The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 by John Kiszely

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 by John Kiszely (Cambridge University Press, 2017) (ISBN number: 978-1-107-19459-5) is a strategic autopsy of the British involvement in the fall of Norway during WW2. 

Kiszely's esteemed book proves that critical thinking, flexible thinking and military innovation , underpin, victory or defeat in military campaigns. The author encapsulates the systematic failures of military and civilian decision makers and the bureaucratic/ineffective strategic decision-making apparatus, committed by the British, in the author's perfectly self described fiasco.

In sporting terms, how two sporting teams perform is dissected by the author. The professional German team out thought and outplayed their British opponents. Admittedly, the nature and character of war does not include level playing fields, unlike, sports leagues, who would not schedule two grossly mismatched teams.


Today, the U.K. Armed forces (hereafter armed forces) are facing a fiscal climate comparable to the experiences of their 1930's counterparts. By the way of airpower and amphibious capabilities: I will explore the implications of the budgetary climate facing the present day armed forces as they relate to the Norway Campaign, below.



In the inter-war wars, the Armed services, planning- preparation, logistics and the majority of equipment was unchanged from the last war. Specifically, planning- preparation, logistics and equipment for amphibious operations was unchanged since the WW1, Gallipoli Campaign.
This lack of investment in amphibious operations reflected in the dangers and delays in Operation Hammer, the plan to land British troops at Narvik in response to the German invasion of Norway.

In the present day, the armed forces amphibious capabilities are under threat from further defence cutbacks. Before reading the book, I was aware of the possible axing of amphibious capabilities, nevertheless, I could not escape my bewilderment that such a eventuality could take place. If strategic and soft power arguments for retaining amphibious capabilities win out over budgetary cut backs is unknown at the time of writing.


The author notes on page 229; Luftwaffe control of the Third Dimension (control of the air) was the deciding factor in the British defeat. This reviewer's understanding of airpower was reinforced by the author's comprehensive analysis of German airpower's integration into combined arms.

The Luffwaffe group, the Condor Legion flew in the Spanish Civil War from 1936-38 and used as test bed for tactics, and rotations of pilots gaining combat experience. Lessons from the Condor Legion's time in Spain were integrated into German training and doctrine. Integrating the Luffwaffe and German Army in planning and combat operations (tactical air strikes by Stuka dive bombers) bore dividends in Poland .

A full assessment of the RAF and Luffwaffe role in the Norway Campaign appears in the book. The RAF never assimilated lessons on airpower from the Spanish Civil War. The RAF's doctrinal inflexibility (remaining welded to Trenchard 's strategic bombing doctrine) ignored the Luffwaffe's development of Close Air Support enabled by improvements in communications.

The decision makers underestimated or were ignorant of the effects of German Airpower. Warships of the Royal Navy, who experienced Luffwaffe air attacks received no air cover from the RAF. The Royal Navy's losses were low in comparison to the threat posed by Luffwaffe air attacks. Also British ground forces witnessed the destruction of Namsos by Luffwaffe bombers.

Returning to the present, Russian Condor Legions are active in Syria and Ukraine. Airpower and cruise missiles are the spearhead of the Russian intervention (hereafter Syrian Condor Legion) in the Syrian Civil War. Incorporating lessons from Russia's Syrian Condor Legion into innovation by military and civilian decision makers can prepare for the ongoing changing character of warfare. However, if this military innovation process fails, defeat not, unlike, seen by British in the Norway campaign.


The author's definitive strategic autopsy of the British involvement in the Norway Campaign will earn a place on military professionals and students of military history bookshelves. The lessons from the author's examination of the anatomy this campaign offers military and civilian decision makers a cautionary tale. The impact of the lessons from the book are not new, but current and future decision makers have the opportunity to learn them in their own time.

Logistics in the next conventional war

In contrast, a degree of risk was accepted in placing large quantities of supplies forward in relatively small areas at unprotected corps and theater logistics bases to support offensive operations. The loss or denial of one of these log bases could have significantly impaired the offensive capability of ARCENT and Marine Central Command ground forces. Fortunately, our intelligence estimates correctly viewed enemy disruption of these bases as unlikely, especially in light of our overwhelming air superiority.

