New Zealand's Strategic Isolation

When sanctions were lifted, there was a clear expectation on the part of Washington DC, Canberra and Wellington that Fiji would come in from the cold and relations would go back to how they were. A series of high level visits by Western powers in December 2014 revealed how out of step the West had become with Fiji. The billboards around Suva depicting the Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi during their respective visits were visual reminders that, during the sanction years, Fiji had built new strategic partnerships. What this means for military to military cooperation is that there is a whole new cadre of RFMF officers who received their staff course education in Russia, China, or India, for example, and have no ties to Australia and New Zealand; a point lamented by former senior RFMF officers. These officers have built their careers on these new relationships and this has changed both the culture and the trajectory of the military. As a consequence, Australia and New Zealand’s strategic relevance to Fiji has diminished.

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In principle at least this emphasis works for New Zealand. The promotion and strengthening of strong global rules has been a standard plank in Wellington’s external policy for many years. New Zealand is, after all, the good global citizen now sitting on the Security Council. And we should not be shocked if the language on global rules in New Zealand’s forthcoming Defence White Paper bears some resemblance to Australia’s. But nobody would expect a kiwi attempt to replicate the Turnbull government’s ambitious force structure proposals, let alone its eagerness to raise Australian defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP. Canberra knows this all too well. ‘We recognise that New Zealand will make its own judgements on its national interests’, the Australian White Paper reads, ‘and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may not always reflect Australia’s.’ 

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I have been wanting to write a article on New Zealand's strategic isolation for quite some time. Recent events have given me the opening to write up the grave dangers New Zealand's face as Asia and the rest of the globe enters restless waters. In covering these events I will tie them into how the land of the Long White Cloud is in danger of being left stranded high and dry.

This year saw the release of the latest Australian Defence White Paper. As I read through the White Paper what I view as the credibility gap in the New Zealand Defence Force's (hereafter the NZDF) combat capabilities. How successive governments have guttered the NZDF and turned it into a UN Peacekeeping/Police force has been well documented elsewhere. My intent is to highlight the consequences of this ill-advised policy.


My view is successive governments have left New Zealand in a extremely vulnerable to the prevailing winds in Asia and the South Pacific. In the first instance the NZDF is really becoming confined to low intensity operations in the South Pacific and even that could become open to question. In the second instance the NZDF would be almost powerless to act in the event of a medium to high intensity conflict breaking out in Asia. Put another way New Zealand would be at the mercy of events.

As if any further problems were needed the NZDF has very few options to put on the table when playing a role in a coalition. I believe this has been reflected in how the NZDF isn't in a position to supply naval or air combat units to the coalition whose aim is to roll back Isis . Supplying ground troops as instructors to the Iraqi Army was the only route open for New Zealand to join the war against Isis.


I now want to turn my attention to the recent spectre of Fiji purchasing arms from Russia. I will come back to how this unfortunate event occurred shortly. Russia could be said to be mischief making in the South Pacific. If one accepts the shipment of arms is as much intended for internal security as overseas peacekeeping the nature of the Frank Bainimarama regime must come under the spot light.

Bainimarama could well prove to be the Robert Mugabe of the South Pacific. How did a would be head of a coconut republic slip right under New Zealand noses? After the 2006 coup New Zealand was corned into following Australia's and the international communities lead in imposing sanctions on the Bainimarama regime.

Space doesn't permit me to go into how and why sanctions are not a effective diplomatic tool. In brief if the reader wants to see how meaningless sanctions are they only need to look at Iran and North Korea. North Korea is currently sustaining a Nuclear Program even through they are under UN sanctions and Iran did so uninhibited for many years. Now that alone should tell the reader something.

All Australia and New Zealand accomplished by imposing sanctions was to push Fiji into the arms of Russia and China. The option of a stand alone military intervention by New Zealand wasn't available. To what extent the option wasn't on the table due to a lack of political will or the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities is perhaps open to debate.

Certainly I would argue the military intervention option would have been dicey at best in the event the Fijian Army decided to stand and fight on the beaches. The point I wish to make is that no future or current government can exercise military/diplomatic options that aren't available to them. Why does New Zealand find it self in such a dangerous position?


