The ghost of WW2 German tank production

But a long war today would be totally different. In fact, after about nine months of intense peer conflict, attrition would grind the U.S. armed forces down to something resembling the military of a regional power.  The Army, for example, would be armed primarily with infantry weapons with heavy firepower coming from gun trucks and a trickle of modern equipment acquired from struggling domestic production and whatever logisticians could scrounge up on the world market. This state of affairs arises because the U.S. government has not thought seriously about industrial mobilization. It is far easier to bask in warm memories of World War II than to face the harsh choices that mobilization preparation entails.

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Correction, I was informed that 28 is the surge number for M1 Abram production, that the figure beggars' belief is not surprising.  

I have never lost my interest in 'long inter-state' wars. My interest in this kind of warfare spans from lifelong interest in WW2 and 20th century history. The reader can judge for themselves, if my historical grounding makes me biases towards the topic or not. What I will freely admit is the way my historical grounding influences my strategic outlook in the present.

Space does not permit a comprehensive look at banishing a ugly and scary historical ghost, which I will describe below. As such, I have ignored the following plausible eventuality: During the next long war, the M1 Abrams tank designed is axed in favour of a less technological sophisticated and cheaper (aka 'mass production friendly') tank design. In effect, my focus is on the foundations (industrial capacity/output) and not what the eventual building resembles ( the M1 Abram or future tank designs).

My next comparison is purely in terms of industrial capacity, and not issues of morality or culture. In terms of industrial capacity, the United States of America is grossly ill-prepared for a future 'long inter-state' war, not unlike the Axis Powers in WW2. Specifically, during WW2, the ghost of Germany's inadequate industrial output has been well documented by historians. The same goes for the way Germany was crushed by industrial output from the United States of America.

In the present, the projected monthly M1 Abrams production figure of 28 is pathetically low. On the basis of the production figure increasing by the tank factory operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, tank production could reach approx 96 per month.

In a twist of historical irony, present day projected M1 Abrams tank production (hereafter tank output) is a historical ghost. Let me explain. In WW2, German tank production could be described as woeful [Sample production figures ], so woeful they failed to keep up with attrition rates (losses in combat). Ironically, like their WW2 German counter parts, American tank production cannot keep up with attrition, in the next war. Interestingly, the same root cause , technological sophistication and high production costs, gives birth to a historical ghost. The ghost of WW2 German tank production (hereafter historical ghost); haunts present day tank output.


Banishing this historical ghost, who haunts me and any sane military planners, requires expanding the industrial base, so a increased monthly tank output can take place. Why reinvent the tank tread? This is my philosophy behind the answer to that question. In WW2, the American automotive industry was retooled to meet wartime demands for industrial mobilisation. The retooling of the American automotive industry formed a part of industrial mobilisation, and the resulting industrial output proved to be a war winner.

In the present, I can see no reason why, the current American automotive and other manufactures, should not embrace tank production. Additionally, the benefits of decentralising tank production are worth noting. Decentralising tank production reduces the likelihood of enemy action ceasing tank production by destroying a single or small number of factories. Geographically decentralising, the manufacture of tank components and tank assembly, would also see the manufacturing sector profit.

The expansion of current day tank output would or will present new challenges, yet there is equally opportunities for advancing manufacturing and transport logistics. In short, 3D Printing can reduce stress on current or create new supply chains, and localise the manufacturing process. Can existing factories fully support current and future advancements (think robotics and artificial intelligence) in tank output? I will come back to this question in a moment.

Cost issues aside, converting existing factories to tank output should pose few difficulties. However, conceptually this approach denies tank output, the potential advantage of portability/decentralisation. For a moment, recall how during WW2, American war industries were not subject to enemy action, this will not be the case in the next war. The permanent nature of existing civilian and military manufacturing and industrial plants provides a fixed target for enemy action.


The advantages of portability in tank and other wartime production ties in with the requirement for the above-mentioned decentralisation. Since the notion of a portable tank factories is conceptual, there is still a requirement to expand potential and existing tank output, across the existing manufacturing/industrial base. Any answer to my above question must factor in a balance between research and development into 3D printing/manufacturing advancements and utilising the existing manufacturing base and emerging technologies.

