As ships cannot remain on station indefinitely, a small navy cannot sustain long-term operations with sufficient numbers on the frontline. Many naval operations last months or even years and require a sustained rotation of vessels. An approximate rule of thumb says 1 ship on station requires 3 vessels; one on the frontline, one in transit and one in refit or undergoing training. Supposedly less maintenance-intensive new platforms and creative approaches to crew rotation may mitigate this slightly but not enough.
Full Article
Fundamentally I believe Peter Sandeman and The Lens of History's friends at Save The Royal Navy Campaign have written the kind of article that will be of historical importance. I would argue the historical importance comes from in light of how Russia is on a war footing. In Asia the People's Liberation Army Navy will exceeded the United States Navy in size by 2020. In the lead up to 2020 and beyond tensions around China's territorial ambitions, which are to numerous to document here will be on going.
I am going to orientate my commentary towards the Royal New Zealand (RNZN) and Royal Australian Navies (RAN). On this basis I may detour slightly from the points made in the original article. In a break from normal departure I will adapt the main points from the source article under subheadings.
The argument I would make is the ability of the RNZN to operate in medium to high intensity environments out to 2030 will be a large determining factor in New Zealand's security and future. Geography dictates how sea based commerce destine for the South Pacific and New Zealand must pass through Asia.
Capabilities / Sword Point of adversaries
Chinese Anti - Access/Area Denial (hereafter A2/D2) capabilities must be at forefront of Australian and New Zealand naval planners thinking. The Sword Point of Chinese technology and A2/D2
doctrine is anti shipping missiles. Sea Mines are also a key force multiplier in the Chinese arsenal. A more detailed look at Chinese A2/D2 capabilities and how they can be counted is for another day.
Only one vessel can be in one place at one time
I will now turn my attention to the RAN. No direct replacement exists for the Adelaide Class Frigates. 3 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) will enter service around 2017 – 2020. The AWD do represent a huge leap forward in operational capabilities and technology. However 3 vessels cannot take the place of what was originally half a dozen Adelaide Class Frigates.
On the basis of two vessels being in port for maintenance only one AWD will be at sea or available for operational duties. The reader may want to consider for instance how a single AWD can't be on convoy duty and be apart of a amphibious task force at the same time. From the Kiwi stand point the Air/Missile Defence role is a specialty capability the RNZN doesn't and won't posses in the foreseeable future.
Murphy's Law can happen / Forces in reserve
I would venture the RNZN has a shortage of frigates/ vessels that can operate in medium to high level warfare environments. So I think it could be said that Murphy's Law isn't even required for New Zealand naval planners to be caught off guard. If a unexpected event in Asia was to occur there is a very good chance the RNZN would be in no position to respond.
Explaining the necessity to keep naval forces in reserve would demean the reader and mean I would have to cover the same ocean I just did in the above paragraph. Instead I will make the following argument: the structure of the RNZN is more geared towards the role of a Coast Guard than deterring a foreign power from undertaking military aggression and for combat purposes. The RNZN has a critical shortage of frigates and Sealift/amphibious vessels.
For a moment I will place the focus on HMNZS Canterbury . The RNZN entire Sealift and amphibious capacity/capabilities rest with a single vessel. In the event HMNZS Canterbury is lost in combat or laid up in dry dock a vacancy sign will hang on-board the navy's Sealift and amphibious capabilities.
One of the fundamental issues the RNZN faces is a shortage of combat power. Out of the entire surface fleet only the HMNZS Te Mana and HMNZS Te Kaha the navy's 2 Anzac Class frigates are capable of operating in hostile seas. At the time of writing HMNZS Te Mana is undergoing a planned upgrade making her unavailable for operational service for a considerable amount of time. The absence of a 4 frigate navy is inexcusable and I will come back to this point later on in the article.
The reader may be wondering how a small force like the peacetime RNZN could be large enough to have vessels in reserve? I would regard this as a text book military question. I believe one answer lies in having multi role vessels instead of dedicated Off Shore Patrol Vessels (hereafter OPV). Multi role vessels could perform Mine Clearance and Anti Submarine Warfare and act as sort back stop that could be called upon in a emergency.
At present the RNZN's OPV's and HMNZS Canterbury are only suitable for operating in low level environments like peacekeeping , fishery patrols and disaster relief. The essential issue in my mind is the requirement for vessels to be able to switch from low level to high intensity environments. By not having this underlying requirement successive New Zealand governments and naval planners have made yet another epic bungle.
Planning for Combat Losses
I will now come back to the RAN. The decision to only opt for only 3 AWD's indicates there is no consideration given to the effects of loses in a future war. In all but the kinds of low level environments mentioned above losses from enemy action are inevitable. Such inevitability was shown in the Battle of the Atlantic and later on in The Falklands War.
The Australian government will have the opportunity to avoid making the same mistake when a decision is made on the number of replacements for the 8 Anzac Class Frigates currently in service with the RAN. 8-10 vessels would be the optimal number to ensure there isn't another short fall in vessels and would allow the RAN to sustain modest losses to enemy action.
Maintaining a Deterrence/ Presence
The value of the RNZN being able to dispatch and maintain a frigate on station was demonstrated in recent history. In 1973 HMNZS Otago was dispatched to act as a presence/protest against French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific. HMNZS Canterbury (a Lender Class Frigate) also performed the same duty. In effect the Labour Government of the day was willing to give the French the proverbial middle finger and rightfully so.
Current and future governments would only be able to mount such a presence/protest subject to the availability of HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha. Sending a OPV to perform the same role would only see New Zealand laughed at on the International Stage. I would suggest to the reader the RNZN undertaking a Freedom of Navigation Patrol in the South China Sea would be the current day equivalent of protesting French Nuclear Testing.
Incidentally I believe the perfect example of not having a presence and or suitable vessel available is the RNZN's absence from Exercise Bersama Shield . Put another way Exercise Bersama Shield and other like it can demonstrate the effects of the RNZN not maintaining the bottom line of having four frigates in service at one time. If the scenario of China invading Malaysia/South East Asia happens for real surely sending a single Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion is as good as leaving the country at the mercy of events?
As a final thought , I would point out that the fact Chinese military planners will be fully aware of the issues covered in this article. To what degree the RNZN partnered with the RAN is failing to provide a sufficient deterrent to future Chinese aggression is a subject and debate by itself. However I would note the RN is facing the same kind of question over its head. Russian military planners like their Chinese counterparts will be just as aware of the their potential adversary’s (the Royal Navy) shortfalls. The only question can be just how severe will the consequences turn out to be for a country like New Zealand?
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