Introduction
Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania ( Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies June 2015) examines the security architecture employed in the region.
For the sake of maintaining readability my commentary will appear separate from the overview of each topic. The overview is intended to act as a highlights package. Quotes directly from the book appear in italics.
Highlights Package
Chapter 1 Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region: Rummaging through the
Blueprints Richard Herr
This chapter offers the reader a overview of the regional architecture from 1944 to the present. Really the regional architecture becomes important in the 1970's. Around this time the region was being decolonised.
The matter of the regions geographical boundaries was defined in 1962.
Historically, the post-1962 ambit of the South Pacific Commission (now the Pacific Community, but still known as the SPC) has defined the boundaries of the Pacific Islands region.
It should be noted that the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum) did not redraw its borders to include Australia and New Zealand despite their status as Forum founding members
The development of regional systems has been ad hoc. In short the beginning was with the South Pacific Commission (Now known as the Pacific Islands Forum) would become the framework for the regional system. In the 1980's Pacific Island groups/organisations took on more of a regional flavour. Significantly in response to being Frozen out of the Pacific Islands Forum Fiji formed the Pacific Islands Development forum.
The divergence of the Australia and New Zealand's interests from those of the Pacific Islands raised many eyebrows. Australia and New Zealand's interests in the Cold War were to use the region as a strategic barrier against invasion and preventing the spread of Communism. In the post 9-11 years the focus has been on preventing a failed state scenario.
The perceptive of the Pacific Island Nations has been motivated by their own local interests. For the first twenty years after decolonisation the aim was to take control of the security agenda. By doing so the new nations were seeking to assert their own national sovereignty. From 1988 to 2004 building bridges to strength the system was the aim.
Institutionally and Economically, Pacific Island nations are unable to support regional security without outside assistance. At the time of writing China is changeling Australia's and New Zealand's monopoly in this area. Adapting the region's pathways and forums to this new reality is the focal point in the present day.
Chapter 2 The Regional Security Environment and Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region Michael Powles
The Pacific Islands are not immune from the geopolitical effects of China's rise as a world power. The central questions are can China emerge as world power peacefully? Can China and the United States peacefully co exist in Asia and Oceania? What are China's ambitions for the Pacific Islands region?
One group of observers, the so-called “realists,” see real grounds for extreme nervousness in the present international security situation. John Mearsheimer, of the University of Chicago, drawing on lessons from history, not least the run-up to the first World War, asserted emphatically, “To put it
bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.”
Not everyone agrees, however. Some countries in Southeast Asia, which have generations of experience dealing with competing major powers in their region, are less pessimistic. Singapore’s foreign minister has said: “The world and Asia are big enough to accommodate a rising China and a reinvigorated United States.”
For small powers the region's security is depended on a couple of factors. The extend to which China respects International law and the International Order . Developments in the East and South China seas are reason for concern. To what degree the United States is willing to share power in Asia with China . The Republic of Korea hasn't shown any interest in helping the USA to contain or obstruct the rise of China.
China's hunger for resources that sustains it economic growth may place pressures on the environment and sustainable resource management. The sustainability of Pacific Tuna is coming under the spot light as Chinese , Japanese , Taiwanese, European and American fishing fleets all harvest the regions stock pile. Generally China has observed it's obligations under the Western and Central Pacific Fishers Convention.
If the worst was to happen and China doesn't take a peaceful road to it's rise the region will naturally feel the impact. Yet for all the risks Pacific Islanders remain optimistic about the future.
Chapter 3 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region Jian Zhang
China's role in the region underwent a transformation around the time they started to flex there muscle as an emerging power. China and Taiwan were engaged in Cheque book diplomacy . Both countries sort to buy diplomatic recognition. The “China Question” as it was once known is currently on the back burner.
Apart from its aid program, China’s growing presence is further reflected in its expanding economic and trade ties with the region. Between 2000 and 2012, China’s trade with the eight Island countries with whom it has diplomatic ties7 rose from $248 million to $1.767 billion, a more than sev-en-fold increase. In 2009, China became the second-largest trade partner in the region, after Australia.
According to a report by China’s Ministry of Commerce, based on 2012 Chinese customs statistics, China’s total trade with all Pacific Island countries, including those having no diplomatic ties with Beijing, was as high as $4.5 billion. Additionally, China has become an important export market for some Pacific Island economies. For example, around 45 percent of Solomon Islands’ 2013 exports went to China. For Papua New Guinea, China has become the largest market for its timber exports over the last decade.
The more pressing issues relate to how Chinese developmental aid comes with no strings attached. When countries like Australia and New Zealand provide such aid it comes with the expectation of better levels of governance. Other OECD donors tie aid to economic and political reforms.
Make no mistake. The Chinese are proud of there differing approach to foreign aid. The Chinese are the 5th largest donor to the Pacific Island Region. Their no strings attached approach is seeing them become an increasingly attractive source of foreign aid. Fiji showcased this very well. After the 2006 coup, Australia and New Zealand led the way in imposing sanctions , cutbacks in aid and diplomatic isolation. Beijing chose to continue business as normal with Commodore Frank Bainimarama's regime.
So far, China’s increased regional engagements have generated considerable concerns and criticisms in countries like Australia and the United States, which have exercised significant regional influence. Many critics target China’s aid policy. According to China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper, key features of this policy are:
• Unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development
capacity
• Imposing no political conditions
• Adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development
The impact of Chinese foreign aid is becoming noticeable in other ways. Tonga has been the recipient of a number of “concessional loans” worth 100 million dollars. Tonga has accumulated debt that is equal to 32% of the country's GDP.
Opinions that deal with what is driving China's engagement in the Pacific Island's Region are almost tribal in nature. Some would argue China's appetite for natural resources, trade and economic interests are the driving factors. Another school of thought states that what is unfolding really represents the microcosm of the US-China rivalry.
China enjoys very diverse interests from development , trade to promoting their own culture via the Confucius Institute at the University of South Pacific in Fiji. 2000 scholarships per year are available to students from South Pacific Countries who wish to study in China.
Yet for all of this China's developmental efforts remain uncoordinated. Heck some of their activities even go as far to undercut the effectiveness of others. Chances for New Zealand to coordinated infrastructure projects with China are limited.
