a folk in the road that Australia and New Zealand are taking. An increasing gap between Australia and New Zealand's military capabilities should also be considered. The gap is placing a strain on interoperability between the ADF and NZDF. Viewed from the perceptive of diplomacy in the Pacific Island's region the Trans Tasman relationship is a house divided.
When the New Zealand government ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in July 1996, it acquired a maritime territory between fifteen and twenty times larger than the total land mass of New Zealand. As a consequence, New Zealand is recognized as having one of the largest maritime domains of all coastal states, with an Exclusive Economic Zone considered the world’s fourth or fifth largest. Moreover, under its constitutional obligations, New Zealand has responsibility for the maritime territories of Tokelau, Cook Islands and Niue. However, New Zealand defense strategists suffer from sea blindness. New Zealand has little maritime consciousness despite the Maori legends of ocean voyages from Hawaiki. It is a strategic paradox that New Zealand is a marine nation, but not a maritime nation. With the anticipated release of both New Zealand’s maritime security policy and the Defence White Paper due in 2015, it is hoped that a comprehensive, overarching maritime strategy is articulated; one that drives increased maritime awareness and capabilities to enable New Zealand to undertake a greater role in monitoring, surveillance, patrolling and protection of its maritime domain.
The driver behind New Zealand's diplomatic reach in the region is driven by the Biketawa Declaration and other regional declarations. Sanctions against Fiji and RAMSI were undertaken under the Biketawa Argeement. Comprehensive analysis of the national cost benefit ratio and the lessons learned from RAMSI are yet to take place.
New Zealand government departments fail to share information. Lessons are going unheeded and mistakes are repeated. These are contributing factors to New Zealand's ad hoc approach to diplomacy in the region.
Lessons from the New Zealand brokered Bougainville peace process have yet to be included in diplomatic efforts in the region. One aspect of these lessons is how during the early days of the Bougainville peace process the initial deployment of the Truce Monitoring Group was deployed to that island unarmed.
Fiji sees itself as the leader of Pacific Island Nations. Out of the nations they lead Fiji has the strongest military. Moreover, with regards to Fiji – and by extension the region – there is the most room for divergence. Following the resumption of Australian-Fijian diplomatic ties and the lifting of sanctions, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s visit to Fiji in November 2014 revealed a potential estrangement in trans-Tasman relations. Bishop’s and Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimara- ma’s announcement that a meeting (hereafter, the Sydney Meeting) would be held in early 2015 with the aim of reviewing the regional architecture caught New Zealand and the rest of the Pacific Islands by surprise. Bainimarama’s diplomatic seduction, combined with Bishop’s inexperience in regional politics, resulted in the successful conflation of two critical issues in regional governance; the first of which is Fiji’s readmission as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its expulsion from the Forum in 2009, Fiji has categorically stated that it would only return if Australia and New Zealand were downgraded from full members to development partner status.
New Zealand and other periphery partners need to improve there listening skills around the region. Originating in South Africa scholarship Developmental Peace Keeping seeks to undertake what amounts to nation building. UN Peace Keeping missions have been dogged by a history of failures and other matters that fall beyond the scope of this review. Developmental Peace Keeping seeks to rectify past wrongs.
Developmental Peace Keeping could play a role in New Zealand's engagement with the region. New Zealand holds a Non – Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council for 2015-16. How can New Zealand make the best use of it's seat at the UN table to improve engagement with the region?
Chapter 7 Indonesian Diplomatic Manoeuvring in Melanesia: Challenges and Opportunities Jim Elmslie
Vigorous Indonesian diplomacy stymied a bid by The West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).WPNCL membership of the MSG was made pending the January 2014 Foreign Ministerial Mission (FMM). The FMM consisted of MSG leaders travelling to West Papua to investigate the situation.
Verifying claims of Indonesian human rights abuses made by WPNCL. By the same token Indonesian claims about human rights abuses being in the past , social and economic progress in the same area were worth examining. The FMM representatives never meet with the representatives of the Indonesian government's critics. Half a day was the amount of time the FMM spent in West Papua. Vanuatu pulled out of the exercise in advance fearing that it would be a farce. Vanautu’s fears were proven correct.
The Vanuatu government has long been a supporter of West Papuans and their desire for independence. This is more than a sentiment held by the political elite; it is felt strongly amongst the society’s grassroots. Even at the time of Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, West Papua was a significant fixture on the political landscape. Vanuatu’s first Prime Minister, Father Walter Lini, said the country would never be truly free while other parts of Melanesia, especially West Papua, remained occupied by foreign powers.
Indonesia has long known about Vanautu's support for West Papua independence. Until recently Indonesia hadn't made any diplomatic efforts to counter this support. High profile activists who support independence for West Papua live in Vanautu. Like all activists they have been successful in gaining their cause in local (in this case Vanautu) media coverage.
The people of Vanautu are embracing the cause in their national conscious. In 2013 former Vanuatu Prime Minister Sato Kilman granted Indonesia observer status in the MSG. Indonesia had wooed Kilman with lavish trips to Jakarta. Kilman misjudged public opinion. Like all political leaders who make such mistakes he was install for a prescription of public backlash. Kilman resigned as Prime Minster after losing a no confidence vote.
Kilman successor Moana Carcasses Kalosil would use the UN as the platform to place the spotlight on the perception that Indonesian atrocities were being ignored. Kalosil would state “How can we then ignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuans who have been brutally beaten and murdered?” In March 2014 Kilman take the matter further by making a speech to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva. In the speech he referred to the horrific torture and murder of individual West Papuans, which had been filmed by soldiers. He called for the Committee to establish a country mandate which should “include investigation of alleged human rights violations in West Papua and provide recommendations on a peaceful political solution in West Papua.”
The Indonesian ambassador fell back on the FMM. “Furthermore, the statement of Mr. Kalosil is simply in contradiction with the visit of a high-level delegation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members representing [the]Melanesian Community to Indonesia from 11 to 16 January 014 in which [the] Ministerial Level Delegation of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and representative[s] of the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of New Caledonia as well as MSG High Representative conducted [an on-site] visit to Papua province and obtained firsthand information.”
Indonesia use of cheque book diplomacy ensured support from other Melanesian countries waned. Indonesia like China would use Fiji suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum to meet its own ends. Indonesia like China places no emphasis on improving governance and human rights issues.
Even before the PIDF meeting, Indonesia was not-so-quietly maneuvering to suppress the West Papua issue; it contributed, for example, $30,000 to Fiji to help fund the costs of hosting the United Nations’ regional meeting of the Special Decolonization Committee. Vanuatu’s Daily Post newspaper saw this as blatant manipulation: “Jakarta’s cheque book diplomacy reflects its determination to silence any murmurs of regional support or discussions within the MSG on the issue of re-enlisting West Papua back on the decolonization list.”11 It seems to have been money well spent as there was scant mention of West Papua in official forums, despite local moves by some church groups to have the issue aired. PNG has always had a more problematic relationship with Indonesia, sharing a long land border with their giant Asian and Muslim neighbor. A latent fear of military invasion has always constrained PNG’s response to the sufferings of their brother Melanesians over the border. Instead, frequent affirmations of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua remain the mantra.
Sensitivities over the referendum on independence for Bougainville which is due this year also influences Papua New Guinea's stance on West Papau. In spite of this and the almighty dollar support West Papau nationalism is growing amongst NGO and political circles in PNG.
Indonesian diplomacy pulled a substantial victory by playing off the West Papua independence groups against one another. The need for unity led to the creation of United Movement for Liberation of West Papua (ULMWP). In February of 2015 ULMWP lodged an application to join MSG. What means Indonesia uses to obstruct the application is unknown at the time of writing.
Timor-Leste has had three distinct periods during in its history. The history of Portuguese colonisation of Timor-Leste which would start with the Portuguese landing in 1515. In 1974 the pro democracy Carnation Revolution in Portugal saw the fall of fall of the fascist Salazar-
Caetano dictatorship. The fall of the fascist regime saw Portugal grant her distance colonies independence.
After the failure of both Portuguese and Timorese initiatives seeking to develop a roadmap towards independence, Indonesia capitalized on the security vacuum, and on Dec. 7, 1975, invaded Timor-Leste.
Indonesia would occupy Timor-Leste for the next 24 years. Indonesia would net out a greater level of brutal treatment to the local population then the Portuguese had done so. In 1999, almost a quarter century after occupation, the tripartite May 5 agreement was signed by the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia, establishing the unarmed UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the act of popular consultation. This took place Aug. 30, 1999, under UN Security Council resolution 1236. In a climate of increased intimidation and violence, 98.6 percent of the population registered to vote, and on Aug. 12, 1999, 78.5 percent voted in favor of independence, rejecting special autonomy within Indonesia.
Prior to the vote Indonesian military and local sponsored militias went on a rampage of killing and destruction. Officially known as Operation Clean Sweep the rampage resulted in the destruction of infrastructure and the mass displacement of people. After Operation Clean Sweep was over the Indonesians acknowledged how they were unable to control the situation in East Timor. After making the acknowledgement Indonesia consented to a UN sanctioned international peacekeeping force.
Timor-Leste would formally gain independence in 2002. Periods of instability would plague the new state. In 2006 fighting amongst political elements shattered East Timor's as the “poster child” of UN peacekeeping/nation building.
East Timor geography uniquely places the country at the gate way to Asia and the Pacific Islands region. Pragmatism has seen East Timor show a desire to reconcile with Indonesia. East Timor aspires to be a global role model for “Post conflict development.” East Timor uses the example of it's growing ties with Indonesia to promote its vision. Timor-Leste views reconciliation with Indonesia as way of advancing peace building and dialogue within the Asian region.
Timor-Leste has sought to position itself as the corridor between Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, while exploiting its “Lusophone alliances” with fellow former Portuguese colonies as gateways into Europe, Africa and Latin America. Gusmao articulated his strategic outlook in 2014, stating: “Timor-Leste is strategically located between the CPLP countries and ASEAN, China, and the Island States of the Pacific. We also want to make use of our strategic positioning in Southeast Asia, since we have the possibility of creating bridges with Europe, Africa and Latin America.”
The government of Timor-Leste activity promotes the idea that their nation is a part of South East Asia. Further to this point the goal of East Timor is to become a full member of Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). East Timor advocates the ASEAN goals of greater political and economic integration in the region. This represents East Timor's Westwards glance. In the words of Gusmao: “Many would have thought this too would be improbable. In a model of reconciliation, and with a firm commitment to focus on the future, we have built a strong relationship of trust and friendship. Rather than being enslaved by the trauma of our history, we are instead honoring our struggle by working towards a better future for our people. We know that Indonesia and Timor-Leste not only share an island, we share a future.
East Timor's eastwards glance begins with the ethnic make up of the country. Much of the eastern half of the country is ethnically Melanesian and Polynesian. Such a subtle distinction has led to discussions: Is East Timor a Southeast Asian or a Pacific Island Nation? Vulnerability and fragility are attributes East Timor shares with its Pacific Island neighbouring countries.
Timor-Leste has pursued a proactive policy of engagement with the regional governance architecture. Timor-Leste has been an observer at the Pacific Islands Forum since 2002; participated in the Pacific Small Islands Developing States meetings; and contributed as a donor partner15 to the Pacific Islands Development Forum established in 2014. Timor-Leste has assumed a similar development partner role with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), funding the MSG Secretariat’s economic advisory position. Timor-Leste has also attended MSG Leaders’ Summits and the Secretariat has indicated a strong desire to engage with Timor-Leste on other issues, including security and development.
East Timor has a stake in strengthening the regional security apparatus. “Boots on the ground” and the security sector are the providers of East Timor's slice of the pie , so to speak. Regional fisheries and environmental security is the tomato sauce served with the pie. The addition of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces.
East Timor's experiences in nation-building, conflict transformation and development processes is seeing the nation gain relevance in the Pacific Islands region. The lessons from East Timor's conflict transformation and the reintegration of veterans and former combatants into the modern independent state, offers lessons to the Solomon Islands, Bougainville , (and by extension) Papua New Guinea.
Domestically East Timor looks to incorporate the lessons in the “New Deal” which the United Nations is considering as part of its post-2015 Development Agenda. Moreover, there are critical lessons to be learned in regards to challenges posed by a growing youth demographic and related issues of disenfranchisement, vulnerability and growing criminality. Growing youth demographics in Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands region are conducive to and facilitate transnational crime. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands in countering transnational crime is critical, as both regions are increasingly targeted by transnational criminal syndicates due to their porous borders, corruption levels, and strategic geography as gateways to richer neighbors. Timor-Leste is a prescient warning of how quickly transnational narcotics syndicates can take root in the fragile and conflict-affected states.
Chapter 9 Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice: The Role of Norms, Values and
Principles in Training for Peace Operations Russell Parkin
Peacekeeping has been evolving since its inception in 1956. Notable Peacekeeping remains a military task. In the present day Peacekeeping is a multi agency undertakings. In the words of Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it.”
Sir Brian Urquhart, the only Hammarskjöld adviser with significant military experience, described the task of peacekeeping as dependent upon: “…the non-use of force and on political symbolism. It is the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction. It takes time to develop the full effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation and to secure the confidence and cooperation of the conflicting parties…For soldiers, peacekeeping can be a thankless and unglamorous task, and yet we have found that most of the soldiers value the experience.…”
The above insight from Sir Brian Urquhart also applies to the role of law enforcement in modern day peacekeeping operations.
The UN Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division provides member states with a Peacekeeping handbook/training manuals. Training peacekeepers is the responsibility of individual member states. PET acts in a Coordinating role.
A training facility for military and civilian police peacekeepers is a laudable goal. Such a facility would increase the professionalism of military and police forces in the region by assimilating international practices in training. The would be Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre
(PI-POTC) would draw on the PET training manuals. The Character and Competence of PI-POTC would stem from a recipe whose elements including: Procedures, rules, protocols and practices. The PI-POTC would tap into international peacekeeping experiences and make suitable adjustments as local cultures deem fit.
The term “community of interest” describes a group of people or organizations who share a common professional interest. In 2000, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions listed over 1,200 organizations — either academic or private peace research bodies — in 80 countries. The “ community of interest” would in effect provide the PI-POTC with networking opportunities on a global scale.
The PI-POTC would be modelled on the Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training Centre (ADFPOTC). Each year, ADF-POTC engages with a range of partners at national, regional and international levels. These activities include, but are not limited to, student and instructor exchanges and the conduct of training courses and seminars.
At the national level the ADFPOTC runs a UN military observer course for local and foreign military students. On the regional level The Centre is a member of the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC) and holds joint exercises with two other member nations: Thailand and Indonesia. Internationally ADFPOTC has engagements with UN DPKO and partner institutions in nations such as Chile, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and African states.
In 2012, a partnership between the Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) led to the development of a handbook entitled, Same Space, DifferentMandates: a civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in internationaldisaster and conflict response. This publication aims to improve the collective understanding of civil-military stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and to create greater opportunities for constructive engagement between them. The handbook acts kind of like a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for military personnel, police and field workers from both government agencies and NGOs.
“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything” Planning – Eisenhower’s oft-quoted aphorism is generally truncated and worth quoting in full: “I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”
Australian peacekeeping operations in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands threw up lessons. The lessons relate to the interagency nature of peacekeeping. The lessons absorbed by Australian agencies through their participation in such missions demonstrate the importance of two interrelated factors: leadership and planning.
Chapter 10 Managing Maritime Resources in the Pacific— With a Focus on Tongan EEZ Management Yoichiro Sato
Under the International Law of the Sea , Pacific Island nations have made claims to vast amounts of maritime resources. The basis for the claims is the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) granted to coastal nations under the aforementioned UN convention. Nations in the region have found themselves facing the gulf that exists between traditional and modern day fishing practices. A clear mandate for improving the management of fisheries and the Pacific Islands improving their own EEZ patrol capabilities is before us.
Pacific Bluefin Tuna is a highly migratory species. The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission (WCPTFC) for the first time agreed to set a total catch quota for Pacific bluefin tuna in 2014 and has started more closely monitoring other Pacific species. Japan , South Korea and the United States are distant members of WCPTFC. Previous regimes suffered from the politicisation of the scientific assessments of fish stocks. The WCPTFC uses external expertise to avoid the issue of politicisation from rearing its ugly head.
In the early 2000's albacore tuna was the main catch in Tonga's EEZ. At the time more then 20 fishing vessels operated in Tonga's waters. In recent times smaller fishing vessels are catching Skipjack tuna and reef fish for the local market. Yellowfin tuna, swordfish and occasionally bluefin Tuna are airlifted to the Japanese market.
In 2004 the Tongan government placed a moratorium on foreign fishing operations. Five years ago the Tongan government resumed licensing of foreign vessels. Since then One Taiwanese fishing vessel has been granted a license to operate in Tonga's EEZ. During the years of the moratorium two confirmed violations by Korean and Taiwanese vessels took place. A lack of routine patrol activities means that the full scope of the offending remains unknown.
Two Tongan government agencies assume primary responsibilities for fishery management. The Fishery Ministry is responsible for licensing foreign The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) conducts actual fishery patrols at sea and enforces fishery laws. There is no catch quota on tuna and swordfish in the Tongan EEZ, thus, enforcement targets non-licensed vessels. Other participating agencies include the Customs Office, which certify export contents (including fish); the Police Ministry, which supports enforcement of the Fishery Act; and the Transportation Ministry, which registers marine vessels.
Tonga's difficulties with fishery management capabilities are compounded by budget shortfalls and the lack of a domestic fishing industry. Tonga has a “rider’s agreement” with the US Coast Guard which permits law enforcement officers on board its patrol vessels in the EEZ. The The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) operate 3 patrol vessels for EEZ fishery patrols, search and rescue and other operations. Tongan law mandates the patrol boats are used for fishery patrols and external defence.
The Patrol vessels were provided to Tonga by Australia under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP).When the vessels are used for search and rescue operations and fishery patrols Australia pays for half the fuel costs. Australia also pays $1000 per day subsidy for “slipping” (preventive maintenance at a dry dock) for every day the vessel is at sea. Hull repairs are done overseas as Tonga lacks the necessary dry dock facilitates.
The TDS’ boat maintenance capability relies on the comprehensive training course its engineering officers receive at the Australian Maritime College in Tasmania. The Tongan Maritime School also enrolls a number of TDS officers for more basic engineering training. The Australian Navy stations mechanical and technical officers in Tonga to assist boat maintenance by the TDS.
Air surveillance maximises the efficiency of patrol boats. No Tongan government agency owns patrol aircraft; thus, the nation relies on infrequent air patrols by New Zealand and France, and occasional flyovers by the United States and Australia. A multilateral regional approach to air patrols is absent.
Seabed mining in the Pacific Islands nations EEZ is a potential economic gold mine (Pun intended). In EEZ mining, national governments hold authority in licensing for area prospecting and actual production. In addition to setting license fees, ensuring that subsequent operations are environmentally sound is an important national government responsibility.
A lack of regulatory oversight looks set to see the Tongan government miss out on a fair return from Seabed Mining. Nothing shields the Tongan taxpayer from any future losses and liabilities. The desire to get rich quick has seen Tonga enter shady dealings. An investor group, comprised of mysterious firms allegedly based in Denver and London, and centered on a Russian individual, signed agreements with the Tongan government for hydrocarbons exploration and mining, and established three Tonga-registered subsidiaries .
Critics are sceptical of collaborative efforts to make up for Tonga's lack of experience in international negotiations and environmental regulation/laws. The issue has been addressed by bodies like European Union and the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of Secretariat
of the Pacific Community (SOPAC).
