The Marines Counterinsurgency and Strategic Culture Lessons Learned And Lost (Georgetown University Press, 2018) is an unusual but informative history of strategic lessons learned and lost in Marine counterinsurgency campaigns in the Banana, Vietnam and Iraq Wars.
Johnson's work suffers from the raw and untidy output from Cultural Topography Framework [1]. Specifically, American and Marine cultural influences over counterinsurgency campaigns are the book's mindset. Johnson's wild structure ruins the typical chronological, topical focus and narrative found in mainstream titles.
The nature of Johnson's work precludes a traditional short to a medium summary. These reviewers first and predominant instinct is to place the book in the unreadable category. However, this runs counter to this reviewer's lifelong argument for constructive criticism and feedback.
Unusually, this reviewer acted as an editor. In the editorial mindset, the reader organisers events in their order of timeline appearance. In continuing this theme, the individual filters out the topics not relevant or of interest to them. For the sake of the reader, this reviewer duplicated the editorial review approach, below.
Johnson's passive writing style is to the detriment of the reader. This reviewer accepts Johnson passive writing style in emphasising on analysis of her subject matter. Nevertheless, the overuse of this writing style removes the emphasis on subjects of importance to the reader.
Reading Johnson helped this reviewer's understanding of American and U.S. military, cultural weaknesses in counterinsurgency and nation-building campaigns. In the context of American culture, an aversion to counterinsurgency. Americans distrust civilian and military decision-makers abilities to steer the effective use of military power. This distrust in ill-informed policymakers was born out of their failure to foresees the protracted nature of Banana, Vietnam and Iraq Wars.
American civilian and military leaders are not required by their public to prove a nuanced or refined view of the world. Civilian policymakers and elected officials careers do not face backlash or punishment for lacking analytical skills or historical knowledge in their fields of expertise. American culture's insular nature hidden behind ignorance of history and international cultures. Marines cultural insensitivity has repercussions beyond alienating local people, affects on relations with allies, and obstructs self-evaluation.
The Marines identity and roles are born from their positions in conventional and small wars. The Marines involvement in WW1 overshadowed their presence in the Banana Wars. For the Marines, The Battle of Belleau Wood was pivotal in establishing the Marines perceived separate identity from the U.S. Army. Craig Cameron notes Belleau Wood as the Marine Corps's"rite of passage to maturity": A respected foe had granted recognition of the Marines institutional distinctness whose performance made them a representative of the United States, separate from the Army[2]."
In 1930 Commandant Ben Fuller assumed command of the Marines coming from nearly twenty years of the Banana Wars. Fuller's tenure oversaw the debate between Marine supporters of amphibious operations and small wars practitioners. The supporters of amphibious orientated Marine Corps felt retaining their separate identity from the Army and navy was of paramount importance. Under Commandants John H. Russell and Thomas Holcomb, this amphibious oriented doctrinal approach overcame recent small wars experiences.
Underlying the Marines presence in the Banana Wars was racism, conditioned by American Culture and compounded by ignorance of local customs [3]. Paternalistic racism with the "for your own good" mentality provided the Marines cognitive justification of unseating local sovereign governments, their strict and cohesive measures and ongoing presence to administer countries.
Across the Banana Wars, this racism and gross mistreatment of local people negatively affected the Marines intelligence-gathering capabilities, but this was not obvious to Marines serving in theatre. Marines failed to perceive the strategic outcome from mistreatment of local populations. The local populations' grievances caused by Marines acted as recruiting calls for insurgents.
Johnson's analysis of Paternalistic Racism, "for your own good" mentality is the gold plate standard. The reader need not look any further for an outstanding instance of the intellectual argument behind paternalistic racism. Racism is morally re-pungent, but the capacity to intellectually outlay the failings of Paternalistic Racism acts as a model for the reader to follow.
The Marines Combined Actions Platoon (CAP) [4] program stands in contrast to their roles in the Banana Wars. Several official histories of the CAP cast the program's origins to the Marines Banana Wars experiences. However, William Corson, one of the programs directors, challenged the idea that the CAP program was born out of lesson from the Banana Wars. Notable, the CAP Program operated outside of General William Westmoreland's "big unit" war.
Ideally, Marines who volunteered, came recommended from their commanding officer, passed proficiency tests and had been in theatre for two months. However, motivations and reasons for Marines joining CAP encompassed commanders removing unwanted Marines from their units, to those who wished to leave combat zones.
