France wins the bidding for the Collins Class Submarine replacement program

Only last month, the Joint Committee for Parliamentary Accounts and Audit examined yet another multi-billion dollar project that was delayed by 3–4 years when paper-based down-selection proved inadequate. At the hearing Defence officials advised that the lesson on preview T&E had been learnt, the new T&E policy would ensure a repeat was unlikely, and that, interestingly, the current restructure of Defence should only strengthen use of this preview T&E policy.

Keith Joiners's article 

DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, a derivative of its Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine currently under construction in France, has turned out to be the winner.
Because of the endurance and long range stipulated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the French have selected the Barracuda as their design reference. The Shortfin Barracuda will be equipped with four diesel alternators to generate electricity, a >7 megawatt permanent magnet motor and ample battery storage. 

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I just wanted to touch upon the announcement of the chosen bidder for the Collins Class Submarine Replacement at this time. I do want to give a brief look at the Japanese failed bid. Overall I will leave the details for future blog entries. Also I am aiming to avoid a technical/geeky discussion around the merits of each design that was submitted to the Competitive Evaluation Process (hereafter CEP).

My aim as always is to provide content for the general reader as much as the military enthusiast. Note to the reader Keith Joiner's article was written before the outcome of the CEP was made public.


I will start off with my glance at the Japanese Bid. Did then Prime Minster Tony Abbott's support for the Japanese option undermine the later CEP Process? Let me explain my reasoning behind the question. How could have the Department of Defence selected a version of the Soryu Class submarine without the appearance of political favoritism overriding the CEP process?

My concerns are 2 fold at this point in time. Firstly I wonder how sound the CEP was in light the political climate in Australia? There is every reason to think the Malcolm Turnbull was under all sorts of pressure to announce subs would be build in South Australia. The announcement would have been intended to shore up votes at the Federal Election which is due sometime this year. Could the timing of the announcement sacrificed a sound CEP?

Secondly my concerns are fairly in line with avoiding the problems that were encountered with the development and construction of the Collins Class Submarines. I like the case made by Keith Joiner for a sound Testing and Evaluation (hereafter T&E) Process. The process must take place early on in the development of the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A before the first of the class enters sea trials.

I believe the focus of public discussion and debate should be around the way to establish and operate the best T&E process in the world. Also with the 12 Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A's to be build locally the focus must be on modernising  shipyards and associated industries. I would make the argument for 3D Printing and Robotics being at the heart of the technological revolution around civilian and military industries.


Lastly I would say restoring public confidence is equally as important implementing a sound T&E process. In order to restore public confidence I would first bring to the public's attention the strategic value the Collins Class Submarines have offered Australia. I would do the same for the Collins Class Submarines accomplishments such as "sinking" United States Navy Aircraft Carriers during exercises.   Despite the well documented issues , I believe Australians should take great pride in the RAN's fleet of Collins Class Submarines.

I would bring forward the launch of the first new submarine by around five years. This would negate the need to upgrade the Collins Class Submarines , give Australia more military options in the Asia – Pacific and ensure the project remains in the minds and eyes of the public.

A look at why Warship numbers and capabilities matter

As ships cannot remain on station indefinitely, a small navy cannot sustain long-term operations with sufficient numbers on the frontline. Many naval operations last months or even years and require a sustained rotation of vessels. An approximate rule of thumb says 1 ship on station requires 3 vessels; one on the frontline, one in transit and one in refit or undergoing training. Supposedly less maintenance-intensive new platforms and creative approaches to crew rotation may mitigate this slightly but not enough.
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Fundamentally I believe Peter Sandeman and The Lens of History's friends at Save The Royal Navy Campaign have written the kind of article that will be of historical importance. I would argue the historical importance comes from in light of how Russia is on a war footing. In Asia the People's Liberation Army Navy will exceeded the United States Navy in size by 2020. In the lead up to 2020 and beyond tensions around China's territorial ambitions, which are to numerous to document here will be on going.