Laying the foundations to banish historical ghosts requires intersecting U.S. Military, private sector and government interests to works towards the common goal of increasing tank output. Above all else, a belief in redefining 'the possible' must drive our thinking surrounding tank production, industrial mobilisation, and the eventuality of 'long inter-state' wars.

The North Korean Problem

This analysis recommends war. It is shocking to put to print. However, with North Korea’s inexorable advance towards developing a nuclear-tipped ICBM, we enter the realm of bad choices. On balance, war on the peninsula is the least bad alternative. There are some months left for a brilliant diplomatic breakthrough that turns North Korea from the brink – these avenues must be energetically and exhaustively pursued. This analysis is presented on the fair assumption that such initiatives will fail.

Crispin Rovere's article 

China is the key deciding factor in resolving the 'North Korean problem'. China can undertake military action against North Korea, green light United States military (hereafter U.S. Military) action against North Korea, or maintain the status qua, Let's start with the status qua and move on to the alternatives in a moment.


Regretfully, China may be using North Korea as a device to test the resolve of the western powers. Specifically, China may want to test the resolve of Australia, South Korea, Japan and the United States. By testing the resolve of those nations,China, is looking to see how much 'lee way' of sorts, potential or current adversaries can take advantage of in the future. In short, by allowing the North Korean nuclear weapons program to go unchecked, Russia, Iran and China may become embolden to start World War 3.

Another more pragmatic as oppose to sinister motives may explain China's current stance on North Korea. Russia shares a modest border with North Korea. Russia may view any potential Chinese annexation of North Korea as territorial threat. In short, Russian fears of their south eastern flank facing a renewed Chinese threat would create another global 'flash point'. Put another way, the risk of a Russia -China War (echoes of the Cold War) would have increased.


I now come to the first of the possible scenario which see's China annexing North Korea, after green lighting, the United States lead coalition or stand alone war (hereafter war) against that country. Let me explain why I think this is the smartest from China's standpoint. Assuming China green lights, the U.S. going to war, they can stand by and watch the fallout.

In North Korea, the fall out would consist of the country having been reduced to rubble, by the spectre of total warfare. Politically, the fallout would fall at the feet of the Trump administration. The extent of the political fall out and the consequences for the Trump administration falls beyond the scope of this article. While the political fallout is ongoing ,China, could occupy and rebuild North Korea in their image. In effect under this scenario, China, can manipulate the 'North Korean Problem' to there perceived advantage.

The last scenario is China stand alone invading , occupying and rebuilding North Korea in their image. This scenario is arguable the best and least likely scenario. If China, deems the continual existence of North Korea as a nation state is not in their interests, the following question must be asked: Why would China not let President Trump take all the political fallout?

Remember, China's political and military leaders do not answer to freedom of the press or to the mercy of public opinion. However, President Trump does have to answer to freedom of the press, American public opinion, and face any political fall out from a preemptive (total) war against North Korea. Hence, this is why, this last scenario is the least likely.


I foresee the status qua remaining in place until the following occurs: North Korea invades South Korea in concert with the use of nuclear weapons against that country and Japan. The exact way events would play out is for another topic all together. Such a eventuality would represent a watershed moment in our history. 

All roads lead to the eventual destruction of North Korea in physical terms and as a nation state.
If the second and third scenarios mentioned above occur without the support of Japan and South Korea , the U.S. Military, would face unexpected logistical challenges (,think the return of Mulberry harbours). Beyond the spectre of total warfare, for military, strategic and diplomatic reasons, the 'North Korea problem' is not easily solved.

Neither can the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of China annexing North Korea be ignored. A authoritarian and paranoid Russia would not welcome Chinese territorial expansion along their own borders. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin would face a historical strategic choice: Does Russia maintain a strategic westwards European focus on the Ukraine and the Baltic States or cast their strategic eye towards Asia?


Looking away from Russia, the consequences of China annexing North Korea are hard to gauge in this space, but should not be ignored. China would demand the withdrawal of U.S. Military forces from South Korea and Japan. China would argue that with the threat from North Korea is now non-existent, so there is no any reason for U.S. Military forces to remain stationed in Japan and South Korea.

In the event China pressures Japan and South Korea, the level of public support in those countries for a continuing U.S. Military presence is speculative. Space does not permit me to go into the other potential consequences or side effects from China annexing North Korea.

