The Cuban Missile Crisis by Phil Carradice (2018) (ISBN: 9781526708069) is a factual road map of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Personnel recollections add the human dimension to the outlay of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Military history students will find the book a useful guide to the events which took humanity to the brink of nuclear Armageddon.
One of the lessons I have learned from reading military history is how perspectives differ from those who witnessed historical first hand and those who read about them in history books. In short, this is why I appreciate the input of the author's personnel recollections. From Carradice's recollections, I was interested in how the crisis become sole topic of conversation among Primary School students. Decades later the events of 9-11 would dominate conversations among my fellow high school students and teachers. In 1898, Cuba was granted 'independence' from Spanish colonial rule. Coming on the heels of the Spanish American War, the 1899 Platt Amendment, cemented future American Cuban commercial interests, and the ongoing lease Guantanamo Bay naval base. Come 1959, Fidel Castro's Communist guerrilla's overthrew the corrupt, pro- American dictator, Fulgencio Batista.
The alliance of Castro's Cuba and Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union was convened the long standing Monroe Doctrine . I feel that the Monroe Doctrine has been sufficiently documented elsewhere, so no further comment is required. If President Kennedy ignored the threats to National Security and U.S. Interests posed by Communist Cuba, his re-election chances would have declined dramatically.
Vast political idealogical differences aside, Kennedy and Khrushchev's stark contrasting backgrounds are worth touching upon. Before reading the book this reviewer was broadly aware of the Kennedy family's internal dynamics in propelling John F Kennedy (1917-1963) to the presidency.
In the affluent, “Ivory League” Kennedy family, JKF was the vehicle for his father's Joseph P. Kennedy's presidential ambitions. Sadly, JFK wore the shoes of his older brother, Joseph Kennedy Jr, who was killed while flying with the Army Air Force in WW2. JFK's charisma, film star good looks , family wealth, and influence played roles in his eventual ascension to the presidency.
Khrushchev (1894- 1971) was born in the tiny Russian village of Kalinovka. Poorly educated, growing up on a small land holding, Khrushchev would go on to survive Stalin's 1930's purges. In WW2, he was present at the Battle of Stalingrad, earning him a badge honour. By the time of the crisis he was First Secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet Union.
The author's observation on page 32 is astute: In hindsight, it is difficult to see what Khrushchev hoped to achieve by placing nuclear missiles on Cuba. He must have known the USA would react, but he firmly believed that Kennedy was weak.
Misleading first impressions was behind Khrushchev's incorrect assessment of Kennedy. Khrushchev formed his misjudgement of Kennedy at the Vienna Conference in 1961. Nor is it known conclusively today, if the cocktail of medications Kennedy was taking, or political naivete was responsible for his poor performance at the Vienna Conference. Interestingly, the unopposed construction of the Berlin Wall, did nothing to alter Khrushchev's assessment of Kennedy.
The division of Germany was at the centre of Khrushchev's geopolitical motives behind the decision to place Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. Berlin, centre stage of Cold War geopolitics, knew no geographical boundaries. I will come back to geopolitics lacking national borders in a moment.
Specifically, the removal of U.S troops from Berlin was Khrushchev's goal. In his grand ploy, Khrushchev was to announce; the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba, in front of the UN General Assembly. In exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Berlin, the Soviets would removal nuclear weapons from Weapons. This ploy, of course, relied on the element of surprise.
Upon receiving CIA, and military intelligence reports, the JFK administration refused to believe, Soviet nuclear weapons (hereafter nuclear weapons) presence on Cuba. Satellite observation over Cuba was also utilised. The resumption of Lockheed U2 flights , suspended since the downing of Gary Powers, provided the CIA with reconnaissance photos of suspected nuclear weapons sites.
On Sunday, 14 October, 1963, CIA photos experts concluded, R12 and R14 Ballistics missile sites were under development in Cuba. Additional evidence supporting their conclusion was provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Russian double agent working for MI6 and CIA. Penkovsky was suspected of being a triple agent by spying for Russia.
One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the author's look at Executive Committee of the National Security Committee (EXCOMM). EXCOMM consisted of nine members of the national security council and five co-opted members. Interestingly, Adlai Stevenson, the Democrat presidential candidate who twice lost to President Eisenhower, and later U.S. Ambassador to the UN, sometimes attended EXCOMM meetings.
To resolve the crises, The Joint Chief of Staffs were in favour of military options. Immediate air strikes on the nuclear weapons sites, or following on air strikes, the invasion of Cuba were options open to Kennedy. Stand alone air strikes weren't guaranteed to completely destroy the nuclear weapons sites. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, was the leading advocate for the invasion of Cuba.
Taking the crisis through diplomatic channels or to the UN General Assembly as a way of pressuring Khrushchev into removing nuclear weapons from Cuba was not seen as a viable option. Under international law blockading nations states constitutes an act of war, so the option of blockading Cuba wasn't straight forward.