The reality of China's presence in the Pacific Islands region will grow over the coming decades needs to be accepted. Simply requesting China to conform to Western practices and norms in developmental aid would be a waste of time. Resisting/trying to contain China's expanding influence would be for zero gain or in effect banging one's head against a wall.
Assimilating the merits of the donor countries practices and norms is the way to formulate policy in coming decades.
Chapter 4 Still Missing in the Rebalance? The United States and the Pacific Island Countries Eric Y. Shibuya
The geopolitics of the Cold War determined how the USA engaged with the Pacific Islands Region. In a sense the Pacific Islands region was underneath a sort triangle of US allies in South Korea , Philippines,Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.
The heart, however, of U.S. influence in the region, was, in fact, among Pacific Island nations, particularly island states in free association with the United States. These included the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau. Along with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, they formed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
The TTPI was under a UN trusteeship system administered by the USA up until the 1960's.
Parts of the Pacific Islands region were sealed off for Nuclear Tests . The populations of Bikini and Enewetak were displaced by nuking testing. Efforts by the Americans to bring Universal Education and a system of government were unsuccessful. These efforts were compounded by the Kennedy administration throwing more money at the existing problems. LBJ's Great Society programs didn't prove to be very great if you lived in the Pacific Islands.
The late 1960s signaled the end of the colonization era, and the beginning of TTPI members’ work to re-shape their relationships with the United States. The Congress of Micronesia (COM) was established in 1965 to further the political development of the TTPI, though the U.S. high commissioner still held much of the governing authority. In 1967, the COM set up a political status commission to explore varying options towards terminating the trusteeship. The COM advocated “free association” (a new status developed between New Zealand and the Cook Islands) and entered into negotiations with the United States in 1969.
In time The Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Federated and States of Micronesia would all enter Free Associations with the USA. In exchange for on going financial aid , access to the US Postal service at domestic rates and American Visa's , the US kept the right to operate military bases in those places if they ever felt the need arose.
The years that awkwardly fell between the end of the Cold War and 9-11 saw the USA neglect the Pacific Island Region . After 9-11 attention turned to preventing fragile states from becoming the Afghanistan of the South Pacific. The Australian lead intervention in the Solomon Islands sought to avoid a failed state scenario. Now we come to the Obama's administration “Pivot to Asia”.
Certainly, the rebalance announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has been a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high-level U.S. participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. Significant disagreements within the U.S. government led to a government shutdown that brought into stark relief the fiscal realities the Obama Administration and its successors will confront. This reality also generally dampened expectations around the region of a massive influx of military personnel and equipment, and their associated economic benefits.
The Compact States (Those who have Free Associations with the USA) are yet to act as staging posts for US military assets. Such an occurrence would raise social and environmental concerns. Balanced against these concerns would be the benefits of improved infrastructure and economic benefits. Pacific Island nations may be better off without the increased American interest in their region.
Greater engagement improves cultural understanding, and greater cultural understanding leads to better, more effective engagement. Ultimately,greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of more, but rather better engagement. From issues spanning conflict resolution to resource management, Island cultures have a lot to teach us; we need to learn how to listen.
Chapter 5 Australia and Security in the Pacific Islands Region Jenny Hayward-Jones
The Pacific Islands are off the international radar.. The UN Security Council and international commentators around the world are focused on the Ukraine, The Middle East and China's activities in East Asia.
Australia is the largest aid donor to the Pacific Island Region. As the dominant donor to the region Australia contributes a significant amount of Security aid in the region. The majority of the funding is spend in Melanesia (More specifically Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.) New development assistance is coming from Russia, South Korea, India, United Arab of Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar.
China’s growing engagement in the Pacific Islands has fueled talk of a power struggle in the region. But viewing China’s regional activities in geostrategic terms is inappropriate and potentially counterproductive. China has not been disruptive — in a security sense — in Pacific Island countries; it has been a largely constructive partner, with its aid and investment largely concentrated in building infrastructure.
The most glaring instance of Australia dominating the security agenda in the region is the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The total cost of RAMSI over a decade has been $2.6 Billion. The Australian tax payer has footed 95% of the bill.
At the time of writing The Pacific Patrol Boat Program is about due for replacement. Support for the program has come in financial and human resources terms. 24 Royal Australian Navy and 2 Royal New Zealand Navy personnel are supplied as maritime surveillance and technical advisers.
Illegal/unregulated fishing is hurting the regions fish stocks. Australia has cooperated in fisheries surveillance, largely through the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and in monitoring the exclusive economic zones of respective Pacific Island countries through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, now known as the Pacific Maritime Security Program .
Among Pacific Island nations, only Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga have their own military forces, although the Vanuatu Police have a paramilitary wing. These militaries are small and lightly equipped; none would be capable of defending their nations against a foreign military force. In Fiji, the military itself has been a major contributor to domestic instability. In Papua New Guinea, certain undisciplined forces have instigated violence against civilians.
Australia's lack of response to Climate Change has disappointed Pacific Island nations. Australia has not done as well as it could in this area. Restoring peace/law and order in the Solomon Islands has been successful. Australia may not always be the Pacific Islands region’s most influential
player from an economic perspective, but is the Pacific Islands region’s indispensable
power from a security perspective.
Chapter 6 Finding Common Ground: New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation
in the Pacific Anna Powles
The paradox of New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is that New Zealand sits both within the region, but also on the periphery. A colonial history, current constitutional obligations, and its role as a development donor to the region, places New Zealand alongside Australia with the regional
periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States.
New Zealand most important relationship historical and in the present is of course with Australia. Of late, New Zealand has been uncomfortable at times with Australia's sphere of influence approach to the Pacific Islands region. Differencing views on the rise of China and understanding the region underscore a folk in the road that Australia and New Zealand are taking. An increasing gap between Australia and New Zealand's military capabilities should also be considered. The gap is placing a strain on interoperability between the ADF and NZDF. Viewed from the perceptive of diplomacy in the Pacific Island's region the Trans Tasman relationship is a house divided.
When the New Zealand government ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in July 1996, it acquired a maritime territory between fifteen and twenty times larger than the total land mass of New Zealand. As a consequence, New Zealand is recognized as having one of the largest maritime domains of all coastal states, with an Exclusive Economic Zone considered the world’s fourth or fifth largest. Moreover, under its constitutional obligations, New Zealand has responsibility for the maritime territories of Tokelau, Cook Islands and Niue.