The non-linear nature of Johnson's framework returns the reader to the Banana Wars. In their role occupiers, the Marines created and administered central governments, eroding the authority of local government bodies. American thinking at the start of the 20th century was, as in the present day, was that the majority of [nation] state problems solved with economic cures.
The Marines first approach was on material offerings and not positive contact with local populations. Strangely, American cultural perception and expectations of enormous material outlay replaced positive interactions among local communities. Disdainful and often abusive treatment alienated local communities. In place of understanding the consequences of their actions, perceived the locals as ignorant.
Civilian and military decision-makers measuring their countries' altruism by the material gifts on offer, dispensing them through service with an emphasis on efficiency, presents a cultural formula of physical accompaniments as their primary objective. The decision-makers instincts towards tangible successes compounded by measures taken out of military necessity.
Out of this military necessity, Marine officers overcame travel handicaps, high rates of disease and poor communications. The Marines focus on efficiency, action-oriented tasks accomplished without local participation, feed positive stories to the American Public.
American civilian and military overseers never understood the fallacy of efficiency material approach undermined their own strategic aims of stable democratic government. Blindly, the Marines laid the physical and figurative roads for local police and military forces to govern their respective republics. After the Marines withdrew, Haiti politically and economically crumbled. In the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, stability remained under long term dictatorships.
The U.S. Army's institutional resistance to CAP, limited the program to five provinces, within I Corps, a Marine Operational area. The CAP program's personnel numbers peaked at 42 officers, 2050 enlisted men, 2 naval officers, 126 corpsmen, and approximately 3000 Popular or Regional Force members. The majority of CAP Marines served under [U.S.] Army command and in army style. Curiously, Johnson does not inform the reader what constitutes "Army style".
One of the CAP program's goals was the empowerment of local hamlets. There is no evidence of the Marines empowering local people to counter the central and corrupt government of South Vietnam. Contrary, the [unintentional ]American military effort in Vietnam aimed to set the conditions for centralised conventional military forces that enabled dictatorships in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.
In the words of Victor Krulak, an early advocate of CAP:
"The Combined Action Program's basic concept was to bring peace to Vietnamese villages by uniting local knowledge of the Popular Forces with the professional skill of the Marines... The Vietnamese knew who the guerillas were and where they hid; the Americans knew how to kill them".[5]
This concept for CAP was alongside advocates for a population-centric approach to fighting or securing villages. Unintentionally and ironically, CAP Marines protected local people and property from South Vietnamese forces, creating local loyalties, and not acting on behalf of the Republic of Vietnam.
CAP members witness the folly of large scale Civic Action projects: The reader glances Johnson employing the instance of a new hospital minus medical supplies, medical personnel and no food for patients. Unsurprisingly, this folly did nothing to further the communities support for CAP or The Republic of Vietnam.
In villages, CAP Marines frustrations at locating village officials and approval for civic action dictated their actions. So research into teach availability was absent. They often build schools without teachers. After waiting for weeks or months, their impatience at securing supplies (building materials) from the Republic of Vietnam government channels, Marines scourged supplies from localities to complete projects.
Upon entering the construction phase, Marines encouraging villages to supply labour. This approach failed, for the Marines impatience at the slow progress, they completed the works from start to finish. The local communities felt left out, and not upset by the Viet Cong destroying completed works.
Some Marines learned lessons from the hubris of large scale civic action projects. Embracing the local spirit of CAP, these Marines embarking on small scale domestic projects. One CAP unit built a grain storage unit, denying the enemy access to food, allowing the storage of food for the time in twenty years, and earned the gratitude of local villages.
In their adjusting to smaller-scale projects, CAP Marines falsified their reports to satisfy the expectations of larger-scale projects. Marines donated money to send the children of villages to school, buy bicycles and buy radios. In thanks, they received fifteen to twenty invites in a day to eat with villages. The communities sought to return the favour by reliving Marines of their regular daily diet of C Rations.
CAP Marines embracing smaller-scale projects in two separate manners. Firstly, neighbourly tasks for villages and Popular Forces, recognisable to the reader, teaching kids to swim and platoons raising money to send kids to school or hire teachers. Marines secured agricultural equipment, and they often assisted villages in agrarian work. Secondly, some Marines sought out dentists, for medical care was the most appreciated form of civic action. Unsurprisingly, CAP Marines involvement with smaller-scale projects was the most rewarding. In their perceptions villages regarded their efforts as genuine.