Chapter 11 Climate Change Challenges to Security in the Pacific Islands Region and Opportunities for Cooperation to Manage the Threat James Scott Hauger
Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include: access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries, and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea levels, other flooding, and storm damage). A handful of Pacific Island Nations consist of low lying atolls. Rising sea levels threaten the very existence of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.
It is not yet possible to project future sea level rise, and its interaction with tides and storms, with enough precision to predict when specific islands will become uninhabitable. This is likely to be a long-term, gradual, and in some ways, sporadic process leading to increasing emigration over time. A reasonable guess is that some low lying atolls may become uninhabitable by the end of this century.
Climate Change is coupled with the additional burdens of global trends, such as population growth, water and air pollution, and increasing demands for natural resources from third world countries. According to the US Department of Defence the increased burden will fall on governance institutions around the world . The effect will act as multipliers for levels of poverty, political instability, environmental degradation and social tensions. Such conditions could be a hot bed for terrorist activity and other forms of violence.
Pacific Island countries and territories contribute little to global Co2 emissions. Never the less diesel generators are the main source of electricity generation in the region. The adoption of renewable energy for sustainable development was made a common goal via the diplomatic language in the in the September 2013 Majuro Declaration. An underlying political purpose of the Majuro Declaration was to present a united position to the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they seek to establish an effective global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions in the 2015 Paris meeting.The UNFCCC has provided significant support to the “least developed countries” (LDCs) to plan for climate adaptation, establishing a fund to support the preparation and implementation of national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs). Kiribati, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have submitted NAPAs and gotten financial support from the LDC fund.
Over the last 25 years several hundred million dollars in climate change related aid to the region hasn't seen any increase in public awareness. Public awareness/relations campaigns haven't come with the aid from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other sources. The region will need to invest in institutions and programs that educate people about Climate Change and foster scientific research.
The human face of climate change is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). The scientific consensus is Climate Change will see an increase in the number of natural disasters. The need for HA/DR in the region will rise with the each incident of a major natural disaster. Improving Pacific Island nation HA/DR capabilities and responding to Climate Change are long terms goals shared by the entire region.
The high cost of imported fuels provides incentive for Pacific Island nations to switch to renewable energy sources. A key area for potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the Islands is the maritime use of biofuels. A variety of civil sector research, development and demonstration projects are ongoing in this arena, as well as military projects such as the joint Department of Agriculture – U.S. Navy “Farm to Fleet” venture.26 Pacific Islands can work together through regional organizations to influence shipping firms to test, demonstrate and adopt these technologies, and they can propose and request mil-to-mil projects to transfer biofuel technologies.
Migrating the worst of the effects of Climate Change via changes to infrastructure and strengthening or changes to agricultural practices will be on going aims. The difficultly curve for these tasks will depend on geography. For the countries in the region with high ground the adoptions will be a tough and expensive, but achievable. The nations/islands that are made up of atolls are staring down the barrel of the impossible.
Finally, there is an apparent opportunity for closer collaboration between Pacific Island nations and the United States, which sponsors a variety of domestic research and development programs concerned with Pacific Island climate issues as they pertain to U.S. states, territories and associated states. Most of this research is relevant to other Island entities, but to be rigorously relevant, it should specifically include data and analyses from non-US-associated islands. There will be bureaucratic barriers to such inclusiveness based on different responsibilities and funding streams for agencies with domestic and international missions. With goodwill and intent, however, these should be resolvable issues, requiring interagency agreements and transfer of funds, and perhaps requiring authorization by Congress.
In Word War 2 the Pacific Islands would gain fame for the Battle of the Coral Sea, Solomon Islands Campaign and the Marshall Islands campaign .In the post war years the region's fame would wane with only nuclear testing keeping the flame or should that be radiation alive. Decolonisation would bring about the topics discussed in Chapter 1.
The region acts like a sea highway between Asia and the Americas. The ocean seemingly a great divider , acts a unifier of cultures and people. Maritime commerce is growing Ships filled with containers of consumer goods commuting to destinations are a common sight in the region More and more, countries are relying on their maritime commerce for their economic growth and prosperity of their people. Yet these last 2 points serve as a back drop to chapters 3 , 4 and 10 .
As was suggested in the introduction, this book incorporates authored chapters as well as findings from a week-long workshop which brought together an inclusive group of Oceania officials, non-governmental organizations, and external powers. The workshop leveraged the outcomes of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Summit on the regional strategic vision held in Palau, in July 2014.
What happens in Oceania has global implications. Hopefully this book will help inform the discussion and contribute to a successful way forward. (Bold mine.)
My Commentary
Unless otherwise stated my commentary will follow the chapter outline in the book. My commentary focuses on East Timor and rising sea levels. From the stand point of someone who lives in New Zealand, how East Timor develops as a teenage nation will define our time. In the second half of the 21st century rising sea levels will really be felt in the region.
I believe that New Zealand has ignored or forgotten the strategic significance of aspects of the Pacific Islands region. Don't be surprised if in the coming war the Solomon Islands and Bougainville are vital to the defence of Australia and New Zealand just like they were in WW2. All I can say is that I am glad that none of the veterans of the fighting in the South West Pacific will be around to see the day history was eerie repeated.
Reading about New Zealand's ad hoc approach to security in the region left me with mixed emotions. I was or am angry and astonished at the same time. As I progressed through the book these feelings would pop up time and time again. The incompatibility of the concerns and aims of nations in the region to those of the United States of America , Australia and New Zealand proved to be very informative. Richard Herr made this important point without bogging down the reader with pages of details.
I understand that an event like 9-11 came out of the blue. 9-11 would define the post Cold War world until China's rise has a world power and the resurgence of Russia. Unexpected events are only are problem if the framework to cope with them hasn't been constructed. I will explore below some of the reasons that I would attribute to this maddening norm below.
I make no bones about the fact that my views on China's rise as a world power are firmly in the realist camp. China's version of the Monroe Doctrine will see them go to war in order to remove what they see as foreign influence in their domain. New Zealand is going to pay a terrible price for appeasing Chinese territorial ambitions in Asia. The price Kiwis pay in blood will be shared with our Australian , American and Pacific Island cousins.
I would make the argument that China is and will operate outside the international order. Dictatorial regimes don't conform to see the same international norms as democracies. As best I can figure the New Zealand foreign policy establishment is mistakenly operating on the assumption that China is going to follow the same norms as the western democracies.
Is Fiji at risk of becoming the Zimbabwe of the Pacific Island region? Is Frank Bainimarama echoes of Robert Mugabe circular 1980 or is he just a show pony? These questions must been seen in the light of China's no qualms approach to developmental aid.
If or when another coup takes place in Fiji Bainimarama could well suspend elections permanently. Either that or wide spread vote rigging/voter intimation may take place. In this case Australia and New Zealand would again take the lead in imposing sanctions and suspending foreign aid. China could increase their cash hand out to Fiji to make up for the lost income.
In my view Taiwan's role as a aid donor/player in the region will decline. China rise as a global economic power has given them tools/muscle that aren't in Tawian's arsenal. China will use its role as a trading partner in the region to gain diplomatic recognition. Taiwan has no hope of matching the value of China as a export market with cheque book diplomacy.
Is New Zealand getting a good deal out of the Free Association with the Cook Islands? I feel like the answer is no. In the event of a Wartime emergency the Cook Islands would turn to the NZDF to ensure the continued supply of food and fuel to the Islands. In peacetime the Cooks Islands the don't provide personnel for the RNZN or the RNZAF.
Should the Kiwi tax payer be put to the expense of subsidising the Cook Island’s semi dominion status? Err I mean Free Association. In fairness to the Cook Islands the region as a whole hasn't achieved economic independence in the last forty years. The reader may want to bear in mind what the cost to benefit ratio may have been like if the Cook Islands had been a territory or state of New Zealand. If the Cooks Islands had been a state of New Zealand the ratio of tax dollars invested in the islands compared to that collected would have been considerable.
At the time of writing the US is steep in a climate of defence spending cutbacks. Seize reductions to existing forces and the cancellation or reductions in future acquisitions. As noted in chapter 4 US forces are stationed in Australia as a part of the “Pivot to Asia.” Beyond these forces does anybody think the US military will be capable of maintaining a large scale presence in the region?
I will come back to the spectre of a failed state in the region later on. What becomes clear is how successive governments from Helen Clark onwards have been incorrect in there assessment of New Zealand's back yard being extremely benign. Either Clark and co have lied or they ignored reality to suit their own political/idealogical ends.
For a moment I wish to touch upon the non traditional donors engagements in the region. Specifically United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. There motivations remain unclear. The rise of Isis and other Islamic extremists groups in the Middle East will be giving aforementioned countries a reason to be more introspective. The region will probably drop off United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar's radar.
Australia’s security dominance in the region hasn't been analysed in New Zealand defence circles. By this I mean the small size and reduction of the NZDF operational capabilities have pigeon-holed our engagement in the region. Seen in a standalone light. Consider the following scenario. A East Timor style intervention was required in Fiji or Nauru and Australia doesn’t sign on. Where would this leave New Zealand and Fiji or Nauru ?
In the event of a high end conflict like I touched upon above New Zealand will be up the creek without a paddle. New Zealand is placing all its eggs in the diplomacy basket. When the eggs are spilled on the kitchen floor the next generation will spill blood to clean up the mess.
The relative geography of Australia and New Zealand determines their outlooks. New Zealand casts its eye to Polynesia and eastern Melanesia. Australia eyes are firmly fixed on Papua New Guinea and Asia. I believe Australia's neglect of the region can be attributed to the nations northward looking blinkers.
New Zealand has gone one step further and neglected the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. New Zealand's relations with Asia are for another time. New Zealand foreign policy is comedic ally tragic. The comedy stems from the anti American Nuclear ban. (The idea that Soviet submarines complied with the ban is at best goofy.) The tragedy is how a generation of Kiwis who are still in Primary School will be the ones who are left to clean up the mess in the kitchen.
In my view New Zealand's ad hoc approach to security and engagement with the region is tragic. Putting aside the rise of China as a world power two other on going matters that are plaguing the region. I will cover Rising sea levels and Timor-Leste fragility in a moment.
Kiwi voters have failed to take advantage of the fact that democratic societies can be self correcting. I believe the 1980 election US presidential election was a good demonstration of voters correcting the failings of a sitting president. Jimmy Carter had proven to be way out of his depth in the Oval Office. In response to Carter's failings American voters turned to Ronald Reagan. As they say the rest is history.
Can Timor-Leste forge a singular national identity peacefully?Australia and New Zealand national identities were forged on the shores of Gallipoli. The USA would do the same during the Revolutionary and later Civil War. In effect the question becomes can East Timor defy history and rise as a nation without bloodshed?
East Timor reminds me of Turkey. The end of WW1 saw the Sick Man of Europe (the Ottoman Empire) die of a terminal illness. From the wake came secular Turkey and Turkish nationalism. Turkey is neither a part of Europe or Asia in cultural or geographical terms. East Timor acts as a bridge between Asia and Oceania. A rich and unique blend of Pacific Island and Portuguese culture awaits East Timor.
Political instability and rising Chinese influence in the region are factors that play roles in determining the future of East Timor. I believe East Timor's birth as a nation will come when the Chinese undertake their planned southward expansion. East Timor's birth as a nation will come with defending their home soil. The threat of invasion would unite the post independence political factions like nothing else could.
If China is accommodated successfully in Asia the complexity of East Timor's future road map changes dramatically. How the young nation is currently faring will draw the road map. I attribute the flare up of political instability in 2006 to Australia and New Zealand abducting their responsibility. By not maintaining a permanent troop/law enforcement presence in country the security situation was allowed to get out of control.
Outside of Dili 19th century style sanitary conditions are prevalent. You have a population that is living in unsanitary conditions and poverty with political fragmentations as a backdrop. When all people have is third world conditions and political divisions the potential for conflict grows.
The ad hoc approach engagement with the region and discomfort with the spear of influence approach explains New Zealand turning its back on East Timor. My argument is that Australia has made two misjudgements. Firstly the assumption was that East Timor would be alright mate after the country formally gained independence. Secondly Australian policy makers never forecast the day or the possibility when state actors from outside from the region (excluding Indonesia and the USA) would be a factor. As blunders go I would rate these along side with New Zealand turning its military into a UN peacekeeping force.
If New Zealand and Australia had accepted the role of nation building East Timor would have become a strong and stable gateway between Asia and the Pacific islands. For this to have occurred Australia and New Zealand would have to borrowed from Douglas MacArthur's play-book and the Marshall Plan. During the occupation of Japan MacArthur oversaw Constitutional reform and free elections. The Marshall Plan saw the rebuilding of Japan from the rubble up.
Speaking of the Marshall Plan, I have come to what I regard as a unspoken reason for Australia's lousy treatment of East Timor. My contention is Australia feared East Timor becoming a economic competitor in future years. Post War Japan is again a worthwhile historical parallel. By the 1960's Japan was economic power house who was in direct competition with the USA. Australia screwed East Timor out of Natural Gas reserves to prevent them from becoming the next Japan.
I enthusiastically support the concept of the Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre (PI-POTC) role as being Australia's and New Zealand's avenue to increasing the regions law enforcement/defence capabilities. Specifically ensuring law enforcement officials are free from corruption , professional ,educated and independent opens doors. The doors bear the title of a contribution towards better levels of governance and a higher levels of regional self reliance.
Coming back to East Timor. If the population of the young nation have no confidence in local enforcement/defence forces the tide turns towards political instability. A lack of confidence in East Timor's law enforcement/ other government institutions may have unforeseen consequences. In my opinion Iraq is a contemporary example of people giving up on their government. In the face of Isis the Iraqi army melted away. I am sure the reader is aware of what has happened in Iraq in the areas under Isis occupation.
The void left by Australia and New Zealand will to some degree be filled by China. Chinese developmental aid to East Timor will be aimed at exploiting natural resources. The trend of Chinese migration in the region may also reach East Timor. Australian and Kiwi troops could even be called upon to quell fiction caused by Chinese involvement in the country. I would go as far as to say that Anzac troops could come under fire from splinter groups who were armed and equipped by the Chinese.
Until now I had deliberately avoided covering Climate Change. The reason for this I didn't want to steer The Lens of History towards the debate around the cause of Climate Change. I just so happen to think that the burden of proof hasn't been meet concerning CO2 emissions causing changes in the climate. What I don't dispute is how Pacific Island nations face existential threats. The threats stem from from rising sea levels/levels of erosion and salt water contaminating their supplies of fresh water.
I believe that the Pacific Island nations that consist solely of Atolls fate will be dictated by their geography. I invite the reader to consider the role geography has played in the destinies of people and empires through out history. Robert D Kaplan explores this very topic in his must read book: The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate.
Protecting the sources of fresh water from contamination in low lying areas like atolls may be next to impossible. Some kind of scientific or engineering solutions may emerge in the next fifty years. Taking into account Australia's and New Zealand's track record on dealing with sanitisation in East Timor. I don't like the chances of anything being done to secure the supplies of atoll island/nations drinking water.
Looking beyond 2030 sources of fresh water look set to become a global flash point. Conflict over fresh water shortages could lead to Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands becoming failed states. I find it difficult to foresee any kind of conflict resolution being successful. Access to drinking water is a matter of life and death. This is why conflict resolution would likely encounter a drought.
If current projections for rising sea levels are correct the potential failed states will be swamped by the sea. I believe that Australia and New Zealand should open their doors to the people's of the atoll islands. I cannot stress enough the importance of establishing a regional frame work for immigration from the most vulnerable nations.
The framework must start with visas. Special visas that grant permanent residence and the right to work and study on both sides of the ditch. If no framework is put in place the displaced persons/refugees will seek illegal means of migration (aka waves of boat people ) to escape their plight.
One question stands out in my mind. Why did New Zealand bother with a temporary seat on the UN Security Council when so much needs to be done closer to home? I am appalled and ashamed at the way New Zealand has pandered to the League of Nations, err I mean the United Nations. New Zealand has a serious case of foreign policy insanity.
Bear in mind that New Zealand spent ten years lobbying for a place on the UN Security Council. Yes , New Zealand's foreign policy has invested the bank into a body that oversaw the election of Saudi Arabia to the Human Rights Council. If New Zealand has invested the same amount of time and resources into the Pacific Island's regional architecture just how much more secure would the future be for the coming generations?
My Final Thoughts
I recommend the book to anybody who wishes to learn more about the Pacific Islands region beyond the image of cyclones and holiday resorts. The reader can and should take advantage of each topic/chapter being available separately. Selecting chapters based personal interest or existing levels of knowledge will aid researchers and the general reader alike. What can be better then a free resource that offers that kind of flexibility?
East Timor Intervention A Retrospective on INTERFET ( Melbourne University Press Academic , September 2015) edited by John Blaxland is a title aimed at Academic researchers and those who are currently serving in the armed forces.
The book successfully takes on board East Timorese , Australian , Indonesian and International perspectives. Space and time constraints meant that only summarised Part one and two of the book in full. So my commentary will be confined to the chapters high lighted below. I highly recommend book for the for it's intended audience.
In my commentary I sight passages from Field Marshal Viscount Slim's book Defeat into Victory , ( 2009 Pan Books). Passages from the book appear in italics.
The International Force For East Timor (INTERFET) restored order and security in East Timor after violence had broken out after the UN supervised ballot (hereafter the Vote or Referendum) . On the 30 of August 1999 78.5% of the population of East Timor vote for independence from Indonesia. After the result of the vote became known the Indonesian backed militias ramped up their campaign of violence and destruction.
INTERFET lay in between two other UN mandated missions in East Timor. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) supervised the vote on independence. INTERFET would hand over to the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. The UN Peacekeeping Mission was a part of the United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTATET) East Timor would gain independence on the 20 of May 2002. Australia had a substantial role in all three of the UN Missions in East Timor.
The UN missions and East Timor's independence were made possible by Indonesia accepting a series of UN resolutions after the ballot. From an Australian stand point INTERFET was a contribution towards the UN efforts to resolve Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. As a regional middle power UN Peacekeeping is a sound way for Australia to contribute to global security.
In 1975 Portugal granted East Timor Independence. Little infrastructure development had taken place under Portuguese colonial rule. Prior to independence Indonesia launched a corvette operation (operasi komodo) whose aim was to foster friendly conditions for their coming occupation. Indonesia established relations with the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI). APODETI favoured closer relations with Indonesia.
Indonesia made it clear they wouldn't accept the former colonial outpost independence if The Revolutionary front for a interdependent East Timor (FRETILIN) was going act in place of a more acceptable ruling party. The APODETI mount a coup. In August of 1975 A brief Civil War broke out between APODETI and FRETILIN. In December of the same year Indonesia would occupy East Timor with the tact approval of Australia and the United States of America.
Brigadier (later Major General) Michael Smith was appointed to command UNAMET. Brigadier Smith's appoint was made with contingency planning in mind. If a Peace Keeping Force was to be required a immediate change in command wouldn't be in order. UNAMET arrived in country ahead of the vote on independence. UNAMET operational base was in Darwin. Preparing for the vote as a massive for UNAMET's one thousand staff. The decision to base UNAMET in Darwin was proven wise when the mission had to be evacuated due to the outbreak of violence.
On September 10 UN Secretary General Korfi Annan advised Australia , New Zealand , Philippines and Malaysia that Indonesia had consented to the presence of a Peace Keeping Force in East Timor. The United States , The World Bank and the International Momentary Fund lend their support to what become INTERFET. At this time the matter was raised at APEC.