However, New Zealand defense strategists suffer from sea blindness. New Zealand has little maritime consciousness despite the Maori legends of ocean voyages from Hawaiki. It is a strategic paradox that New Zealand is a marine nation, but not a maritime nation. With the anticipated release of both New Zealand’s maritime security policy and the Defence White Paper due in 2015, it is hoped that a comprehensive, overarching maritime strategy is articulated; one that drives increased maritime awareness and capabilities to enable New Zealand to undertake a greater role in monitoring, surveillance, patrolling and protection of its maritime domain.
The driver behind New Zealand's diplomatic reach in the region is driven by the Biketawa Declaration and other regional declarations. Sanctions against Fiji and RAMSI were undertaken under the Biketawa Argeement. Comprehensive analysis of the national cost benefit ratio and the lessons learned from RAMSI are yet to take place.
New Zealand government departments fail to share information. Lessons are going unheeded and mistakes are repeated. These are contributing factors to New Zealand's ad hoc approach to diplomacy in the region.
Lessons from the New Zealand brokered Bougainville peace process have yet to be included in diplomatic efforts in the region. One aspect of these lessons is how during the early days of the Bougainville peace process the initial deployment of the Truce Monitoring Group was deployed to that island unarmed.
Fiji sees itself as the leader of Pacific Island Nations. Out of the nations they lead Fiji has the strongest military. Moreover, with regards to Fiji – and by extension the region – there is the
most room for divergence. Following the resumption of Australian-Fijian diplomatic ties and the lifting of sanctions, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s visit to Fiji in November 2014 revealed a potential estrangement in trans-Tasman relations. Bishop’s and Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimara- ma’s announcement that a meeting (hereafter, the Sydney Meeting) would be held in early 2015 with the aim of reviewing the regional architecture caught New Zealand and the rest of the Pacific Islands by surprise.
Bainimarama’s diplomatic seduction, combined with Bishop’s inexperience in regional politics, resulted in the successful conflation of two critical issues in regional governance; the first of which is Fiji’s readmission as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its expulsion from the Forum
in 2009, Fiji has categorically stated that it would only return if Australia and New Zealand were downgraded from full members to development partner status.
New Zealand and other periphery partners need to improve there listening skills around the region. Originating in South Africa scholarship Developmental Peace Keeping seeks to undertake what amounts to nation building. UN Peace Keeping missions have been dogged by a history of failures and other matters that fall beyond the scope of this review. Developmental Peace Keeping seeks to rectify past wrongs.
Developmental Peace Keeping could play a role in New Zealand's engagement with the region. New Zealand holds a Non – Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council for 2015-16. How can New Zealand make the best use of it's seat at the UN table to improve engagement with the region?
Chapter 7 Indonesian Diplomatic Manoeuvring in Melanesia: Challenges and Opportunities
Jim Elmslie
Vigorous Indonesian diplomacy stymied a bid by The West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).WPNCL membership of the MSG was made pending the January 2014 Foreign Ministerial Mission (FMM). The FMM consisted of MSG leaders travelling to West Papua to investigate the situation.
Verifying claims of Indonesian human rights abuses made by WPNCL. By the same token Indonesian claims about human rights abuses being in the past , social and economic progress in the same area were worth examining. The FMM representatives never meet with the representatives of the Indonesian government's critics. Half a day was the amount of time the FMM spent in West Papua. Vanuatu pulled out of the exercise in advance fearing that it would be a farce. Vanautu’s fears were proven correct.
The Vanuatu government has long been a supporter of West Papuans and their desire for independence. This is more than a sentiment held by the political elite; it is felt strongly amongst the society’s grassroots. Even at the time of Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, West Papua was a significant fixture on the political landscape. Vanuatu’s first Prime Minister, Father Walter
Lini, said the country would never be truly free while other parts of Melanesia, especially West Papua, remained occupied by foreign powers.
Indonesia has long known about Vanautu's support for West Papua independence. Until recently Indonesia hadn't made any diplomatic efforts to counter this support. High profile activists who support independence for West Papua live in Vanautu. Like all activists they have been successful in gaining their cause in local (in this case Vanautu) media coverage.
The people of Vanautu are embracing the cause in their national conscious. In 2013 former Vanuatu Prime Minister Sato Kilman granted Indonesia observer status in the MSG. Indonesia had wooed Kilman with lavish trips to Jakarta. Kilman misjudged public opinion. Like all political leaders who make such mistakes he was install for a prescription of public backlash. Kilman resigned as Prime Minster after losing a no confidence vote.
Kilman successor Moana Carcasses Kalosil would use the UN as the platform to place the spotlight on the perception that Indonesian atrocities were being ignored. Kalosil would state “How
can we then ignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuans who have been brutally beaten and murdered?” In March 2014 Kilman take the matter further by making a speech to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva. In the speech he referred to the horrific torture and murder of individual West Papuans, which had been filmed by soldiers. He called for the Committee to establish a country mandate which should “include investigation of alleged human rights violations in West Papua and provide recommendations on a peaceful political solution in West Papua.”
The Indonesian ambassador fell back on the FMM. “Furthermore, the statement of Mr. Kalosil is simply in contradiction with the visit of a high-level delegation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members representing [the]Melanesian Community to Indonesia from 11 to 16 January 014 in which [the] Ministerial Level Delegation of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and representative[s] of the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of New Caledonia as well as MSG High Representative conducted [an on-site] visit to Papua province and obtained firsthand information.”
Indonesia use of cheque book diplomacy ensured support from other Melanesian countries waned. Indonesia like China would use Fiji suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum to meet its own ends. Indonesia like China places no emphasis on improving governance and human rights issues.
Even before the PIDF meeting, Indonesia was not-so-quietly maneuvering to suppress the West Papua issue; it contributed, for example, $30,000 to Fiji to help fund the costs of hosting the United Nations’ regional meeting of the Special Decolonization Committee. Vanuatu’s Daily Post newspaper saw this as blatant manipulation: “Jakarta’s cheque book diplomacy reflects its determination to silence any murmurs of regional support or discussions within the MSG on the issue of re-enlisting West Papua back on the decolonization list.”11 It seems to have been money well spent as there was scant mention of West Papua in official forums, despite local moves by some
church groups to have the issue aired.
