A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part 2

Full report

Welcome to part 2 of my article entitled A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part1 allowed me to provide the reader with a overview of the source material from which I made select commentary. My commentary was aimed at energy security from a Japanese perceptive. I also touched upon other topics including fossil fuels and the rise of Liquefied natural gas (hereafter LNG).

In part 2 I will turn my attention to Deep Sea Mining (hereafter DSM) . I am going to take the liberty of shifting much of my focus away from Asia to the South Pacific. When I do turn my attention to Asia how DSM will effect the dynamics of the region will be my focus. My thanks go to Anna Powles for pointing me the right direction when I was researching DSM.


Note to the reader I had originally planned to cover Timor – Leste and alternative energy sources in this article. For space considerations I will cover those topics in the next 1 or 2 instalments of the A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood series. I ask the reader to forgive me for not breaking down the South Pacific into more accurate geographical regions. As DSM will take place in all the regions I have chosen to take a broader perspective.

If the reader isn't very familiar with DSM I would invite them to check out the following resources on minerals found on the sea bottom: Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts ; Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides and Manganese Nodules.


Generally speaking the South Pacific will be vulnerable to legal and illegal DSM practices. Australia and New Zealand's neglect of our collective backyard will become more stark. Space doesn't permit me to go into more details concerning the neglect. , My thoughts on the entrance of China and other non traditional state actors into the South Pacific can be found in a earlier article .

A look at how DSM operates is in order. Starting from the sea floor the extraction of minerals is as follows: disaggregating mineralised material ; transporting the material to the surface and dewatering the material. The effect of the filtered sea water return to the ocean will extend beyond the mining site. Transportation via ship to a processing plant or market place is the end point.

Environmental management plans/regulations will serve as any nations framework for dealing with DSM. 2 factors are now worth a mention. A good regulatory frame work will or does balance out commercial and environmental issues. A lack of enforcement of regulations has numerous effects from environmental pollution to undermining a nations sovereignty.

Tying into these considerations is revenues from mining taxes and royalties. Corruption , illegal mining and a poor tax regime can play roles in the ups and downs of nations gaining the economic benefits from any kind of mining.


The merits of mining in tourism areas has been debated in New Zealand. If Open pit mine would be a eye to foreign tourists in New Zealand the same will apply to Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. The energy security and economic independence offered by DSM may act like a lure. If the lure is to great , Rarotonga's reputation as pristine tourist destination may well be ruined. Since this is a no brainier I will now shift my focus northward.


Asia provides different dynamics to the South Pacific. In Asia the abundance of natural resources at the sea bottom looks set to harden China, the Philippines , Taiwan , Vietnam , Brunei and Malaysia's competing territoral claims in the South China Sea. Whereby in the South Pacific states will wrangle with matters such as environmental regulations , in Asia defining nation states borders is already the order of the day.

I believe any consideration towards the outcome of the South China Sea's dispute must factor in energy security. The sovereignty of the nations involved , the natural resources on offer and national pride are all on the line. DSM and other forms of mining look set be a test of national sovereignty in sometimes contrasting ways.


New Zealand will face the coming challenges directly and on a strategic level. In the direct sense preventing illegal DSM in territorial waters , forming sound environmental regulations and tax regimes are all obvious stand outs. I will come back to a local perspective in 1 tick.

The biggest unspoken risk is if New Zealand is caught completely off guard and unable to police our own territorial waters including Marine Reserves. If New Zealand's defence outlook wasn't so half baked the risk would have been largely migrated by sound defence policy.

I fear New Zealand in general is ill prepared to accept the reality of rising tensions in Asia. Ignoring the effects of DSM would be perfectly in line with people burying their heads in the sand. Kiwi's from the person on the street to Prime Minster John Key are living in fairy land , when it comes to a meaningful discussion around the emergence of China as a economic and military power.


I believe the abundance of natural resources made unlockable by DSM may influence the course of a future war in Asia. A case in point is the reserves of Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides (hereafter SMS) minerals in the Bismarck Sea. If the Reserves of SMS could turn Papua New Guinea into a mini Saudi Arabia China will have a reason to cast their eyes beyond the South China Sea.