 Full article

In the above article, Chris Paparone, Colonel, US Army retired, writes about logistics during the Gulf War. My intention is to frame my commentary around Paparone's analyse of logistics during the Gulf War with the next conventional war (hereafter next war) in mind. The specific details concerning the location and nations involved in the next conventional war falls beyond the scope of this article. However, the reader may wish to consider, how the next European War (Russia invading western Europe), plays out strategically and logistically.

The length of the next war will determine how much, if at all, the character of logistical support evolves to meet battlefield conditions. In an 'long war', logistical capabilities will evolve to meet new operational and strategic demands. Let me explain. In WW2, the character of logistics continued to become parts of the fabric of modern warfare. Specifically, D-Day provides a window into the character of logistics at the strategic level. Until battlefield constraints (The Battle of the Atlantic) were overcome, D-Day remained theoretical in the minds of British and American military planners.

A short war would not last enough to alter the character of logistics, and any lessons would face examination after the war finished. As such further analyse of logistics in an short war is not required in this article. The character of logistics in the next 'long war' will evolve, and turn theoretical operational, technological, transportation, and battlefield medicine concepts into reality.

In the next war, will large quantities of supplies capable of supporting brigades, placed in forward areas, in a scaled down version of what occurred in the Gulf War? For a moment, let us assume there are sufficient quantities of supplies in theatre to warrant such a eventuality. To what extent unmanned systems and more traditional (manned) aerial resupply methods, offset the requirement, for the presence large quantities of supplies in forward areas only poses more questions. These questions on logistical resupply from forward areas could cover topics from camouflage to the dispersal of supplies.

Will the option of deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support exist in the next war? In short, the answer is no. If logistical demands driven by high intensity combat operations and attrition are not meet then front line ground forces would face destruction in combat. No amount of prewar training or acts of battlefield courage can overcome logistical failings. Munitions, fuel, water, and spare parts are the 'wheels' ground forces operate on.

Deliberately deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support, and ground forces facing inadequate logistical support due to enemy action are not mutually exclusive. During the next war, United States and coalition air and naval supremacy is not assured. This (probable) absence of air and naval supremacy requires military planners to factor in disruptions to logistical supply chains-resulting in restrictions on ground forces' combat capabilities. I will come back to these logistical restrictions on ground forces in a moment.

I am going to raise the issue of battlefield medicine from a logistical standpoint. Specifically, can existing levels of medical supplies,practices and personnel cope with the next war? The American Civil War (1861-65) (hereafter Civil War) provides us with a historical precedence where existing preparations for medical care were ill-prepared for the volume of battlefield and non battlefield (disease) casualties. In short, the Civil War, unexpectedly lasted longer than 90 days, and this is why existing battlefield medical infrastructure was overwhelmed at the start of the war.

The historical parallel to battlefield medicine in the Civil War serves two purposes. The Civil War at first provides us with a historical basis to pose the following question: Could the ghost of the Civil War, who witnessed ill-prepared battlefield medicine infrastructure and personnel appear in the next war? A complete hypothetical answer to this question is for the reader to ponder. I am prevented by space and topical considerations from answering this question. However, the question contains a inherent warning, for as the Civil War demonstrated, the length of wars can exceed expectations.

Topically, readers may ask why or how I selected battlefield medicine as a subject of logistics. My interest in the Civil War aside, my goal is to provide the reader with subject matter to think about. Also, I was able to frame the prospect of the duration of the next war in a useful historical context.

At the strategic level, the severity of logistical restrictions on ground forces, caused by losses in combat at sea , in the air, and on the ground will dictate the outcome of the next war. In light of advancements in unmanned systems and 3D printing there is a danger that the nature of logistics in warfare is forgotten. Put another way, regardless of exciting technological progress, the nature of modern day logistics will remain the same. Ground forces, who face no logistical restrictions will always defeat those facing such constraints.

The ghost of WW2 German tank production

But a long war today would be totally different. In fact, after about nine months of intense peer conflict, attrition would grind the U.S. armed forces down to something resembling the military of a regional power.  The Army, for example, would be armed primarily with infantry weapons with heavy firepower coming from gun trucks and a trickle of modern equipment acquired from struggling domestic production and whatever logisticians could scrounge up on the world market. This state of affairs arises because the U.S. government has not thought seriously about industrial mobilization. It is far easier to bask in warm memories of World War II than to face the harsh choices that mobilization preparation entails.