PNG has always had a more problematic relationship with Indonesia, sharing a long land border with their giant Asian and Muslim neighbor. A latent fear of military invasion has always constrained PNG’s response to the sufferings of their brother Melanesians over the border. Instead, frequent affirmations of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua remain the mantra.
Sensitivities over the referendum on independence for Bougainville which is due this year also influences Papua New Guinea's stance on West Papau. In spite of this and the almighty dollar support West Papau nationalism is growing amongst NGO and political circles in PNG.
Prospective WPNCL membership in the MSG was deferred at the June 2013 Noumea Summit, pending the FMM fact-finding trip to Indonesia. The MSG’s decision was formally announced at its meeting in PNG’s capitol, Port Moresby, on June 26, 2014. Not surprisingly, given the foregoing analysis of regional politics, the WPNCL’s application was knocked back. The official MSG communiqué announced that: 8. The Leaders: (i) Noted and accepted the contents of the Ministerial Mission’s Report;(ii) Agreed to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh application
Indonesian diplomacy pulled a substantial victory by playing off the West Papua independence groups against one another. The need for unity led to the creation of United Movement for Liberation of West Papua (ULMWP). In February of 2015 ULMWP lodged an application to join MSG. What means Indonesia uses to obstruct the application is unknown at the time of writing.
Chapter 8 Acting West, Looking East: Timor-Leste’s Growing Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region Jose Kai Lekke Sousa-Santos
Timor-Leste has had three distinct periods during in its history. The history of Portuguese colonisation of Timor-Leste which would start with the Portuguese landing in 1515. In 1974 the pro democracy Carnation Revolution in Portugal saw the fall of fall of the fascist Salazar-
Caetano dictatorship. The fall of the fascist regime saw Portugal grant her distance colonies independence.
After the failure of both Portuguese and Timorese initiatives seeking to develop a roadmap towards independence, Indonesia capitalized on the security vacuum, and on Dec. 7, 1975, invaded Timor-Leste.
Indonesia would occupy Timor-Leste for the next 24 years. Indonesia would net out a greater level of brutal treatment to the local population then the Portuguese had done so. In 1999, almost a quarter century after occupation, the tripartite May 5 agreement was signed by the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia, establishing the unarmed UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee
the act of popular consultation. This took place Aug. 30, 1999, under UN Security Council resolution 1236. In a climate of increased intimidation and violence, 98.6 percent of the population registered to vote, and on Aug. 12, 1999, 78.5 percent voted in favor of independence, rejecting special autonomy within Indonesia.
Prior to the vote Indonesian military and local sponsored militias went on a rampage of killing and destruction. Officially known as Operation Clean Sweep the rampage resulted in the destruction of infrastructure and the mass displacement of people. After Operation Clean Sweep was over the Indonesians acknowledged how they were unable to control the situation in East Timor. After making the acknowledgement Indonesia consented to a UN sanctioned international peacekeeping force.
Timor-Leste would formally gain independence in 2002. Periods of instability would plague the new state. In 2006 fighting amongst political elements shattered East Timor's as the “poster child” of UN peacekeeping/nation building.
East Timor geography uniquely places the country at the gate way to Asia and the Pacific Islands region. Pragmatism has seen East Timor show a desire to reconcile with Indonesia. East Timor aspires to be a global role model for “Post conflict development.” East Timor uses the example of it's growing ties with Indonesia to promote its vision. Timor-Leste views reconciliation with Indonesia as way of advancing peace building and dialogue within the Asian region.
Timor-Leste has sought to position itself as the corridor between Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, while exploiting its “Lusophone alliances” with fellow former Portuguese colonies as gateways into Europe, Africa and Latin America. Gusmao articulated his strategic outlook in 2014, stating: “Timor-Leste is strategically located between the CPLP countries and ASEAN, China, and the Island States of the Pacific. We also want to make use of our strategic positioning
in Southeast Asia, since we have the possibility of creating bridges with Europe, Africa and Latin America.”
The government of Timor-Leste activity promotes the idea that their nation is a part of South East Asia. Further to this point the goal of East Timor is to become a full member of Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). East Timor advocates the ASEAN goals of greater political and economic integration in the region. This represents East Timor's Westwards glance.
In the words of Gusmao: “Many would have thought this too would be improbable. In a model of reconciliation, and with a firm commitment to focus on the future, we have built a strong relationship
of trust and friendship. Rather than being enslaved by the trauma of our history, we are instead honoring our struggle by working towards a better future for our people. We know that Indonesia and Timor-Leste not only share an island, we share a future.
East Timor's eastwards glance begins with the ethnic make up of the country. Much of the eastern half of the country is ethnically Melanesian and Polynesian. Such a subtle distinction has led to discussions: Is East Timor a Southeast Asian or a Pacific Island Nation? Vulnerability and fragility are attributes East Timor shares with its Pacific Island neighbouring countries.
Timor-Leste has pursued a proactive policy of engagement with the regional governance architecture. Timor-Leste has been an observer at the Pacific Islands Forum since 2002; participated in the Pacific Small Islands Developing States meetings; and contributed as a donor partner15 to the Pacific Islands Development Forum established in 2014. Timor-Leste has assumed a similar development partner role with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), funding the MSG Secretariat’s economic advisory position. Timor-Leste has also attended MSG Leaders’ Summits and the Secretariat has indicated a strong desire to engage with Timor-Leste on other issues, including security and development.
East Timor has a stake in strengthening the regional security apparatus. “Boots on the ground” and the security sector are the providers of East Timor's slice of the pie , so to speak. Regional fisheries and environmental security is the tomato sauce served with the pie. The addition of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces.
East Timor's experiences in nation-building, conflict transformation and development processes is seeing the nation gain relevance in the Pacific Islands region. The lessons from East Timor's conflict transformation and the reintegration of veterans and former combatants into the modern independent state, offers lessons to the Solomon Islands, Bougainville , (and by extension) Papua New Guinea.