If a wartime scenario in which the Bismarck Sea becomes a factor eventuates , events will overtake Australia and New Zealand. Military the Chinese would include controlling the Bismarck Sea as a objective along with blockading or invading the Indonesian mainland and Papua New Guinea. If the worst happens New Zealand's failure to come grips with energy security in the South Pacific will have had consequences beyond most people's wildest imaginations.


In part 1 I mentioned Geoeconomics being a factor in the global LNG Market. There is every reason to think China will use DSM as a means of exercising Geoeconomic levers. Chinese State Own Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) will legally or illegally establish DSM sites at the bequest of their government. I would urge the reader to factor in the MO of Chinese SOE's into their thinking around energy security.

In New Zealand SOE's are expected to run on a commercial basis. China uses SOE's for aims that in no way involve making a profit. 2 instances of how China uses SOE's is worth highlighting. The first is taking over a strategic asset in the Port of Darwin with the intent of weakening Australia's ties with the USA. In a less subtle move China has placed a Oil Rig in Vietnam's territorial waters . China's motives for the placement of the Oil Rig appears to be something along the lines of possession of real estate is nine tenths of the law.


Now for this next section I am going to assume New Zealand will be able to weather the DSM storm. What options are available to New Zealand and Australia to ensure our South Pacific neighbours can do the same? Clearly the ideas I present below will not form a complete answer. As per usual I do want to provide the reader with food for thought and matters for debate.

Is the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (here after PPB) and it's planned replacement a token gesture or a program that never overcame obstacles like so few days spend by vessels at sea? In a near empty tool box the PPB sits at the disposal of participating nations. More on these points below.

My argument is the PPB is one of the core capabilities which should be expanded to strengthen the participating nations maritime capabilities. Law enforcement and maritime surveillance are also examples of core capabilities. By building up the capabilities of smaller states to defend their sovereignty New Zealand can kill two birds with the same stone. Improved relations with our neighbours and a more stable backyard would be the benefits.

Turning the PPB into a ocean going program would be no small feat. Logistical support in the form of Replenishment and repair at sea would fall onto the RAN and RNZN. The number of patrol vessels in the PPB would be increased as to ensure one is always available to meet any unexpected contingencies. To summarise under my kind of plan the PPB would be modelled on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (hereafter RFA). If the reader would like me to expand upon my thoughts on a South Pacific RFA , feel free to leave a comment below.

The reader may be wondering how on earth Australia and New Zealand could ever fund the capital and operational costs of a South Pacific RFA? Reorientating foreign aid budgets away from ad hoc infrastructure projects in the region and towards the PPB wouldn't require any new additional spending. Japan has the financial muscle to pay for the new PPB bases and supporting infrastructure. The historical irony of Australia and New Zealand urging Japan to invest in defence related infrastructure in areas they tried to conquer in WW2 is not lost on me (think the Battle of the Bismarck Sea).

Effectively my expanded PPB/RFA would give the participating nations excellent maritime patrol capabilities. The new maritime patrol capability would act as the centre piece of efforts to build a sense of self reliance among South Pacific nations. By playing a role in providing greater levels of security and stability the conditions for a South Pacific renaissance will be in place. Successfully dealing with DSM and illegal fishing operations/management of Fisheries would be all positive by-products of the new age.  

In offering my thoughts on DSM's role in energy security in the Asia- Pacific I have only really scratched the surface. I will leave the reader with my final thoughts. If the New Zealand government and foreign policy establishment leave our engagement with the Asia – Pacific as the status quo there will be a heavy price to pay.

In terms of DSM at best the price will see our Pacific Islands cousins pillaged by legal or illegal means. At worst combined with strategic blindness New Zealand will stumble into a war. The war starts as a high intensity conflict in the South China and sea and soon engulfs Indonesia , Australia and New Zealand.

A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighborhood Part 1

link to full report


A good overview of energy security in Asia turned out to be well timed. The report was authored by Andrew Pickford of the Perth USAsia Centre. Incidentally I listen to the Perth USAsia Centre Podcast . I recommend the reader tune into the podcast if they are interested in the prevailing winds carrying us into the Asian Century. For some time the topic of energy security in Asia- Pacific has been fermenting in my mind. I will come back to my thoughts , below. As per usual quotes from the report or other external sources appear in italics.