Full article 

Correction, I was informed that 28 is the surge number for M1 Abram production, that the figure beggars' belief is not surprising.  

I have never lost my interest in 'long inter-state' wars. My interest in this kind of warfare spans from lifelong interest in WW2 and 20th century history. The reader can judge for themselves, if my historical grounding makes me biases towards the topic or not. What I will freely admit is the way my historical grounding influences my strategic outlook in the present.

Space does not permit a comprehensive look at banishing a ugly and scary historical ghost, which I will describe below. As such, I have ignored the following plausible eventuality: During the next long war, the M1 Abrams tank designed is axed in favour of a less technological sophisticated and cheaper (aka 'mass production friendly') tank design. In effect, my focus is on the foundations (industrial capacity/output) and not what the eventual building resembles ( the M1 Abram or future tank designs).

My next comparison is purely in terms of industrial capacity, and not issues of morality or culture. In terms of industrial capacity, the United States of America is grossly ill-prepared for a future 'long inter-state' war, not unlike the Axis Powers in WW2. Specifically, during WW2, the ghost of Germany's inadequate industrial output has been well documented by historians. The same goes for the way Germany was crushed by industrial output from the United States of America.

In the present, the projected monthly M1 Abrams production figure of 28 is pathetically low. On the basis of the production figure increasing by the tank factory operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, tank production could reach approx 96 per month.

In a twist of historical irony, present day projected M1 Abrams tank production (hereafter tank output) is a historical ghost. Let me explain. In WW2, German tank production could be described as woeful [Sample production figures ], so woeful they failed to keep up with attrition rates (losses in combat). Ironically, like their WW2 German counter parts, American tank production cannot keep up with attrition, in the next war. Interestingly, the same root cause , technological sophistication and high production costs, gives birth to a historical ghost. The ghost of WW2 German tank production (hereafter historical ghost); haunts present day tank output.


Banishing this historical ghost, who haunts me and any sane military planners, requires expanding the industrial base, so a increased monthly tank output can take place. Why reinvent the tank tread? This is my philosophy behind the answer to that question. In WW2, the American automotive industry was retooled to meet wartime demands for industrial mobilisation. The retooling of the American automotive industry formed a part of industrial mobilisation, and the resulting industrial output proved to be a war winner.

In the present, I can see no reason why, the current American automotive and other manufactures, should not embrace tank production. Additionally, the benefits of decentralising tank production are worth noting. Decentralising tank production reduces the likelihood of enemy action ceasing tank production by destroying a single or small number of factories. Geographically decentralising, the manufacture of tank components and tank assembly, would also see the manufacturing sector profit.

The expansion of current day tank output would or will present new challenges, yet there is equally opportunities for advancing manufacturing and transport logistics. In short, 3D Printing can reduce stress on current or create new supply chains, and localise the manufacturing process. Can existing factories fully support current and future advancements (think robotics and artificial intelligence) in tank output? I will come back to this question in a moment.

Cost issues aside, converting existing factories to tank output should pose few difficulties. However, conceptually this approach denies tank output, the potential advantage of portability/decentralisation. For a moment, recall how during WW2, American war industries were not subject to enemy action, this will not be the case in the next war. The permanent nature of existing civilian and military manufacturing and industrial plants provides a fixed target for enemy action.


The advantages of portability in tank and other wartime production ties in with the requirement for the above-mentioned decentralisation. Since the notion of a portable tank factories is conceptual, there is still a requirement to expand potential and existing tank output, across the existing manufacturing/industrial base. Any answer to my above question must factor in a balance between research and development into 3D printing/manufacturing advancements and utilising the existing manufacturing base and emerging technologies.

Laying the foundations to banish historical ghosts requires intersecting U.S. Military, private sector and government interests to works towards the common goal of increasing tank output. Above all else, a belief in redefining 'the possible' must drive our thinking surrounding tank production, industrial mobilisation, and the eventuality of 'long inter-state' wars.