I am going to orientate my commentary towards the Royal New Zealand (RNZN) and Royal Australian Navies (RAN). On this basis I may detour slightly from the points made in the original article. In a break from normal departure I will adapt the main points from the source article under subheadings.

The argument I would make is the ability of the RNZN to operate in medium to high intensity environments out to 2030 will be a large determining factor in New Zealand's security and future. Geography dictates how sea based commerce destine for the South Pacific and New Zealand must pass through Asia.


Capabilities / Sword Point of adversaries
Chinese Anti - Access/Area Denial (hereafter A2/D2) capabilities must be at forefront of Australian and New Zealand naval planners thinking. The Sword Point of Chinese technology and A2/D2
doctrine is anti shipping missiles. Sea Mines are also a key force multiplier in the Chinese arsenal. A more detailed look at Chinese A2/D2 capabilities and how they can be counted is for another day.


Only one vessel can be in one place at one time

I will now turn my attention to the RAN. No direct replacement exists for the Adelaide Class Frigates. 3 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) will enter service around 2017 – 2020. The AWD do represent a huge leap forward in operational capabilities and technology. However 3 vessels cannot take the place of what was originally half a dozen Adelaide Class Frigates.

On the basis of two vessels being in port for maintenance only one AWD will be at sea or available for operational duties. The reader may want to consider for instance how a single AWD can't be on convoy duty and be apart of a amphibious task force at the same time. From the Kiwi stand point the Air/Missile Defence role is a specialty capability the RNZN doesn't and won't posses in the foreseeable future.


Murphy's Law can happen / Forces in reserve

I would venture the RNZN has a shortage of frigates/ vessels that can operate in medium to high level warfare environments. So I think it could be said that Murphy's Law isn't even required for New Zealand naval planners to be caught off guard. If a unexpected event in Asia was to occur there is a very good chance the RNZN would be in no position to respond.

Explaining the necessity to keep naval forces in reserve would demean the reader and mean I would have to cover the same ocean I just did in the above paragraph. Instead I will make the following argument: the structure of the RNZN is more geared towards the role of a Coast Guard than deterring a foreign power from undertaking military aggression and for combat purposes. The RNZN has a critical shortage of frigates and Sealift/amphibious vessels.

For a moment I will place the focus on HMNZS Canterbury . The RNZN entire Sealift and amphibious capacity/capabilities rest with a single vessel. In the event HMNZS Canterbury is lost in combat or laid up in dry dock a vacancy sign will hang on-board the navy's Sealift and amphibious capabilities.

One of the fundamental issues the RNZN faces is a shortage of combat power. Out of the entire surface fleet only the HMNZS Te Mana and HMNZS Te Kaha the navy's 2 Anzac Class frigates are capable of operating in hostile seas. At the time of writing HMNZS Te Mana is undergoing a planned upgrade making her unavailable for operational service for a considerable amount of time. The absence of a 4 frigate navy is inexcusable and I will come back to this point later on in the article.

The reader may be wondering how a small force like the peacetime RNZN could be large enough to have vessels in reserve? I would regard this as a text book military question. I believe one answer lies in having multi role vessels instead of dedicated Off Shore Patrol Vessels (hereafter OPV). Multi role vessels could perform Mine Clearance and Anti Submarine Warfare and act as sort back stop that could be called upon in a emergency.

At present the RNZN's OPV's and HMNZS Canterbury are only suitable for operating in low level environments like peacekeeping , fishery patrols and disaster relief. The essential issue in my mind is the requirement for vessels to be able to switch from low level to high intensity environments. By not having this underlying requirement successive New Zealand governments and naval planners have made yet another epic bungle.

Planning for Combat Losses

I will now come back to the RAN. The decision to only opt for only 3 AWD's indicates there is no consideration given to the effects of loses in a future war. In all but the kinds of low level environments mentioned above losses from enemy action are inevitable. Such inevitability was shown in the Battle of the Atlantic and later on in The Falklands War.