There are no 'good' options for resolving the 'North Korean problem'. Australia and New Zealand must make a realistic strategic assessment of our predicament. Yet in a General New Zealand election year, the difficult strategic situation, is not being widely discussed in the media or by the general public. This lack of discussion around the 'North Korean problem' worries me.

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue by Williamson Murray (Hoover Institution Press, 2017) explains the importance of military history to past,current and future events. The book is essential reading for informed/concerned citizens, future military and civilian political leaders.

Through out the book, the topical nature of analysis changes quickly in each chapter. The author begins work's by explaining how historical events cannot provide a accurate forecast of where, when and how future wars will unfold, but they can provide a intellectual foundation, for thinking about the future.


Equally, the way commentators, who have or do forecast trends towards a more peaceful world with fewer wars taking place have not delved into history books. These contemporary commentators commit a multitude of 'sins.' Mistaking the lack of great power conflict (aka WW1/WW2) during the Cold War, ignoring post colonial wars in places like Vietnam and Rhodesia to not understanding the extent of humans to commit folly. Interestingly, through out history, the same mistake has been repeated by others, who made miscalculations.

Intellectually, chapter 2 is where the author began to engaged me. The character of war is shaped by social and technological changes through out time, yet the nature of war endures. I will comeback to the character of war in a moment. The military theorist and quasi historian, Carl Von Clausewitz, who articulated the nature of war (hereafter nature), fame has outlived people's ability to adsorb historical lessons.

Across five “military- social revolutions” [as found on page 50], the character of war was reshaped, and with the most recent development, the advent of Nuclear Weapons (the nuclear age) is upon us all. In short, from the emergence of modern nation state to industrialised warfare, the character of warfare will be forever evolving. However, the nature of war, whether it be unexpected consequences or things not going to plan will remain the same.

Skipping ahead to chapter 4 in the book allows me to share my own thoughts with the reader. Let me explain. My thoughts were connected to a lifetime of reading, for much of my knowledge about 20th century history comes from book reading. How the author explains, the same mistakes committed by US military and political leaders, during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars is illuminative. This illuminative experience was intellectually reinforcing in that my existing knowledge was supplemented by new learning's.


Chapter 5 entitled; The American Problem could have equally taken the titles ' The importance of Professional Military Education', 'Intellectually preparing for the next war' and 'The Art and Science of educating'. A sound Professional Military Education (PME) prepares military personnel for future wars. The aim of PME is to ensure lessons are learned in a classroom environment and not during the next war. Yet despite the obvious value of bloodless classroom learning experiences, the US military has learned lessons on the battlefield, leaving a trail of coffins. The legacy of the Iraq War is draped over the coffins.

Institutions who provide PME curriculum, (Staff and War Colleges) that do not intellectually challenge their students, do not hold any educational worth. A PME curriculum constructed around the use of strategy, examination the employment of joint forces ( all three services combined) at the operational level; and lastly the process sitting governments use to acquire defence equipment is a useful model to follow.


The sheer weight of crushing bureaucracy on the US government's National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and military is comparable to a terminal cancer (my comparison). The bureaucratic expansion of the National Security Council (NSC) has encumbered that organisation with a majority of staff who do not speak a second language. The CIA is also burdened by 13% of analysts, who do not speak the second language. The outcome is members of the NSC and CIA analysts who lack the basic knowledge required to asses threats to US and global security.

A supersized combo of legal constraints on Rules of Engagement, bureaucracy and unmanned drone strikes cloud US political and military leaders judgement. The low cost in political capital and non existent front-line military causalities from unmanned drone is (once again!) clouding minds with the false notion that wars can be won without 'boots on the ground'.


Curiously, the Appendix listing potential trouble spots, indirectly influenced my thinking on, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Specifically, a moral question not covered in the book: Is it moral for democracies to engage in total warfare before they are attacked? I feel pointing out to the reader, how the author, provoking me into questioning such a moral and political question is important. Comparatively, I have found few works that are so provocative and intellectually engaging at the same time.

The old adage that you can not argue with history is proven by the author through out the book. As such, the book is must read for everyone from concerned citizens, military personnel regardless of rank, and future political leaders. New Zealand cannot afford to let the aforementioned adage go ignored. Yet by enlarge Kiwis are ignoring the foundations of the author's thesis at our own peril.