On page 2 the author sets out a definition of energy security. For space considerations I will mostly leave this section to the reader. I do feel sticking with the idea of uninterrupted availability of appropriate forms of energy at affordable prices is very sensible. The general reader who watches the price of petrol at the pumps may empathises with the author's straight forward approach.


I appreciated reading the historical background to Oil's role as a commodity in 20th century history. As a kid I first read about the value of Java (now a part of present day Indonesia) as the key Oil producing area of the world. My reading was naturally related to WW2 history. Staying with the influence of my early reading : the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a oil exporting nation planted seeds in my mind.


The seeds had me wondering. How did the US go from a exporter of oil to a net importer? Why did Saudi Arabia emerge as a oil power house after and not before WW2? My intent isn't to answer these questions. The point I wish to make is how history books grabbed my attention. I hope the coming generations are captivated in the same manner I was and still am today by the ties between historical and current events. Enough of my of tangent.

My commentary will follow the structure of the report. I believe the author has done well in forecasting likely strategic shocks which could affect energy markets. Outside of foreign policy circles the reader may be wondering just what consists of a Strategic Shock?

In a essay entitled Strategic Shock: Managing the Strategic Gap by Colonel Peter Jarrell Lane United States Army; the following definition appears on Page 9 : If such scenarios are sufficiently plausible and sufficiently worrisome— posing a credible and serious threat to American security—then senior national security decision makers should devote time and resources to address them. —Andrew Krepinovitch1 Military Futuris

Now I turn to themes for the next 20 years. In my opinion the forecast concerning fossil fuels remaining the dominant source of energy is sound. For now I will stick with Liquefield natural gas ( hereafter LNG or natural gas). In today's Geoeconomics , Geopolitical and energy markets natural gas is the big mover. For reasons of space I will conserve LNG for part 2 of A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood.

Coal remains the energy source of choice in India. Will coal become obsolete as a energy source? I expect coal will become obsolete in a time period 50 – 70 years beyond the time frame covered by the author. I make this prediction on the basis of 2 factors. The amount of time India will take to evolve as a first world country is the first factor.

Alternative Energy is the wild card in future energy markets. If alternative energy matures as a technology before the time frame I mentioned above the apple cart will be over turned. If the apple cart is overturned not only India but the rest of the globe will experience a energy revolution. A alternative energy revolution is naturally the second factor. I will return to Alternative Energy sources in part 2 of this article.


Technological Innovation isn't confined to efforts to weaning energy sources off fossil fuels. The reader may have come across instances of Smart Grid technology without giving even thinking about it. I count myself in the category of coming across the use of Smart Grid tech at work and not blinking. My electricity provider plans to move towards a automated reader system. For the customer/power consumer the only noticeable change will be never seeing someone employed as a meter reader again.

Such instances of automation offer clear advantages (more accurate power bills) and come with the risk of technical faults. Under the banner of technical faults I would include IT failures and deliberate disruptions caused by hacking or other means.


I now return to Strategic Shocks. In this commentary I am going to combine Strategic Shocks and Structural/Economic Shocks. I hope Foreign Policy nerds will forgive this trespass in the name of maintaining a reader friendly style of writing.

Outside of Japan and Germany Nuclear Power is very radiant (Pun intended). In Asia China leads the charge of adopting Nuclear Power. Logic would suggest the charge will play a role in the next generation of Nuclear Power reactors going from a laboratory to power plants. Since by the nature of a dictatorial regime public opinion is a non factor , I will leave China for part 2 of this article.

The questions in my mind is the effects of Japan closing down Nuclear Power Plants. Will Japan be more susceptible to the perils of relying on imported Energy Sources? Will Deep Sea Mining make Japan more or less energy independent? These are only some of the questions which come to mind. My commentary now becomes Japan centric. Dealing with Saudi Arabia and Iran would have taken the topic away from New Zealand's extended backyard.

