Should Australia build its own naval warships?

 Recommendations

 1. An expansion of Australian military power will help support the forces of the US and its other allies at a crucial time, as American pre-eminence comes under serious challenge. However, locking into a naval shipbuilding program in perpetuity is betting heavily on surface vessels, which are increasingly vulnerable to new technologies.

 2. Given the very high costs and strategic importance of the RAN’s surface fleet, any plan to establish a continuous naval shipbuilding program should be accompanied by a comprehensive analysis of the costs, benefits and risks of the program compared to alternative procurement options.

 3. The sale of ASC is inextricably linked to a number of elements of the broader naval shipbuilding industry landscape, including the future submarines and frigates and the ongoing maintenance of the Collins-class submarines. Any credible enterprise-level naval shipbuilding plan will need to include a sequenced road map showing how the various elements will be brought into harmony.

 4. If a monopoly rolling production program is established, the government needs to explain how it will monitor performance and ensure value for money through incentives and sanctions. One option would be to establish a Naval Shipbuilding Office to oversee the performance of Defence and the monopoly supplier.

 5. Rather than commit to a rolling-build program today, the government could initiate an Anzac replacement program with a production run on a schedule consistent with transitioning to a continuous-build program later, with any further work contingent on achieving value-for-money levels of productivity.

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The structure of this article is my reply to the five recommendations listed above. I will also address the need to modernise the Australian shipbuilding industry. Note to the reader: The report only covers the replacement for the Anzac Class Frigates and not the Collins Class submarine successor.

1. In a future war Australian shipyards will be called upon to meet the wartime demand for frigates and other surface vessels. In short this require the expansion of the RAN's surface fleet to meet wartime demands and replacing ships lost in combat. Having Australian shipyards and other industrial plants tooled for rolling production is a prerequisite for wartime mass production.

If the reader would like me to further explore the topic of wartime mass production , then feel free to drop me a line or leave a comment below.

2. Why is any cost , benefit and risk analysis being done on the current work force and as the shipyards and other industrial plants are tooled? Wouldn't the analysis be worthless if the shipyards and other manufacturing plants are retooled for 3D printing?

3. The sale of the ASC is one of the pivotal policy decisions concerning the Australian Defence industry that has been made in recent years. I would go as far to say as the buyer could make or break the future of Australian shipbuilding.

The reader may want to consider how the fate of the New Zealand rail network during the years it was owned by Tranz Rail. Tranz Rail guttered New Zealand's rail network with a lack of maintenance and investment in equipment. Tranz Rail only real goal was asset stripping. I believe what happened to the railways in New Zealand under Tranz Rail's watch is a cautionary tale. Government's must take care when they privatise strategic assets like shipyards and railways.

What kind of criteria should the Australian government set for the sale of the ASC? What measuring sticks should be used when measuring the success a firm has previously had in delivering vessels on time and on budget?

4. I am not opposed to the creation of the Naval Ship Building Office. I do think that the future owners of the ASC should receive payment bonuses for vessels that are delivered on or under time. By the same token the firm should lose money on a vessel that has been delayed longer then a specified amount of time.

5. A very sensible idea. How does the RAN's surface fleet expand if the initial order of vessels suffers from gross cost over runs? A contingency plan that ensures the additional vessels are available from off shore sources is required.

I do think that the production of vessels should take place in two phrases. Phrase one would entail the trialling of competing designs. After the winning design has been chosen prototype vessels can be constructed for further testing. Ironing out any wrinkles with new production methods and a retrained work force could also take place without adversely effecting the phrase two production schedule.

Phrase two as I have indicated would be the production phrase. The focus would be on delivering vessels in a speedy manner to the RAN and maybe even export markets.

Modernisation of the Australian Shipbuilding Industry

I believe that the advent of 3D printing as rendered current manufacturing tooling obsolete. The reader may want to consider how the Chinese are using 3D printing in the construction of high rise buildings If 3D printing can be used to fabricate high rise buildings , why cant it be used in shipbuilding? 