The North Korean Problem

This analysis recommends war. It is shocking to put to print. However, with North Korea’s inexorable advance towards developing a nuclear-tipped ICBM, we enter the realm of bad choices. On balance, war on the peninsula is the least bad alternative. There are some months left for a brilliant diplomatic breakthrough that turns North Korea from the brink – these avenues must be energetically and exhaustively pursued. This analysis is presented on the fair assumption that such initiatives will fail.

Crispin Rovere's article 

China is the key deciding factor in resolving the 'North Korean problem'. China can undertake military action against North Korea, green light United States military (hereafter U.S. Military) action against North Korea, or maintain the status qua, Let's start with the status qua and move on to the alternatives in a moment.


Regretfully, China may be using North Korea as a device to test the resolve of the western powers. Specifically, China may want to test the resolve of Australia, South Korea, Japan and the United States. By testing the resolve of those nations,China, is looking to see how much 'lee way' of sorts, potential or current adversaries can take advantage of in the future. In short, by allowing the North Korean nuclear weapons program to go unchecked, Russia, Iran and China may become embolden to start World War 3.

Another more pragmatic as oppose to sinister motives may explain China's current stance on North Korea. Russia shares a modest border with North Korea. Russia may view any potential Chinese annexation of North Korea as territorial threat. In short, Russian fears of their south eastern flank facing a renewed Chinese threat would create another global 'flash point'. Put another way, the risk of a Russia -China War (echoes of the Cold War) would have increased.


I now come to the first of the possible scenario which see's China annexing North Korea, after green lighting, the United States lead coalition or stand alone war (hereafter war) against that country. Let me explain why I think this is the smartest from China's standpoint. Assuming China green lights, the U.S. going to war, they can stand by and watch the fallout.

In North Korea, the fall out would consist of the country having been reduced to rubble, by the spectre of total warfare. Politically, the fallout would fall at the feet of the Trump administration. The extent of the political fall out and the consequences for the Trump administration falls beyond the scope of this article. While the political fallout is ongoing ,China, could occupy and rebuild North Korea in their image. In effect under this scenario, China, can manipulate the 'North Korean Problem' to there perceived advantage.

The last scenario is China stand alone invading , occupying and rebuilding North Korea in their image. This scenario is arguable the best and least likely scenario. If China, deems the continual existence of North Korea as a nation state is not in their interests, the following question must be asked: Why would China not let President Trump take all the political fallout?

Remember, China's political and military leaders do not answer to freedom of the press or to the mercy of public opinion. However, President Trump does have to answer to freedom of the press, American public opinion, and face any political fall out from a preemptive (total) war against North Korea. Hence, this is why, this last scenario is the least likely.


I foresee the status qua remaining in place until the following occurs: North Korea invades South Korea in concert with the use of nuclear weapons against that country and Japan. The exact way events would play out is for another topic all together. Such a eventuality would represent a watershed moment in our history. 

All roads lead to the eventual destruction of North Korea in physical terms and as a nation state.
If the second and third scenarios mentioned above occur without the support of Japan and South Korea , the U.S. Military, would face unexpected logistical challenges (,think the return of Mulberry harbours). Beyond the spectre of total warfare, for military, strategic and diplomatic reasons, the 'North Korea problem' is not easily solved.

Neither can the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of China annexing North Korea be ignored. A authoritarian and paranoid Russia would not welcome Chinese territorial expansion along their own borders. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin would face a historical strategic choice: Does Russia maintain a strategic westwards European focus on the Ukraine and the Baltic States or cast their strategic eye towards Asia?


Looking away from Russia, the consequences of China annexing North Korea are hard to gauge in this space, but should not be ignored. China would demand the withdrawal of U.S. Military forces from South Korea and Japan. China would argue that with the threat from North Korea is now non-existent, so there is no any reason for U.S. Military forces to remain stationed in Japan and South Korea.

In the event China pressures Japan and South Korea, the level of public support in those countries for a continuing U.S. Military presence is speculative. Space does not permit me to go into the other potential consequences or side effects from China annexing North Korea.

There are no 'good' options for resolving the 'North Korean problem'. Australia and New Zealand must make a realistic strategic assessment of our predicament. Yet in a General New Zealand election year, the difficult strategic situation, is not being widely discussed in the media or by the general public. This lack of discussion around the 'North Korean problem' worries me.

