Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 2

Invest in forces housing and ‘value added’ benefits for service personnel

As public sector pay restraint appears to be here for good, the RN needs to find other ways to offer the best possible quality of life for its service personnel to aid recruitment and retention. Ensuring that new service housing is built or existing stock brought up to a consistently high standard should be a priority. At the same time this investment would provide work for a construction sector that may face challenges as the economy adjusts to Brexit. The MoD should be able to get the best possible prices for work which would need to be carried out at some point in the futures in any case.

Save The Royal Navy Campaign Article 

Welcome to Part 2 of my look at what issues would be faced in the event the Royal New Zealand Navy was expanded. In Part 1 I covered the potential pitfalls when acquiring new vessels. I have covered why the RNZN is to small in previous articles. For the reader who isn't familiar my reasoning can be found concerning the importance of Sea Power to New Zealand security. And why Warship numbers and capabilities are also vital to the RNZN.

In Part 2 I will turn to the issues of Recruitment and Retention of RNZAF personnel. Compared with part 1 the reader will find a more general approach to the topics at hand. I won't make the claim of covering every aspect of maintaining and in the event it happens expanding the RNZN. As per usual I welcome any feedback from the reader.


To what ratio current personal and new recruits would crew new vessels is depended on a number of factors. The type of vessel entering service and the proportion of current members of the RNZN required would be some of the factors involved. A more precise analysis won't be possible until the day comes when Kiwis wake up to how much they really needed the RNZN before a emergency broke out. The same goes for financial costings involved with what this very article covers.

I now come to the matter of Recruitment and Retention. Fundamentally I believe the Recruitment of new and retention of current personnel has been overlooked by the current RNZN and New Zealand Governments. I can not stress enough the importance of this matter to the RNZN whether or not expansion ever takes place or not.

Let me make a slight side diversion. When I read the article from The Lens of History's friends at the Save The Royal Navy Campaign, the way the issues crossed over with the RNZN stood out to me. I whole heartily endorse the view of John Dunbar raises. For the sake of remaining topical I will focus on Defence Force housing.

For the sake of the international reader I would like to point out house prices in Auckland hover around the 7 hundred thousand to the 1 million dollar mark.  Members of the RNZN based at the Devonport Naval Base are at the coal face of unaffordable housing in New Zealand. I find it hard to believe Auckland housing prices aren't having a negative effect on the RNZN ability to retain personnel.

I believe there is a mandate for for a renewed focus on Defence Force housing. The New Zealand Government and the NZDF drifting away from providing housing is very short sighted. Exposing members of the defence force to the forces of “market” rents and housing prices may well take the cake for short sighted-ness!


Recruitment is a area I feel is lacking in attention in debate and discussion. The RNZN like the RNZAF and the Army compete with the private sector for the best and brightest people. I believe a 2 fold approach should be taken to NZDF recruitment and promoting awareness/benefits of a military career.

The first measure would be to expand the Limited Service Volunteer Program. The expanded program would be in placed in Universities , Polytechs and other training providers. Students placed in the program would be introduced to military life and undergo a fitness program. At the end of the program students would be given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or the regular full time military.

1 or more charter schools modelled on the Australian Army Apprentice Scheme would form the 2nd measure. The schools would be open to individuals who are unemployed as well as secondary students. Under the charter school model school leavers would have the assurance of a secure military military in the years ahead of them.

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 1

There is an urgent need to resolve delays in the Type 26 Frigate building programme. Clearly, the MOD needs to ensure value for money – but increasing the flow of money into shipbuilding in the short term to support the economy is a real consideration. Bringing forward construction of Type 31 frigates in parallel with the Type 26 construction to enable a sustained increased level of shipbuilding would also be beneficial, and see an increase in surface escort numbers which can be sustained in the longer-term.

Save The Royal Navy Article

This article is angled towards a reader @GardinerWira who thought rightly Kiwis would want to know the cost of bringing the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) up to a adequate strength . I was delayed in writing this article by circumstances on my home front. On the positive side of things the article by John Dunbar proved to very timely and topical.