Johnson describes CAP Marines existing in a steady state of ragged disrepair, their uniforms filthy from night patrols. They lived and slept in the bush. Little of the American basket of plenty was available to Marines, and this characterised their lives. They did not employ massive amounts of firepower in engagements against the Viet Cong. Their restraint in not using the most abundant resource available to them earned the graduate of locals.
What strategic benefits did the villages gratitude yield? Johnson argues the more straightforward discussion is the backlash not generated. CAP Marines did not undertake projects the locals are unable to maintain, nor did they destabilise their villages with the inflow of goods and money.
Among the short term advantages of civic action was improvements in intelligence gathering and processing. CAP Marines superior knowledge of local terrain, often they knew the ground better than the enemy, and intermixing with village life provided intelligence windfalls. Receiving material gifts did not motivate the villagers who supplied actionable intelligence. The Marines relentless patrolling to establish security, a well developed sixth sense and neighbourly civic action encouraged warm and informative relations with communities.
Unintended self-preservation, instances of CAP Marines behaviour towards villages foiled plans to kill them. A former Marine returned to his (CAP) village decades the Vietnam War ended. Friends of the Marine confessed to previous Viet Cong membership. Why did they not kill his squad?
The perception of them as "good kids" was from this medical treatment and respectful behaviour towards communities. This view of the CAP squad saved their lives. For this passage of her work:
Johnson falls back on the reflections from a CAP veteran in place of her conclusions in patches of her work.
In their relationship with the Marines, military logic and personnel ties overlapped. Military, the presence of CAP protected members of the Viet Cong from U.S. Army's search and destroy missions.
The majority of CAP members time spent planning aggressive patrols and ambushes in the vicinity of their villages. Tactically: Patrols and ambushes aimed to prevent Viet Cong members from infiltrating and remaining in communities.
Unfortunately, this section of the book highlights the absence of topical flow among and between paragraphs. Sudden changes in topic disrupt the logical flow in and between paragraphs: entire issues or points of interest to the reader to start and finish in a single sentence.
The reader either ignores these sentences or falls back on their existing knowledge. A single sentence is not sufficient to explain topics or points of interest to the reader. In one instance, Johnson offers the reader:
The aggressive and geographically constrained patrolling style of the CAP Marines yielded several benefits. Villagers responded first and foremost to a clearly demonstrated ability to provide security. When Marines succeeded in protecting them, villages tended to open up.[6]
Johnson does not elaborate on the nature of the intelligence gathering by Marines who provided security in villages.
The readers who are new to the field of Army and Marine counterinsurgency history may undertake further research into the topics raised in Johnson's narrative. However, these readers may find these topics and their non-linear order akin to a maze with no exit. If the reader finds the maze too unrewarding, they may reconsider their desire to read the book.
This reviewer recommends two titles to the reader, who wishes to undertake prior research to reading Johnson's work. Williamson Murray's America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue, is intellectually engaging and smooth reading. In short, Murray dissects past and present U.S. Military-strategic and political successes and failures. Effectively, the reader glimpses historical lessons learned and re-learned [7].
Thomas Richardson's Destroy And Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966- 72, is the second title [8].The reader's understanding of Johnson's findings will increase in two matters. Firstly, the overall political and military conditions in the Republic of Vietnam. Secondly, the incorrect rationale behind economic development policy cures and their outcomes.
Johnson demonstrates the strategy of a civil action, enhancing the Republic of Vietnam government's legitimacy failed. Overall, the American perception of civic action increasing the legitimacy of host governments is an unchallenged strategic fantasy. CAP produced unintended improvements in force protection and intelligence gathering.
CAP Marines past on the benefits of civic action to cooperative to local government officials.
However, the legitimacy of the Republic of Vietnam government was not enhanced. The goodwill and gratitude generated by civic action did not transfer to local or national governments and followed the Marines home.
Johnson's sites content from the Marine Corps Gazette and Small War Manual to gauge the level of institutional interest in current small wars, lessons learned, experiences, and perceptions of Marines. The Gazette echoes mission accomplished in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The absence of articles covering counterinsurgency experiences and doctrine conveys this impression.
The first article on Haiti resembled a travel brochure. Topically, the material contained advice for Marine officers and their families relocating to Haiti and no military content.
The Marines counterinsurgency campaigns on Hispaniola did not result in institutionally learned lessons. Marines experiences shattered the perceptions of success and ease of efforts in counterinsurgency efforts and state-building. Their lessons derived from breaking existing perceptions remained local.