Domestically East Timor looks to incorporate the lessons in the “New Deal” which the United Nations is considering as part of its post-2015 Development Agenda. Moreover, there are critical lessons to be learned in regards to challenges posed by a growing youth demographic and related issues of disenfranchisement, vulnerability and growing criminality. Growing youth demographics in Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands region are conducive to and facilitate transnational crime. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands in countering transnational crime is critical, as both regions are increasingly targeted by transnational criminal syndicates due to their porous borders, corruption levels, and strategic geography as gateways to richer neighbors. Timor-Leste is a prescient warning of how quickly transnational narcotics syndicates can take root in the fragile and conflict-affected states.
Chapter 9 Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice: The Role of Norms, Values and
Principles in Training for Peace Operations Russell Parkin
Peacekeeping has been evolving since its inception in 1956. Notable Peacekeeping remains a military task. In the present day Peacekeeping is a multi agency undertakings. In the words of Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it.”
Sir Brian Urquhart, the only Hammarskjöld adviser with significant military experience, described the task of peacekeeping as dependent upon:
“…the non-use of force and on political symbolism. It is the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity and leadership,
as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction. It takes time to develop the full effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation and to secure the confidence and cooperation of the conflicting parties…For soldiers, peacekeeping can be a thankless and unglamorous task, and yet we have found that most of the soldiers value the experience.…”
The above insight from Sir Brian Urquhart also applies to the role of law enforcement in modern day peacekeeping operations.
The UN Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division provides member states with a Peacekeeping handbook/training manuals. Training peacekeepers is the responsibility of individual member states. PET acts in a Coordinating role.
A training facility for military and civilian police peacekeepers is a laudable goal. Such a facility would increase the professionalism of military and police forces in the region by assimilating international practices in training. The would be Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre
(PI-POTC) would draw on the PET training manuals. The Character and Competence of PI-POTC would stem from a recipe whose elements including: Procedures, rules, protocols and practices. The PI-POTC would tap into international peacekeeping experiences and make suitable adjustments as local cultures deem fit.
The term “community of interest” describes a group of people or organizations who share a common professional interest. In 2000, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions listed over 1,200 organizations — either academic or private peace research bodies — in 80 countries. The “ community of interest” would in effect provide the PI-POTC with networking opportunities on a global scale.
The PI-POTC would be modelled on the Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training Centre (ADFPOTC). Each year, ADF-POTC engages with a range of partners at national, regional
and international levels. These activities include, but are not limited to, student and instructor exchanges and the conduct of training courses and seminars.
At the national level the ADFPOTC runs a UN military observer course for local and foreign military students. On the regional level The Centre is a member of the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC) and holds joint exercises with two other member nations: Thailand and Indonesia. Internationally ADFPOTC has engagements with UN DPKO and partner institutions in nations such as Chile, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and African states.
In 2012, a partnership between the Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) led to the development of a handbook entitled, Same Space, DifferentMandates: a civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in internationaldisaster and conflict response. This publication aims to improve the collective understanding of civil-military stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and to create greater opportunities for constructive engagement between them. The handbook acts kind of like a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for military personnel, police and field workers from both government agencies and NGOs.
“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything”
Planning – Eisenhower’s oft-quoted aphorism is generally truncated and worth quoting in full:
“I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”
Australian peacekeeping operations in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands threw up lessons. The lessons relate to the interagency nature of peacekeeping. The lessons absorbed by Australian agencies through their participation in such missions demonstrate the importance of two interrelated factors: leadership and planning.
Chapter 10 Managing Maritime Resources in the Pacific— With a Focus on Tongan EEZ Management Yoichiro Sato
Under the International Law of the Sea , Pacific Island nations have made claims to vast amounts of maritime resources. The basis for the claims is the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) granted to coastal nations under the aforementioned UN convention. Nations in the region have found themselves facing the gulf that exists between traditional and modern day fishing practices. A clear mandate for improving the management of fisheries and the Pacific Islands improving their own EEZ patrol capabilities is before us.
Pacific Bluefin Tuna is a highly migratory species. The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission (WCPTFC) for the first time agreed to set a total catch quota for Pacific bluefin tuna in 2014 and has started more closely monitoring other Pacific species. Japan , South Korea and the United States are distant members of WCPTFC. Previous regimes suffered from the politicisation of the scientific assessments of fish stocks. The WCPTFC uses external expertise to avoid the issue of politicisation from rearing its ugly head.
In the early 2000's albacore tuna was the main catch in Tonga's EEZ. At the time more then 20 fishing vessels operated in Tonga's waters. In recent times smaller fishing vessels are catching Skipjack tuna and reef fish for the local market. Yellowfin tuna, swordfish and occasionally bluefin Tuna are airlifted to the Japanese market.
In 2004 the Tongan government placed a moratorium on foreign fishing operations. Five years ago the Tongan government resumed licensing of foreign vessels. Since then One Taiwanese fishing vessel has been granted a license to operate in Tonga's EEZ. During the years of the moratorium two confirmed violations by Korean and Taiwanese vessels took place. A lack of routine patrol activities means that the full scope of the offending remains unknown.
Two Tongan government agencies assume primary responsibilities for fishery management. The Fishery Ministry is responsible for licensing foreign The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) conducts actual fishery patrols at sea and enforces fishery laws. There is no catch quota on tuna and swordfish in the Tongan EEZ, thus, enforcement targets non-licensed vessels. Other participating agencies include the Customs Office, which certify export contents (including fish); the Police Ministry, which supports enforcement of the Fishery Act; and the Transportation Ministry, which registers marine vessels.
Tonga's difficulties with fishery management capabilities are compounded by budget shortfalls and the lack of a domestic fishing industry. Tonga has a “rider’s agreement” with the US Coast Guard which permits law enforcement officers on board its patrol vessels in the EEZ. The The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) operate 3 patrol vessels for EEZ fishery patrols, search and rescue and other operations. Tongan law mandates the patrol boats are used for fishery patrols and external defence.
The Patrol vessels were provided to Tonga by Australia under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP).When the vessels are used for search and rescue operations and fishery patrols Australia pays for half the fuel costs. Australia also pays $1000 per day subsidy for “slipping” (preventive maintenance at a dry dock) for every day the vessel is at sea. Hull repairs are done overseas as Tonga lacks the necessary dry dock facilitates.