So the matter becomes how and who pays for the modernisation of the shipbuilding industry. Who will pay for the Research and development into 3D printing? Who will pay for retooling the shipyards? How will the smaller firms who support the shipbuilding make the transition to the new era of 3D printing? I would advocate that these questions be resolved before the ASC is privatised.

Australia could potentially have a world leading and cutting edge shipbuilding industry. For the enormous amount of potential to be unlocked the Australian government will need to make careful and considered policy decisions. Australian firms will have to embrace pushing technological boundaries into uncharted frontiers.

Russian Warships and the G20

What to do if you are the leader of a former superpower about to travel to a small-ish country whose leader has promised to shirtfront you? The answer seems to be to flex a little muscle.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is in Beijing today for the APEC meeting ahead of this week's G20 Summit in Brisbane. Also in the neighbourhood this week, an unusual sight: several elements of the Russian Navy.

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Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) executive director Peter Jennings says Russia’s actions, while not unprecedented in terms of military behaviour, are unusual because “we haven’t seen activity like this around Australia before”.

Jennings says there are two main reasons why Russian vessels would be approaching Australia.

1. As a show of force – which is very much the Russian approach.
2. Intelligence gathering operations – They’ll do their best to sit off the coast in international waters and pick up any signals or data coming out of the G20.

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Article

A government source said the Australian warship HMAS Parramatta is conducting “exercises” with the Russian cruiser Varyag, as the powerful Russian warship steams towards Brisbane.

A second frigate, HMAS Stuart, remains in a holding pattern off Moreton Bay where she will be joined by the replenishment ship HMAS Sirius for refuelling.

the government also asked the Navy about the possibility of a Collins Class submarine joining the mission but was told that the nearest boat was in Perth and would not be able to reach the area until well after the G20 summit was over.

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In this entry I will look at the mission of Russian naval vessels who visited international waters to the North of Australia coinciding with the 2014 G20 summit in Brisbane. My focus on replenishment at sea role in the field of naval logistics offers the reader an angle they won't have found in the main stream media reporting of the topic.


Concerning Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) executive director Peter Jenning's analysis I believe his point about the Russians making a show of force is correct and as such doesn't require further examination in this entry.


The Russian Navy deployed four confirmed ships the the guided missile cruiser Varyag, an ocean going tug , destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov and a replensment tanker probaly a Boris Chilikin class ship. Note to the reader it is probale that the Russian submarine was also present but this hasn't been confirmed. I wasn't able to find the details for the tanker so I have made an educated guess based on my research.


Peter Jennings second contention is more open to debate. I would suggest that the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation would have had both human, electronic and other assets in place at the G-20 to monitor world leaders conservations away from official meetings.
If the Russian's goal was intelligence gathering around the G-20 why didn't they deploy a Vishnya Class intelligence ship?


The intelligence gathering aims of the deployed warships would have been limited by how the destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov and guided missile cruiser Varyag are combat warships as opposed to specialist intelligence gathering ships.


What can be said to gone unnoticed by the main stream media and the reports from analyst's is the importance of Replenishment at Sea and how the reach and amount of time the Russian Pacific Fleet can spend at sea is greatly extended. The Royal Australian Navy response to the presence of the Russian vessels was partial enabled by their capability to support and replenish HMAS Stuart at sea.


Seen in a naval light I would say that replenishment ships like HMAS Sirius are not seen as being “sexy” like the Anzac Class frigates and other front line warships, which sees their importance go largely unnoticed in spite of the important role they have in the world's navies.


For the reader who is not familiar with replenishment ships they can be considered a floating petrol stations and general stores. Put another way consider the handicaps you would face if you could only fill your car's petrol tank from home , the distance you could travel would be half the maxim distance that your fuel supply allowed you to go.


The mission of the Russian naval vessels this article covers undoubtedly was a show of force because of the nature of the vessels that were confirmed to have been present would have had fairly limited intelligence gathering capabilities compared to a dedicated intelligence gathering platform like the Vishnya Class intelligence ships .

The Russian's are actively undertaking military modernisation , to what degree the Russian Navy upgrades its at replenishment at sea capabilities is well worth being under The Lens of History.