Smedley Butler embraced the culture of Marines lacking formal education, and he believed too much formal education was detrimental to fighting spirit. In Haiti and The Dominican Republic, the training and education of Marines remained in theatre.
In place of counterinsurgency doctrine, Marines learned from their experiences and informal mentorship. Marine officers learned and re-learned the same lessons in the Banana Wars. Counterinsurgency practitioners recognised the weaknesses or deficiencies in institutional learning and the absence of doctrine.
For a time, articles on preparing for the next counterinsurgency conflicts appeared in the Gazette. Major E.H Ellis, Major Samuel M. Harrington and Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, the most significant proponents of separating counterinsurgency characteristics from their conventional war counterparts. Specifically, this is the reason for separate training in counterinsurgency tactics and operations was required.
In their preference for action over education, the Marines development of counterinsurgency doctrine slowed. However, circumstances doomed their efforts to create counterinsurgency doctrine. Firstly, as noted above, the Marines amphibious doctrine emerged over small wars capabilities. Secondary, Marines preference for serving in WW1, the costliest and destructive conventional war to date, they viewed counterinsurgency operations and tactics as beneath them. Not unexpectedly, Marines veterans of WW1 displayed no interest in counterinsurgency operations.
In the timeline of U.S. involvement inWW1 (1917-18), Marines focus on overseas service was on the Western Front. Marine recruits who enlisted in 1917 expected to serve in France. Marines serving in Haiti felt cut off from the fighting on the Western Front. Second-string Marines remained in Haiti, and they understood the best Marines are shipping out to France.
Smedley Butler, the commandant of Haitian Gendarmerie, felt the humiliation of serving in Haitian backwater. His Marines felt frustration and degradation. The Marines feelings of degradation flowing from their perception of fighting a second rate foe. A tendency to oversimplify their enemy, regarding them as bandits and not proper foes.
Incorrectly, the Marines subscribed the insurgent's motives to predatory and criminal intentions. The Marines flawed analysis obscured the motivations of insurgent recruits. Nor was consideration given to the tactics required to defeat the insurgency.
The Marines' bandit mentality was glaring in the Small Wars Manual. Major E.H. Ellis, a contributor to the Small Wars Manual, did not recognise the logical fallacy inherent in the idea of criminal bandits enjoying the widespread support of local people.
The majority of the assessments in the Small Wars Manual covered the lopsided causality rates in favour of the Marines. Marines who served in the later Vietnam War did not benefit from this focus on uneven causality rates.
Furthermore, Marines entered Caribbean theatres of war without small wars and counterinsurgency doctrines. They had access to the [U.S.] Army Landing Force Manual. In disregarding the manual's advice on small patrols, they opted for conventional military operations. Their familiarity with existing operational norms triumphed over the manual's recommendation.
Marines garrisoned significant population centres in Haiti, The Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and adopted an operationally defensive posture. Initially, the Marines conventional operations (mostly) did not end in disaster, nor was the "bandit problem" solved. Johnson characterises these efforts in the form of a traditional of troops moving in columns. Another unsuccessful approach was forcefully relocating local people.
Curiously, Johnson does not draw parallels to the forceful relocation of people in the Malaysia Emergency and Vietnam War. Arguable, furthering the reader's understanding of why the approach of forcefully relocating is unsuccessful outweighs the broad scope of Johnson's work. The reader who is not familiar with the forceful relocation of people may not understand why the approach failed. No explanation behind this unsuccessful the method is offered by Johnson.
After careful consideration, this reviewer has chosen to omit details either not directly related to the narrative or do not require further explanations not found in Johnson's work. However, in this reviewer's judgement, there is one point in her work that is worth expanding upon, briefly. The reader who is unfamiliar with the Vietnam War may not understand why the focus on lopsided causalities rates was not the basis for sound strategy [9].
General William Westmoreland, the commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam, never resolved the intellectual puzzle of fighting simultaneously conventional and counterinsurgency campaigns. The consensus of historians and military writers was to dismiss "body count" as an ineffective metric among counterinsurgency strategies. In short, the inaccurate and inflated body count statics provided false data towards an approach unsuited to counterinsurgency campaigns [10].
Westmorland's attritional strategy made sense for the Vietnam War's conventional front lines and battles. This reviewer argues, the relationship between the host country and coalition forces is the foundation of Small Wars and counterinsurgency campaigns. This observation makes sense in light of Johnson's analysis of the Marines track record in the Banana Wars.
