In contrast, a degree of risk was accepted in placing large quantities of supplies forward in relatively small areas at unprotected corps and theater logistics bases to support offensive operations. The loss or denial of one of these log bases could have significantly impaired the offensive capability of ARCENT and Marine Central Command ground forces. Fortunately, our intelligence estimates correctly viewed enemy disruption of these bases as unlikely, especially in light of our overwhelming air superiority.
Full article
In the above article, Chris Paparone, Colonel, US Army retired, writes about logistics during the Gulf War. My intention is to frame my commentary around Paparone's analyse of logistics during the Gulf War with the next conventional war (hereafter next war) in mind. The specific details concerning the location and nations involved in the next conventional war falls beyond the scope of this article. However, the reader may wish to consider, how the next European War (Russia invading western Europe), plays out strategically and logistically.
The length of the next war will determine how much, if at all, the character of logistical support evolves to meet battlefield conditions. In an 'long war', logistical capabilities will evolve to meet new operational and strategic demands. Let me explain. In WW2, the character of logistics continued to become parts of the fabric of modern warfare. Specifically, D-Day provides a window into the character of logistics at the strategic level. Until battlefield constraints (The Battle of the Atlantic) were overcome, D-Day remained theoretical in the minds of British and American military planners.
A short war would not last enough to alter the character of logistics, and any lessons would face examination after the war finished. As such further analyse of logistics in an short war is not required in this article. The character of logistics in the next 'long war' will evolve, and turn theoretical operational, technological, transportation, and battlefield medicine concepts into reality.
In the next war, will large quantities of supplies capable of supporting brigades, placed in forward areas, in a scaled down version of what occurred in the Gulf War? For a moment, let us assume there are sufficient quantities of supplies in theatre to warrant such a eventuality. To what extent unmanned systems and more traditional (manned) aerial resupply methods, offset the requirement, for the presence large quantities of supplies in forward areas only poses more questions. These questions on logistical resupply from forward areas could cover topics from camouflage to the dispersal of supplies.
Will the option of deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support exist in the next war? In short, the answer is no. If logistical demands driven by high intensity combat operations and attrition are not meet then front line ground forces would face destruction in combat. No amount of prewar training or acts of battlefield courage can overcome logistical failings. Munitions, fuel, water, and spare parts are the 'wheels' ground forces operate on.
Deliberately deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support, and ground forces facing inadequate logistical support due to enemy action are not mutually exclusive. During the next war, United States and coalition air and naval supremacy is not assured. This (probable) absence of air and naval supremacy requires military planners to factor in disruptions to logistical supply chains-resulting in restrictions on ground forces' combat capabilities. I will come back to these logistical restrictions on ground forces in a moment.
Will the option of deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support exist in the next war? In short, the answer is no. If logistical demands driven by high intensity combat operations and attrition are not meet then front line ground forces would face destruction in combat. No amount of prewar training or acts of battlefield courage can overcome logistical failings. Munitions, fuel, water, and spare parts are the 'wheels' ground forces operate on.
Deliberately deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support, and ground forces facing inadequate logistical support due to enemy action are not mutually exclusive. During the next war, United States and coalition air and naval supremacy is not assured. This (probable) absence of air and naval supremacy requires military planners to factor in disruptions to logistical supply chains-resulting in restrictions on ground forces' combat capabilities. I will come back to these logistical restrictions on ground forces in a moment.
I am going to raise the issue of battlefield medicine from a logistical standpoint. Specifically, can existing levels of medical supplies,practices and personnel cope with the next war? The American Civil War (1861-65) (hereafter Civil War) provides us with a historical precedence where existing preparations for medical care were ill-prepared for the volume of battlefield and non battlefield (disease) casualties. In short, the Civil War, unexpectedly lasted longer than 90 days, and this is why existing battlefield medical infrastructure was overwhelmed at the start of the war.
The historical parallel to battlefield medicine in the Civil War serves two purposes. The Civil War at first provides us with a historical basis to pose the following question: Could the ghost of the Civil War, who witnessed ill-prepared battlefield medicine infrastructure and personnel appear in the next war? A complete hypothetical answer to this question is for the reader to ponder. I am prevented by space and topical considerations from answering this question. However, the question contains a inherent warning, for as the Civil War demonstrated, the length of wars can exceed expectations.
Topically, readers may ask why or how I selected battlefield medicine as a subject of logistics. My interest in the Civil War aside, my goal is to provide the reader with subject matter to think about. Also, I was able to frame the prospect of the duration of the next war in a useful historical context.
The historical parallel to battlefield medicine in the Civil War serves two purposes. The Civil War at first provides us with a historical basis to pose the following question: Could the ghost of the Civil War, who witnessed ill-prepared battlefield medicine infrastructure and personnel appear in the next war? A complete hypothetical answer to this question is for the reader to ponder. I am prevented by space and topical considerations from answering this question. However, the question contains a inherent warning, for as the Civil War demonstrated, the length of wars can exceed expectations.
Topically, readers may ask why or how I selected battlefield medicine as a subject of logistics. My interest in the Civil War aside, my goal is to provide the reader with subject matter to think about. Also, I was able to frame the prospect of the duration of the next war in a useful historical context.
At the strategic level, the severity of logistical restrictions on ground forces, caused by losses in combat at sea , in the air, and on the ground will dictate the outcome of the next war. In light of advancements in unmanned systems and 3D printing there is a danger that the nature of logistics in warfare is forgotten. Put another way, regardless of exciting technological progress, the nature of modern day logistics will remain the same. Ground forces, who face no logistical restrictions will always defeat those facing such constraints.