I believe Japan's history is worth revisiting for a moment. Below is my take on modern Japanese history from the stand point of energy security. Japan's history from Commodore Matthew Perry (1794 -1858) arrival to the present day has undergone several distinct periods. In the space available, I would say Perry trigged the law of unintended consequences on a grand scale. As historical events turned out the consequences wouldn't be felt in Perry's lifetime.

Following Perry came the Meiji Restoration period which included rapid industrialisation. The sudden burst of the industrial revolution brought about a thirst for natural resources. As the reader will be well aware Japan is a country completely devoid of natural resources. Historians regard the Russo – Japanese War as the turning point which marked Japan's late entrance in the race for empire.

By the time of The Great Depression, simultaneous occurrences were taking place which are relevant to my argument. A growing population was placing additional pressure on imported resources whether it be supplies of food , oil and coal to list just a few examples. The process of radicalisation a by product of the dire economic conditions was in full flight.

These factors would culminate in Japan' entry into WW2. How the Imperial Japanese Empire rose to great heights and fell between Pearl Harbour and the dropping of the Atomic bombs has been well documented elsewhere. For all the blood shed and rubble (formerly known as Japanese cities) the same fundamental problem remained unsolved. As a nation state Japan was still entirely depended upon external sources/imports of natural resources including those for energy security.


For obvious reasons the coming of the Atomic Age is best remembered for the Mushroom Clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I would argue the value of Nuclear Power to Post War Japan has gone widely under appreciated. Let me explain my reasoning. People outside of Japan may not understand the extent of just how far that country is devoid of natural resources. The Baby Boomer and later generations of Japanese are to young to remember the ruin WW2 brought to their country.

In the case of Japan Nuclear Power's is more than just a source of clean renewable electricity.
Indeed as a energy source which is not reliant on a continuous external fuel supply , Nuclear Power is very valuable! Consider for instance how Japan or for that matter New Zealand's source of petrol would cease if the supply of fuel oil was interrupted or ceased. I do not mean to suggest Nuclear Power has made giant leaps in Japan achieving energy independence. As the saying goes a small amount of progress is better than none.


I now come to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster (more commonly known as Fukushima ) and how it will effect the future of Nuclear Power. Can public opinion sustain a downturn in the use of or complete removal of Nuclear Power?

I believe the answer to this question must be taken over the long term. Before I offer the reader my answer to the above question I will make a detour. The detour will relate to my personal experiences during and after the Canterbury Earthquakes. My intention is avoid the reader thinking I am trampling over Japanese public opinion in a heartless manner. I ask the reader to bear with me for moment.

A strong range of emotions still come to mind when I ever think about the earth moving under my feet. The trauma from the string events leading up to and after February 22 2011 has long since subsided. My memoires of meeting people who were adversely effected are never far from my mind. What stood out for me is how trauma was a shared experience with countless other people.

I would also argue options or “luxuries” undertaken in the wake of the quakes wouldn't be available in Japan. The Zoning Decisions undertaken by the New Zealand government were one such luxury. Japan's topography and population density would have probably made the same kind of approach to post disaster recovery impractical if not impossible.


So my following conclusion/forecast is done with the utmost respect to the Japanese people. Phrasing out Nuclear Power isn't a luxury available to Japan. For any replacement of Nuclear Power would increase Japan's dependency on imported energy sources. I expect the Japanese government will eventually approve the use of next generation Nuclear Power technology.

Perhaps it could be said Japan's politicians aren't in a position to govern by opinion polls. Current New Zealand Prime Minster John Key has turned governing by opinion polls into a art form. Only time will tell us what ill side effects New Zealand will suffer from our politicians having the option of governing in such a poor fashion.

Jeremy Corbyn welcomes the next war

Jeremy Corbyn has called for Nato to be "closed down", it emerged today as defence chiefs warned his comments about the organisation are "weakening western civilisation”.

Lord Roberson, the former Labour defence secretary and Secretary General of Nato, said: "It beggars belief that the leader of the party most responsible for the collective security pact of Nato should be so reckless as to undermine it by refusing to say he would come to the aid of an ally.

"Even in its darkest, daftest days in the past the Labour Party stuck to its commitment to Nato and to the defence of any ally attacked.