Australia was logical country to lead INTERFET for several reasons. Australia had the military forces to respond to just such a contingency. Australia also had previous experience with UN Peace Keeping missions. Australia greased the wheels of diplomacy when assembling a “coalition of the willing.” Behind the success of INTERFET was the logistical , material and diplomatic support from the United States. Australia was careful not act without the support of the United States.
INTERFET was a interim peace keeping force whose mission was to stabilise East Timor before what become UNTATET took over. Despite advice from Australia that was based on previous peacekeeping experience the UN was slow to act in a authorising a transitional force for East Timor. The UN Security Council wouldn't give UNTATET the go ahead until the 25 of October.
INTERFET proved to be a successful operation under the UN flag. At the time of the book's publication Australia's contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations is at its lowest point. In spite of the fact the United States didn't contribute front line troops their logistical , intelligence and diplomatic support greatly enable INTERFET. Australia can strengthen it's relationship via military exchanges , trade , education and disaster management and foreign assistance.
Australia's role with INTERFET placed a strain on its relationship with Indonesia . Any future threats to Australia's national interests will come through Indonesia. Post 9-11 the focus as been the threat of Islamic extremists operating in and from Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest Islamic country in the world.
INTERFET exposed the fragility of Australia's sea logistics and civil military cooperation (CIMIC). Strides are presently being undertaken to improve sea transport. Work remains to be done in the area's of logistics and CIMIC.
Chapter 2 Understanding Australia's role in the lead up to the intervention Hugh White
Australia's role in the lead up to INTERFET are at risk of being covered in sentiment and myth. In his book Lazarus Rising John Howard states : When asked to listed the achievements of my Prime Ministership of which I am most proud I always include the Liberation of East Timor. By taking John Howard's and Alexander Downer revisionist narrative of Australia's role in East Timor's independence on board, they won't be in possession of all the facts.
The majority of the credit for East Timor achieving independence lies to the North of Australia. President Habibie offer of a referendum on independence to East Timor came at great political risk. The population set out to make East Timor ungovernable by East Timor. The Independence movement kept their country on the international agenda.
By claiming “The Liberation” of East Timor Howard implies that he intended for it to happen all along. In his memoirs Howard acknowledges that he hadn't contemplated such an eventuality , he is evasive when he changed his mind and favoured Australia's preference was East Timorese independence. In the The March of Patriots Paul Kelly explores this point in depth. Kelly suggests that by late 1998 Howard and Downer had shifted to the view that it was in Australia's interests for East Timor to be interdependent.
Much of Kelly's evidence comes from retrospective evidence comes from the participants. Howard , Downer and perhaps others are naturally keen to claim they intended the outcome they so eager to claim credit for. A key piece of evidence is a letter Howard wrote to Habibie ( the Habibie letter).
The early drafts of the Habibie letter show the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade supporting independence for East Timor. In the final version of the Habibie letter Howard stated that Australia would go along with that very course of action. Additionally Howard suggested another course of action. East Timor could join with Indonesia in a Free Association.
In 1999 most of the Australian foreign policy established still clung to the pre 1975 view of East Timor. The view held that a independent East Timor would be a diplomatic , strategic and economic liability to Australia. Not to mention how Australia's relationship with Indonesia would be complicated . Downer predicted East Timor would vote for independence after Habibie announced the ballot.
At this stage Howard is still well behind the play. Howard's wishful thinking bore out his proposed Magitignon model. Under the Magitignon model East Timor would be granted limited autonomy and independence would be put to a vote decades later. In reality the vote would never take place. Habibie had a much firmer grip on the situation. Habibie understood how winning the referendum was the only legitimate way for Indonesia to maintain its grip on East Timor. Howard and Habibie understood the people of East Timor would always opt for independence if given the choice. Hence Howard's case of wishful thinking.
What share of the responsibility does Australia bear for the violence after the ballot? The issue centres around if Australia supported or opposed a peacekeeping force (PKF) as a part of UNAMET during and after the ballot. The small number of police and military observers who served with UNAMET had no authority to maintain security. A Peacekeeping force would have prevented or reduced the violence.
Clinton Fernandes argues that Australian opposition was the key reason a peacekeeping force wasn't deployed. Fernades evidence comes from a recording of a conversation between Ashton Calvert and Stan Roth. The clearest evidence against Fernandes is how the readiness 1st Brigade in Darwin was moved from 180 to 7 days. Elements of the DFAT opposed a PKF without defining Australia's policy. The Department of Department (Hugh White included) began advocating for a PKF because the Indonesian National Military (TNI) couldn't be trusted to supervise the election.
The sheer complexity of the situation isn't necessary understood by Fernades. Aside from Indonesia sovereignty Australia wanted to avoid alienating the TNI. The TNI was the key to Indonesia future. Once the ballet was offered ensuring it was held securely and creditability become the priority.
The other viewed presented most authoritatively by Howard is that Australia pressed for a peacekeeping PKF , but simply couldn't get President Habibie to accept it. The decision lay with the Tripartite Agreement between Portgual , East Timor and the UN. Australia didn't take any measures to prevent the deployment of a PKF as a part of UNAMET.
The indicators were that the presence of a PKF at that time would lead to Habibie being overthrown by his generals , spelling trouble for Australia and East Timor. With all that said could have Australia done more to ensure the presence of a PKF during UNAMET? Had Canberra had a clearer picture a more intensive diplomatic effort directed at gaining the assent for a PKF might have been possible.
Chapter 3 UNAMET's Electoral Mission Accomplished Michael Maley
INTERFET provided some political leaders in Australia with a opportunity to present the operation as a triumph. Public outrage at the atrocities committed by the Indonesian militias in 1999 saw public support surge for INTERFET from nowhere. These factors have ensured that the role UNAMET has been forgotten.
National support/unity for INTERFET reached levels not seen since Cyclone Tracy in 1974. The support was made possible by the people of East Timor expressing their support for independence. And Australia organising UNAMET which provided the mechanics for the vote. Those who were involved with UNAMET were left with deeply felt personal experiences.
Michael Maley had the benefit of previous experiences that in hindsight served him well during his time with UNAMET. In 1989 the Electoral Division of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group were involved with the first independent elections in Namibia. The mission represented the UN's re-engagement with Peacekeeping. The UN hadn't undertaken such a mission since its failed efforts in the Belgian Congo. Later on in 1999 the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) involvement with East Timor began with the UN Preliminary Assessment Mission visited Canberra.
Knowing the Modalities Agreement was close to being signed the UN Preliminary Assessment Mission requested the assistance of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The Australia National University branch of Centre for Democratic Institutions hosted a three day conference which helped the AEC grasp the situation and the role they could play. Maley was invited to speak at the conference.
In preparing to address the attendees he realised just how much unfolding events in East Timor were different from the ones that were in Namibia. Essentially the post Cold War international political scene and conditions on the ground in Namibia were made for a UN electoral mission. Maley advised the AEC that it wouldn't be safe to deploy their staff in East Timor.
UNAMET still had no voter registration process or lawmaking mandate. The electoral process for the referendum on independence was generated at the UN's Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). As for the electoral process the generation process produced the implementation plan for the independence vote.
The AEC undertook procedural training for the UNAMET volunteers and aided in computerising East Timor's voting records. Maley briefed the Australian Federal Police on just how volatile the pending situation was shaping up. In his view Indonesia would be willing to wreck the vote if they were ever at risking of losing. Contingency planning was needed in the event Australia had to deal with the UNAMET train being derailed.
After a delay caused by logistical difficulties saw the vote postponed from the 8 August to the 30 August 1999. The vote went smoothly. Massive voter turn out occurred in spite of people's fear for their immediate future. Vote counting took place in Melbourne. After the result of the vote was announced all hell broke lose in East Timor.
UN staff were trapped in their Dili compound and refused to leave , in show of solidarity with local colleagues and persons seeking protection. This is something noteworthy for the people who make snide remarks about the UN to bear in mind. Public outrage , political and economic pressure would lead to the rescue of the UN volunteers and INTERFET.
Little sense can be made of the motives of Australian policy makers around the time of UNAMET. Identifying the motives of policy makers isn't easy because they probably had different motives at different points in the process. From the discussions Maley had with various government officials Australia’s and Indonesia's interests were intersecting on the issue of independence for East Timor.
Why did Indonesia let the vote go ahead and not stop it like Maley feared? The Indonesians believed or deluded themselves that a genuine chance existed that the vote could go their way. This left them stranded in between stopping the vote or letting it go ahead. What occurred is a wake up call to Australia's understanding of its backyard. In the future one would like to think that the success (what become INTERFET) isn't a product of Australian miscalculation.
Earlier on in 1999 Maley spoke with John Australian ambassador to Indonesia. In the conversation McCarthy made the point that Indonesian – Australian relations were strong enough to weather any future forecast storms. McCarthy's point of view would be servilely tested by UNAMET and INTERFET.
The real value of UNAMET would be shown by how elections in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban would be marred by by electoral malpractice. Unlike East Timor, Afghanistan never developed strong electoral bodies that could oversee national and local elections.
Chapter 4 A Personal Account of UN Police in UNAMET Martin Hess
In line with UN practice the members of UNAMET were to be deployed without carrying a firearm on them in line with New Zealand and British police practice. They would serve as a part of UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL or CIVPOL). The UNCIVPOL members who would make up UNAMET consisted police from Australia, New Zealand, Ireland ,Spain United States and other nations.
The CIVPOL objectives were to project the UN activities in a way that would inspire confidence within the community to register to vote in a free,fair and stress free environment. Discretion should exercised by members of CIVPOL to ensure they don't become involved in local issues that aren't tied to the mission’s objectives.
Hess was apart of the first fifteen members of the UNCIVPOL contingent to arrive in East Timor. The first fifteen's role was to liaise and advise the Indonesian Police on security matters relating to the coming vote. They also supervised the delivery of ballots to polling centres. Each police officer was assigned to a electoral team which consisted of two UN electoral advisors , a interpreter and a driver. The drivers and interpreters were locals.
Hess found safety in numbers deployed with several other electoral teams in the Maubisse in the Cova-Lima Regency. Hess and his electoral team were based in Pousada an Indonesian Government owned residence, on top of a hill in Maubisse. In the residence Hess's team were joined by their UN Companions and a section of the Indonesian Mobil Brigade (BRIMOB) . Members of the BRIMOB were charged with protecting UN staff.
The first hurdle to overtime was communication difficulties. The hand held radios they had been issued were only capable of line of sight communication. Negotiation with the Indonesians lead to the use of a retransmission station.
Each of the former Portuguese Colonial Regencies became an electoral district. The Indonesia sponsored Militias were based in the Regencies. Each Militia wore their own distinctive dress and would sometimes cross Regencies lines as operational purposes demanded. East Timor's lack of infrastructure made members of the UN unarmed , isolated and vulnerable to ambush.
UNCIVPOL engagement with the Indonesian Police and the local population was exemplary. Police from Malaysia and The Philippines brought with them language skills and cultural understanding . These factors played a important role in maintaining a relative level of security for UN Staff.
The Pre Registration period lasted from the 30 June – 15 July 1999. Acts aimed provocation were the order of the day from the militias and the Indonesians. The militia’s and Indonesians aim was to compromise the neutrality of the UNAMET and the UNCIVPOL.
A Indonesian flag was flown on the UNCIVPOL residence radio mast , apparently a local mayor was behind the move. The mayor argued that since members of BRIMBO were renting rooms there was a valid reason for the flag to be flown. The problem was temporary solved by mother nature . Wind tore down the radio mast.
The next instalment in the flag saga came from Mahidi militia. The Mahidi militia some who were carrying machetes hauled a make shift flag pole into the area of Pousada. Thirty members of the militia were used to erect the flag pole. Local dignitary's and people came to view the flag. UNCIVPOL and BRIMBO ensured that the crowd was dispersed peacefully. In order to protect their neutrality UNCIVPOL resolved the matter by having UNAMET not oppose the presence of the flag and reporting the matter via official channels.
Registration of voters 16 July – 6 August
Milita action against the local population and UN staff increased once voter registration commerced. The militias employed numerous forms of intimation, ranging from acts of violence including bodily arm , hostile propaganda , death threats and being fired upon. These activities were squarely aimed at disrupting the voter registration process.
Campaigning 11 August – 27 August
UNCIVPOL attended as many pro independence and pro autonomy rallies as possible , to provide a impartial UN presence. On one occasion pro autonomy supporters including militia were seen pushing a 4WD up a hill. They were making there way to a pro autonomy rally. Hess stopped the vehicle they were in and towed the 4WD up the hill . The militia pushed the 4WD down the hill to the rally. Such a incident went a long way to demonstrating UNCIVPOL neutrality and may have even helped to save lives a bit later on , as another incident would demonstrate.
At a pro autonomy rally information was received that UN electoral staff had been questioning and searching premises in the village of Fato Besi. Investigations by Australian UNCIVPOL uncovered what had really happened. Member’s of the International Members for East Timor (IFET a Pro independence student East Timorese group) had enter the house of elderly man who was in poor health and questioned him about weapons. The members of IFET came dressed in blue jackers similar to the ones worn by UN staff, hence the confusion. This confusion had placed UN Staff in danger.
Cooling-Off Period 28 August- 29 August
During this period two US members of UNCIVPOL were taken hostage. Both of them had come from Kosovo and one of them was a Vietnam veteran. Their electoral area was two hours drive from Maubisse where they were housed. A group of UN staff were lured away under the false pretence of one of their companions was in need of assistance. The group consisted of two US Police (One female and male) , two UN electoral observers (Irish and Czech) and two Filipinos all male.
A local Indonesian Police (PORLI) Sergeant engaged the group in conversation while accomplices deflated their vehicles tires. The sergeant informed them that it wouldn't be safe for them to leave as he couldn't guarantee their safety. Hess learned about the situation after it had been radioed in that morning. Hess's team negotiated for the release of the hostages through Australian police in Maubisse , British Police dealing with PORLI in Maubisse and local police. Again the Language skills of the Malaysian police were crucial in the negotiation process.
Hess's team was able to obtain release of the UN staff and the Filipinos. The two Americans were held until midnight. As it panned out the Filipinos were freed because they are Asian. The captives had threatened to rape the female then silt the throat of the hostages.
Ballot 30 August
The polls were open from 6AM – 4PM . The sight of the East Timorese people in their hundreds walking to polling stations would remain with Hess. Polling went smoothly. At the conclusion of polling tamper proof devices were fitted to the ballot boxes. The ballot boxes were transported to Maubisse and placed under UNCIVPOL guard. BRIMBO placed a 24 hour guard around the Pousada. No incidents occurred.
Things didn't go so smoothly in other districts. In Ermera armed militia directly threatened fourteen out of the twenty one polling stations. In one instance local volunteer was stabbed while loading a ballot box for transportation , despite the best efforts of members of UNCIVPOL the he later died in hospital. UNCIVPOL were also endangered by gunfire in the same location. The author mentions a couple of other incidents that are best left to the reader due to space constraints.
Ballot Result Announced 4 September and Post Ballot Period
Hess witnessed the security situation deteriorate at a fast pace. On September 4 both pro independence groups and pro Indonesian militia committed acts of violence. In Liquica members of UNCIVPOL came under automatic weapons fire as they escaped their base with one man being injured.
Members of UNCIVPOL began to converged on UN headquarters in Dili , some would escape with only the clothes on their backs. Others would also have narrow escapes. UN vehicles were abandoned at a next door high school. A scorched earth policy was also under way leaving villages a flame. Hess's team became aware of this chaos via UN Radio Traffic.
Hess and his fellow UN volunteers/UNCIVPOL were evacuated via RAAF and UN C-130 flights. Those who were left behind were left to their fate , something that has left a lingering sense of guilt with members of UNCIVPOL.
Through out the time of UNAMET the PORLI had only recently separated from the Indonesian military. They were effectively struck between a rock and a hard place.
Chapter 5 Creating a Australian – Led Multinational Coalition Chris Barrier
Many past authors of doctoral dissertations , articles and books on INTERFET never asked Barrier for a contribution. For this reason Barrier was happy to contribute to the book. In July of 1998 Barrier was appointed Chief of the Defence Force .
Barrier carried out a review of Australia’s immediate strategic outlook . The results of the review showed that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) could be called upon to undertake concurrent operations in its front yard. Brush fires ( Aka: political instability) were burning in Fiji , The Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Barrier had the foresight to change the way he received advice about likely deployments and the Strategic level considerations that would tie in with them.
The work or role was moved from the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) to the less formal (by Military Standards) Strategic Command Group (SGC). The COSC retained the role of dealing with the long term consequences of policy , particularly involving the ADF. The SGC flexible membership was based on the knowledge and experience of civilian and uniformed members. The SGC worked involved solving less structured problems then those posed to the COSC.
In December 1998 Barrier and Secretary Department of Defence Paul Barrett AO meet with the National Security Committee of the Cabinet (NSCC) to inform minsters of Australia's short term outlook and the need to raise the readiness of the 1st Brigade based in Darwin. Given the time the increase in readiness would take a target date of 30 June 1999 was set. At the end of June 1999 the ADF would have a force of two Brigades ready to deploy at fairly short notice.
Barrier quotes from the Habibie Letter and deals with the surrounding circumstances. While I don't wish to diminish the importance of the Habibie letter , I feel for the purposes of this review that I need to avoid covering the same ground.
From 10 -12 March 1999 Barrier attended a bilateral forum with Indonesian military leaders in Jakarta. Over three days Barrier and his senior Indonesian counterparts discussed national security questions. During one workshop, Barrier would have a discourse with General Wiranto on how they would prepare their respective military forces for the 21st century.
In May 1999 the RAN acquired HMAS Jervis Bay a fast catamaran. HMAS Jervis Bay role was to assist the 1st Brigade level of increased operational readiness. HMAS Jervis Bay would go on to provide valuable logistical capabilities during INTERFET. The 1st Brigade achieved the desired level of operational readiness on schedule.
Also in May a small ADF team was dispatched to UN New York (UNNY) in order to help Australian staff in the event anything went south (pun intended) with UNAMET. The team was headed by Major General Mike Smith. Previous experience had shown the UN's Department of Peacekeeping lacked the skills to put together a operation without a great deal of outside help . These lack of skills had shown up in Rwanda and Cambodia. After the security situation in East Timor declined in September the team offered invaluable support to Brigadier Gary Born Holt and Ambassador Penny Wesley.
Events now played out as outlined in previous chapters. Many writers have incorrectly asserted that the 1st Brigade's readiness was raised in preparation for operations in East Timor. The ADF did begin classified contingency planning with talks concerning Australia's expectations taking place with Government Minsters. To stay updated Barrier visited the relevant headquarters.
Two strategic considerations were at work . The first is that any outcome had to be good for Indonesia , East Timor and Australia. At the time nobody had the benefit of hindsight which tells us that this happened. Secondly any ADF/coalition deployment to East Timor would only take place after consent had been granted by Indonesia. Mounting a intervention without Indonesia's consent was never considered as it would be a act paramount to war. The second consideration really came into play after the results of the vote was announced.
Operation Spitfire was the evacuation of foreign nationals and threatened East Timorese. “Approved” people were flown in C-130's from airfields in Dili and Bacau to Darwin. Cool heads were needed as both Indonesian and Australian special forces were apart of the operation. Armed self protection personnel were deployed to provide security for the aircraft on the ground.
For reasons that remain unknown at the time of writing nobody in authority in Indonesia would return phone calls. This meant that the Australian and Indonesian governments were communicating via the media and people on the ground. This made obtaining Indonesian permission for a intervention tricky.