I am going to break the topic into 2 parts. Part 1 will covers some of the pitfalls the New Zealand Government and the RNZN would need to avoid. In Part 2 I will take a look at issues around crewing the new vessels and retaining personnel.

The reader will note how I am not offering precise figures/costings. A outlay of costings would have meet with difficulties due to the variables involved. Such variables include up front capital costs , ongoing operational costs , choice of vessels , cost overruns at the construction stage and so on. The reader can take the matters I raise and apply them to the RNZN of today even if they don't support my ideas.


Now I will turn attention to the pitfalls that can apply to buying naval vessels or even new acquisitions for the Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force. The New Zealand government's record in the area of defence acquisitions is lousy to say the least. Space doesn't permit me to go into detail around the debacle around Project Protector and Army LAV's . Suffice to say the public should question the competence of the current and future governments/defence bureaucracy to be entrusted with tax payer dollars and the future of the armed forces.

Clearly a return to basics involving acquiring the right kind of and volume of equipment is desperately needed. A suitable number of vessels that can meet operational requirements isn't a given. Nor is avoiding cost over runs at the construction/purchasing stage guaranteed. I am now going to turn the matter of avoiding cost over runs.

My intention isn't to pick on the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) I do want to highlight how a potentially good selection of design isn't the same as getting a vessels delivered on time and on budget. Essentially the Hobart Class AWD have been a classic case of mismanagement and a terrible Corporate/Business Corporate/Business model.

Casting a glance beyond Australia how the Royal Navy's Type 26 Frigate Program could said to be struck in the mud. Space and the need to stay topical means I won't go into the issues faced by the Type 26 Frigate Program. What I want to convey to the reader is how beyond Australia huge issues exist with Navies acquiring new vessels.

Essentially I would argue whether it be the replacement of the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates or undertaking a restructure of the navy the choice of ship builders shouldn't automatically follow on from the design choice. I believe old fashion saying of buyer beware applies to the situation.


The main pitfall that nobody is talking about is how New Zealand is solely reliant on Military Off the Shelf hardware. The failure to develop shipyards and strengthen the local defence industry over the last 2 decades is coming with a heavy price. A localised defence industry with a focus on Research and development would have place New Zealand well as global events take a trend for the worst.

The New Zealand Defence Force could have had access to lower cost high end military equipment that is interoperable with our allies/coalition partners. The same military equipment would have also found ready export markets around the world.

Questions hang around like the smell of seaweed drying out on a beach. For me at least one question is how the RNZN/Department of Defence could take a design like the Type 26 Frigate from the design table to operational service without any major hiccups?

Book Review: War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft

War by Other Means by Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris (Harvard University Press 2016) . War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft is a examination of Geoeconomics squarely aimed at Policy Makers and Academia. The primary focus of the book is China's use of Geoeconomics as a tool of State Craft.

Quotations from the book appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book.

The opening of the book is a look at the definition of Geoeconomics. The term of Geoeconomics is used extensively in US foreign policy circles. Scholars aren't in agreement concerning a precise definition of Geoeconomics. On page 20 the authors urge the following definition: The use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations' economic actions on a country's geopolitical goals.

The remainder of the chapter 1 is devoted to how there hasn't been a great deal of debate among scholarly circles around Geoeconomics. As far back as 1970 Susan Strange recognised in the studies of international economic relations were focused on politics and not economics.

Nation states as varied as China and Qatar have seen Geoeconomics take a resurgent path in international relations. I will come back to China a fair bit in this review. My take from current events/opening of the book is Russia's actions in the Ukraine is representative of the resurgence of Geoeconomics as a tool of foreign policy.

I feel the point or discussion around Geoeconomics not being a Zero Sum ( Winners and losers) game could have received more attention from the authors. Put another way the outcome of a Nation State use of Geoeconomics isn't always Black and White. The use of military action to achieve a objective can be said to be successful or failure.

The Iraq War is widely regarded has having been a gross miscalculation . Viewed from the standpoint of achieving the objective of turning Iraq into a democracy , the war was a failure. I believe a historical parallel to the Vietnam War. The political and public fall out from the Vietnam War is akin to what has occurred in the wake of the Iraq War. As the reader all of this sprung to mind. As such the fall out is for another discussion.