Full article 

Article 

Why am I doubling down on Jeremy Corbyn and have yet to so on Donald Trump? Trying to avoid any sense of political favouritism is why I will start this article by answering such a question. For a while I have been considering what Donald Trump's foreign policy would resemble in practice. I don't yet have a treatment for Charles Lindbergh , err Donald Trump and the America First Movement MK2. My treatment program for Trump will have to wait for another time.


Now I will come back to Corbyn's comments concerning NATO. How can I best sum up my immediate reaction/thoughts to what Corbyn had to say ? In polite terms, unkind would be a apt description. Before writing this article I took upon some time for reflection. I wasn't very successful in the sense of finding constructive way of expanding upon my below thoughts.

The only conclusion I can draw is Corbyn's comments are recklessly irresponsible on a grand scale! Inviting the next European War is the only realistic consequence of Corbyn and his supporters mindset. Like other reasonably minded people I view such recklessness in a broader international context.

Vladimir Putin and his military advisors must be gleeful at a would be UK Prime Minster advocating for the dissolution of NATO. I would say Corbyn actions have reinforced my forecast for a coming European War. I will come back to my forecast in a moment. Beyond the invasion of the Ukraine going unchecked , Corbyn is providing the greatest incentive for the Russians to commit future military aggression against Western Europe and the UK.


As to why Russia is on a war footing the reader can find my reasoning in past articles. I covered the historical/present day motivations behind Putin's aims in a previous article . Is history doomed to repeat in the wake of unlearned historical lessons? What should more moderate and responsible Labor MP's do to repute Corbyn's foolishness?

New Zealand Defence White Wash 2016

But ‘Asia’ isn’t a single actor wielding power. It’s a grouping of many states with conflicting strategic objectives. ‘Power’ isn’t a measure of size but rather a state’s willingness to use it. The White Paper points to the enduring nature of terrorism, resource competition, WMD proliferation and information technology as features shaping New Zealand’s strategic outlook. It’s an odd list, producing policy gems like ‘the adoption of technology has a number of advantages in the military context’, but missing other factors such as the rise of Asian nationalism, climate change and any serious discussion of military technology trends.

ASPI Article  

This blog entry was delayed by a combination circumstances including yours truly moving house. I have been wanting to address the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2016 (hereafter White Paper) since it's release 2 months ago. I feel Peter Jennings offers the best analysis of the White Paper's failings. My intention is to summarise my thoughts on why the White Paper is a white wash.

In previous articles I have covered deficiencies in the NZDF concerning a lack of high end combat capabilities. For this reason I have chosen to cover other matters in this article. The same goes for for more specific topics like roles of Air and Sea Power in New Zealand's security. My intention as per usual is to to offer the reader a fresh perceptive they won't find anywhere else. If the reader would like me to expand upon any of the issues I have raised , please feel free to leave a comment below.


From my standpoint: New Zealand lacking a coherent defence strategy is what shines through the contents of the White Paper. For a moment I will follow this line of thinking. What reasons/symptoms of the aforementioned lack of strategy? Space doesn't permit me to provide a detailed and complete answer. Some glaring symptoms can be examined in brief.

The refusal to acknowledge China's role in heightened tensions around territorial disputes in Asia is glaring. To what extent denial is behind the blinkers worn by the New Zealand Government as opposed to a lack of strategic thinking is worthy of debate. In writing this article I hope to spur on such a debate amongst the public and academic circles.

Staying with nation states, did anybody else notice how the contents of the White Paper defied New Zealand's geography? Let me explain my point: Any threat conventional military threat (read China) to New Zealand will come from Asia. Put another way interstate warfare is unlikely to originate from the Antarctic in the time frame covered by the White Paper.


I believe defending New Zealand in the event of a wartime emergency is a blind spot in current defence thinking. It is only fitting that I finish up with a symptom of such a dangerous blind spot. New Zealand's defence ties with countries like India , Japan and Indonesia either barley rate a mention or they don't at all. In fact Indonesia is omitted all together.

Who in their right mind would think neglecting defence ties with our security partners in Asia is a good idea? Has New Zealand placed a over reliance on the International Rules Order at the expense of diplomatic and military ties with the Asia – Pacific region? Certainly I would make the case , New Zealand has placed all it's cards in the falling house known as the International Rules Based Order.