Barrier was in daily contact with the US Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) , Admiral Dennis Blair surveying the situation and discussing military options. Dennis and Blair were equally concerned about the unfolding situation in East Timor. At the time the major contribution of the USA was diplomatic. The US threatened to withdraw all direct foreign investments from Indonesia. Along with the threat of sanctions Indonesia was reminded of the international outrage their actions in East Timor were causing. This is what led to Indonesia consenting to a military intervention.
Military involvement by the USA was being discouraged in Washington. The fear was that US military involvement would lead to another “Black Hawk Down” incident. Additionally the US military was burdened by deployments in other parts of the world. The Australian public and media were united in unhappiness at the lack of commitment from the US . The Australian perception was that Australia was being cast aside as an ally after contributing to previous US lead Coalitions (Korea, Vietnam and The Gulf War).
The matter was resolved when Australian Prime Minster John Howard and US President Bill Clinton had a one on one meeting at the Auckland APEC summit. Barrier believes a little known discussion between Blair and his Commander in Chief, ensured the US made a sufficient military contribution to quell Australian discontent.
The discussion between Blair and Clinton took place on Air Force One. Blair boarded the plane at a refuelling stop in Hawaii. Clinton was on his way to APEC. Blair was able to convince Clinton that that if the US military remained absent from the intervention in East Timor , the foundations of the ANZUS alliance could be undermined. Put another way Australians would view the US as not holding up its end of the alliance bargain , so to speak.
Indonesia requested the help of the United Nations on 12 September. The UN authorised INTERFET to undertake the restoration of peace and security in East Timor ; to protect and support UNAMET in carry out its and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations within force capabilities.
At this stage Barrier was made overall Commander of the operation by the Australian Government meaning he was responsible for its command structure and other major elements. The command structure was constructed around a joint force deployable headquarters and the yet to be appointed commander of INTERFET. Balancing the needs of Australian forces with a coalition operation was another factor in planning. The work of the ADF team in UNNY was appreciated.
Assembling the coalition meant time consuming negotiations with countries who were going to supply forces to INTERFET. Barrier delegated the task to Vice Chief of the Defence Force Air Marshal Doug Riding. After a country agreed to supply forces to INTERFET logistics (Movement to Australia) became the focus. In total twenty two countries contributed to the coalition in one way or another.
Barrier was grateful for the US contribution when it did eventuate. Medical personal and intelligence operatives operated under Australian command. Although they were never needed ashore the US 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force made a stop over on the way to Crocodile 99 due to take place in the Shoalwater Bay military training area in Queensland.
The Command Structure now included the newly appointed Major General Peter Cosgrove as the Commander of INTERFET (COMINTERFET). Cosgrove exercised his judgement on the readiness of overseas troops as they arrived in Australia. Malaysia was the only noteworthy country who declined to take part in INTERFET. Thailand and the Philippines each contributed close to a thousand troops each. Their contributions are covered later on in the book. A deputy INTERFET Commander Major General SongKitti Jaggabatara was appointed from Thailand.
Some Forward thinking was required. From past experience enthusiasm for coalition operations are at their height on day one , by day 365 the situation is different with international support waning. Rules of engagement had to be set with the operational plan and Australian rules.
Up until this time Australian military doctrine operated on the assumption that the ADF would take part in a NATO led Coalition unless they were defending their homeland. Again drawing on past experience a management structure was put in place based on the fact that Australia was taking the lead role in INTERFET. The reader best bet for helping to understand the INTERFET Command Structure is the diagram on page 91.
INTERFET shifted the Australian public's mindset towards military service. Military service had become respectable again out in the community. Australia's military standing in the USA got a boast. Senior US military commanders were impressed by how Australia managed a multinational coalition and devised a successful exit strategy , after East Timor was granted independence.
To much enthusiasm may have been shown to hand East Timor over to the UN. Had INTERFET gone on for another 8 weeks East Timor may have been better prepared to deal with the UN on their own terms. Barrier sights the example of how a ship anchored alongside Dili provided comparative levels of luxury to UN workers then INTERFET troops had lived in . The local people would have duly taken notice of this happening.
Barrier hopes lessons have been learned about Australia's role in the region. Indonesia only agreed give ground on the issue of East Timor after pressure from the US. Barrier isn't certain that Indonesia would have requested UN assistance without the diplomatic moving from the US.
Part 2 The Intervention
Chapter 6 Lessons for Australia National Security Policy and Policy Making David Connery
At the start of the chapter Connery notes the tense atmosphere at a NSCC meeting on 22 September 1999. INFERNET had kicked off twenty four hours or so ago and no causalities had been reported. Significant risks still remained, pro Indonesian militia and East Timorese independence fighters were still active. Members of the NSCC may have thought that Australia would never mount such a unprecedented operation on such a scale again.
In the military learning and adsorbing lessons is something of a mini industry. A hierarchy of learning starts with a individual who realises that experience can teach them something about their organisation. Towards the end of the process the analysis , consolidation comes before the lessons learned are implemented in their organisation. At the political level in Australia and most countries no such learning hierarchy is around , meaning valuable lessons go unheeded.
Connery turns his attention towards Australia's role as a middle power. In the late 1990's Australia's actions in its immediate neighbourhood started to count for something. Australia’s economic , military and diplomatic power came into play as the need to secure regional stability has arisen. INTFERNET represented Australia acting decisively by bankrolling and leading a coalition that contributed to regional stability.
INTERFET represented a watershed moment in how the Australian government viewed its role in Asia. East Timor sharpened John Howard's views of his country's role in Asia and helping contribute to a more stable world. Most likely INTFERNET will be a frame of reference for Australian political leaders when a crises occurs , particularly in the South Pacific.
Many Asian views were negative towards Australia leading role in INTFERNET. These negative views cast Australia as the white , racist and rich and created ambiguity with “diplomatic damage “ in South East Asia. Those (Coughs Malaysia) who saw Australia as the US deputy Sheriff in Asia had their pre existing perceptions reinforced.
Regional opinion wasn't all against Australia. One year on from INFERNET Singapore's Senior Minster Lee Kwan Yew spoke of how Australia would have brought contempt and lost creditability had they not acted. Clearly in the future Australia will be dammed if they do and dammed if they don't , when acting to stabilise regional security in the mould of INFERNET. Flaunting wealth or power in the region is likely to increase suspicions of Australia's motives in the region, Connery hopes this is a lesson learned.
As previously noted INFERNET gave a rise to Australia's standing in the US. The balance of power in the US-Australia Alliance didn't changed. Australia did go from being just a strategically useful piece of real estate to a regional power who was willing to lead the way. Back in 1999 this was a stark contrast to the US recent experiences in Bosnia. Australia did not become a power in its own right. So basically Australia's ability to achieve outcomes in the international arena isn't guaranteed and will depend upon countervailing forces.
East Timor saw the Australian public take notice of national security issues . Previously only a elite few had taken part in discussions around National Security. If the Australian government learned anything it was the importance of public opinion in a crises and how it could create Political Space . In laymen’s terms high levels of public support gave the Australian government the freedom to act and deal with what was to come later. The realms of political science aside , the high level of public support saw some strange bedfellows, The Catholic left , The Return Services League(RSL) , The Australian Labour Party (ALP) and Socialists of all kinds agreed that INTFERNET was necessary.
Unintentionally some Australians triumphal behaviour contributed to the negative attitudes towards INTFERNET that were mentioned above. When Australia acts in the region it should remember who its neighbours are , that things don't always end happily ever after, people get hurt when others play politics and the country is better helping humbly. Gloating over gains that offer no returns and success others don't share in is damaging, Connery sight's this as another lesson unlearned.
The NSCC was a Howard government initiative dating from 1996. As a part of a tightly controlled National Security system the NCSS proved to be ideal. Officials rarely attended NCSS meeting until the onset on the East Timor crises in 1998. Minsters learned how bringing officials to meeting speed up and improved the decision making process. Another benefited on the same line was ideas could be tested with officials and experts. A clear measure of the NSCC success is that it has been used by successive Prime Minsters. Subcommittees set up to tackle the likes of people smuggling were eventually integrated into the NSCC.
The NSCC did create some tension by bypassing Treasury and Finance when approving government spending. The decisions around government spending probably went through the correct official channels and Australia's fiscal position permitted them to happen. As demonstrated by pulling government's budget strings the NSCC could act on behalf of Cabinet. The NSCC proved to be a flexible , authoritative forum for decision making.
For this chapter Australia's Governor General puts on his “old solider hat” back on. Cosgrove states: The first week or so of INTERFET was always going to be the real security challenge. There was a chance that INTFERNET forces could come into conflict with the TNI after a misjudgement or mischance. By the same vain militia could have continued to prey upon the local population. In the first few weeks no major confrontations took place.
The fast paced deployment of combat troops from Australia , New Zealand and United Kingdom provided a emphatic deterrent to militias. INTERFET undertook a “benign occupation” that allowed Non Government Organisations (NGO) , UN to provide services, people could return to their homes in Dili and community leaders could look towards independence.
Kenyan engineers maintained roads up to a standard where they could be used by by INTERFET. The Kenyan engineers were accustom to dealing with shabby roads back home. Their expertise allowed INTFERNET forces to move via road .Once the security situation was under control Cosgoves's role was to visit international forces and ensure they had confidence in the Australians. His other main role was to look after Australia's relationship with Indonesia.
Cosgrove dips his hat to the people of East Timor and in particular FAILNTIL for the restraint they showed after the vote. Celebrations were muted and members of the TNI were mostly permitted to depart Dili unmolested. FAILNTIL would also remain in their Cantonments , simplifying the security situation. Cosgrove gives great credit to the leadership of Xana Gusmao and Taur Matan Ruak after he returned to East Timor.
Cosgrove and his Indonesian counterpart General Kiki Syahnakri worked from the ground up to avoid friction and exhibit good will between their respective nations. In Jakarta Cosgrove effigy was being burned , at the same time he was holding meetings with Syahnakri over coffee. The importance of the relationship between Cosgrove and Syahnakri would soon be shown.
A platoon from 2RAR came under fire from militia near the village of Mota'ain near the border with West Timor. The soldiers returned fire and killed a Indonesian Police Sergeant and two wounding two others. The Diggers accompanied by translators were tasked conducting a patrol through the village after reports of militia activity had been received. After the incident took place Cosgrove and Syahnakri meet to defuse the situation. In order to avoid another incident leading to a escalation the two generals devised a MO for border operations. The border region with West Timor became more settled.
The temperate in the atmosphere cooled off when INTFERNET handed over the reins to UNTAET. UNTAET was a regular UN Peacekeeping Mission whether INTFERFET was a emergency stabilisation force. Since INTFERNET Cosgrove has been warmly welcomed in Jakarta. Along with a group of distinguished retired officers and security experts from Australia and Indonesia, Cosgrove enjoys membership of IKHAN. IKHAN members share the knowledge that their children will inherit the Indonesia – Australia relationship.
INTFERNET was the first time that the majority of supporting logistical assets were Australian. The ADF had senior command experience from Lieutenant General John Sanderson's time in Cambodia.
The twenty one nations in the coalition had high hopes of success and high expectations of Australia. Fundamentally Cosgrove had to command his own and other countries forces in a professional manner.
Orders given had to pass a litmus for being logical for the forces involved , useful to the mission , respectful and sensitive. Cosgrove feels that Australia demonstrated to the coalition that their convictions and the mission had been worthwhile. What Cosgrove is 100% certain of is that Australia can hold its head high on the professional standards , energy, and effectiveness of its stewardship of INTFERNET.
Cosgrove devote a considerable amount of time to honing communications and “socialising” via visits to foreign forces , consultation and attending cultural events. Cosgrove achieved the desired effect. In the Publicity/national pride department Cosgrove encouraged national contingents to promote the idea they were best forces in country to the home front. A Ironclad rule was that unofficial publicity efforts mustn't come at the expense of fellow members of the coalition.
In the few days Cosgrove faced a steep learning curve in relation to NGO's. How NGO's operate , their philosophy , structure and operational goals when dealing with their representation and needs. NGO's demanded immediate access to all parts of East Timor where they thought they were needed. Cosgrove would find that the NGO's demands were not unreasonable , but they had a tendency to over inflate the needs of the community.
In 1999 the Australian Army was well equipped and trained at the tactical level. The RAAF was inexperienced at high tempo “surge” (resupply) long distance flights in support of major ground forces . The RAN was unaccustomed to to providing intimate support for ashore operations. “Jointery” the application of joint warfare techniques (in the ADF) was in its infancy. The potential for major blunders was averted by the high standards of professionalism displayed by the Army , RAAF and RAN.
Chapter 8 A Tactical Commander’s Perceptive Mark Evans
On 20 September 1999: Mark Evans was on board the seventh out of eight C-130's flying troops to Kormono Airfield near Dili. Just four weeks earlier he wouldn't have believed that INTFERNET would ever take place. This chapter deals with the preparation ,execution and strategic context of Operation Warden.
The TNI stationed in East Timor found themselves in a difficult position. Some members of TNI owned property and had families living in the former Indonesian province. Elements of the TNI territorial force in particular were mad and dismayed. These elements were added into the security situation that was described above.
In February off 1999 Evans was attending the Chief of the Defence Force Conference. Late one evening at a bar the Deputy Chief of the Defence Force pulled Evans aside and told him to start getting his head around the idea of a UN Peacekeeping Force in East Timor. The next day Brigadier Jim Molan told him the Peacekeeping Force was a real possibility. Evans started reading up on East Timor's history and Culture. He was very excited about the prospect of commanding a Brigade in East Timor.
Evans was to be disappointed. In March he learned that the 1st Brigade commanded by Brigadier David Hurley was earmarked as the Australian Army's contribution to any Peacekeeping Force. Evans 3rd Brigade had spend years taking part in joint deployment and high readiness exercises. Evans conveyed his disappointment to his divisional commander Major General Peter Cosgrove the commander of the 1st division and Joint Forces Head Quarters.
The 3rd Brigade deployed as planned to Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA) . Looking back Evan states how CATA was the catalyst for the 3rd Brigade's later success in East Timor. He got to know the strength and weakness of his unit commanders. He tested out what proved to be the best of tactical staffs , back then staffs were smaller giving them dexterity. These officers became fundamental to the success of ground operations in East Timor , Evans owes them a great deal for their professionalism and loyalty in testing times. The Commander and his/her staff is an immensely important dynamic.
Watching on from Evans eye’s Operation Warden stemmed from events in East Timor moving past Operation Spitfire. In June Evans's Brigade was placed on thirty days notice , reinforcing the idea they were going nowhere soon. 3RAR and a squadron from the 2nd Calvary Regiment was added to the 1st Brigade's battle order.
In May Cosgrove had alerted Evans's that his Brigade was earmarked for possible evacuation (Operation Spitfire as it was to be named) if it was required and contingency planning was began. On the 22nd June Cosgrove approved the outline of Evans's plan. The additions to the Unit's battle order complicated which battalion would deploy if a evacuation was required. In the end Evans selected 2RAR to deploy a decision that will be or is more talked about then the later operational tactical decisions he made during his career.
Once Operation Spitfire commenced in the form of a Services Protected Evacuation (SPE) , 1st Brigade felt the restraints of the ADF's lift (transport) capacity. Capabilities were shaved with Evan's Landrover a casualty of bartering between operational and movement staff. By the 3rd of September Evan's Command and Control over the Brigade was getting messy. Elements of the brigade were scattered , combat forces in Townsville, Special Forces , 3RAR , 4th Aviation unit at Tindal and crucial equipment for a SPE was at sea on board HMAS Toburk.
On September 6th Cosgrove rang Evans and informed him that is staff were exhausted from the planning work they had done over a period of months. Cosgrove asked Evans to convert the SPE to a mission that established Cantons where members of the UN and East Timorse could be protected. Evans and his brigade staff started work on the new plan in the early hours of the morning. By about 5am the plan was finished.
Evans could recognise the flaws in the plan: The plan involved securing the areas that were apart of the SPE. It was no longer possible to work from an original plan. The plan's most serious flaws were still coming and they probably were the Brigades Logistics configuration and lift capabilities. Events as covered in the book , rolled on. On the 8th of September Evans was directly told by Cosgrove that his Brigade would be deployed for forty days and that it would be “ the best and worst of times.” The structure of the Brigade was planned accordingly.
Four days later the operational plan to protect the Cantons morphed into a prolonged intervention (Operation Warden). On that same day Evans was appointed by the “Commander Australian Theatre” as Australian national commander and land component commander on top of his existing responsibilities. A bit further down the track , Evans would encounter difficulties wearing more then one command hat. Some of the difficulties would be caused the Spartan nature of his headquarters ,Tactical tasking and the Australian make up of INTFERNET HQ.
2RAR acted as the 3rd Brigade's spearhead into Dili. Evans force grew within days. Five Thousand Five Hundred Australian troops were joined by forces from overseas. A Filipino Company deployed to Bacau , a New Zealand Battalion was on the way and he enjoyed intermittent Command and Control over a Gurkha Company Group. Some the 3rd Brigades subsequent operations are covered later on in the book.
Evans reflects on how grateful he is the right people were in the place at the tactical and operational levels. Evan's troops proved to be tough, resilient , culturally aware , disciplined well equipped , professional and just darn right lucky. When it came to dealing with Malaria Evans commanders had never read Defeat into Victory , General Slim's account of the Burma Campaign.
Chapter 9 Lessons Learned from INTERFET's First Ten Days Bob Breen
Since the end of the Vietnam War the first strategic priority in every Australian Defence White Paper has been the defence of national sovereignty. People hope the ADF is never called upon to defend Australia from a conventional military threat. Having the ADF capabilities in line with excising Coercion force preferable with allies and delivering humanitarian aid have also been defence policy aims.
Breen's chapter exposes what he views as inconvenient truth's about the ADF's capabilities to project power that came to light thanks to INTFERNET. The rise of Isis and the political situation in the Middle East has seen the need for the ADF to return to the region. Consequentially after the ADF withdrew from Afghanistan the ADF remains very operationally active. Breen takes aim at the lack of substantial debate around the lessons from INFERNET , what the ADF should look like, and what the ADF should train for .
Breen's chapter is split into two parts. Part one is the military lessons from INTFERNET/the risks that were involved. Part 2 is how those risks can be mitigated in the future. The chapter focuses on the first ten days of INFERNET when what didn't or did happen made the operation a success.
Risk factors of secrecy and short notice mostly apply to land forces. Planes and ships tend to always be available unless they are down for maintenance. Breen spends a bit of time on how the necessity of military secrecy/security leads to compartmentation , meaning logistics headquarters in Melbourne wasn't up with the play.
Risk number one is the movement of troops and supplies by air. The RAAF failed to load the planes with the supplies that had been specified by Cosgrove for the first two weeks of the operation. The responsibility for this lapse lays with the Joint Movements Control Organisation and RAAF. The lapse upped the risk surrounding logistics. Had the start of INTFERNET degenerated into open warfare , Australian troops would have run out of ammunition a catastrophe in the making. As far as Breen knows nobody was ever held to account for what could have been flights of bloodshed.
Risk number two is logistics. Although Australia had help from members of the coalition the burden of airlifting troops fell on the leader of the coalition. An audit by the Australian National Audit Office revealed systematic failings in the logistics efforts.
In the 1990's the ADF logistics system was commercialised. In practice this meant that when a future operation arose the ADF would purchase fuel , food and other supplies from off the shelf sources. Very little stock was held in warehouses. In the first ten days contractors were unable to keep up with demand and the pre existing stocks ran out.