The Marines primary challenge was locating and inflicting causalities on the bandits. Tactically, small aggressive patrols sought to encage the bandits and employ superior firepower to emerge victoriously.
In 1933, Colonel Utley, small wars doctrinal supporter, advocated for small patrols in the Small Wars Manual. Utley passionately advocated for relentless small patrols, the military situation permits. Marine patrols are denying irregulars access to fertile agricultural areas and forcing the disbandment of guerilla groups.
Johnson notes the Marines institutionally forgot and re-learned the merits of small patrols in the Vietnam War. CAP Marines did not carry Utley's article in their back pockets. Nevertheless, Johnson's above inexplicit characteristic is a symptom of the undercooked nature of her work. The findings of her research reflect the unrefined finished product.
Johnson does not discuss the willingness of local people to serve in militia, armies and combat insurgencies in service of their governments. In short, this reviewer argues, metrics for measuring the success of counterinsurgency are not impactful if local communities and visiting forces do not meet two conditions.
Firstly, if local people are unwilling to fight for their government, there are flow-on effects: Government corruption and cronyism undermined public confidence in the Republic of Vietnam [10]. Unwilling to fight for their government, (many) South Vietnamese adopted a passive attitude towards the outcome of the war.
Secondly, if there is a weak relationship between the local population and visiting forces, then the insurgencies recruitment numbers will increase. The groundwork for the rise of 'political backfire' may lay the conditions unintended consequences. This reviewer regards the rise of dictatorships in the wake of the U.S. interventions among the Banana Wars is an example of political backfire.
In the analysis of the tenants of Mission Command, Johnson reveals the uneven nature of her book. Johnson's explicit comparison between the decentralised Marine leadership in the Banana and (CAP) Vietnam Wars provides a stark contrast to the reader. The reader finds a small but crisp picture of leadership woes in the Banana Wars. Her previous analysis is patchy in sections, as noted above.
Johnson's direct comparison illuminates the importance of enlisted to middle-ranking officers leadership styles: In Haiti, Major Clark H. Wells acted on his own accord. In disobeying Colonel John Russell's orders, Wells continued the brutal practice of Corvée [11]. Unsurprisingly, Russell's actions sparked a renewed revolt in the local area.
Marine Sergeant's commanded and self-administrated CAP platoons. CAP leader's autonomy permitted self tasking and innovations. Their assessments of tactical and local conditions formed the basis of community-based projects and patrolling patterns. Among the innovative culture, killer teams actively sought out suspected Viet Cong members.
Out of touch Marine commanders in rear areas abolished killer teams. CAP Marines who participated in killer teams lobbied for their retention. Under the guise of security teams, the killer teams modus operandi returned to the field.
Mission Command in CAP style units falls on the Marines developing Non Commissioned Officers. Johnson briefly mentions the risk of granting autonomy to men aged 19 to 22. Historically, a minority of CAP members committed unspecified acts of caprice.
In the present, insufficient investment in preparing junior leaders opens the Marines to risks. In counterinsurgency environments, these risks entail Marines committing hostile acts against local communities.
At this junction, this reviewer untangled the outcome suggested in the book's title. Marines in combat environments re-learned strategic and tactical lessons from past wars. For Marine journals, the articles offer no instructional value beyond the interest of their contemporary authors.
Johnson leaves the reader to assemble the reasons for the Marines losing institutional knowledge. The Marines preference for action over education is one piece of the puzzle. Additionally but not exclusively, Marines serving in war zones reflect contemporary societal attitudes.
What impact do American cultural norms have on the Marines training up and coming leaders? Johnson leaves the answer to this question unasked and undocumented. Her omission represents a gap in her narrative and not new research avenues.
Johnson applies her framework to the Iraq War across a single chapter. The same observations and critiques of her work mentioned above apply to the penultimate instalment of the book. However, one point representing new doctrine and new lessons, slip under the radar.
Johnson presents the far-sighted Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak, who created the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). Krulak championed Marine innovation in between The Gulf War and 9-11. Remarkable, the Marines focus on training for conventional military operations did not obstruct Krulak's aims.
The MCWL served to incubate new battlefield ideas. The tenants of Krulak's vision embraced military operations other than war. From the soup, the concepts of the Three Block War and strategic corporal emerged. In arising from conceptual development, Marines turned to for guidance during stability operations in Iraq [13].
