New Zealand and the War against Isis Part 3

This article follows on from Part 2 in the series that covers New Zealand's role in the war against Isis. In this instalment I will look at the second alternative strategy that was open to New Zealand when joining the coalition's military efforts to combat Isis. The down and upsides of New Zealand joining in the defence of Jordan against tidal wave of Isis is covered below.

I will begin the article with the clear advantages offered by the “Jordanian option.” The first distinction that I believe is worth making is the fact Jordan is a internationally recognised state. Now the reader may be wondering why I would make such an obvious statement. From a diplomatic stand point the New Zealand government would have an easier time with the Jordanian option. Coming to the defence of a internationally recognised state fits comfortably within international law.

On the other hand arming and equipping the Kurds makes good military sense. In diplomatic/political terms Turkey and the Kurds are yet to reach an accord. In short Turkey and the Kurds are yet to realise that Isis is the real and common enemy. In part 3 I will cover this political migraine in greater depth.

The Jordanian Armed Forces has undergone the transformation from a conscript to All professional , well trained and motivated force. The Iraqi Army melted away at the first sight of the enemy. Instead of trying to revive a dead patient (the Iraqi Army) the NZDF would have become a junior coalition partner with one of the stronger military in the region.

Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.

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Logistics could well be the one reason why the Jordanian option wasn't ever open to the NZDF. When the NZDF deploys outside of the Pacific Islands region they plug into coalition partners logistical supply chain. If the logistical supply chain isn't available the means to keep air , naval and ground units resupplied isn't available.

The regular New Zealand Army remains a UN peacekeeping force at the time of writing. Barring any major policy shift in the coming Defence White Paper this policy will remain in place. Not having high intensity combat capabilities would rule the regular army out from front line duties in Jordan , Syria and Iraq. The NZ SAS would bear the combat load like they did in their first couple of stints ( 2001 and 2005) in Afghanistan.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force lacks air strike or combat wing capability (last seen with the Skyhawkes.) The SAS would be reliant on the Jordanian Air Force for air cover. I for one am opposed to the NZDF deploying anywhere overseas without native air cover.

The final obstacle is the lack of previous ties between the NZDF and the Jordanian armed forces. Interoperability between the NZDF and other nations defence forces is depended on policy decisions made by the New Zealand government. New Zealand devoting resources to winning a temporary seat on the UN Security Council was ill-advised. New Zealand would have been better served furthering diplomatic and military ties with a country like Jordan.

For having said of this I will still come back to Jordan in the last instalment of the series. Considerable diplomatic manoeuvring from the USA and the rest of the international community will be needed if a wider war in the Middle East region is to be avoided.