A shortage of uniformed logistics specialists was felt. US military aircraft flew in supplies of helmets for Australian troops. The design of the ADF's logistics information system was for base to base support in Australia and not for tracking cargo and troops overseas.
Support Command Australia took (the then attempt at joint logistics was apart of them) 54 days to come to grips with logistical support for INTFERNET. Later on after Command Australia had released a scathing report on their logistical performance. Only finding out about INTFERNET the week before left Brigadier Jeff Wilkinson as the man who bore the brunt of the systematic flaws.
Risk three is associated with Command and Control. The improvised nature of INTFERNET's Command and Control succeeded because of how Cosgrove and Keating were in daily close cooperation. Both men had vowed that fears of a serious incident that many feared wouldn't take place.
Again Logistics pops up. Wilkinson only commanded his own troops , the RAAF and RAN resupplied their own forces. In effect Wilkinson was a Land Forces Logistics Commander. He was responsible for raising a Force Logistics Support Headquarters from his own headquarters. The Army supplied reservists and regular troops for the ad-hoc Force Logistics Support Headquarters. Force Logistics Support Headquarters deployed to Dili.
The command of Special Forces was involved with INTFERNET was improvised and unprecedented , but effective. The Special Forces were commanded at the strategic level from Canberra for highly specialised operations. This arrangement did lead to some tension and misunderstanding at times.
Breen now turns to applying the above mentioned lessons in the future. Command and Control wise the generation of Army officers who took part in INTFERNET would contribute to the Army Adoptive Intuitive ten years later. A Forces Command was established in Sydney , a change in the First Division Headquarters in Brisbane , creation of the 6th Brigade and the amalgamation of high technology and specialist intelligence units. Breen outlines other changes to made to the Australian Army , I will leave them to the reader for the sake of space.
It is clear to Breen that the logistical lessons from INFERNET haven't been fully applied. Force level logistics remains to far down the chain of command to be involved with planning and setting up supply chains. 17 Combat Services Brigade (Logistics Support Force renamed) has no direct connection to the staff at Joint Operations Headquarters or Headquarters Joint Logistics Command who are responsible for setting up supply chains.
Breen also states: Joint Operations Command should have a co-located subordinate Rapid Response Headquarters that would command and practice high readiness forces from the RAN , Army, RAAF , Special Forces , Federal Police and civilian agencies.
Thompson presents the reader with his perceptive as the Commander of the Special Forces element called Response Force (RESFOR). In 1999 RESFOR was commanded by the Commanding Officer of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) Lieutenant Colonel Tim McOwan. Thompson was the commander 4RAR Commando. Thompson would assume command of RESFOR not long after INTFERNET had kicked off. McOwan returned to Australia to prepare for the 2000 Olympics.
As events unfolded in East Timor ,3 Squadron SAS was deployed with 12 hours notice to RAAF Base Tindal South of Darwin. C-130's and Black Hawk Helicopters were present at Tindal. No one knew if Operation Spitfire would be opposed by the TNI and militia or not. Before embarking on Operation Spitfire members of the SASR practised protecting C-130's and providing security for HMAS Jervis Bay.
Operation Spitfire was under taken as noted in earlier chapters. The disciplined , mature and reliable
manner the SASR conducted themselves in vindicated their tough training regime. Meanwhile contingency planning involved adsorbing intel , studying East Timor's geography and incorporating elements of the British Special Boat Service (SBS) and New Zealand Special Air Service . Liaison with Air and Naval forces was taking place at the same time.
Consideration was given to how Indonesian Air Force and Army Special Forces ,a small number of regular forces , territorial and militia may react. At this stage of contingency planning INTFERNET was no certainly at all to go ahead.
Cosgrove planned INFERNET to take part in four phases: Phase one negotiate with Major General Kiki Syahnakri for the safe lodgement , Phase two the rapid deployment of forces, Phase three establish a secure environment in East Timor and phase 4 transition from INTFERNET to UNTAET.
Originally in line with the phases the plan was for special forces to be inserted into Dili Airport via 10 Black Hawk Helicopters . On a gut feeling , Cosgrove went with Syahnakri unarmed leaving behind his SASR protection on the aircraft. After the meeting Cosgrove cancelled the planned insertion. The presence of TNI at the airport and the possibility of a serious incident came into Cosgrove's thinking.
2RAR began to arrive in Dili. Special Forces provided force protection and commandeered vehicles abandoned by UNAMET for transport purposes. Before handing over responsibility for security in Dili, Syahnakri had reduced the Garrison from fifteen thousand to thirteen hundred. The militia and their controllers had left. INFERNET had achieved most of it's goals in a week. The scene for the rest of the campaign had been set.
During this period RESFOR was established at the Dili heliport with elements of the 5th Aviation regiment. Special Forces are usually associated with long range covert recce. RESFOR defied this by undertaking overt patrols in vehicles. Thompson now turns to the roles assigned to his force during INTFERNET.
Through out INFERNET special forces/5th Aviation regiment provided a Ready Reaction Force (RRF). The RRF was only needed on a small number of occasions. In once instance militia were holding hundreds of people hostage in Com a fair distance to the East of Dili. Troops from the ready reaction force were inserted away from Com ,patrolled towards the town and determined what was going on. The ready reaction force caught the militia by surprise and freed the hostages.
On another occasion Thompson accompanied the RRF to the town of Turiscai , south west of Dili. Reports had been received that militia were firing at the local population. A quick fly over confirmed that two parties were shooting at each other. The RRF went on to land safely and neutralise both forces. As it turned out the Villages were playing out a long time dispute. The weapons were confiscated and harsh words had with the villages before the RRF left the village.
Once Dili was stabilised Cosgrove look to deploy INFERNET around East Timor and in particular the northern border regions. Special Forces provided an overt presence on Reconnaissance in Force Operations. As a show of force special forces in lightly armoured vehicles set out to show the militia how determined they were to negate their influence and disarm them or drive them across the border into West Timor.
Thompson mentions a couple of contacts that took place in the vicinity of Suai before the New Zealand battalion assumed responsibility for the area under the command of the 3rd Brigade. By mid October INTFERNET had the New Zealand battalion , 3RAR and 2RAR occupying the vital border regions.
Border Surveillance Operations/patrols were undertaken in response to reports of militia activity before the 3rd Brigade came to town. In the time before the 3rd Brigade came to town a notable contact took place near Aidabasala. After confirming the presence of milita a patrol found itself up against a sizeable enemy force.
After the arrival of the 3rd Brigade Ready Force Operations Ready Force's operated discreetly with area's of operation being negotiated with the three battalions mentioned above. No causalities were incurred by the patrol. The opposing Militia forces suffered numerous incidents. No serious incidents of note would take place along border during Thompson's time as Commander of RESFOR.
On the day Thompson assumed his duties as Commanding Officer the SBS was departing. The NZSAS contingent was commanded by Major Peter Kelly. Kelly went on to become the commander of the NZSAS Regiment. The NZSAS would stay until mid December. The SASR , NZSAS and SBS had integrated smoothly due to exchanges at the sergeant and captain levels, ,Common MO and SOP's and levels of training.
Tauar Matan Ruak was the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL). Concerns around how FALINTIL would react to the militia and TNI were allayed when in a show of incredible discipline they didn't react to the atrocities being committed. After INTFERNET had settled in the focus turned to how FALINTIL could be incorporated into the new East Timor Defence Force. During the same discussions the matter of housing FALINTIL in Alieu south of Dili was worked out.
Ruak's commanders were strong willed, committed and determined making the discussion around housing tough. Alieu wasn't really where Ruak's wanted to be and they didn't always get along and generally kept their distance from each other. Ruak did a magnificent job of keeping his forces in check. The SASR did a great job of liaising with Alieu. Members of the SASR were surprised by the speed and skill of FALINTIL patrol skills , no doubt homed in by years of avoiding the TNI. SASR teams even struggled to keep up with FALINTIL on patrols.
Thompson travelled extensively through Indonesia expect for Acheh. On these travels he would meet with the TNI in West Timor. Across the border in East Timor he would visit INFERNET battalion commanders and the SASR. Former militia leaders informed Thompson that militia elements were still receiving support from the TNI. The TNI stopped supporting the militia in 2001.
Thompson was charged with the sensitive task of restoring links between the SASR and Indonesian Special Forces. In the wake of INTFERNET the ties between the two special forces units had been cut. Thompson accomplished this task and in a few years time the strained relationship was back on a good footing.
Ruak would be elected President of East Timor in 2012. In the years before 2012 he was the Commander of the East Timor Defence Force.
INTFERNET represented the start of the enhancement of the ADF's special forces capabilities. The confidence senior ADF commanders had in Special Forces. The enhancements certainly didn't take place in a speedy manner. 9-11 and the Bali Bombings would become catalysts for getting the ball rolling on the enhancements.
4RAR (Commando) developed a as a fully capable special forces Commando unit with two addition companies to expand the unit. The SASR received investments in Command and Control , communications ,more modern equipment and enhanced training. In Western Iraq where the SASR operated as a part of Operation Falconer these investments paid off handsomely.
After the fall of the Saddam Regime and Bali bombings: Cosgrove recommended the creation of a Special Forces Command under the Command of a Major General (2 Star in American Military lingo.) After approval and funding came from the Australian government the SASR , 4RAR , a logistics component , and the newly created Incident Response Regiment all came under the new command. The Australian government's counter terrorism capability improved as did special forces capabilities across the board.
Chapter 11 East Timorese Experiences and Expectations of INTFERNET Joao M Dos , Reis C Noronha , Joaquim JM Soriano , Viana and Joanne Wallis
After twenty five years of brutal Indonesian rule East Timorese had high expectations of INTFERNET. East Timorese were appreciative and grateful for the role INTFERNET played in restoring security and laying the groundwork for UNTAET. UNTAET role was nation building and humanitarian aims.
The authors now turn to areas where East Timorese feel INTFERNET could have performed better. The factors mentioned in earlier chapters around gaining Indonesian consent for a UN Peacekeeping Force for East Timor come into play. To many in Indonesia , Australia and East Timor the UN seemed inexperienced at such negotiations. The negotiations opened the door to the two week period of Indonesian atrocities and destruction of infrastructure.
Many East Timorese feel INTFERNET should have started sooner , even on the day after the referendum. Handing over security in East Timor at the time of the vote to the Indonesian Police was politically expedient. The Indonesian Police acted in the manner already covered in the book. A large international media contingency covered the events of before and after the referendum.
The international media's coverage of what happened after the vote should have woken up Australia faster to the need for a intervention. Many East Timorese felt Australia and other powerful nations lacked empathy towards their plight. Knowing the UN had administered the referendum many also had the expectation the same body had the responsibility to end the violence.
INTFERNET was perceived to be solely aimed at restoring security at the expense of humanitarian aid. Some East Timorese felt INTERFET was more concerned with evacuating UN staff to Darwin then meeting their immediate needs. Displaced people outside of Dili were left wanting for shelter ,water and food. Diarrhoea/sanitation issues sprung up because of INTFERNET slowness at operating outside of the capital.
From the East Timorese point of view INTERFET and humanitarian aid was delayed reaching more rural/border areas due to the following factors: Rules of Engagement , risk of a serious incident with Indonesian forces and negotiations around the West Timor and East Timor border. When INTERFET did leave Dili they moved cautiously from secure locations. INFERNET's strategy paid off when their were no serious incidents or combat related deaths. The authors mention some of the suffering that was caused by the cautious way INTFERNET forces spread out around East Timor.
Note to the reader I am skipping the section on INTFERNET's deployment to Oecussi as it is covered in the next chapter. INTFERFET's Law and Order mandate was unclear and grossly inadequate. When INTFERNET arrived East Timor no longer had a functioning legal system. Legal records , prisons and courts had been burned and legal officials (lawyers and judges) had left.
In total INTFERNET only arrested 25 militia members while hundreds escaped across the border to West Timor. According to later claims INFERNET facilitated or aided militia suspects in returning to Indonesia. Allowing masses of militia to escape justice permitted their future roles in the deaths of a Kiwi solider, a Nepalese solider, and three UN staff during UNTAET.
In the longer term the feeling of how the perpetrators of the violence and destruction went unpunished laid the seeds for political unrest. The political unrest broke out in 2006 and I will come back to it in a moment.
INTFERNET had no mandate on disarming , demobilising and integrating FALINTIL into Post independence East Timorese society. In line with the topic covered above INFERNET failed to provided humanitarian aid to members of FALINTIL who were housed in the lead up to the referendum. Subsequently several former members of FALINTIL were involved with incidents during UNTAET and the political instability that rocked the young nation.
In the wake up of the flare up of political instability in 2006, East Timor requested a Australian lead International Stabilisation Force. The arrival of the International Stabilisation Force was greeted with dismay at how lessons from INTFERNET had gone unlearned. In one instance Diggers were equipped with poor maps of Dili and they had to resort to interacting with locals for directions. Many East Timorese perceived the International Stabilisation Force as being more interested in standing by and watching the fighting then putting an end to it.
Violence surrounded the 2007 elections. Major Alfredo A Reinado a rogue police officer would in the course of events make the International Stabilisation Force look just plain inept. Reinado disobeyed orders to deal with political unrest a year previously. Reinado and his band of fellow police officers fled to the hills around Dili. On May 23 2006 Reinado group ambushed a East Timorese military and police convoy killing five people.
What happened next could be mistaken for a Hollywood movie script. Reinado was arrested by Australian and Portuguese forces and taken into custody. After engineering a jail break Reinado spend eighteen months on the run , continuity evading International Stabilisation Force troops. Reinado freely moved between the districts of Ermera and Suai where Diggers were stationed.
Reinado was fatally shot in February 2008 when he and his men made an alleged attempted to assassinate the President of East Timor Jose Ramos – Horta. Many local people wondered if the ADF should have done more to prevent the assassination attempt and or should they have had better control of the response to the event?
Chapter 12 Early Days in the Ambeno Enclave Michael Crane
Before INTFERNET Crane had never been on real life operations through out his twenty year career in the Australian Army. Crane was the Commanding Officer of the 4th Field Regiment , part of the 3rd Brigade. 130 members of the regiment would deploy to East Timor. In a break from tradition Cranes's forces didn't deploy as artillerymen as intel reports indicated INTFERNET wouldn't require Fire Support.
Since the Army couldn't afford anything to go wrong , Brigadier Mark Evans designed the brigade force with dominant fire support build in. The regiments tactical headquarters deployed as the brigades planning cell,the battery commander and observers deployed as civil-military liaisons with 2RAR and 108 battery personnel were configured as a rifle company initially attached to 3RAR. The 108 battery's guns were sent to Darwin where they could be forwarded to East Timor in the event they were needed.
Crane would be stationed at a headquarters in Suai after INTFERNET had deployed to the border regions and the countryside beyond Dili. Right at this time Crane was given the unenviable task of setting the annual posting plan. Each year a third of the Australian Army moves to new posting either because of promotion or to gain new experience. Crane had to ensure that replacement personnel would be available. Stopping the annual posting plan would have clogged the system back in Australia.
On October 20 Crane went to Dili to work through the details of his annual posting plan with INTFERNET personnel staff. On arrival he found Evans on the phone to Colonel Ash Power , Colonel of Operations at INTFERNET Headquarters. When Evans got off the phone Crane was given a change in assignment. Crane was to stop working the annual posting plan and prepared to command a force that would secure the Ambeno Enclave.
The Ambeno (now Oecussi) is a district of East Timor , a coastal enclave 70KM west of East Timor proper. Under the Treaty of Lisbon Ambeno somehow remained a Portuguese enclave. The Treaty left West Timor with the Dutch and East Timor with the Portuguese. The people of Ambeno had requested protection from militia and humanitarian assistance from INTFERNET.
Cosgrove like any competent military commander was mindful of ensuring he didn't spread out his forces to thinly across East Timor. So for this bit of military logic/reasoning, Crane would command a composite force consisting of a , Special Forces detachment, A Company of Royal Gurkha Rifles, a platoon from 5/7 RAR mounted in their M113 armoured personnel carriers (APC) , a small signals detachment, one truck and miscellaneous other specialists.
Crane's interim force was to secure the Ambeno enclave until international forces arrived freeing up 3RAR to take over the area. Crane expected to be in the area for ten days. A special reconnaissance force had been dispatched to the enclave and reported that Crane's troops would be able to enter the area uncontested. Two platoons Gurkha's and the special forces detachment lodged by sea to form a security advanced force.
Power promised had promised to provide a headquarters for Crane's force. Few details surrounding the make up of the headquarters were forthcoming. Crane asked Evans to release Major Andrew Plant and a handful of other members of his Regimental Tactical Headquarters for the task. Plant was yet to attend Staff College, but he had the required intellect and skills for the job. Having Plant would also allow them to switch doctrines to a Fire Support Role if it ever became necessary.
Evans reluctantly allowed Crane to have his people and equipment. One aspect of the equipment was a vehicle for Crane's personal use. Crane suspects that Evans had a word in the ear of Power. Crane had a meeting with Cosgrove at INTFERNET Headquarters. During the meeting Cosgrove informed Crane of his mission in a sort of official military way. At that stage Crane was forbidden from discussing a program of repatriating displaced persons from West Timor back to there homes in the enclave.
Cosgrove tasked Crane's force with working with NGO and the media with a benign hand and to keep the Special Forces and the Gurkhas detachments on a short leash. Crane first priority was force protection at the exclusion of the other tasks mentioned above. Next on Crane's agenda came Intelligence briefings , planning and meeting some of the individuals who would be attached to his headquarters. Two key officers were Lieutenant Commander Peter Thompson who was to be Crane's RAN Liaison Officer and Captain Todd Kleindeinst his interpreter.
On 20 October Plant and Crane arrived outside the Oecussi township via a Black Hawk Helicopter. They were meet by Major Jim McMahon the commander of Evan's Special Forces Detachment. Jim showed Evans the disposition of his forces. McMahon took the party on a vehicle reconnaissance of the town.
Jim would record his impressions in his notebook: A couple of church's and occasional roof's intact, otherwise 90-95% destroyed. Main Church had a fire , but would be a good area for humanitarian area. Wharf looks good needs a engineering recce ASAP. Airfield is bad. Roads in town ok for min use of APC on the road to the wharf. Market is a good defensible location east end of the airfield, occupy. Flying over the rest of the enclave revealed most of the villages had been damaged to some extent.
Returning from the flight Evans meet with local leaders who were calm and dignified. The local leaders would inform Evans that three thousand displaced people were living in the Church with one hundred and thirty of them being sick. Concerns around sanitation and shelter were expressed and help from Evans force requested. Evans and his team spend a quiet but nervous night awaiting the main force.
The next morning the balance of the Gurkha Company arrived and secured the town without incident. The Gurkha Company was commanded by Major Warrigton and his company headquarters/logistics elements was set up in a compound buildings opposite the beach. Lieutenant David McCammon proved to be a able leader of the 5/7 RAR platoon while speaking little. McCammon's platoon were quartered in a motel a little west of the town. After consultation with McMahon the special forces detachment was set up as a listening post in the remote township of Bobometo Oe Silo. The Gurkha's secured the town and the regular Australian troops acted as a commanders reserve.
Throughout the time Evans's force was deployed in the enclave a RAN warship was always deployed off shore. These warships provided helicopters for a medical evacuation a potentially critical capability in light of the distance to INTFERNET's medical facilitates. Generous ships captain's made detachments of their crews available to assist the locals with cleaning up the town. The RAN accommodated small number of Evan's force at a time by giving them a shower and meals , something that was greatly appreciated! Landing craft were used for resupply purposes.