The forward-thinking Marine leaders of the 1990s followed their predecessors in recording lessons learned in journals. The lessons entered doctrine and training for future overseas operations. Nevertheless, individuals and not the institution of the Marines broke the cycle. In this reviewers estimation, the assimilation of knowledge broke the historical cycle of experiences, lost and re-learned in operational service. Johnson's sometimes jumbled and inexplicit narrative is behind this estimate.
General James Mattis credits his success in counterinsurgency operations to his Marine background. In embracing Marine culture, he received training on the CAP program and received a reprint of the Small Wars Manual. The Three-Block War and strategic corporal outlies was compulsory reading for officers. Beyond reading, the Marines' extended boot camps and training in urban counterinsurgency warfare shaped Mattis's career.
The First Battle of Fallujah fought on the ground and in the propaganda sphere. The insurgents crushed the coalition in the media narrative stake. During "Major Operations, media reporters embedded with Marine units filed positive reports. The withdrawal of the majority of embedded reporters ended the feed of these news stories. Nevertheless, in placing the seeds of defeat, the people behind the reduction in reports ignored standing advice.
In 2002, in the Marine Corps Gazette, specific instructions on Marine interactions with the media appeared. In short, the time Marines spend with journalists is not wasted. An unaware journalist covering the Marines is not an annoyance. Answering their questions is the opportunity to mould their outlook and make a lifelong impression upon them.
The Marines returned to drawing from the lessons from their battlefield experiences. Days into the battle, media outlets are supporting the insurgent's broadcast images of dead children. The insurgent's propaganda machine attributed the deaths to the Marines. Deprived of the means to counter the flow of false information, they lost the fight for political leaders support.
The Iraqi Governing Council and coalition governments grew deeply fearful of public backlash generated by the insurgent's propaganda. Out of this fear, coalition governments pressured decision-makers in Washington, D.C into withdrawing the Marines from Fallujah. In the withdrawal of Marines, American political leaders cave into the threats from coalition partners to leave Iraq.
In preparing for The Second Battle of Fallujah, the Marines actively recruited unbiased and credible members of the press. In their command centres, Marines explained their targeting process to these reporters. Additionally, ninety journalists from sixty news outlets received invites to join the Marines on the front line. Johnson does not specify the details of the targeting process. The reader, who is not familiar with her description of the targeting process is out in the cold.
In summary, the extracts from Johnson's work in this review reflects the diamonds in the rough. The researcher who is seeking new leads on pitfalls in counterinsurgency campaigns finds a gold mine on offer. Also, the addition of notes at the end of each chapter favours students and researchers. They do not have to search for references at the end of the book.
Furthermore, there is sufficient undeveloped material for a three-volume history of Marines counterinsurgency campaigns. The potential transformation of the raw subject matter into a multi-volume work is an opportunity for aspiring historians. Johnson's work is not suited to the general reader, and they are unlikely to weather the storm of her work's pitfalls.
[1] The following article provides a comprehensive overview of Cultural Topography Framework not available in the book. An overview of Cultural Topography Framework: Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis
Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berret (July 2011)
[2] Jeannie L. Johnson, The Marines Counterinsurgency, And Strategic Culture (Georgetown University Press, 2018). See Page 59.
[3]A Lecture by U.S. Naval Academy professor Aaron O'Connell. The lecture covers the background to the Banana Wars. The motivations and roles of three U.S. Presidents in the Banana Wars. The backgrounds to the U.S. Marines interventions on Haiti, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua are covered in the lecture. Paternalistic racism is also discussed later on in the lecture.
[4] Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam by Major Christopher Reynolds, United States Marines
A brief background to the origins of CAP is available on Pages 6 – 7.
[5] Jeannie L. Johnson, The Marines Counterinsurgency, And Strategic Culture. See page 193.
[6] Ibid, P193.
[7] Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue (Hoover Institution Press, 2017).
[8] Thomas Richardson, Destroy and Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-72 (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[9] Analysis of Westmoreland's body count strategy A fresh look at the motivations behind Westmoreland's attritional strategy.
[10] A Strategy of AttritionWhy General Westmoreland Failed in 1967 by Major Gregory P. Escobar, United States Army
A look at General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition during Operation City Junction.
[11] Corruption in the Republic of Vietnam An introduction to the role institutional corruption played in the Republic of Vietnam's downfall.
[12] Instead of paying taxes, Corvée employs people in brutal physical labour.
[13] Three-block war and strategic corporals An overview of Krulak's three-block war and strategic corporal concepts.