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue by Williamson Murray (Hoover Institution Press, 2017) explains the importance of military history to past,current and future events. The book is essential reading for informed/concerned citizens, future military and civilian political leaders.

Through out the book, the topical nature of analysis changes quickly in each chapter. The author begins work's by explaining how historical events cannot provide a accurate forecast of where, when and how future wars will unfold, but they can provide a intellectual foundation, for thinking about the future.


Equally, the way commentators, who have or do forecast trends towards a more peaceful world with fewer wars taking place have not delved into history books. These contemporary commentators commit a multitude of 'sins.' Mistaking the lack of great power conflict (aka WW1/WW2) during the Cold War, ignoring post colonial wars in places like Vietnam and Rhodesia to not understanding the extent of humans to commit folly. Interestingly, through out history, the same mistake has been repeated by others, who made miscalculations.

Intellectually, chapter 2 is where the author began to engaged me. The character of war is shaped by social and technological changes through out time, yet the nature of war endures. I will comeback to the character of war in a moment. The military theorist and quasi historian, Carl Von Clausewitz, who articulated the nature of war (hereafter nature), fame has outlived people's ability to adsorb historical lessons.

Across five “military- social revolutions” [as found on page 50], the character of war was reshaped, and with the most recent development, the advent of Nuclear Weapons (the nuclear age) is upon us all. In short, from the emergence of modern nation state to industrialised warfare, the character of warfare will be forever evolving. However, the nature of war, whether it be unexpected consequences or things not going to plan will remain the same.

Skipping ahead to chapter 4 in the book allows me to share my own thoughts with the reader. Let me explain. My thoughts were connected to a lifetime of reading, for much of my knowledge about 20th century history comes from book reading. How the author explains, the same mistakes committed by US military and political leaders, during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars is illuminative. This illuminative experience was intellectually reinforcing in that my existing knowledge was supplemented by new learning's.


Chapter 5 entitled; The American Problem could have equally taken the titles ' The importance of Professional Military Education', 'Intellectually preparing for the next war' and 'The Art and Science of educating'. A sound Professional Military Education (PME) prepares military personnel for future wars. The aim of PME is to ensure lessons are learned in a classroom environment and not during the next war. Yet despite the obvious value of bloodless classroom learning experiences, the US military has learned lessons on the battlefield, leaving a trail of coffins. The legacy of the Iraq War is draped over the coffins.

Institutions who provide PME curriculum, (Staff and War Colleges) that do not intellectually challenge their students, do not hold any educational worth. A PME curriculum constructed around the use of strategy, examination the employment of joint forces ( all three services combined) at the operational level; and lastly the process sitting governments use to acquire defence equipment is a useful model to follow.


The sheer weight of crushing bureaucracy on the US government's National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and military is comparable to a terminal cancer (my comparison). The bureaucratic expansion of the National Security Council (NSC) has encumbered that organisation with a majority of staff who do not speak a second language. The CIA is also burdened by 13% of analysts, who do not speak the second language. The outcome is members of the NSC and CIA analysts who lack the basic knowledge required to asses threats to US and global security.

A supersized combo of legal constraints on Rules of Engagement, bureaucracy and unmanned drone strikes cloud US political and military leaders judgement. The low cost in political capital and non existent front-line military causalities from unmanned drone is (once again!) clouding minds with the false notion that wars can be won without 'boots on the ground'.


Curiously, the Appendix listing potential trouble spots, indirectly influenced my thinking on, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Specifically, a moral question not covered in the book: Is it moral for democracies to engage in total warfare before they are attacked? I feel pointing out to the reader, how the author, provoking me into questioning such a moral and political question is important. Comparatively, I have found few works that are so provocative and intellectually engaging at the same time.

The old adage that you can not argue with history is proven by the author through out the book. As such, the book is must read for everyone from concerned citizens, military personnel regardless of rank, and future political leaders. New Zealand cannot afford to let the aforementioned adage go ignored. Yet by enlarge Kiwis are ignoring the foundations of the author's thesis at our own peril.

Destroy And Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966–72

Destroy and Build Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-72 by Thomas Richardson (Cambridge University Press, 2017) is the latest edition to the Australian Army History Series. The book is must read for students of the Vietnam War and the origins of contemporary counter-insurgency doctrine.