The TDS’ boat maintenance capability relies on the comprehensive training course its engineering officers receive at the Australian Maritime College in Tasmania. The Tongan Maritime School also enrolls a number of TDS officers for more basic engineering training. The Australian Navy stations mechanical and technical officers in Tonga to assist boat maintenance by the TDS.
Air surveillance maximises the efficiency of patrol boats. No Tongan government agency owns patrol aircraft; thus, the nation relies on infrequent air patrols by New Zealand and France, and
occasional flyovers by the United States and Australia. A multilateral regional approach to air patrols is absent.
Seabed mining in the Pacific Islands nations EEZ is a potential economic gold mine (Pun intended). In EEZ mining, national governments hold authority in licensing for area prospecting and actual production. In addition to setting license fees, ensuring that subsequent operations are environmentally sound is an important national government responsibility.
A lack of regulatory oversight looks set to see the Tongan government miss out on a fair return from Seabed Mining. Nothing shields the Tongan taxpayer from any future losses and liabilities. The desire to get rich quick has seen Tonga enter shady dealings. An investor group, comprised of mysterious firms allegedly based in Denver and London, and centered on a Russian individual, signed agreements with the Tongan government for hydrocarbons exploration and mining, and established three Tonga-registered subsidiaries .
Critics are sceptical of collaborative efforts to make up for Tonga's lack of experience in international negotiations and environmental regulation/laws. The issue has been addressed by bodies like European Union and the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of Secretariat
of the Pacific Community (SOPAC).
Chapter 11 Climate Change Challenges to Security in the Pacific Islands Region and Opportunities for Cooperation to Manage the Threat James Scott Hauger
Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include: access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries, and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea
levels, other flooding, and storm damage). A handful of Pacific Island Nations consist of low lying atolls. Rising sea levels threaten the very existence of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.
It is not yet possible to project future sea level rise, and its interaction with tides and storms, with
enough precision to predict when specific islands will become uninhabitable. This is likely to be a long-term, gradual, and in some ways, sporadic process leading to increasing emigration over time. A reasonable guess is that some low lying atolls may become uninhabitable by the end of this century.
Climate Change is coupled with the additional burdens of global trends, such as population growth, water and air pollution, and increasing demands for natural resources from third world countries. According to the US Department of Defence the increased burden will fall on governance institutions around the world . The effect will act as multipliers for levels of poverty, political instability, environmental degradation and social tensions. Such conditions could be a hot bed for terrorist activity and other forms of violence.
Pacific Island countries and territories contribute little to global Co2 emissions. Never the less diesel generators are the main source of electricity generation in the region. The adoption of renewable energy for sustainable development was made a common goal via the diplomatic language in the in the September 2013 Majuro Declaration.
An underlying political purpose of the Majuro Declaration was to present a united position to the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they seek to establish an effective global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions in the 2015 Paris meeting.The UNFCCC has provided significant support to the “least developed countries” (LDCs) to plan for climate adaptation, establishing a fund to support the preparation and implementation of national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs). Kiribati, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have submitted NAPAs and gotten financial support from the LDC fund.
Over the last 25 years several hundred million dollars in climate change related aid to the region hasn't seen any increase in public awareness. Public awareness/relations campaigns haven't come with the aid from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other sources. The region will need to invest in institutions and programs that educate people about Climate Change and foster scientific research.
The human face of climate change is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). The scientific consensus is Climate Change will see an increase in the number of natural disasters. The need for HA/DR in the region will rise with the each incident of a major natural disaster. Improving Pacific Island nation HA/DR capabilities and responding to Climate Change are long terms goals shared by the entire region.
The high cost of imported fuels provides incentive for Pacific Island nations to switch to renewable energy sources. A key area for potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the Islands is the maritime use of biofuels. A variety of civil sector research, development and demonstration projects are ongoing in this arena, as well as military projects such as the joint Department of Agriculture – U.S. Navy “Farm to Fleet” venture.26 Pacific Islands can work together through regional organizations to influence shipping firms to test, demonstrate and adopt these technologies, and they can propose and request mil-to-mil projects to transfer biofuel technologies.
Migrating the worst of the effects of Climate Change via changes to infrastructure and strengthening or changes to agricultural practices will be on going aims. The difficultly curve for these tasks will depend on geography. For the countries in the region with high ground the adoptions will be a tough and expensive, but achievable. The nations/islands that are made up of atolls are staring down the barrel of the impossible.
Finally, there is an apparent opportunity for closer collaboration between Pacific Island nations and the United States, which sponsors a variety of domestic research and development programs concerned with Pacific Island climate issues as they pertain to U.S. states, territories and associated states. Most of this research is relevant to other Island entities, but to be rigorously relevant, it should specifically include data and analyses from non-US-associated islands. There will be bureaucratic barriers to such inclusiveness based on different responsibilities and funding streams for agencies with domestic and international missions. With goodwill and intent, however, these should be resolvable issues, requiring interagency agreements and transfer of funds, and perhaps requiring authorization by Congress.
Conclusion Regional Security Architecture in Oceania: Quo Vadis? Carleton Cramer
In Word War 2 the Pacific Islands would gain fame for the Battle of the Coral Sea, Solomon Islands Campaign and the Marshall Islands campaign .In the post war years the region's fame would wane with only nuclear testing keeping the flame or should that be radiation alive. Decolonisation would bring about the topics discussed in Chapter 1.
The region acts like a sea highway between Asia and the Americas. The ocean seemingly a great divider , acts a unifier of cultures and people. Maritime commerce is growing Ships filled with containers of consumer goods commuting to destinations are a common sight in the region More and more, countries are relying on their maritime commerce for their economic growth and prosperity of their people. Yet these last 2 points serve as a back drop to chapters 3 , 4 and 10 .
As was suggested in the introduction, this book incorporates authored chapters as well as findings from a week-long workshop which brought together an inclusive group of Oceania officials, non-governmental organizations, and external powers. The workshop leveraged the outcomes of the
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Summit on the regional strategic vision held in Palau, in July 2014.
What happens in Oceania has global implications. Hopefully this book will help inform the discussion and contribute to a successful way forward. (Bold mine.)
