Wednesday 14 June 2017

Australia and New Zealand's strategic blindness

Daesh-linked militants swept through a southern Philippine city, beheading a police chief, burning buildings, seizing a priest and his worshippers and raising the flag of Daesh, authorities said Wednesday. President Rodrigo Duterte, who had declared martial law across the southern third of the nation, warned he may expand it nationwide.
As details of the attack in Marawi city emerged, fears mounted that the nation could be falling into a growing list of countries grappling with the spread of influence from Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
background

Strategic blindness is staring New Zealand in the face , thanks to political leaders who display the symptoms of blindness towards the Asia-Pacific. I draw the comparison to a lack of vision because New Zealand fails to recognise threats to security in the Asia-Pacific, yet remains committed to the against ISIS in Iraq. This article will focus on the threat posed by ISIS in the Southern Philippines.

I will return to the Southern Philippines in a moment, but first let us take a glance at the Indonesia occupying East Timor (1975 – 1999). In 1975 when Indonesia occupied/colonised East Timor, like so many conquerors before them, they walked into the trap of favouring the stick over (economic) carrots. Also in 1975, Australia and New Zealand abdicated our regional responsibilities by green lighting Indonesia's actions in East Timor. This hand-wringing only ended with the Australian lead intervention, the International Force For East Timor (INTERFET), restored security after Indonesian colonial rule in East Timor ended.


Threats from ISIS and other Islamic Extremist groups in the Southern Philippines may alter New Zealand's security environment in unexpected ways. Let's explore the ways how New Zealand's security environment may be driven by events on Mindanao. The fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations, opening up strategic 'gateways' (hereafter gateways), offering the reader strategic forecasting.

These 'gateways' start with the threat of or all the fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations (hereafter the fall of Mindanao). Now I will turn to the first 'gateway'. By using the threat or the fall of Mindanao, the Chinese would have the pretext to unilaterally intervene, not unlike the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

There is every reason to think by intervening on Mindanao, the Chinese ,would repeat the moral social and economic blunders made by Indonesia's effort to colonise East Timor. Until East Timor's independence, the Indonesian flag flying over that nation had no negative impact on Australia's security. However, the Chinese, occupying Mindanao would be calamities, and akin to the Fall of Singapore. The change in Australia and New Zealand's security/strategic outlook would be permanent, unlike the defeat of the Japanese in WW2 (1941- 1945).

The second 'gateway' stays in the shadow of East Timor without the dark clouds mentioned above. By leading the next INTERFET (hereafter coalition), Australia would act as a responsible middle power, and put ghosts from 1975 to rest. Operating in medium to high intensity (warfare) environments,the coalition, would aim to restore security on Mindanao.

As coalition partners, the potential roles of Indonesia, China and Japan are worth a glance. In light of Japan's WW2 history and Indonesia's ties with East Timor mentioned above, the chance for those nations to be seen as genuine liberators of people, strikes me as fascinating. Instead of playing the role of outright occupier, the Chinese, would make a welcome contribution to the coalition. Units from Japan Self Defence Force and People's Liberation Army could serve alongside each other. Delicious historical irony does not ensure that such occurrences will take place.

Australia and New Zealand's level of military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines deserves more public discussion. Increasing Australia military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines, increases regional security, by in effect keeping our hands on the steering wheel. Likewise, the same goes for New Zealand.


Logically, the following question must be posed: why are Australia and New Zealand's efforts focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq, and not in the southern Philippines? Attempting to answer this question from a New Zealand perspective; leads to more questions. If the reader would like me to explore these questions , feel free to leave a comment, below.

How New Zealand is suffering from strategic blindness is evident, if not the underlying causes. The willingness of Australia New Zealand's political leaders to place our regional security at risk is also stark. History does not take a particular course without under currents acting as driving forces. Do not ignore the forces which are defining our time.