Destroy and Build Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-72 by Thomas Richardson (Cambridge University Press, 2017) is the latest edition to the Australian Army History Series. The book is must read for students of the Vietnam War and the origins of contemporary counter-insurgency doctrine.
The book centres on challenging the existing orthodoxy around, the Australian Task Force (1ATF) Pacification efforts and military control over Phuoc Tuy province (Phuoc Tuy or the province ), during the Vietnam War. In 2002, Governor- General Michael Jeffery summarised the orthodoxy by stating: 'We Australians had everything under control in Phuoc Tuy province''. In challenging the existing orthodoxy, the author has debunked , any notion of the 1ATF being wholesale in control of Phuoc Tuy by 1970.
In chapter one, the Cold War back drop to pacification looms large. Forming the background to Pacification, the Cold War ideological battle ground(Communism vs Free World capitalism), looms large. The Cold War backdrop would not be complete without the competing US and Soviet interests in third world nations (hereafter third world) newly interdependent from the old colonial order.
The aim of pacification was economic development/industrialisation of the third world, the resulting increasing levels of prosperity would eradicate poverty, and remove the fertile ground Communism exploited. The grievances of rural Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Society were not accurately understood by western obverses, they wanted a fairer share of the pie, and not a larger pie.
Chapter 2 en-lighted my ignorance about Phuoc Tuy, in 1966, the year 1ATF arrived in GVN. Phuoc Tuy was strategically important due to having access to Vung Tau, RVN's's second largest port behind Saigon. Phuoc Tuy would allow for the 1ATF to have operational independence by fighting a 'self contained' war to a degree. Phuoc Tuy was not a large province.
Geographically, Phuoc Tuy was dominated by the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai hills, collectively known as the Nui Dinhs or 'the Warburtons' by Australian soldiers. The Nui Dinhs proved a fairy straight forward infiltration route via rice paddy's into the town of Baria, and a cave system adjoined by man made tunnels provided cover from air strikes and artillery fire. The high ground in the Long Hais overlooked the western half of the population, and shared the characteristics of the Nui Dinhs.
Yet, much of Phuoc Tuy was not hilly. Elsewhere, in the province, the rubber plantation at Long Tan and village of Binh Ba were future battle-sites, while the Nui Dinhs and Long Hais were would remain logistical hubs for the NLF. Due to space considerations; the importance of the road network to the local economy is best left to the reader explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores the complexities of local population demographics.
Superficially, the grievances around of land ownership, or the brutal Communist methods/suppression would explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores complexities among local population demographics. These complexities encompassed , the economic diversity of the province, a families' history of fighting French colonial rule, and past heavy handiness ( the To Cong program) of South Vietnamese government. As the reader, I commend, the author, for bringing Phuoc Tuy to' life'.
Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism are behind, the constant failings responsible, for the RVN becoming a de facto failed state. The Government of Vietnam (GVN, think government of South Vietnam) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AVRN) were dogged by institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism, and like all bodies infected by such diseases their effectiveness was reduced. This disease infected, the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), who were chiefly responsible, for security in Phuoc Tuy. The RF/PF were akin to Army reservists or local militia.
The weaknesses of the RF/PF and AVRN remained a constant. Each time the 1ATF would depart a village or cease patrolling/ambushing in a area , the RF/PF or less often South Vietnamese Army failed to maintain the improved security situation, or pressure on the enemy's activities. In the chapter entitled 'Bereft of their Australian strongman': November 1971-January 1973, the reader, will find this disease, culminates in the loss of any security/pacification gains made by the 1ATF.
The other constant is in regard to members of the population in Phuoc Tuy, who were opposed to the NLF, but at best were Lukewarm(pun intended) towards the diseased GVN Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism prevented the GVN from winning over these Lukewarm people, and thus the war.
The ATF1 mission was to restore security in Phuoc Tuy , permitting the South Vietnamese government to regain control of the province. In 1966, Phuoc Tuy was firmly under NLF control, reflecting the security situation in much of GVN. Pacification efforts centred around Revolutionary Development (CORDS) and other non military civic action could only take place when ,the security, situation improved.
The author encapsulates the operational, strategic and tactical dilemma faced by the Australians and American in Vietnam. This ongoing dilemma was as follows: from the ATF1 perceptive, their was not enough manpower to sustain operations against the NLF's more conventional units (mostly the D445 battalion) and conduct operations aimed at cutting the NLF's links to local population.
I should pretext my next comments for the reader. I am the son of a Vietnam veteran. In 1969, my father served with 5RAR, during Operation Esso, he was badly wounded by a mine incident, and evacuated home. This is why a passage on page 133-134 struck a cord with me. The passage covers , the 1ATF operating in the Long Hais.
Specifically, constructing a bunker system around Dat Do, patrolling around the Long Hais and CORDS in Dat Do. The NLF heavily mined areas likely to frequented by Australian Army patrols in the Long Hais. This mine laying effort resulted in twenty Australian soldiers Killed in Action and 119 wounded. Despite the heavy causalities, the 1ATF, goal of injecting or denying the NLF's logistical rice supply was successful.
The reader will have noticed , how I have chosen to skip over the Ted Offence, this is because I wish to focus on other topics covered by the author. This is a strength and not a weakness of the book.
A long term American goal was the use of democratic elections to legitimatise South Vietnam in the eyes of the international community and it's own people. In the same time frame, flawed analysis driven by computer modelling and wishful thinking,saw a unrealistic and 'rosy' view of the security situation in Phuoc Tuy.
The author effectively covers the electoral process for Senate and lower house elections. The AVN banned the Communist and neutral political parties from taking part in elections. In the 1970 Senate election and 1971 Lower House elections showed voters in Phuoc Tuy were capable of making informed decisions at the ballot boxes. Neither, did these informed choices reflect the lack of participation in the political process. The diversity of Phuoc Tuy was reflected in the way people voted in both legislative elections.
Voters were unified in cynicism in the electoral process. This reader found the October 1971 Presidential election , which Thieu won unopposed, not only justified voter cynicism, yet also displayed a figurative upper cut to the GVN's own jaw. Prior to the presidential election, the outright rigging of lower house election results, in Phuoc Tuy was publicly confirmed. President Thieu resorted to amending electoral laws to prevent 'peace', comprise' and his chief rival Nguyễn Cao Kỳ from winning the, October 1971, presidential election.
I have only covered a fraction of the fanatic content in the book. By covering a fraction of the author's content, I have focused on two focal points:
How my family history relates to the book means a great deal to me on a personnel level. This does not not preclude a more rational overview of the book. During the time 1ATF and Pacification efforts took place in Phuoc Tuy , the ills of the GVN and South Vietnamese Army prevented any pacification efforts from having any lasting successful impact.
In a brief summary, the ills also ensured the RVN nation state had no viable future, and the author's narrative largely ends with, the 1971 ATF draw down from Phuoc Tuy, and in 1972, the failure of the AVRN efforts (Operation LAM SON 79) in the province. By 1972, the People's Liberation Armed Forces switched to conventional military efforts, for the NFL had failed to ferment a popular Communist revolt in the province/wider RVN.
The author has produced a book which earns pride of place on my book shelf, for both reasons of rational/logical analysis of the intended subject matter, and my own personnel family history as described above.
The author has produced a book which earns pride of place on my book shelf, for both reasons of rational/logical analysis of the intended subject matter, and my own personnel family history as described above.