My Commentary
Unless otherwise stated my commentary will follow the chapter outline in the book. My commentary focuses on East Timor and rising sea levels. From the stand point of someone who lives in New Zealand, how East Timor develops as a teenage nation will define our time. In the second half of the 21st century rising sea levels will really be felt in the region.
I believe that New Zealand has ignored or forgotten the strategic significance of aspects of the Pacific Islands region. Don't be surprised if in the coming war the Solomon Islands and Bougainville are vital to the defence of Australia and New Zealand just like they were in WW2. All I can say is that I am glad that none of the veterans of the fighting in the South West Pacific will be around to see the day history was eerie repeated.
Reading about New Zealand's ad hoc approach to security in the region left me with mixed emotions. I was or am angry and astonished at the same time. As I progressed through the book these feelings would pop up time and time again. The incompatibility of the concerns and aims of nations in the region to those of the United States of America , Australia and New Zealand proved to be very informative. Richard Herr made this important point without bogging down the reader with pages of details.
I understand that an event like 9-11 came out of the blue. 9-11 would define the post Cold War world until China's rise has a world power and the resurgence of Russia. Unexpected events are only are problem if the framework to cope with them hasn't been constructed. I will explore below some of the reasons that I would attribute to this maddening norm below.
I make no bones about the fact that my views on China's rise as a world power are firmly in the realist camp. China's version of the Monroe Doctrine will see them go to war in order to remove what they see as foreign influence in their domain. New Zealand is going to pay a terrible price for appeasing Chinese territorial ambitions in Asia. The price Kiwis pay in blood will be shared with our Australian , American and Pacific Island cousins.
I would make the argument that China is and will operate outside the international order. Dictatorial regimes don't conform to see the same international norms as democracies. As best I can figure the New Zealand foreign policy establishment is mistakenly operating on the assumption that China is going to follow the same norms as the western democracies.
Is Fiji at risk of becoming the Zimbabwe of the Pacific Island region? Is Frank Bainimarama echoes of Robert Mugabe circular 1980 or is he just a show pony? These questions must been seen in the light of China's no qualms approach to developmental aid.
If or when another coup takes place in Fiji Bainimarama could well suspend elections permanently. Either that or wide spread vote rigging/voter intimation may take place. In this case Australia and New Zealand would again take the lead in imposing sanctions and suspending foreign aid. China could increase their cash hand out to Fiji to make up for the lost income.
In my view Taiwan's role as a aid donor/player in the region will decline. China rise as a global economic power has given them tools/muscle that aren't in Tawian's arsenal. China will use its role as a trading partner in the region to gain diplomatic recognition. Taiwan has no hope of matching the value of China as a export market with cheque book diplomacy.
Is New Zealand getting a good deal out of the Free Association with the Cook Islands? I feel like the answer is no. In the event of a Wartime emergency the Cook Islands would turn to the NZDF to ensure the continued supply of food and fuel to the Islands. In peacetime the Cooks Islands the don't provide personnel for the RNZN or the RNZAF.
Should the Kiwi tax payer be put to the expense of subsidising the Cook Island’s semi dominion status? Err I mean Free Association. In fairness to the Cook Islands the region as a whole hasn't achieved economic independence in the last forty years. The reader may want to bear in mind what the cost to benefit ratio may have been like if the Cook Islands had been a territory or state of New Zealand. If the Cooks Islands had been a state of New Zealand the ratio of tax dollars invested in the islands compared to that collected would have been considerable.
At the time of writing the US is steep in a climate of defence spending cutbacks. Seize reductions to existing forces and the cancellation or reductions in future acquisitions. As noted in chapter 4 US forces are stationed in Australia as a part of the “Pivot to Asia.” Beyond these forces does anybody think the US military will be capable of maintaining a large scale presence in the region?
I will come back to the spectre of a failed state in the region later on. What becomes clear is how successive governments from Helen Clark onwards have been incorrect in there assessment of New Zealand's back yard being extremely benign. Either Clark and co have lied or they ignored reality to suit their own political/idealogical ends.
For a moment I wish to touch upon the non traditional donors engagements in the region. Specifically United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. There motivations remain unclear. The rise of Isis and other Islamic extremists groups in the Middle East will be giving aforementioned countries a reason to be more introspective. The region will probably drop off United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar's radar.
Australia’s security dominance in the region hasn't been analysed in New Zealand defence circles. By this I mean the small size and reduction of the NZDF operational capabilities have pigeon-holed our engagement in the region. Seen in a standalone light. Consider the following scenario. A East Timor style intervention was required in Fiji or Nauru and Australia doesn’t sign on. Where would this leave New Zealand and Fiji or Nauru ?
In the event of a high end conflict like I touched upon above New Zealand will be up the creek without a paddle. New Zealand is placing all its eggs in the diplomacy basket. When the eggs are spilled on the kitchen floor the next generation will spill blood to clean up the mess.
The relative geography of Australia and New Zealand determines their outlooks. New Zealand casts its eye to Polynesia and eastern Melanesia. Australia eyes are firmly fixed on Papua New Guinea and Asia. I believe Australia's neglect of the region can be attributed to the nations northward looking blinkers.
New Zealand has gone one step further and neglected the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. New Zealand's relations with Asia are for another time. New Zealand foreign policy is comedic ally tragic. The comedy stems from the anti American Nuclear ban. (The idea that Soviet submarines complied with the ban is at best goofy.) The tragedy is how a generation of Kiwis who are still in Primary School will be the ones who are left to clean up the mess in the kitchen.
In my view New Zealand's ad hoc approach to security and engagement with the region is tragic. Putting aside the rise of China as a world power two other on going matters that are plaguing the region. I will cover Rising sea levels and Timor-Leste fragility in a moment.
Kiwi voters have failed to take advantage of the fact that democratic societies can be self correcting. I believe the 1980 election US presidential election was a good demonstration of voters correcting the failings of a sitting president. Jimmy Carter had proven to be way out of his depth in the Oval Office. In response to Carter's failings American voters turned to Ronald Reagan. As they say the rest is history.
Can Timor-Leste forge a singular national identity peacefully?Australia and New Zealand national identities were forged on the shores of Gallipoli. The USA would do the same during the Revolutionary and later Civil War. In effect the question becomes can East Timor defy history and rise as a nation without bloodshed?