My argument is Kiwis live in a South Pacific bubble of their own creation. New Zealand is a factory for the world's best Rugby coaches. Beyond the Rugby field critical/strategic thinking is absent around the country. How the media/6PM news will give coverage to the All Blacks before world events is a symptom of the South Pacific bubble. I love New Zealand dearly and it pains me greatly to know that one day the bubble will burst.


Now I come to Kim Beazley. Before I go on any further I wish to make one point about Beazley. In the modern era the 2 Labor political figures I have most time for are Bob Hawke and Kim Beazley. Sure I have my share of ideological differences with Beazley. By the same token I respect how a serious intellect is coupled with his political views and in this regard Hawke and Beazley are alike.

I believe the astute observations Beazley offers concerning his time as Australia's ambassador to Washington in the above interview are also the kind of discussion that are missing in New Zealand outside of academic circles. The reader will be rightfully asking what does this have to with the topic? I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment.

I believe Beazley is both a strategic/critical thinker as well as being a key Australian Labor Party Figure. Beazley's time as Minster of Defence in the Hawke Government is worth a glance. None of what Beazley and his successors in the Defence portfolio achieved could have been done without critical/strategic thinking.

Around the time Beazley served in the hot seat , Australia's Defence outlook moved towards defending the Northern Air- Sea Gap. Notable the Anzac Class Frigates , Collins Class Submarines and F-18 fighter jets were all acquired or at least committed to during the time of the Hawke Government. The acquisitions would replace ageing military platforms (e.g Oberon class submarines) and contribute to the strategic outlook of the time.

While Beazley was Minster of Defence , New Zealand was at the beginning of the many self inflicted wounds ( The first being New Zealand's anti American Nuclear Ban) that in due time would lead me to write this very article. The kind of clear thinking Beazley offers the listener about American culture ,government and general foreign policy aims was missing in the fourth Labour government and never came back. The  fourth Labour government was lead by Prime Minster David Lange (1942 - 2005) and his successors.



My argument is as follows. Public debate and discussion around Australia's current strategic outlook and future defence projects (e.g Collins Class Submarine replacement) is sound and to be encouraged. By the same vain the decisions made in the Hawke era should also be debated. In particular the axing of the Naval Air Arm by not replacing the Aircraft Carrier HMAS Melbourne deserves attention.

By relying on ground based air power Australian defence planners are taking a calculated strategic risk. Such a calculated risk relies on a firm strategic outlook and the required military hardware and infrastructure: in this case the likes of F-18's and airbases in Northern Australia. I will leave why I think the risk factor involved with land based air power is greater than made out to be for another time.



In the case of New Zealand, the complete absence of any kind of coherent strategic direction towards the Asia Pacific and the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities makes such discussions nearly impossible. In other words without a sound defence and diplomatic strategies New Zealand is inviting a unstable Asia Pacific region (think a unstable East Timor) and aggression by a foreign power (read the Chinese.) In my opinion this is a far cry from risk management. Australia's use of land based Air Power is one instance of  risk management in defence planning as opposed to a outright reckless policy vacuum.

Ultimately the blame for New Zealand's strategic isolation must fall with voters. Stay with me while I make a topical detour. A survey of the priorities of voters at the last General Election didn't reveal any surprises. Domestic issues like the economy and education got top billings. In political terms John Key and National understood what was on the minds of voters the best and the final election result was a reflection of this fact.

Issues like I have addressed in this article will never get a look in with the majority of the voting public because short -sightedness is a Kiwi trait along with Rugby being the unofficial national religion. One of the reasons I started The Lens of History Blog and Podcast was to bring a issue like New Zealand's strategic isolation to the attention of the general public. In writing this article I hope to have taken a step forward towards accomplishing my goal.

Ultimately the voting public will have set up a cycle in which they are responsible for not holding successive governments to account for their fool hardiness. The end result of the fool hardiness will come back to haunt New Zealand. The only question in my mind is to what degree or scale does our strategic isolation come back to bite us?