The contents of the White Paper is a reflection how little public and political interest there is in New Zealand's defence and foreign policies. There can be no no doubt the lack of debate around the White Paper stems from disinterest. I can only foresee the level of interest increasing in the event of New Zealand facing a wartime emergency at which times all of our chickens will be coming home to roost.

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 2

Invest in forces housing and ‘value added’ benefits for service personnel

As public sector pay restraint appears to be here for good, the RN needs to find other ways to offer the best possible quality of life for its service personnel to aid recruitment and retention. Ensuring that new service housing is built or existing stock brought up to a consistently high standard should be a priority. At the same time this investment would provide work for a construction sector that may face challenges as the economy adjusts to Brexit. The MoD should be able to get the best possible prices for work which would need to be carried out at some point in the futures in any case.

Save The Royal Navy Campaign Article 

Welcome to Part 2 of my look at what issues would be faced in the event the Royal New Zealand Navy was expanded. In Part 1 I covered the potential pitfalls when acquiring new vessels. I have covered why the RNZN is to small in previous articles. For the reader who isn't familiar my reasoning can be found concerning the importance of Sea Power to New Zealand security. And why Warship numbers and capabilities are also vital to the RNZN.

In Part 2 I will turn to the issues of Recruitment and Retention of RNZAF personnel. Compared with part 1 the reader will find a more general approach to the topics at hand. I won't make the claim of covering every aspect of maintaining and in the event it happens expanding the RNZN. As per usual I welcome any feedback from the reader.


To what ratio current personal and new recruits would crew new vessels is depended on a number of factors. The type of vessel entering service and the proportion of current members of the RNZN required would be some of the factors involved. A more precise analysis won't be possible until the day comes when Kiwis wake up to how much they really needed the RNZN before a emergency broke out. The same goes for financial costings involved with what this very article covers.

I now come to the matter of Recruitment and Retention. Fundamentally I believe the Recruitment of new and retention of current personnel has been overlooked by the current RNZN and New Zealand Governments. I can not stress enough the importance of this matter to the RNZN whether or not expansion ever takes place or not.

Let me make a slight side diversion. When I read the article from The Lens of History's friends at the Save The Royal Navy Campaign, the way the issues crossed over with the RNZN stood out to me. I whole heartily endorse the view of John Dunbar raises. For the sake of remaining topical I will focus on Defence Force housing.

For the sake of the international reader I would like to point out house prices in Auckland hover around the 7 hundred thousand to the 1 million dollar mark.  Members of the RNZN based at the Devonport Naval Base are at the coal face of unaffordable housing in New Zealand. I find it hard to believe Auckland housing prices aren't having a negative effect on the RNZN ability to retain personnel.

I believe there is a mandate for for a renewed focus on Defence Force housing. The New Zealand Government and the NZDF drifting away from providing housing is very short sighted. Exposing members of the defence force to the forces of “market” rents and housing prices may well take the cake for short sighted-ness!


Recruitment is a area I feel is lacking in attention in debate and discussion. The RNZN like the RNZAF and the Army compete with the private sector for the best and brightest people. I believe a 2 fold approach should be taken to NZDF recruitment and promoting awareness/benefits of a military career.

The first measure would be to expand the Limited Service Volunteer Program. The expanded program would be in placed in Universities , Polytechs and other training providers. Students placed in the program would be introduced to military life and undergo a fitness program. At the end of the program students would be given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or the regular full time military.

1 or more charter schools modelled on the Australian Army Apprentice Scheme would form the 2nd measure. The schools would be open to individuals who are unemployed as well as secondary students. Under the charter school model school leavers would have the assurance of a secure military military in the years ahead of them.

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 1

There is an urgent need to resolve delays in the Type 26 Frigate building programme. Clearly, the MOD needs to ensure value for money – but increasing the flow of money into shipbuilding in the short term to support the economy is a real consideration. Bringing forward construction of Type 31 frigates in parallel with the Type 26 construction to enable a sustained increased level of shipbuilding would also be beneficial, and see an increase in surface escort numbers which can be sustained in the longer-term.