East Timor reminds me of Turkey. The end of WW1 saw the Sick Man of Europe (the Ottoman Empire) die of a terminal illness. From the wake came secular Turkey and Turkish nationalism. Turkey is neither a part of Europe or Asia in cultural or geographical terms. East Timor acts as a bridge between Asia and Oceania. A rich and unique blend of Pacific Island and Portuguese culture awaits East Timor.
Political instability and rising Chinese influence in the region are factors that play roles in determining the future of East Timor. I believe East Timor's birth as a nation will come when the Chinese undertake their planned southward expansion. East Timor's birth as a nation will come with defending their home soil. The threat of invasion would unite the post independence political factions like nothing else could.
If China is accommodated successfully in Asia the complexity of East Timor's future road map changes dramatically. How the young nation is currently faring will draw the road map. I attribute the flare up of political instability in 2006 to Australia and New Zealand abducting their responsibility. By not maintaining a permanent troop/law enforcement presence in country the security situation was allowed to get out of control.
Outside of Dili 19th century style sanitary conditions are prevalent. You have a population that is living in unsanitary conditions and poverty with political fragmentations as a backdrop. When all people have is third world conditions and political divisions the potential for conflict grows.
The ad hoc approach engagement with the region and discomfort with the spear of influence approach explains New Zealand turning its back on East Timor. My argument is that Australia has made two misjudgements. Firstly the assumption was that East Timor would be alright mate after the country formally gained independence. Secondly Australian policy makers never forecast the day or the possibility when state actors from outside from the region (excluding Indonesia and the USA) would be a factor. As blunders go I would rate these along side with New Zealand turning its military into a UN peacekeeping force.
If New Zealand and Australia had accepted the role of nation building East Timor would have become a strong and stable gateway between Asia and the Pacific islands. For this to have occurred Australia and New Zealand would have to borrowed from Douglas MacArthur's play-book and the Marshall Plan. During the occupation of Japan MacArthur oversaw Constitutional reform and free elections. The Marshall Plan saw the rebuilding of Japan from the rubble up.
Speaking of the Marshall Plan, I have come to what I regard as a unspoken reason for Australia's lousy treatment of East Timor. My contention is Australia feared East Timor becoming a economic competitor in future years. Post War Japan is again a worthwhile historical parallel. By the 1960's Japan was economic power house who was in direct competition with the USA. Australia screwed East Timor out of Natural Gas reserves to prevent them from becoming the next Japan.
I enthusiastically support the concept of the Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre (PI-POTC) role as being Australia's and New Zealand's avenue to increasing the regions law enforcement/defence capabilities. Specifically ensuring law enforcement officials are free from corruption , professional ,educated and independent opens doors. The doors bear the title of a contribution towards better levels of governance and a higher levels of regional self reliance.
Coming back to East Timor. If the population of the young nation have no confidence in local enforcement/defence forces the tide turns towards political instability. A lack of confidence in East Timor's law enforcement/ other government institutions may have unforeseen consequences. In my opinion Iraq is a contemporary example of people giving up on their government. In the face of Isis the Iraqi army melted away. I am sure the reader is aware of what has happened in Iraq in the areas under Isis occupation.
The void left by Australia and New Zealand will to some degree be filled by China. Chinese developmental aid to East Timor will be aimed at exploiting natural resources. The trend of Chinese migration in the region may also reach East Timor. Australian and Kiwi troops could even be called upon to quell fiction caused by Chinese involvement in the country. I would go as far as to say that Anzac troops could come under fire from splinter groups who were armed and equipped by the Chinese.
Until now I had deliberately avoided covering Climate Change. The reason for this I didn't want to steer The Lens of History towards the debate around the cause of Climate Change. I just so happen to think that the burden of proof hasn't been meet concerning CO2 emissions causing changes in the climate. What I don't dispute is how Pacific Island nations face existential threats. The threats stem from from rising sea levels/levels of erosion and salt water contaminating their supplies of fresh water.
I believe that the Pacific Island nations that consist solely of Atolls fate will be dictated by their geography. I invite the reader to consider the role geography has played in the destinies of people and empires through out history. Robert D Kaplan explores this very topic in his must read book: The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate.
Protecting the sources of fresh water from contamination in low lying areas like atolls may be next to impossible. Some kind of scientific or engineering solutions may emerge in the next fifty years. Taking into account Australia's and New Zealand's track record on dealing with sanitisation in East Timor. I don't like the chances of anything being done to secure the supplies of atoll island/nations drinking water.
Looking beyond 2030 sources of fresh water look set to become a global flash point. Conflict over fresh water shortages could lead to Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands becoming failed states. I find it difficult to foresee any kind of conflict resolution being successful. Access to drinking water is a matter of life and death. This is why conflict resolution would likely encounter a drought.
If current projections for rising sea levels are correct the potential failed states will be swamped by the sea. I believe that Australia and New Zealand should open their doors to the people's of the atoll islands. I cannot stress enough the importance of establishing a regional frame work for immigration from the most vulnerable nations.
The framework must start with visas. Special visas that grant permanent residence and the right to work and study on both sides of the ditch. If no framework is put in place the displaced persons/refugees will seek illegal means of migration (aka waves of boat people ) to escape their plight.
One question stands out in my mind. Why did New Zealand bother with a temporary seat on the UN Security Council when so much needs to be done closer to home? I am appalled and ashamed at the way New Zealand has pandered to the League of Nations, err I mean the United Nations. New Zealand has a serious case of foreign policy insanity.
Bear in mind that New Zealand spent ten years lobbying for a place on the UN Security Council. Yes , New Zealand's foreign policy has invested the bank into a body that oversaw the election of Saudi Arabia to the Human Rights Council. If New Zealand has invested the same amount of time and resources into the Pacific Island's regional architecture just how much more secure would the future be for the coming generations?
My Final Thoughts
I recommend the book to anybody who wishes to learn more about the Pacific Islands region beyond the image of cyclones and holiday resorts. The reader can and should take advantage of each topic/chapter being available separately. Selecting chapters based personal interest or existing levels of knowledge will aid researchers and the general reader alike. What can be better then a free resource that offers that kind of flexibility?
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