The book centres on challenging the existing orthodoxy around, the Australian Task Force (1ATF) Pacification efforts and military control over Phuoc Tuy province (Phuoc Tuy or the province ), during the Vietnam War. In 2002, Governor- General Michael Jeffery summarised the orthodoxy by stating: 'We Australians had everything under control in Phuoc Tuy province''. In challenging the existing orthodoxy, the author has debunked , any notion of the 1ATF being wholesale in control of Phuoc Tuy by 1970.


In chapter one, the Cold War back drop to pacification looms large. Forming the background to Pacification, the Cold War ideological battle ground(Communism vs Free World capitalism), looms large. The Cold War backdrop would not be complete without the competing US and Soviet interests in third world nations (hereafter third world) newly interdependent from the old colonial order.

The aim of pacification was economic development/industrialisation of the third world, the resulting increasing levels of prosperity would eradicate poverty, and remove the fertile ground Communism exploited. The grievances of rural Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Society were not accurately understood by western obverses, they wanted a fairer share of the pie, and not a larger pie.


Chapter 2 en-lighted my ignorance about Phuoc Tuy, in 1966, the year 1ATF arrived in GVN. Phuoc Tuy was strategically important due to having access to Vung Tau, RVN's's second largest port behind Saigon. Phuoc Tuy would allow for the 1ATF to have operational independence by fighting a 'self contained' war to a degree. Phuoc Tuy was not a large province.

Geographically, Phuoc Tuy was dominated by the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai hills, collectively known as the Nui Dinhs or 'the Warburtons' by Australian soldiers. The Nui Dinhs proved a fairy straight forward infiltration route via rice paddy's into the town of Baria, and a cave system adjoined by man made tunnels provided cover from air strikes and artillery fire. The high ground in the Long Hais overlooked the western half of the population, and shared the characteristics of the Nui Dinhs.

Yet, much of Phuoc Tuy was not hilly. Elsewhere, in the province, the rubber plantation at Long Tan and village of Binh Ba were future battle-sites, while the Nui Dinhs and Long Hais were would remain logistical hubs for the NLF. Due to space considerations; the importance of the road network to the local economy is best left to the reader explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores the complexities of local population demographics.


Superficially, the grievances around of land ownership, or the brutal Communist methods/suppression would explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores complexities among local population demographics. These complexities encompassed , the economic diversity of the province, a families' history of fighting French colonial rule, and past heavy handiness ( the To Cong program) of South Vietnamese government. As the reader, I commend, the author, for bringing Phuoc Tuy to' life'.

Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism are behind, the constant failings responsible, for the RVN becoming a de facto failed state. The Government of Vietnam (GVN, think government of South Vietnam) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AVRN) were dogged by institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism, and like all bodies infected by such diseases their effectiveness was reduced. This disease infected, the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), who were chiefly responsible, for security in Phuoc Tuy. The RF/PF were akin to Army reservists or local militia.

The weaknesses of the RF/PF and AVRN remained a constant. Each time the 1ATF would depart a village or cease patrolling/ambushing in a area , the RF/PF or less often South Vietnamese Army failed to maintain the improved security situation, or pressure on the enemy's activities. In the chapter entitled 'Bereft of their Australian strongman': November 1971-January 1973, the reader, will find this disease, culminates in the loss of any security/pacification gains made by the 1ATF.

The other constant is in regard to members of the population in Phuoc Tuy, who were opposed to the NLF, but at best were Lukewarm(pun intended) towards the diseased GVN Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism prevented the GVN from winning over these Lukewarm people, and thus the war.


The ATF1 mission was to restore security in Phuoc Tuy , permitting the South Vietnamese government to regain control of the province. In 1966, Phuoc Tuy was firmly under NLF control, reflecting the security situation in much of GVN. Pacification efforts centred around Revolutionary Development (CORDS) and other non military civic action could only take place when ,the security, situation improved.

The author encapsulates the operational, strategic and tactical dilemma faced by the Australians and American in Vietnam. This ongoing dilemma was as follows: from the ATF1 perceptive, their was not enough manpower to sustain operations against the NLF's more conventional units (mostly the D445 battalion) and conduct operations aimed at cutting the NLF's links to local population.