Save The Royal Navy Article

This article is angled towards a reader @GardinerWira who thought rightly Kiwis would want to know the cost of bringing the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) up to a adequate strength . I was delayed in writing this article by circumstances on my home front. On the positive side of things the article by John Dunbar proved to very timely and topical.

I am going to break the topic into 2 parts. Part 1 will covers some of the pitfalls the New Zealand Government and the RNZN would need to avoid. In Part 2 I will take a look at issues around crewing the new vessels and retaining personnel.

The reader will note how I am not offering precise figures/costings. A outlay of costings would have meet with difficulties due to the variables involved. Such variables include up front capital costs , ongoing operational costs , choice of vessels , cost overruns at the construction stage and so on. The reader can take the matters I raise and apply them to the RNZN of today even if they don't support my ideas.


Now I will turn attention to the pitfalls that can apply to buying naval vessels or even new acquisitions for the Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force. The New Zealand government's record in the area of defence acquisitions is lousy to say the least. Space doesn't permit me to go into detail around the debacle around Project Protector and Army LAV's . Suffice to say the public should question the competence of the current and future governments/defence bureaucracy to be entrusted with tax payer dollars and the future of the armed forces.

Clearly a return to basics involving acquiring the right kind of and volume of equipment is desperately needed. A suitable number of vessels that can meet operational requirements isn't a given. Nor is avoiding cost over runs at the construction/purchasing stage guaranteed. I am now going to turn the matter of avoiding cost over runs.

My intention isn't to pick on the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) I do want to highlight how a potentially good selection of design isn't the same as getting a vessels delivered on time and on budget. Essentially the Hobart Class AWD have been a classic case of mismanagement and a terrible Corporate/Business Corporate/Business model.

Casting a glance beyond Australia how the Royal Navy's Type 26 Frigate Program could said to be struck in the mud. Space and the need to stay topical means I won't go into the issues faced by the Type 26 Frigate Program. What I want to convey to the reader is how beyond Australia huge issues exist with Navies acquiring new vessels.

Essentially I would argue whether it be the replacement of the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates or undertaking a restructure of the navy the choice of ship builders shouldn't automatically follow on from the design choice. I believe old fashion saying of buyer beware applies to the situation.


The main pitfall that nobody is talking about is how New Zealand is solely reliant on Military Off the Shelf hardware. The failure to develop shipyards and strengthen the local defence industry over the last 2 decades is coming with a heavy price. A localised defence industry with a focus on Research and development would have place New Zealand well as global events take a trend for the worst.

The New Zealand Defence Force could have had access to lower cost high end military equipment that is interoperable with our allies/coalition partners. The same military equipment would have also found ready export markets around the world.

Questions hang around like the smell of seaweed drying out on a beach. For me at least one question is how the RNZN/Department of Defence could take a design like the Type 26 Frigate from the design table to operational service without any major hiccups?

Book Review: War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft

War by Other Means by Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris (Harvard University Press 2016) . War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft is a examination of Geoeconomics squarely aimed at Policy Makers and Academia. The primary focus of the book is China's use of Geoeconomics as a tool of State Craft.

Quotations from the book appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book.

The opening of the book is a look at the definition of Geoeconomics. The term of Geoeconomics is used extensively in US foreign policy circles. Scholars aren't in agreement concerning a precise definition of Geoeconomics. On page 20 the authors urge the following definition: The use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations' economic actions on a country's geopolitical goals.

The remainder of the chapter 1 is devoted to how there hasn't been a great deal of debate among scholarly circles around Geoeconomics. As far back as 1970 Susan Strange recognised in the studies of international economic relations were focused on politics and not economics.

Nation states as varied as China and Qatar have seen Geoeconomics take a resurgent path in international relations. I will come back to China a fair bit in this review. My take from current events/opening of the book is Russia's actions in the Ukraine is representative of the resurgence of Geoeconomics as a tool of foreign policy.

I feel the point or discussion around Geoeconomics not being a Zero Sum ( Winners and losers) game could have received more attention from the authors. Put another way the outcome of a Nation State use of Geoeconomics isn't always Black and White. The use of military action to achieve a objective can be said to be successful or failure.