Thompson had made all the above happen. Evans valued his work highly enough that he argued successfully to retain him when INTFERNET wanted him back. Outlying towns were deserted . Ten thousand people were crammed around the church to fearful to return to their homes. The people would only go home and plant seasonal crops if they had the reassurance of a permanent INTFERNET presence. Beyond dispatching a platoon to the centre of town of Bacqui (with the planning done by Warrigton) Evans couldn't spare any additional forces because of the need for force protection.
When dealing with the locals Evans was careful not to show any political bias and many of the leader he meet wore National Council of East Timor Resistance Council (CNRT badges). Evans would meet with local leaders in the loft of the church. When CNRT set up a local headquarters Evans refused to hold meeting their and maintained them at the current venue. Evans established cordial relationships with local leaders.
Evans relationship with NGO was cordial yet frustrating. Humanitarian aid was slow to arrive. Aid agency's sent large amounts of rice and tin (for use as a roofing material). The problem was tin and food didn't provide a means of immediate shelter for the people without a roof over their heads. Water containers and cooking instruments were in short supply.
The NGO's lacked the organisational structure and appropriate resources to deal with the scale of the humanitarian crises. The situation didn't improve until Evans mentioned the situation to INTFERNET Headquarters. After a senior UN official visited the town a more senior aid coordinator was appointed for the Ambeno. More meaningful humanitarian assistance started to arrive.
Before the end of the chapter Evans details how with INFERNET approval he meet with a Lieutenant Colonel Morisis Manurung to discuss , how to deal with the border and repatriation of “refugees.” Manurung requested the meeting by a letter a fortnight the deployment began. For reasons of space I will summarise Manurung as a pomp ass who used stage craft/”members of the public” at later meetings.
Manurung was interesting character who shares the credit for the repatriation of five thousand people in the last ten days of Evans command . Although he failed to stop the militia tax collectors or preventing their return for reasons, Evans as been unable to ascertain. Perhaps it was his own idea , under orders from his superiors or under threat from the militia.
Three and half weeks after first entering the enclave Evans would turn over command of the area to Lieutenant Colonel Peter Singh the new Commanding Officer of 3RAR. Rifle companies from 3RAR began arriving two to three days before the change in command. The increase in manpower would allow the work of reconstructing the district to begin.
Evans notes how a ad-hoc headquarters presented challengers and ought to be avoided in future. Even with a small force his force was stretched for Span of Command . His small headquarters was able to last the distance (no pun intended) because of the hard work of the soldiers in particular Plant , support from the RAN and INTFERNET headquarters. Over the near month long deployment Evans's force never faced any opposition showed its face which helped no end.
Part 3 International Perspectives
Chapter 13 The Unique Relationship between TNI and INTFERNET Kiki Syahnakri
During the brief civil war in East Timor stray bullets , Grenades and mortars landed in Indonesia , injuring several people. Indonesian efforts to work with Portugal to avoid the Civil War had failed. Across East Timor UDT, APODETI , Kota and Trabalista supported by TNI volunteers conducted a counter offensive against FRETILIN forces.
President Soeharto eventually gained the approval of the People's Consultative Assembly to send Indonesian Military Forces into East Timor. The government's of Australia and the United States gave the green light to what is now known as the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. On 17 of December 1976 East Timor became the twenty seventh province of the Republic of Indonesia.
Indonesia motivations' behind it's move into East Timor were driven by the anti Communist climate of the Cold War. Indonesia's military and civilian leaders had the fall of South Vietnam fresh in their minds. The fall of Saigon had only preceded the East Timorese Civil War by a period of months.
During the time of Integration the Indonesian government went to considerable efforts to develop infrastructure , health care , education and the economy of East Timor. The people of East Timor were not happy and security problems continued for the twenty three years of integration and ended with the Habibie letter.
At the time of the Habibie letter and UNAMET Syahnaki was Assistant Operations to Army Chief of Staff in Jakarta. Deputy Chief of the Army was Lieutenant General Jonny Lumintang. Lumintang and Syahnaki had both served as military commanders in East Timor and they knew the character of the local people.
Watching political developments saw both men conclude that a referendum would repeat the mistakes of the earlier decolonisation practices of Portgual. They also predicted the referendum would be decided by a slim margin of the East Timorese population. There recommendation was to prepare two brigades of specially trained peacekeepers for deployment in East Timor as they expected the situation to escalate.
As Lumintang and Syahnaki forecast all hell broke lose after the result of the referendum was announced. Syahnaki's view is that the Indonesian government made a mistake in accepting responsibility for security around the referendum. FALINTIL and the TNI remained at their bases while the vote was carried out. The Indonesian police were overwhelmed by the violence and responsibility for security was handed over to the TNI.
On September 5 Major General Damiri the Military Commander of Udayana officially took charge of security in East Timor. The next evening President Habibie imposed Martial Law on East Timor. Syahnaki was appointed Martial Law commander. The next day Syahnaki suggested the two brigades (previously mentioned above) be deployed to East Timor.
The afternoon of September 8 saw Syahnaki arrive in Dili. From Intel reports from Damiri, Syahnaki ascertained shots were being fired by members of the TNI who were unhappy with the result of the referendum. The majority of the soldiers were born in East Timor , including ones from the 744 Battalion and local military command. Syahnaki didn't condone their behaviour. He did understand the anger behind the emotional outbursts , while trying to figure out a way to stop it.
The soldiers felt President Habibie had sold them out with a short cut ( the Referendum). The short cut saw the soldiers displaced from their homes , leaving behind livestock and all their worldly possessions.
Syahnaki appointed Colonel Geerhan Lantara as the Dili area commander. The city was divided into section where battalions and companies of troops took responsibility for security. He threatened subordinates with disciplinary action if they were unable to control their men and the security situation. Indonesian troops flowed in over the next three days. By the third day the security situation was settling down. By that time the fires that broke out were people burning their homes down before they left. Ten days after Martial Law had been imposed the security situation became manageable.
As already covered the Indonesian government gave approval for INTERFET. Syahnaki command role would shift from providing security in Dili to evacuating members of the PPI (known as the militia) to East Nusa Tenggara without delay. If Syahnaki failed to evacuate the militia a full blown confrontation with INTERFET would be looming. Syahnaki mentions how the pending arrival of INTERFET caused him to accelerate the liquidation of the Korem 164/Wira Dharma military sub district (Korem 164/Wira ).
The evacuation wasn't easy with most of the difficult task proving to be persuading the native East Timorse soldiers to evacuate. The evacuation was primary accomplished by means of sea transport. 112 native East Timorese refused to leave and disappeared from their unit. Syahnaki was unable to keep track of those who would be left behind as he was focused on the evacuation.
The liquidation of Korem 164/Wira brought with it allegations of Indonesian forces conducting “forced displacement.” Syahnaki rejects these allegations and in as a rebuke points out how: Most of the refugees were military personnel , police and local government employees. Typically the refugees brought twenty to thirty followers with them. Cultural reasons and a fear for their lives saw the extended families of the refugees pack their bags and leave.
On the 19 September Syahnaki meet with Cosgrove , Cosgrove's deputy and some of his staff. Syahnaki meet the group at Dili airport before touring the city. The group travelled to Martial Law Headquarters and discussed the technical details of the INTFERNET landings. Cosgrove travelled back to Darwin and Syahnaki thought his visit had been to ensure INTERFET arrival went smoothly.
On 27 of September Syahnaki over the responsibility for security to INTERFET. The Indonesian government established the Indonesian Task Force in East Timor (ITFET) to liaise with INTERFET. Syahnaki spends a bit of time giving his perspective on the death of Dutch Journalist Robert Sander Thoenes. By leaving the details to the reader , I do not wish to be disrespectful towards Thoenes and the deceased family.
Syahnaki was serving as the Udayana military commander during the period of INTFERNET and UNPKF/UNAET. The border and the presence of refugees in West Timor was still an on going issue at the time UNAET. False claims in the Australian print media appeared about fifteen thousand militia being trained by the TNI in Atambua. The militia would be sent across the border to renew the post referendum violence. Atambua is a small town where one hundred people under training could have been easily discovered.
Domestic and foreign media , United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) were all in the area. Brigadier Ken Brownrigg the Australian Defence Attache in Jakarta , told Syahnaki he didn't believe the rumour was true. Syahnaki doesn't know where the rumours started , although he is sure it didn't come from INTFERNET. Despite the untruthfulness of the rumours it tested the relationship between the TNI and UNAET.
Staying in the same period two incidents occurred that intensified problems for Indonesia and especially for the TNI. The first was the death of Kiwi solider Private Leonard Manning and the loss of a minimi gun in a exchange with a group of ex militia consisting of two people from Atambua and two refugees. It took three months for the Indonesians to arrest the perpetrators , take them to the court and return the minimi gun to UNPKF.
The second incident involved the deaths of three UNHCR personnel at a mass demonstration by refugees in Atambua. The TNI and UNPKF cooperated to secure the people who worked for UNHCR and IOM in Atambua. Flash flooding killed one hundred and fifteen people in southern Atambua. The tragedy blinded positive cooperation between TNI and UNPKF. The UNPKF and TNI searched for victims and delivered a range of humanitarian missions.
Syahnaki finishes up with a summary of how allegations of human rights abuses from mostly after the referendum, continue to dog the TNI. The number of causalities was exaggerated. The Indonesians admit they failed to maintain security after polling, but this was due to the unfair conduct of UNAMET. It isn't fair to hold Indonesia solely responsible for the violence, but UNAMET must bear its share of the blame.
Syahnaki's conclusion that haven't been done to death already are worth mentioning. The people of Indonesia including retired members of the TNI who served their appreciate that Timor-Leste is now a genuinely independent nation. As neighbouring countries now is the time Timor-Leste , Indonesia and Australia to take hold of the future, unify, Camaraderie and collaboration in various fields including regional security.
The smooth running of INTFERNET was due to the good relationship between both parties. Syahnaki thanks Cosgrove and his staff and Brownrigg made this happen. It is the duty of soldiers to carry out the course of action decided by politicians. This is why Syahnaki advice to all political leaders is to thoroughly consider the full implications of a (would be) action before committing to it for the sake of security and prosperity of the people.
Chapter 14 The East Timor Crises and the Australia Indonesian Relationship Gary Hogan
Hogan aim in the first section of his chapter is describe the emotional components to the Australia – Indonesia relationship. Hogan starts the chapter by explaining how Indonesia commentates its war dead in the same way Australians do at the Internationally known Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Staying with the comparison Indonesians mark their fallen war dead who helped to unite the Republic of Indonesia in the post colonial era , in the same way Australians mark the fallen (WW1 , WW2 and so on).
One monument is dedicated to the the efforts to incorporate East Timor as a province of Indonesia. The names of fifteen hundred Indonesian soldiers , police and civilian officials who lost their lives during the efforts to subdue East Timor are etched on the Seroja memorial . Indonesians who visit the memorial feel the same way emotionally Australians commentate the Vietnam War.
The damage done to Australia – Indonesian relations cannot be understand without taking a walk in Indonesians shoes. The walk takes the reader to the feeling rightfully or wrongfully that Australia was the chief conspirator along with the international community in violating Indonesian territory. Indonesian felt like a long term friend in Australia had betrayed them.
Australia's emotional feelings towards Indonesia was or has been dominated by the alleged murders of five journalists (Bailbo Five) by Indonesian Special Forces in 1975. Some people count the summary execution of Journalist Richard East who was killed while investigating East Timor , in with the other five deceased.
Paul Keating believes the ABC and Fairfax media outlets have ignored the central role Indonesia has played in Australia's strategic stability. Media reporting has been clouded or directed at the death of the six journalists. According to Keating, Soeharto's thirty year rule ensured that Indonesia never became a Basket Case like many African States.
WW2 mythology surrounding the efforts of East Timorese to save remnants of sparrow force and to support the operations of 2/2 interdependent guerilla company. The fact that many East Timorse collaborated with the Japanese was overlooked.
Amongst the ranks of the Labor left their was a lingering unease at allegations that Gough Whitlam had delivered the Judas Kiss to East Timor. A unsubstantiated version , but persistent version of events is that Whitlam assured Soeharto Australia’s relationship with Indonesia would go on as “normal” in the wake of annexation of East Timor. Even if the allegations were true , Cold War factors would have seen Whitlam give a silent nod to Indonesia. A Communist East Timor would have intolerable for Indonesia and against Australia's interests.
Whitlam may have concluded Indonesian rule in East Timor would lead to fewer deaths in East Timor then a ongoing civil war. If this was Whitlam's judgement the death toll from ongoing conflicts in post colonial Africa (e.g Angola and Mozambique) would bear him out as being correct in his judgement.
The guilt felt by elements of the political left only went away when the events the book covers took place. Their guilt was a gift to the East Timorese propaganda machine. East Timor expats predominantly in Australia ran an effective anti Indonesian propaganda campaign. The Propaganda campaign was conducted on a international scale.
Hogan compares the Australian -Indonesian relationship as a game of snakes and ladders and fortunately their has been more ladders then snakes. I feel that this section of Hogan's chapter can be left to the reader as the causes of the ups and downs in the Australian -Indonesian relationship have been well documented elsewhere.
The principal role of the Indonesian military has been to guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of the homeland. Not all Indonesians have been happy living in a unified republic. Insurrection and separatism mostly from Javanese and Sumatran nationalists has dogged the country since the 1950's. Maintaining a single unified nation of two hundred and fifty million people from three hundred ethnic groups across tens of thousands of islands stretching the distance from Christchurch to Perth, is a tall order for the current president Joko Widodo .
Historically: Separate attempts to create a Islamic State in Ache started in 1953 and only ended with a Peace settlement after 2004 Boxing Day Tsunamis. Elsewhere around Indonesia on Sulawesi a CIA military uprising was defeated in 1958,and in west Java the Darul separatist movement expanded in the 1950's and wasn't brought under control until 1965. To the east from 1950 – 1963 sporadic fighting took place to form the breakaway Republic of South Maluku.
While INTFERNET was conducted for the right reasons the reader should bear in mind Indonesia's recent history of combating insurrection and separatism. Nothing is more sacred to Indonesians then maintaining the territorial integrity of their country , they refer to it as harga mati – worth dying for. Some observers think that Indonesia is repeating mistakes (brutal treatment of the local population) in West Papua. Others would even go as far to predict , West Papua will follow East Timor in gaining independence.
Judging from the recent behaviour of the TNI in West Papua they have learned and adsorbed the lessons from East Timor. Hogan gives the example of how after eight Indonesian Soldiers were killed by the Free Papua Movement (OPM) none of the expected retaliation ever took place. West Papau gaining independence would be a disaster for Indonesia – Australian relations. Since the TNI isn't what it use to be the chances of West Papua gaining independence are on the slide. The OPM have also moved in the direction of organised crime and away from being a independence movement.
In 1988 Australian foreign minster Gareth Evans addressed a Australia – Indonesia business group in Bali . Evans spoke of adding greater levels of trade and commerce to add balance to the relationship between the two countries.
In the years after withdrawing from East Timor the TNI began the process fast paced reform. Much of the reform came from the TNI's senior leadership. Before he became a Cabinet Minster and later President in his own right, General Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono had a reputation for being a military reformer. Generals Agus Wirahadikusumah and Agus Widjojo carried the torch of reform.
In more recent times the pace of reforms within the TNI were more incremental. A significant shift has seen the ranks of the TNI filled by personnel who have served in the reformed TNI. Those officers who have attended Staff colleges have all done so after INTFERNET. At the time of writing the TNI is more aligned with the All Professional ADF , than the former security apparatus of the state.
Hogan mentions , how ironically the wounds around INTFERNET improved Australian – Indonesian relations. After the wounds healed Australia and Indonesia are better placed to deal the next speed bumps in the road.
East Timor was subject to five hundred years of Portuguese Colonial rule. The most famous of the many unsuccessful revolts against colonial rule was the Manufahi revolt in 1912. WW2 brought the East Timorese and Australian people together for the first time. East Timorese sheltered , feed and acted as guides for Australian soldiers.
Like many poor countries East Timor became a victim of the Cold War. Western leaders supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor or stayed silent. Unlike liberation movements in Asia and Africa the East Timor resistance fought the war of liberation without external logistical support from neighbouring countries.
The lack of logistical support and a force of less then fifteen hundred personnel saw them to a international hearts and minds campaign. The weapons used in the campaign included magazine articles , photos , films , public talks and protests. Building a relationships with pro democracy groups in Indonesia was another aim. Gusmão recognised that the Indonesian people weren't their enemy , as they to were the victims of a western backed dictatorship.
Many Australians opposed the illegal occupation of East Timor and the unjust policies of the Australian government. The late Brian Manning and Denis Freney were recently honured in a ceremony at East Timor's presidential palace. Manning broke Australian law by providing the East Timorese liberation movements with radio transmitters that allowed communication with the outside world.
Freney was the pioneer of the first movement of Australian solidarity with East Timor movement.
Freney help establish through out Australia the campaign for a independent East Timor. Freny would continue his efforts to get the message out in the face of surveillance monitoring and persecution by intel and security agency's.
Gusmão acknowledges the many unknown Australians who leaked diplomatic and intel material to reveal the truth of the events that took place in East Timor before INTFERNET was undertaken. The identities of these Australians will probably never be known.
The Asian Financial Crises caused great hardship in Indonesia. The great hardships did bring about the resignation of President Soeharto and begin the process of political reform. As the anti Communist climate had acted against East Timor as new millennium approached the tide turned , unexpectedly in favour of East Timor's independence. Like many dramatic historical events , many people thought they would never see the day East Timor became an independent nation.
Today , the vote represents the dignity and the bravery of the East Timorese people. After the post referendum violence broke out , a international intervention/peacekeeping force was no certainty. FALINTIL didn't take part in the vote because they knew it would only lead to further violence. Gusmão and FALINTIL learned from the historical lessons of 1975.
FALINTIL remained at “home” “despite the anguish of the East Timorese people during the violence. How the international community viewed the violence was imperative. If FALINTIL hadn't shown incredible discipline by not responding to the violence , the international community would have viewed the unfolding events as a another civil war.
Gusmão pays tribute to the more then forty thousand Australians who marched in Melbourne in support of East Timor's independence. The march took place on September 10 1999. Marches on the same scale happened around Australia.
After INTFERNET began Gusmão gauged Cosgrove's as being a man of moral integrity and a great leader. Gusmão would develop a good working relationship with Cosgrove. The working relation Gusmão enjoyed with Cosgrove allowed for the successful resolution of a incident that involved INTFERNET troops disarming a group of FALINTIL members in a heavy handed manner . The members of FALINTIL had been in a truck that had broken down. To satisfy honour Gusmão lodged a protest with Cosgrove at INTTFERNET headquarters. Gusmã's protest ended with a old fashion hand shake with Cosgrove.
Gusmão acknowledges the cooperation of Cosgrove , Syahnakri and the late Sergio Vieira de Mello role in securing the peace after he meet them at the border. Their and other groups cooperation and collaboration is a lesson for future peacekeeping missions. The Australian SAS who toured the country with Gusmão via car or helicopter were great ambassadors for Australia.
For historical purposes Gusmão points out that INTFERNET was successful because of the cooperation displayed by FALINTIL. FALINTIL was mature enough to understand what they had to do for the sake of the future of their country. To do otherwise would have meant abandoning the cause FALINTIL was founded to pursue.