I should pretext my next comments for the reader. I am the son of a Vietnam veteran. In 1969, my father served with 5RAR, during Operation Esso, he was badly wounded by a mine incident, and evacuated home. This is why a passage on page 133-134 struck a cord with me. The passage covers , the 1ATF operating in the Long Hais.

Specifically, constructing a bunker system around Dat Do, patrolling around the Long Hais and CORDS in Dat Do. The NLF heavily mined areas likely to frequented by Australian Army patrols in the Long Hais. This mine laying effort resulted in twenty Australian soldiers Killed in Action and 119 wounded. Despite the heavy causalities, the 1ATF, goal of injecting or denying the NLF's logistical rice supply was successful.


The reader will have noticed , how I have chosen to skip over the Ted Offence, this is because I wish to focus on other topics covered by the author. This is a strength and not a weakness of the book.

A long term American goal was the use of democratic elections to legitimatise South Vietnam in the eyes of the international community and it's own people. In the same time frame, flawed analysis driven by computer modelling and wishful thinking,saw a unrealistic and 'rosy' view of the security situation in Phuoc Tuy.

The author effectively covers the electoral process for Senate and lower house elections. The AVN banned the Communist and neutral political parties from taking part in elections. In the 1970 Senate election and 1971 Lower House elections showed voters in Phuoc Tuy were capable of making informed decisions at the ballot boxes. Neither, did these informed choices reflect the lack of participation in the political process. The diversity of Phuoc Tuy was reflected in the way people voted in both legislative elections.

Voters were unified in cynicism in the electoral process. This reader found the October 1971 Presidential election , which Thieu won unopposed, not only justified voter cynicism, yet also displayed a figurative upper cut to the GVN's own jaw. Prior to the presidential election, the outright rigging of lower house election results, in Phuoc Tuy was publicly confirmed. President Thieu resorted to amending electoral laws to prevent 'peace', comprise' and his chief rival Nguyễn Cao Kỳ from winning the, October 1971, presidential election.

I have only covered a fraction of the fanatic content in the book. By covering a fraction of the author's content, I have focused on two focal points:

How my family history relates to the book means a great deal to me on a personnel level. This does not not preclude a more rational overview of the book. During the time 1ATF and Pacification efforts took place in Phuoc Tuy , the ills of the GVN and South Vietnamese Army prevented any pacification efforts from having any lasting successful impact.

In a brief summary, the ills also ensured the RVN nation state had no viable future, and the author's narrative largely ends with, the 1971 ATF draw down from Phuoc Tuy, and in 1972, the failure of the AVRN efforts (Operation LAM SON 79) in the province. By 1972, the People's Liberation Armed Forces switched to conventional military efforts, for the NFL had failed to ferment a popular Communist revolt in the province/wider RVN.

The author has produced a book which earns pride of place on my book shelf, for both reasons of rational/logical analysis of the intended subject matter, and my own personnel family history as described above.

Australia and New Zealand's strategic blindness

Daesh-linked militants swept through a southern Philippine city, beheading a police chief, burning buildings, seizing a priest and his worshippers and raising the flag of Daesh, authorities said Wednesday. President Rodrigo Duterte, who had declared martial law across the southern third of the nation, warned he may expand it nationwide.
As details of the attack in Marawi city emerged, fears mounted that the nation could be falling into a growing list of countries grappling with the spread of influence from Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
background

Strategic blindness is staring New Zealand in the face , thanks to political leaders who display the symptoms of blindness towards the Asia-Pacific. I draw the comparison to a lack of vision because New Zealand fails to recognise threats to security in the Asia-Pacific, yet remains committed to the against ISIS in Iraq. This article will focus on the threat posed by ISIS in the Southern Philippines.

I will return to the Southern Philippines in a moment, but first let us take a glance at the Indonesia occupying East Timor (1975 – 1999). In 1975 when Indonesia occupied/colonised East Timor, like so many conquerors before them, they walked into the trap of favouring the stick over (economic) carrots. Also in 1975, Australia and New Zealand abdicated our regional responsibilities by green lighting Indonesia's actions in East Timor. This hand-wringing only ended with the Australian lead intervention, the International Force For East Timor (INTERFET), restored security after Indonesian colonial rule in East Timor ended.