The Iraq War is widely regarded has having been a gross miscalculation . Viewed from the standpoint of achieving the objective of turning Iraq into a democracy , the war was a failure. I believe a historical parallel to the Vietnam War. The political and public fall out from the Vietnam War is akin to what has occurred in the wake of the Iraq War. As the reader all of this sprung to mind. As such the fall out is for another discussion.


Historical examples of the successful use of Geoeconomics by the US have been forgotten. Chapter 6 is entitled US Foreign Policy And Geoeconomics in Historical Context. I will leave Chapter 6 and much of the other content to the reader. For the purpose of this review I will touch upon the role State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) have in Geoeconomics. SOE's can be used as a tool of State Craft in the Geoeconomics Chess Board.


Geoeconomics is distinct from foreign (or international) or economic policy, mercantilism and liberal economic thought.

Early on I was struck by how relevant this passage of the book is to New Zealand. In the manner of Academia the authors argue Geoeconomics is confused with a reinvented form of Mercantilism . Others mix up Geoeconomics with the liberal (Market orientated) economic school of thought. Adam Smith a noted liberal economic thinker understood the limits of economic logic: what was/is mutually beneficial in economic terms might not be so in political terms. According to Smith , “the wealth of a neighbouring country “ might be dangerous in war and politics. “


From page 37: The emergence of new generation of state capitalists- significantly larger , wealthier, more global, less democratic and more sophisticated than their predecessors – raises important questions for US Foreign Policy.


And from page 54: Twenty years ago state owned enterprises (SOE's) were little more than domestic employment vehicles. Ten years ago there was wide spread scepticism about whether these firms, saddled with bad debt debt and inexperienced leadership, could succeeded beyond home markets. Today they include some of the world's biggest companies , backed by some of the globes largest pools of capital and can claim over half the world's top ten IPO's over the last six years.


In the present day state backed firms account for 30% of foreign direct investment ( hereafter FDI) in emerging markets. SOE's remain grossly inefficient in comparison to their private sector counterparts. Efficiency and operating on a for profit basis is in no way the aim.


Now I can turn to the thread of SOE's. In April of 2011. President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff made Beijing her first overseas trip. Strengthening ties with Brazil was on the mind of Chinese President Hu Jintao and SOE airlines were his means of doing so. The stated owned Chinese airlines placed orders for 30 Brazilian Embraer planes plus options for option for 5 more with 3 airlines.


The above example is only mentioned briefly in the book. I feel the brief mention is never the less very illustrative of how the Chinese make use of Geoeconomics in foreign policy circles.  Could the Kiwi reader ever imagen their government exercising the same Geoeconomics lever via Air New Zealand?!


For the second thread I will move away from SOE's. In China's arsenal the use of SOE's isn't the most brazen lever they employ from their Geoeconomics tool box. The Chinese government understands only the use of military force to resolve territorial disputes will invoke the US – Japan Alliance. China's relationship with Japan is described as “Politically cold and economically cool. “ China Geoeconomics aims are to back up their claims to the Diaoyu/SenKaKu Islands and weaken the US – Japan Alliance.

 Economic retaliation is the name of the Chinese game. In 2001 China reduced the import quota for imported Japanese Cars by 40 to 60%. Specifically China was objecting to Prime Minster Junichiro paying his respects in the Yasukuni Shine. Testimony concerning Japan's Gem Warfare experiments in WW2 had also taken place at this time.


The Kiwi reader will find the references to the Trans Pacific Partnership (hereafter TPP) to be very topical. The TPP is covered in the chapter entitled America's Geoeconomic Potential. To summarise: the TPP was conceived to revive a dying round of Doya talks at the World Trade Organisation. Using the TPP to combat China's use of Geoeconomics was never a consideration.

The original name for the TPP was Trans Pacific Economic Partnership. The newly minted Obama Administration changed the agreement name to what it is known as today. In changing the name the Obama Administration signaled to China and the rest of the globe the TPP wasn't a foreign policy objective.

The book covers how from the time of Nixon admiration to the present Geoeconomics slipped away from the American Foreign Policy establishment/Policy Makers minds. I feel the reader is best served taking in this when they read this and the other material in the book. The book will succeed in reaching the planned target audience and as such the authors will have achieved their aims.