The Timorese people have a special sensibility for making special occasions and preserving memories. A women gave birth as INTFERNET tanks (likely APC's) rolled by past her home in the Oecussi Enclave. As a show of gratitude the lady named her new born baby INTFERNET. Today a teenager is floating around Oecussi with the nickname “INT.”
My Commentary
John Howard government and the Australian foreign policy establishment fundamentally misread the unfolding situation in Indonesia as it related to East Timor. So why did Howard and co find themselves stumbling in the dark over the future of East Timor? Perhaps the sheer scope of the Asian Financial Crises was a factor? I would tend to think the rational behind Australia's support for the Indonesian occupation of East Timor had gone unchecked in the post Cold War world.
The reasons for Gough Whitlam's (1916 -2014) government supporting Indonesia's actions in East Timor have never to my knowledge been examined in any depth by historians. Historians and political commentators have spent their efforts on bursting the bubble of mythology surrounding the Whitlam's government time in office. Beyond mythology, the legacy surrounding the dismissal of his government would shape Australian politics and leave a bitter legacy that lasted a generation.
The events of 1975 still reverberate in Australian politics today. The way bitter legacy surrounding the dismissal of the Whitlam government placed a fog on the Australian public's attention and feelings towards Whitlam and Fraser. The fog would remain at it's thickest for the next thirty years and arguable never went away. In the context of East Timor , Hogan offers two explanations that would lift the fog.
The first explanation offered by Hogan doesn't stack up. I believe Whitlam's government's de-facto support for North Vietnam during the closing stages of the Vietnam War must be taken into consideration. I believe Whitlam's pro Communist stance must be taken into account when debating his government's support for Indonesia's actions in East Timor.
The second explanation Hogan presents to the reader is very plausible. If this was Whitlam's reasoning events in Southern Africa would have left him feeling vindicated. In 1975 the Rhodesian Bush War intensified in the wake of Portugal's sudden departure from Africa. Portugal’s decolonisation of Mozambique was one of the turning points in the Rhodesian Bush War and the post colonial fate of southern Africa. As the Rhodesian Bush War intensified civilian and Rhodesian Army Causalities increased.
Malcolm Fraser's (1930 - 2015) stance on East Timor may be a reflection of the sheer complexity of his character. How did Fraser reconciled his support for Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War and Indonesia’s East Timor policy with his backing of Communist backed forces fighting in Rhodesia? Laid out bare the question can be also be posed as: What made the Communist China backed Robert Mugabe a freedom fighter and the North Vietnamese regime and FALINTIL , any different? I won't attempt to offer the reader a complete answer. The proverbial fog now covered muddled waters.
However there isn't any reason to think that Fraser and Whitlam didn't privately share the view of how a independent East Timor would be a liability for Australia. I can take a educated guess at why Whitlam crafted a pro Indonesian policy surrounding East Timor, whether Fraser's complex motivations are best left to the study of historians and future biographers.
Could a PKF been deployed along side UNAMET? When I read Maley's chapter a number of different thoughts crossed my mind. The first thought that sprung to mind was Howard and Alexander Downers stumbling in the dark . Did the stumbles/lack of situational awareness prevent the deployment of a peacekeeping force? I felt uncomfortable when I pondered this question. In my view the motivations behind Habibie granting East Timor the vote and thus independence play a part in the answer.
I do respect Maley's opinion because he was on the ground to witness events first hand. I don't doubt that members of the Indonesian public and the more junior ranks (reservists and regulars) of the TNI sincerely believed East Timorese would opt out of independence. Did Habibie , Syahnaki and other TNI senior commanders really buy into this delusion?
My interpretation of events is Habibie saw the writing on the wall concerning East Timor. Indonesia's economic circumstances no longer permitted the continuation of its attempts to colonise East Timor. Habibie probably came to the realisation that after twenty five years , East Timorese weren't going to have a change of heart.
A unilateral withdrawal/granting of independence to East Timor was never on the table. Such a move would have lead to a disastrous coup with Indonesia becoming a military junta. Suffice to say if this had occurred Australia's and New Zealand's security outlook would have nosed dived. The coup would have amounted to a face saving exercise by TNI commanders. I believe the violence and destruction inflicted by the “militia” on East Timor was a face saving exercise on behalf of the TNI. As a face saving exercise the orgy of violence and destruction was successful while being no less morally repugnant.
Loosing and saving face is roughly akin to salvaging pride. The closest thing to loosing face that I have come across as a cultural equivalent is when the All Blacks lost at the knock out stages of the 1999 Rugby World Cup. The whole of New Zealand went into mourning, recriminations were wide spread and scrape goats were found. My comparison does fall down by the fact no bloodshed took place and during later instalments of the tournaments the country coped better when their national rugby team came home early.
To what degree the militia were under the Command and Control of the TNI isn't explored in the book. I do feel the level of Command and Control the TNI had over the militia is worth touching upon. As presented in the book the militia were rogue members of the TNI who Indonesian authorities had no control over , a decent enough cover story for the time. In 1999 international media outlets brought into Indonesia's cover story as did the general public around the world.
As I read the book I got the sense the TNI had unsurprisingly kept the “militia” on puppet strings. The fact Syahnaki was able to rein in the militia's activities without open warfare breaking out is a indicator they were undertaking a well planned and executed plan. As I see it a carefully laid plan unfolding is hardly compatible with a out of control unruly mob.
The “militia” never seriously challenged the presence of foreign forces in the early days of INTFERNET in spite of their reaction/feelings towards events. If my thesis is correct by the time Cosgrove meet with Syahnaki the TNI's officer corps and hard core nationalists elements had satisfied their blood lust and cultural pride. I do not in any way wish to down play the tension or the risk of a serious incident in the first three days of INTFERNET. A misjudgment or miscalculation from either side would have been a catastrophe for 2RAR.
Reading the chapters on UNAMET I felt the subject matter is deserving of a stand alone book on its own. My hope is UNAMET will emerge out of the shadows of INTFERNET in the eyes of historians and scholars. Only by receiving more attention can lessons be learned from the deployment of UNAMET. Assuming the Indonesians were engaged in a face saving exercise , permitting a PKF wouldn't have been in their interests.
Interestingly American diplomatic and economic pressure was the one tool available that may have been able to pressure Indonesia into accepting the presence of peacekeepers before the vote took place. Beyond the previously mentioned risk of a coup , the deployment of a peacekeeping force alongside UNAMET if it was ever possible could have only occurred if Howard and Downer had a clear understanding where the East Timor highway was heading.
Should the law enforcement members of UNAMET been deployed unarmed? In New Zealand perfectly valid arguments or reasons exist for my local coppers not to carry a firearm on them. Arming Kiwi cops would negatively effect their interactions with members of the community. The international reader should note how Kiwi cops only respond to a incident with firearms in a very minor percentage of the time. The security situation as it unfolded in East Timor certainly would have warranted the carrying of side arms.
Would have members of UNAMET carrying a firearm for self defence purposes deterred hostile forces from threatening them? Would have such a move simply provoked the Indonesian presence in East Timor and compromised UNAMET's neutrality? I can't give the reader a definitive answer. I will say that I am not keen for such a electoral mission to ever be deployed unless it is accompanied by a PKF. If UNAMET didn't give Australian and Kiwi policy makers a lot to think about , I don't know what will.
Below is a few points that I would like to raise with the reader before my commentary moves on from UNAMET to INTFERNET.
I do have a lot of respect for the UN volunteers who showed solidarity with their East Timorese counterparts in Dili. Nor have I doubted that many people around the world serve faithfully in various roles with the UN. Before he became a Labour MP David Shearer was just such one individual. Like with other topics I will come back to the UN later on.
The incident involving Hess towing a pro autonomy group's 4WD up a hill really stood out for me. In my opinion Hess and his fellow members of UNAMET displayed the same levels of courage , professionalism and discipline as their later INTFERNET counterparts. I do hope history gives the members of UNAMET the credit they deserve.
The incident concerning IFET visiting a elderly man while wearing blue jackets is perhaps understated in the book. Also the incident contrasts the smarts or lack of it between FALINTIL and IFET. I am fascinated by how the leaders of FALINTIL understood how the perceptions of the international community was going to dictate if their was going to a PKF/intervention or not. FALINTIL stayed off the streets to avoid the international perception of the ongoing violence being another civil war.
IFET may have set out in an attempt to provoke the militia into attacking members of UNAMET. They ran the risk of turning the tide of International opinion away from Indonesian atrocities and towards the East Timorese independence movement/ a civil war taking place. Fortunately no members of the international media interviewed the old man and aired his mistaken belief to the world's news networks. Had CNN , BBC and other news outlets got a hold of the story before any fact checking was done , Indonesia would have gifted a propaganda opportunity they couldn't fail to exploit.
The use of blue jackets by members of IFET is reminiscent of Operation Greif (German soldiers disguised as GI's at the Battle of the Bulge. ) Providing one doesn't care about historical accuracy , one can watch Operation Greif as it is portrayed in the film Battle of the Bulge . Like Operation Grief the net effect of the incident was more psychological (Giving the old man a fright) than material damage was accomplished. In both cases the ultimate course of historical events (Germany's defeat in WW2 and INFTERNET) continued unaffected.
At any rate I am sure Otto Skorzeny would agree that IFET's efforts were very amateurish. If Skorzeny had been around at the time and aware of the incident he probably would have had a lot to say about the incident. Skorzeny would have only been to happy to share his opinion with the world's media. I think he would have said such a amateurish and counter productive effort was deserving of a firing squad.
I am puzzled as to why so few past authors of doctoral dissertations , articles have sought out Barrier for research purposes. To my mind Barrier is one of the first ports of call for researchers. His central, yet little role known in the lead up to INTFERNET gives the reader a window into Australia's strategic position in the years leading up to 9-11.
Due to the virtue of their age senior military commanders of (enter name of campaign) are the first to be claimed by old age. Looking at the history of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War brings my point to light. To the best of knowledge all the senior Australian commanders (rank of Brigadier and above) of the Australian Task Force (ATF) are no longer with us.
For better or worse the decisions undertaken by the ATF's commanders can now only be understood and debated from historical records. In writing this review I hope to stir up some interest in the lessons from INTFERNET that have gone unnoticed. Barrier's chapter is good place to dive into the topic.
The NSCC has no direct equivalent in New Zealand. So I am unable to make a direct comparison between Australia and New Zealand's National Security/Cabinet processes. The Cabinet National Security Committee could be said to be a Tran-Tasman cousin of the NSCC. New Zealand hasn't faced a wartime emergency in the post war era. Stay with me while I take a worth while detour that will make sense to the reader in a moment.
The direct threat of invasion by the Japanese during WW2 was greater to Australia then New Zealand. I believe the legacy of the bombing of Darwin and the fear generated by the threat of Japanese invasion lived on in Australia for about sixty years. Australian attitudes and bipartisan support for maintaining the ADF's high end combat capabilities, have come in part from the events of 1942.
The other factors are patriotism and Australia's defence posture during the Cold War and to the present. To what degree Australia's National Security structure has been effected by the aforementioned factors is something that hasn't been studied widely by the academic community.
Now coming back to my point, New Zealand is heading for troubled waters with a unwieldy and untested National Security structure. Some might say the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) and other agencies response to Christchurch Earthquakes is a case study of how well New Zealand can cope with a national crises , in which case we have nothing to worry about.
The holes in the logic are gigantic. The Christchurch Earthquake pose no threat to New Zealand's national security. No threat to New Zealand's sovereignty from State Actor/Non State Actor stemmed from the quakes. The levels and accuracy of intel concerning foreign government's moves on diplomatic and military chess boards was a non factor.
When New Zealand does a face a wartime emergency (the outbreak of war in the Pacific) the accuracy and volume of intel available to the government will be of historical importance. The design of New Zealand's National Security structure may well be proven to be inadequate. Any National Security system is only as good as the officials and elected leaders who run the show. No official or MP can make good decisions if the data available to them is faulty or lacking.
In the sixteen years after INTERFET the NZDF's operational capabilities have been downgraded to the status of a UN police force. This has occurred because the fact Kiwi voters failed to punish the successive governments that have made insane decisions surrounding the NZDF. In my opinion New Zealand is well placed to deal with a National Emergency like a large scale natural disaster , but poorly placed to deal with a wartime emergency.
In fairness I do think it is possible for the more causal observer to draw the wrong strategic conclusions from INTERFET. Let me explain. As the book shows INTERFET was predominantly a land based operation. The majority of the historical documentation of INTERFET will be around the core mission of providing security and humanitarian support to East Timor. The history books that are yet to be written may overlook the role of soft air and sea power in enabling and supporting INTERFET.
Coalition forces had the luxury arriving in theatre via air and sea unopposed. Ongoing logistical support for INTERFET forces was conducted via the same means and in the same unopposed manner. My prediction is the next crises in the Asia-Pacific will be a medium to high end scenario and Timor-Leste may well be front , centre and stage once again. Make no mistake, Air and Sea Power are the most important military ingredients to Australia's and New Zealand's security.
What I find to be extremely worrying is how no one was held to account for the stuff ups around the cargo assigned to RAAF C-130 resupply flights. Had events taken a turn for the worse , Australian troops would have run out of ammunition. Could the same vulnerability rear its ugly head in the future? I sure hope not. Just hope isn't acceptable when the men and women of the Australian Army are deployed overseas.
The NZDF like the ADF has privatised the logistical supply chain. I can't fathom why any ADF senior military commander could have supported the outsourcing of logistics. The only motive I can come up with is the advancement of individuals careers came before the interests of the ADF. However I am not surprised at the way nobody in New Zealand has voiced concerns with the NZDF's logistical arrangements.
The fact none of the NZDF's senior leadership ever spoke out about the insanity of successive governments defence policies is very telling. Not even after they had retired and are free to speak their minds did they voice any concerns publicly. One of the reasons I started The Lens of History Blog and Podcast is to draw attention to these kinds of issues .
If the reader is looking for some bearing on why “off the shelf” logistics bombed (Pun intended) they might wish to consider the way you shop at your local supermarket. From your local supermarket you can stock up on your regular supply of groceries. Now if you were to go the same store and expect to buy ten thousand cans of soup you will be disappointed. The Australian Army found out this out as outlined in the book.
Chinese military planners will be noting the weaknesses in the ADF and NZDF's logistical capabilities. The Chinese like any other adversary will look to exploit the weakness of their would be enemies. Warfare isn't a game of gentlemanly cricket. As General William Tecumseh Sherman observed. War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueller it is, the sooner it will be over. For the sake of staying on topic I leave it to the reader to ponder the kind of cruelty, logistical deficiencies will bring to the ADF and NZDF in the next war.
From my own experiences in the civilian world the “off the shelf” approach to logistics can work on a small scale. After the September 4 2010 earthquake (not to be confused with the later February 22 2011 quake mentioned above) I was a volunteer with Waimakariri Civil Defence Emergency Management. In my modest role with Waimakariri CDEM I helped to staff my local Sector Post. I saw how the likes of a small laptop were supplied to meet our operational requirements. About half a dozen people were roster on per shift.
A brief look at NGO's is in order while I am reflecting on my own personal experiences. After the events of February 22 2011 I had the privilege of having a small role at a local welfare centre. Looking back now after the trauma has subsided the value of having NGO's integrated in with the CDEM relief efforts is clear. For example the Salvation Army provided meals for the people who were staying at the Welfare Centre. People staying or entering the Welfare Center also had access to government departments who provided emergency accommodation and so on.
Now that I have gotten miles ahead of the narrative some back tracking is in order. I Believe the Australian Public was rightfully pissed off at the US political establishment's reluctance to supply military forces for a PKF in East Timor. Just eight years previously Australia had been a participant in the US lead Coalition that successfully prosecuted the Gulf War.
Blair's conversation with Clinton on board Air Force One will go down as one of the most important conversations in the history of the US-Australia alliance. Had Blair not talked some sense into a clueless Clinton, the US-Australia alliance would have been put at risk. In the court of public and political opinion the US would have been dammed as betraying a close friend or step brother.
The logistical and intel support the US provided to INTFERNET cooled the nuclear melt down that was the fury of Australian public opinion. Although no one could have foreseen it the support the US supplied to INTFERNET, would help to shape Australia's contributions to the post 9-11 war in Afghanistan. After the events of 9-11 Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty when committing to regime change in Afghanistan.
Now I don't usually deal in what if or alternate history scenarios in The Lens of History blog and podcast. Given how the US Alliance is the bedrock of Australia's security and contribution's made to the war's in Afghanistan and Iraq, I am willing to make an exception in this case. In my view had Blair not shown some internal fortitude/initiative in going to see his Commander in Chief, there is no reason to think Australia would have contributed military forces to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US betrayal of Australia would have still been fresh in people's memories. Australians have a long memory, as Indonesia found out after they invaded East Timor.
The shift in Australian opinion towards seeing a military career in a favourable light represents a historical milestone. Wounds from Australia's controversial role in the Vietnam War had lingered in the public's mind for many years. One of the wounds had been how the anti Vietnam War protest movement had stained many members of the public's views towards military service. As the son of a 5RAR Vietnam veteran I would have liked to have explored this further. Other matters arising from the book deserve my attention.
From my conversation with John Blaxland, I found how if INTFERNET had taken a turn for the worse five hundred causalities were expected over the first few days. I found this part of the conversation every enlightening to say the least. The projected causalities wouldn't have factored in the lack of ammunition on board the resupply flights. Cosgrove's legacy has been defined by the success of INTFERNET.
Had INTFERNET been a disaster, Cosgrove would today be remembered in the same vain as General Arthur Percival (1887 - 1966) the commander of British Empire Forces during the Malaysia Campaign and The Fall of Singapore. Percival was vilified in the Australian accounts of the Fall of Singapore. I first read such accounts about the Fall of Singapore when I was about eight years old.
In later years I came to understand that Percival's role in history better. He was poorly qualified for his role as a senior military commander of British Empire ground forces. Equally he was the fall guy for the systematic failings that have been well documented in the history books. There is every reason to think that Cosgrove was either going to be remembered as he is today or become the fall guy for the already mentioned failings.
Evan's doesn't eluded a great deal to his reference to Defeat into Victory. So I went to my bookshelf and found a related passage in the book. Defeat into Victory is essential reading for upcoming military leaders and civilian leaders, wannabe political leaders and military history buffs. In General William Slim's words from page 206.
Good Doctors are no use without good discipline. More than half the battle against the disease is fought, not by the doctors, but by the regimental officers. It is they who see the daily dose of mepacrine is taken, that shorts a never worn , that shirt shorts are put on and sleeves turned down before sunset, that minor abrasions are treated before , not after they go septic , that bodily cleanness is enforced. When metacrine was first introduced and turned men a jaundiced yellow, there was the usual whispering campaign among troops that greets every new remedy – the drug would render them impotent-so, often the little tablet was not swallowed. An individual medical test in almost all cases will show whether it has been taken or not, but there are a few exceptions and it is difficult to prove for court martial purposes. I,therefore had surprise checks of whole units, every man being examined. If the overall result was less than ninety-five percent positive I sacked the commanding officer. I only had to sack three; by then the rest had got my meaning.
General Dwight D Eisenhower has been rightly heralded as what I will call the first modern senior military commander. By that I mean Eisenhower embraced the unknown. Eisenhower personal attributes made him successful at diplomacy , inter alliance political and leadership management. Eisenhower successfully overseeing the D-Day landings and his time in the White House made him into a well known historical figure.