Historical examples of the successful use of Geoeconomics by the US have been forgotten. Chapter 6 is entitled US Foreign Policy And Geoeconomics in Historical Context. I will leave Chapter 6 and much of the other content to the reader. For the purpose of this review I will touch upon the role State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) have in Geoeconomics. SOE's can be used as a tool of State Craft in the Geoeconomics Chess Board.


Geoeconomics is distinct from foreign (or international) or economic policy, mercantilism and liberal economic thought.

Early on I was struck by how relevant this passage of the book is to New Zealand. In the manner of Academia the authors argue Geoeconomics is confused with a reinvented form of Mercantilism . Others mix up Geoeconomics with the liberal (Market orientated) economic school of thought. Adam Smith a noted liberal economic thinker understood the limits of economic logic: what was/is mutually beneficial in economic terms might not be so in political terms. According to Smith , “the wealth of a neighbouring country “ might be dangerous in war and politics. “


From page 37: The emergence of new generation of state capitalists- significantly larger , wealthier, more global, less democratic and more sophisticated than their predecessors – raises important questions for US Foreign Policy.


And from page 54: Twenty years ago state owned enterprises (SOE's) were little more than domestic employment vehicles. Ten years ago there was wide spread scepticism about whether these firms, saddled with bad debt debt and inexperienced leadership, could succeeded beyond home markets. Today they include some of the world's biggest companies , backed by some of the globes largest pools of capital and can claim over half the world's top ten IPO's over the last six years.


In the present day state backed firms account for 30% of foreign direct investment ( hereafter FDI) in emerging markets. SOE's remain grossly inefficient in comparison to their private sector counterparts. Efficiency and operating on a for profit basis is in no way the aim.


Now I can turn to the thread of SOE's. In April of 2011. President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff made Beijing her first overseas trip. Strengthening ties with Brazil was on the mind of Chinese President Hu Jintao and SOE airlines were his means of doing so. The stated owned Chinese airlines placed orders for 30 Brazilian Embraer planes plus options for option for 5 more with 3 airlines.


The above example is only mentioned briefly in the book. I feel the brief mention is never the less very illustrative of how the Chinese make use of Geoeconomics in foreign policy circles.  Could the Kiwi reader ever imagen their government exercising the same Geoeconomics lever via Air New Zealand?!


For the second thread I will move away from SOE's. In China's arsenal the use of SOE's isn't the most brazen lever they employ from their Geoeconomics tool box. The Chinese government understands only the use of military force to resolve territorial disputes will invoke the US – Japan Alliance. China's relationship with Japan is described as “Politically cold and economically cool. “ China Geoeconomics aims are to back up their claims to the Diaoyu/SenKaKu Islands and weaken the US – Japan Alliance.

 Economic retaliation is the name of the Chinese game. In 2001 China reduced the import quota for imported Japanese Cars by 40 to 60%. Specifically China was objecting to Prime Minster Junichiro paying his respects in the Yasukuni Shine. Testimony concerning Japan's Gem Warfare experiments in WW2 had also taken place at this time.


The Kiwi reader will find the references to the Trans Pacific Partnership (hereafter TPP) to be very topical. The TPP is covered in the chapter entitled America's Geoeconomic Potential. To summarise: the TPP was conceived to revive a dying round of Doya talks at the World Trade Organisation. Using the TPP to combat China's use of Geoeconomics was never a consideration.

The original name for the TPP was Trans Pacific Economic Partnership. The newly minted Obama Administration changed the agreement name to what it is known as today. In changing the name the Obama Administration signaled to China and the rest of the globe the TPP wasn't a foreign policy objective.

The book covers how from the time of Nixon admiration to the present Geoeconomics slipped away from the American Foreign Policy establishment/Policy Makers minds. I feel the reader is best served taking in this when they read this and the other material in the book. The book will succeed in reaching the planned target audience and as such the authors will have achieved their aims.