Threats from ISIS and other Islamic Extremist groups in the Southern Philippines may alter New Zealand's security environment in unexpected ways. Let's explore the ways how New Zealand's security environment may be driven by events on Mindanao. The fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations, opening up strategic 'gateways' (hereafter gateways), offering the reader strategic forecasting.

These 'gateways' start with the threat of or all the fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations (hereafter the fall of Mindanao). Now I will turn to the first 'gateway'. By using the threat or the fall of Mindanao, the Chinese would have the pretext to unilaterally intervene, not unlike the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

There is every reason to think by intervening on Mindanao, the Chinese ,would repeat the moral social and economic blunders made by Indonesia's effort to colonise East Timor. Until East Timor's independence, the Indonesian flag flying over that nation had no negative impact on Australia's security. However, the Chinese, occupying Mindanao would be calamities, and akin to the Fall of Singapore. The change in Australia and New Zealand's security/strategic outlook would be permanent, unlike the defeat of the Japanese in WW2 (1941- 1945).

The second 'gateway' stays in the shadow of East Timor without the dark clouds mentioned above. By leading the next INTERFET (hereafter coalition), Australia would act as a responsible middle power, and put ghosts from 1975 to rest. Operating in medium to high intensity (warfare) environments,the coalition, would aim to restore security on Mindanao.

As coalition partners, the potential roles of Indonesia, China and Japan are worth a glance. In light of Japan's WW2 history and Indonesia's ties with East Timor mentioned above, the chance for those nations to be seen as genuine liberators of people, strikes me as fascinating. Instead of playing the role of outright occupier, the Chinese, would make a welcome contribution to the coalition. Units from Japan Self Defence Force and People's Liberation Army could serve alongside each other. Delicious historical irony does not ensure that such occurrences will take place.

Australia and New Zealand's level of military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines deserves more public discussion. Increasing Australia military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines, increases regional security, by in effect keeping our hands on the steering wheel. Likewise, the same goes for New Zealand.


Logically, the following question must be posed: why are Australia and New Zealand's efforts focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq, and not in the southern Philippines? Attempting to answer this question from a New Zealand perspective; leads to more questions. If the reader would like me to explore these questions , feel free to leave a comment, below.

How New Zealand is suffering from strategic blindness is evident, if not the underlying causes. The willingness of Australia New Zealand's political leaders to place our regional security at risk is also stark. History does not take a particular course without under currents acting as driving forces. Do not ignore the forces which are defining our time.

Book review: Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction

Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction Editors Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr (Georgetown University Press 2016 ). The book is aimed at undergraduate and graduate students who are undertaking courses in Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Technical and Academic jargon is avoided to make the subject matter accessible to students of international relations.

The book excels at introducing Asia-Pacific Security Studies to the reader. Each chapter is authored by a academic with expertise in the particular field. In the introduction, Traditional and Non Traditional international relations theories are summarised, and act as a warm start to the book. Through out the book, the terms appear in bold can be found in the glossary.


Two chapters from the book stood out for me. Chapter three entitled: Are Japan and India Potential Members of the Great Power club? by Dr David Envall and Professor Ian Hall captured my attention. Envall and Hall encapsulate the internal and external challenges facing Japan and India, in a informative manner. My own status; self confessed WW2 buff, always transfers my mind across modern day (Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrival to the present day) Japanese history.

Chapter seven Maritime Security – Will Asia's Next War Occur at Sea? Specifically, the table listing disputed territories in the East China Sea and South China Sea, is useful for reference purposes. One of my reading habits is to reference information from books , on a as needed basis.

Among the nations involved in the maritime territorial disputes, the forces of Nationalism burn hotter than the obvious value of the islands in disputed territories. The fires of nationalism bring additional investments in military spending, from the governments involved in the territorial disputes. Chapter seven also takes in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the origins of the maritime territorial disputes, and other aspects relating to the topic.

The book excels at meeting the aim of providing students with a introduction to Asia-Pacific Security studies. The more general reader like me will also find the book useful, gaps in my knowledge are filled in by the contributing scholars/authors. I hope Asia-Pacific Security Studies scholars are empowered to write book titles; taking their cue from the from the chapters in Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction, the future of such book titles looks promising.