I believe General Slim also had attributes of a modern day senior military /coalition commander. In the era of Colonial elitism/racism Slim was a Salt of the Earth character who successfully commanded fourteenth army. The fourteenth Army had been drawn from troops from Britain , India, East Africa and West Africa. Slim frequently toured front line units and addressed Indian and Gurkha units in their native tongues.
Slim was able to use his tours of front line units to a install a sense of unity and purpose (Debunking the myth of Japanese invincibility and kicking them out of Burma.) that crossed what is now known as cultural/national divides. The read should bear this in bear with how Slim's command sat at the bottom of the priorities list of the Allies logistical supply chain. The European and Pacific theatres all received significantly greater amounts of war material ahead of the Fourteenth Army.
Slim was viewed as a sort of father figure and was greatly respected by the troops under his command. Unlike Eisenhower , Slim remains a little known figure outside of military history circles. Now I invite the reader on a wild road that defies geography by taking the Burma Road from Mandalay to East Timor.
The way Cosgrove toured INTFERNET front line forces and attended cultural events is reminiscent of the way Slim lead the fourteenth Army. I have no doubt that Slim would have approved of the way Cosgrove set out to ensure the members of the coalition had confidence in INTFERNET's operational goals.
Slim faced a tricky political situation that he could have easily overlooked during the Race to Rangoon. The Burma National Army (BNA) had collaborated with the Japanese. The BNA had gone as far as to form a puppet government.
In Silm's own words from page 555-556 and are worth quoting in full.
There was at this stage a difference of opinion between Force 136 and our Burma Civil Affairs organisation. Force 136 wanted to foster and support the mutinous BNA in all respects; especially after the liberation of Burma would be more trouble than use, opposed any support of it. My opinion was that the BNA prowling on their lines of communications , could not fail to be a nuisance to the Japanese and give them a uncomfortable feeling on dark nights. If they were not with us , as well as against the Japanese , we should end up fighting them too. There was a lot to be said politically for having the only Burmese Nationalist armed force actually fighting on our side. I, therefore recommended we should Aung San , with arms and supplies and try to get some tactical control of his forces to make them fit into the general plan. Admiral Mountbatten quiet apart from my arguments of mine, had come to the same conclusion and decided that Aung San should be supported. I did not expect the BNA to exert any serious influence on the campaign, but I hoped they would -as in fact they did occasionally cut up stragglers , harass small parties and ambush vehicles , but I made no changes in my plans because of any plans expected of them.
I will now interject Slim's narrative with my commentary. Yes, it is clear that the decision to support the BNA rested with Admiral Louis Mountbatten (1900-1979). By now the reader may be wondering what the fudge does Slim and the BNA have to do with INTFERNET? I invite the reader to take a step back for a moment. For the first time British military commanders were making politically/Non military calculated moves around a nationalist movement. In the past the tendency of the British had been to suppress nationalistic feelings in India/Burma.
What I really want the reader to take from this is the way Slim and Mountbatten's thinking and command decisions around the BNA were of little military value. Considerations around the political and security situation in post war Burma were predominant in Slim and Mountbatten's thinking.
Returning to INTERFET. Cosgrove's personal attributes and military training saw him follow in the footstep's of Slim and Eisenhower. Cosgrove's employment of diplomacy during his engagement with Syahnakri throughout INTFERNET did represent shades of Eisenhower's personal strengths. I believe Eisenhower's dealings with the commander of Free French Forces in WW2, Charles de Gaulle may offer a historical parallel to the relationship between Cosgrove and Syahnakri. Both De Gaulle and Syahnakri sort to protect their national interests as they saw fit.
I should point out that nothing in the book suggests that Syahnakri is a prickly personality like de Gaulle was notorious for being in his dealings with Eisenhower and Churchill. Also de Gaulle on paper should have answered to the French Government in exile. From what I have read over the years de Gaulle represented more of a stand alone figure who exercised his own authority and judgement. Syahnakri as is the norm was answerable to the Indonesian government of the day.
By the virtue of the different era's they lived in Slim and Cosgrove enjoyed very different relationships with the media. During WW2 Slim didn't really have need for publicity/media management. Wartime censorship ensured no sensitive or classified information was published in the media. Speaking with John Blaxland I learned how Cosgrove used “Tactics and TV” to achieve the desires outcomes talked about in the book and in my commentary (e.g. promoting the role of a nation's forces back home in a positive light ).
In class rooms the leadership/command principals laid out by Eisenhower , Slim and others are past onto to the next generation of military leaders. By the same vain Cosgrove's use of Tactics and TV, successful leadership and coalition management of INTFERNET should be added to the text books. For future military leaders to be successful they must absorb the lessons from past successful and failed military campaigns. I feel the way Cosgrove used TV and Tactics is in need of better documenting and study by historians , scholars and even people just like myself.
A brief side note on TV and Tactics is worthwhile. Cosgrove made very effective use of TV and Tactics during INTFERNET. In 2002 Brigadier David Richards utilised TV and Tactics to gain the support of the UK government for a INTFERNET style intervention in Sierra Leone. Like Blair's decision to have a frank conversation with President Clinton, Richards displayed personal courage and initiative in his actions. Richards went way out on a limb in a way many of his peers may not have done so.
Richards was able to bring about the outcome he desired with media outlets doing about seventy percent of the ground work. The other thirty percent was the promises Richards made to the President of Sierra Leone Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. To his great credit Tony Blair the British Prime Minster at the time gave Richards his government's backing for a intervention in Sierra Leone.
As I see it, had Richards been in Sierra Leone in the era before television he would have been struck in a corner. If Richards was unable to persuade his civilian superiors of his case , he would have only had two options available to him. Either leave Sierra Leone to it's fate or outright defy Constitutional Authority (civilian/government control of the armed forces) and mount a intervention with the forces available to him. Richards has told the story of his military career before and after Sierra Leone in his autobiography.
I now return to Defeat into Victory , pages 590 – 591. My commentary will act as a intermission in the below extract. In writing the book Slim meant to speak to future generations and military leaders.
It was not long before Aung San that what he meant by independence had little relation to what Japanese were prepared to give – that he had exchanged an old master for a infinity more tyrannical new one. As one of the leading followers once said to me , “If the British sucked our blood , the Japanese ground our bones !” He became more and more disillusioned with the Japanese and in early 1943 we got news from Seagrim a most gallant officer who had remained in the Karen Hills at the ultimate of his life, that Aung San's feelings were changing.
Okay, by now my astute readers may be wondering if I have had to much to drink at The Lens of History Christmas Party? Fear not a common thread exists between Indonesia's actions in East Timor and how the Japanese were brutal conquers in South East Asia. In order to make my case let's take a glance at the nature of the of the Imperial Japanese Empire at the time of the Burma Campaign.
Japan was run by a militarisic regime who had been hell bent on overseas expansion. The Japanese people subscribed to a radical form of the Bushido code and they worshipped their emperor as a living god. Hold on to this for a moment. The fanaticism shown by the Japanese on the battlefield and brutality as occupies is not really any different from ISIS's present conduct in the Middle East.
Speaking with John Blaxland I was interested to hear his views on East Timor and how Indonesia wasn't going to tread lightly. Having battled it out with Communists in the 1950's Suharto was in no mood to do the same in East Timor. Many people feared that East Timor would become the next Cuba of Asia , right on Australia's door step.
In 1975 Indonesia was ruled by a nationalistic anti Communist dictatorship. The Suharto regime's goal was to combat Communism and maintain the unity of the unity of their Republic. Ideologically they were different from the Imperial Japanese regime. Yet the common thread between the two regimes is the brutality they displayed when undertaking military expansion.
My contention is that dictatorial regimes , no matter their idealogical flavour don't play by the same rule book as western democracies. The mistake Whitlam made was to assume the Indonesians would “play nice” in East Timor. At that time Indonesia wouldn't have had any concept of the backlash they would generate by taking a sledge hammer to Limestone.
Now I come to what I believe is the lesson from Indonesia's actions in East Timor. Dictatorial regimes will always use the sledge hammer when they undertake military or other kinds of force to meet their aims. The murder of the Bailbo Five represents my argument perfectly. In the minds of TNI's commanders eliminating what they saw as a unwelcome intrusion on their activities was a perfectly legitimate course of action. Since they didn't have answer to public opinion or a free press the TNI had a free hand to commit atrocities as they pleased.
At the time of writing China is a emerging military and economic power. China is a nationalistic/fascist dictatorship with territorial expansion very much on their minds. My forecast is as follows: In the not too distance future China will look to flex its military muscle in Malaysia's slice of Borneo and the Southern Philippines. Amphibious operations followed by what I will term a dose of the “East Timor” treatment.
What justification will the Chinese give for their military undertaking? The answer to that question depends on where the tide of the declining international situation is at the time. If Russian tanks are headed for Berlin and the Thrid Battle of the Atlantic is under way the question becomes moot. In such a situation the Chinese would go the route of naked territorial conquest. No doubt , historical irony will be in abounds as the onset of the Pacific War is repeated with China filling Japan's previous role.
For the sake of staying topical I am going to assume that the war is yet to break out in Europe. The Chinese would use the justification/thinly veiled cover story of conducting anti terrorist (Isis and co) operations. Now I can finally get to the heart of the matter. If Australian and New Zealand political leaders have failed to learn the lessons from the recent past they will repeat them in a sickening fashion.
Australia and New Zealand could well make the same kind of calculation Whitlam probably made in 1975 around the viability of a independent East Timor. The levels of poverty , corruption and poor governance in the Philippines may be judged as a hindrance to combating Islamic terrorism. Accordingly the amount of bloodshed from on going counter insurgency efforts would be reduced or stopped all together by the Chinese intervention.
Aung Sang called in on Slim after his change of heart (see below). Malaysia may not have any calling cards after it dawns on them that sharing the same or similar skin colour with another country doesn't guarantee better treatment or your independence. If Homer Simpson wishes he had no kids and three money , than Malaysia will wish China had no influence and Australia was the predominant power in Asia.
I now return to Slim's words for the last time in this review. Note to the reader for the sake of space and remaining topical I will skip parts of the Slim's account of his first meeting with Aung San. Slim politely , but firmly refused San's demands for status as a ally and not subordinate commander of his forces. The same goes for the notion of San representing the provisional government. Slim concluded that he could do business with Aung San.
On 1 August 1944 he was bold enough to speak publicly with contempt of the Japanese brand of independence , and it was clear that , it they did not soon liquidate him, he might prove useful to us. Force 136 through its agents already had channels of communication, and when the revolt of the Burma National Army occurred and it was clear Aung San had burned his boats, it was time to deal directly with him. With the full approval of Admiral Mountbatten, the agents of Force 136 offered Aung San on 21 April a safe conduct to my headquarters and my promise that, whether we came to an understanding or not , I would return him unharmed to his own people. He hesitated until 15 May, but on the day it was reported to me that he and a staff officer had crossed the Irrawaddy at Allanmyo and were asking to meet me. I sent an aircraft , which flew them to my headquarters at Meiktila the next day. The arrival of Aung San dressed in near Japanese uniform of a Major General, complete with a sword startled one or two of my staff who had not been warned of his coming. However, he behaved with the utmost courtesy, I hope did we. He was a short , well-build , active man in his early middle age , neat and soldierly in appearance, with regular Burmese features in a face that could be a impassive mask or light up with intelligence. I found he spoke good English , learnt in his school and university days and he was accompanied by a staff officer who spoke it perfectly , as well as he might , if it were true as I was told that his father had been a senior British Official who had married a Burmese lady. I admired his boldness and told him so. “But' I said, “apart from the fact that you , a British Subject , have fought against the British Government , I have here in the headquarters people who tell me there is a well substantiated case of civil murder, complete with witness , against you. I have been urged to place you on trial for that. You have nothing in writing , only a verbal promise at second hand , that I would return you to your friends. Don't you think you are taking considerable risks in coming here and adopting this attitude?” “No” he replied shortly. “Why not?” “Because you are a British Officer ,” he answered. I had to confess that he scored heavily – and what was more I believe he meant it. At any rate he had come out on my word alone . I laughed and asked him if he felt like that about the British , why had he been so keen to get rid of us?” He said it was not that he disliked the British, but did not want British or Japanese or any other foreigners to rule his country . I was impressed by Aung San. He was not the ambitious, unscrupulous guerrilla unscrupulous guerrilla leader I had expected. He was certainly ambitious and meant to secure for himself a dominate position in Post-War Burma , but I judged him to be a genuine patriot and a well balanced realist – characters which are not always combined. His experience with the Japanese had put his views on the British into a truer perspective.
I would draw another historical parallel at this point. Slim's meeting with Aung San is in some way is not unlike Cosgrove's first meeting with Syahnaki at the start of INTFERNET. When Cosgrove gets off the plane for his meeting with Syahnaki he had to make a judgement call about the man and his intent. Cosgrove went on his gut instinct before the meeting took place. In a show of faith and confidence Cosgrove arrived at the meeting unarmed and unescorted. The meeting between Cosgrove and Syahnaki set the tone for INTFERNET's operational success.
Beyond the fact San backed which side was winning the war, Slim knew very little about the man he came face to face with at his headquarters. Like Cosgrove generations later , Slim made a intuitive judgement about the man and the situation before him. To what extent San genuinely believed Slim was honorary solider and British gentlemen has been lost to history. In my opinion Slim's judgement averted a immediate Post War revolt against British rule in Burma.
Now I come to Syahnaki's chapter in the book. Syahnaki's true role before and during INFERNET is yet to be recorded in the history books. Syahnaki's rational did strike me as the same kind of revisionism offered by those who fought for the Axis Powers in WW2. Intellectually, I struggled with organising my thoughts on Syahnaki in a well thought out manner. I felt the same kind of reaction I would get if I had been reading accounts of Japanese atrocities in WW2.
In all probability Syahnaki represents nothing unusual. Syahnaki like those former members of Hitler's war machine who joined the Post War West German military was finding his feet in a brave new world. Syahnaki saw his country's greatest fear , East Timorese independence come true. Like those who slipped into the West German armed services who had the been apart of the defeat of the Nazi regime , the sun dawned after a perceived Armageddon.
Like his West German counterparts WW2 veteran counterparts witnessed his country transformation from a dictorship to a demcractic state. The Western German authorites never properly examined the wartime service records of most noteable former members of SS and Wehrmacht Panzer divsions. In return the West German armoured units/ post war NATO tank development gained , hard fought tactical and technical knowdgle and experinces of its forerunners. There isn't any reason to think Syahnaki didn't pass on his own hard fought knowdgle and experinces to the next generation of TNI officers.
Until I am in possession of more facts concerning his role at the time of INTFERNET , I am unable to reach a more fact based conclusion concerning Syahnaki's character. Despite the fact I haven't devoted much space to Syahnaki in my commentary , I still gave the man's place in history a great deal of thought.
Tackling the matter of INTFERNET lack of a law enforcement and War Crimes trials mandate is another topic , I feel needs greater examination by scholars and historians. In writing my commentary, I hope to get the ball rolling on just such research and authorship. INTFERNET represented a significant speed bump in Australia's relationship with Indonesia. So it stands to reason , War Crimes trials would have represented a gigantic sink hole in place of the speed bump.
Was the absence of a law enforcement and War Crimes trials mandate a deliberate omission or a oversight? I have doubt the Australian government would have been willing to forsake justice for the people of East Timor for the sake of its relationship with Indonesia. The other possibility is the Australian government overlooked the matter during the mad policy scramble to meet the new reality around Post Suharto Indonesia and East Timor.
Indonesians still share the genuine fear of a Asian Balkanisation that began with their country's founding. I feel understanding this is the first step to understanding modern day Indonesia. Hogan's chapter did me a great service by giving me this bit of insight. The fear was driven by anti communist feelings and separatist movements springing up like weeds. Today Islamic extremism and separatist movements still represent security threats to Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific region.
I wish to touch upon a few points that I take away from the book. Security is King! In East Timor the success of INTFERNET in securing Dili and the countryside allowed for the distribution of humatarian aid as is covered in the book. UNTATET was able to take over from INTFERNET in a the space of only a few months. In Sierra Leone the dire situation was brought under control by the British Military Intervention. When British troops patrolled the streets of Free Town the locals felt safe and foreigners didn't want to leave.
In any post conflict scenario securing the (enter country or location here) will always be paramount. The collespe of security in post Saddam Hussein Iraq brings the lesson home like no instructor or lectucer in a class room could ever do so. US ground troops patrolling Iraq's Urban centers would have made people feel safe. The perpetrators of the epidemic lawlessness would have been deterred from ever stepping foot out on the streets. Greater levels of humanitarian aid could have been delivered to those most in need.
I would far as to say if American , British and Australian political and military leaders really understood the lessons from INTFERNET the Iraq war would have never happened. I am not going to deal with Post Saddam Iraq in any great depth , if I did so I would still be working on this article come Christmas because of the sheer number of blunders that were committed by civilian planners and military planners.
Fundamentally Australia and New Zealand must find their security within the Asia-Pacific region. Successive New Zealand governments have blundered by committing our security to the hands of the United Nations. The extend of this is demonstrated by how New Zealand expended ten years worth of diplomatic resources into securing a temporary seat on the UN Security council. I believe New Zealand's seat on the Security Council as come at the expense of improved diplomatic relations with the Asia-Pacific region.
The failure to develop a sound strategy towards the Pacific Islands region is already being felt with China starting to flex it's economic muscle in what use to be a Australian lake. Elsewhere one eyed Kiwis insist that China is simply a customer for Fonterra products, a source of foreign students and tourism. No thought is given to what is driving the competing territorial claims in places like the Spratly Islands.
In Asia , New Zealand's security lies with diplomatic and military ties with countries like Japan ,Philippines, Vietnam, India and Indonesia. I regard the need for New Zealand to improve these relationships as a absolute imperative. Only from Australia's and New Zealand's relationships and engagement with Asia can the history of post colonial East Timor be prevented from repeating. The same goes for an a regional frame work to combat Isis and other Islamic terrorist organisations.
As a nation New Zealand's failure to understand and engage with our neighbourhood will be past onto the next generation. Those kids who are still in school or under the age of twenty will pay the price in blood for the mistakes of successive governments.
I believe the success of INTFERNET repersented the high mark of UN peacekeeping operations. I feel once INTFERNET is better documented by historians more people will share in my conclusion. INTFERNET was unexpectedly trigged by the Habibie letter. In the future Australia and New Zealand can't afford to be caught off guard by unexpected events in the Asia. Equally next time around misreading events and or not having a clear policy is unlikely to have a happy outcome.
Before Australia once again leads a large scale military coalition in peacekeeping or warlike operations, some considerations are worth making. The luxury of a UN Resolution/Mandate to authorise the operation probably won't be around. The permanent members of the UN Security Council will always vote in favour of their interests. The interests of China and Russia are certainly not in align with those of Australia and New Zealand.
The ADF and NZDF can't count on receiving logistical and political support from the US military during the next INTFERNET or onset of the Pacific War Mk2 for two reasons. Politically, the sitting US president at the time may well throw Australia under the bus like Clinton almost did in 1999. The combinations of budget cutbacks and the demands of current/future operations may mean the US military no longer has any spare supplies left lying around in Warehouses.
In the years after 9-11 Australia and New Zealand could make significance military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq with little risk of a war breaking out in Asia. Over the next ten to fifteen years tensions in Asia will increase. Coupled with tension will be the risk of a war breaking out on Australia's door step. By taking part in the attempts to quell a fire storm (the war against ISIS) Australia and New Zealand run the risk of having to many fire trucks unavailable when a fire breaks out close to home.