Unbeknown to EXCOMM, the presence of R-12 missiles on Cuba, would have inflicted further causalities on invading American forces. Yet Kennedy's choices was between blockading or invading Cuba. However, a quarantine of Cuba in International Waters wouldn't violate international law or consistent of an act of war. Kennedy, after careful and deliberate considerations, opted to quarantine Cuba.
The quarantine was designed to pressure Khrushchev into removing nuclear weapons from Cuba. By design the quarantine was designed to stop the flow of arms into Cuba. This was demonstrated early on by the following incident: The carrier USS Essex and the destroyer USS Gearing tried unsuccessfully to intercept the tanker Bucharest . The Bucharest was permitted to proceed, for her cargo didn't consist of arms.
Military, the USAF was also at the heart of the crisis. B-52's armed with nuclear weapons, were posted in range of the Soviet Union. The deployment of the B-52's was to show the Soviets the seriousness of U.S. Intent, and not necessary undertake offensive action. Yet when I reading the book, this deployment was neither disturbing or remarkable, during the time of heightened international tensions.
However, I was troubled by the author's account of Soviet Foxtrot- Class Submarine B-59. Under the command of Valentin Savitsky, B-59 was about 100 miles south of Bermuda on the northern edge of the (quarantine) exclusion zone. The Pentagon warned that any Soviet submarine located by hunting [USN Anti Submarine Warfare] groups would be called to surface, and face practice depth chargers. Tactically, the aim was to force Soviet submarines to the surface and interrogate the crews.
The USN's Anti Submarine Warfare “cat and mouse” efforts forced the B-59 to surface. Low batteries, the build up of CO2 levels and 120 degree heat, ensuring she was in a bad way. Savitsky knew nothing about the crisis, having not been in contact with Moscow, for he knew WW3 was underway. The B-59 carried conventional and nuclear torpedoes, nor was the presence of nuclear torpedoes known to the Americans.
In the event of Soviet Navy submarines were at risk of damage from enemy action, the employment of nuclear torpedoes was authorised. However, the employment of nuclear torpedoes (hereafter torpedoes) required the authorisation of three officers. Savitsky discussed following his standing orders with Political Officer Ivan Semonovich and Vasily Arkhipov. Semonovich and Semonovich, supporting the use of torpedoes, leaving the fate of humanity, in the hands of Arkhipov, who vetoed the idea.
Admittedly, this reviewer views the incident with the benefit of historical hindsight. Still, a few brief observations are worthwhile. Undoubtedly, Arkhipov brave stance saved humanity from nuclear Armageddon. Authoritarian by nature, the Soviet Union, wasn't known for producing independent thinkers or individuals with moral courage. Yet Arkhipov display of moral courage is the model for how military and civilian leaders should act in an crisis.
Now I shall touch upon the resolution of the crisis. On Friday, 26 October the State Department received two letters from Khrushchev. The first letter offered to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for the U.S. pledging not to invade Cuba. However, the second strange message was long, strange and emotional.
But as the author notes, the second letter was coherent and was written by Khrushchev himself. At the end of second letter, Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter Missiles (hereafter missiles) from Turkey. Khrushchev gambit was over, but he looking for a way out of the crisis of his own making.
Turkey was strongly opposed the removal of the missiles, for they represented national prestige. The real fear of Soviet Invasion was another reason why Turkey opposed the removal of the missiles. Notable the obsolescence of the missiles left the option of their secret withdrawal open to Khrushchev and Kennedy. On Sunday, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for the secret withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.
This reviewer wishes to focus on the author's characterisation of Khrushchev legacy: Khrushchev must have known the consequences when he pulled the missiles out of Cuba. He had come to prominence during the Stalinist era, a time when political failure meant immediate and harsh consequences. Yet knowing how his actions would be interpreted he went ahead, not for the good of Nikita Khrushchev, but for the good of mankind.
This reviewers desires to see greater levels of discussion and debate surrounding Khrushchev's motives in starting and ending the crisis. Was Khrushchev the ruthless pragmatist, who was behind the start and of the crisis, or did circumstances and not design dictate his actions? Alternately, was he genuinely motivated by the perceived foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union, of course, this was the removal of U.S. Troops from Berlin? Did he end the crisis out of sparing humanitarian nuclear holocaust? All these questions warrant further examination, and the author deservers credit, for placing the opportunity to debate Khrushchev's motives and character in the public domain.
For students of Cold War history, the book comprehensively maps out the crisis. As noted above, thought provoking questions arise, and the legacy of the book may well lie in the debate and discussion around those questions. There is no finer legacy for any author then to have their works further people's understanding of historical events by generating debate and discussion around their chosen subject matter.
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