The Australian government will have the opportunity to avoid making the same mistake when a decision is made on the number of replacements for the 8 Anzac Class Frigates currently in service with the RAN. 8-10 vessels would be the optimal number to ensure there isn't another short fall in vessels and would allow the RAN to sustain modest losses to enemy action. 

Maintaining a Deterrence/ Presence

The value of the RNZN being able to dispatch and maintain a frigate on station was demonstrated in recent history. In 1973 HMNZS Otago was dispatched to act as a presence/protest against French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific. HMNZS Canterbury (a Lender Class Frigate) also performed the same duty. In effect the Labour Government of the day was willing to give the French the proverbial middle finger and rightfully so.

Current and future governments would only be able to mount such a presence/protest subject to the availability of HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha. Sending a OPV to perform the same role would only see New Zealand laughed at on the International Stage. I would suggest to the reader the RNZN undertaking a Freedom of Navigation Patrol in the South China Sea would be the current day equivalent of protesting French Nuclear Testing.

Incidentally I believe the perfect example of not having a presence and or suitable vessel available is the RNZN's absence from Exercise Bersama Shield . Put another way Exercise Bersama Shield and other like it can demonstrate the effects of the RNZN not maintaining the bottom line of having four frigates in service at one time. If the scenario of China invading Malaysia/South East Asia happens for real surely sending a single Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion is as good as leaving the country at the mercy of events?

As a final thought , I would point out that the fact Chinese military planners will be fully aware of the issues covered in this article. To what degree the RNZN partnered with the RAN is failing to provide a sufficient deterrent to future Chinese aggression is a subject and debate by itself. However I would note the RN is facing the same kind of question over its head. Russian military planners like their Chinese counterparts will be just as aware of the their potential adversary’s (the Royal Navy) shortfalls. The only question can be just how severe will the consequences turn out to be for a country like New Zealand?

New Zealand's Strategic Isolation

When sanctions were lifted, there was a clear expectation on the part of Washington DC, Canberra and Wellington that Fiji would come in from the cold and relations would go back to how they were. A series of high level visits by Western powers in December 2014 revealed how out of step the West had become with Fiji. The billboards around Suva depicting the Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi during their respective visits were visual reminders that, during the sanction years, Fiji had built new strategic partnerships. What this means for military to military cooperation is that there is a whole new cadre of RFMF officers who received their staff course education in Russia, China, or India, for example, and have no ties to Australia and New Zealand; a point lamented by former senior RFMF officers. These officers have built their careers on these new relationships and this has changed both the culture and the trajectory of the military. As a consequence, Australia and New Zealand’s strategic relevance to Fiji has diminished.

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In principle at least this emphasis works for New Zealand. The promotion and strengthening of strong global rules has been a standard plank in Wellington’s external policy for many years. New Zealand is, after all, the good global citizen now sitting on the Security Council. And we should not be shocked if the language on global rules in New Zealand’s forthcoming Defence White Paper bears some resemblance to Australia’s. But nobody would expect a kiwi attempt to replicate the Turnbull government’s ambitious force structure proposals, let alone its eagerness to raise Australian defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP. Canberra knows this all too well. ‘We recognise that New Zealand will make its own judgements on its national interests’, the Australian White Paper reads, ‘and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may not always reflect Australia’s.’ 

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I have been wanting to write a article on New Zealand's strategic isolation for quite some time. Recent events have given me the opening to write up the grave dangers New Zealand's face as Asia and the rest of the globe enters restless waters. In covering these events I will tie them into how the land of the Long White Cloud is in danger of being left stranded high and dry.

This year saw the release of the latest Australian Defence White Paper. As I read through the White Paper what I view as the credibility gap in the New Zealand Defence Force's (hereafter the NZDF) combat capabilities. How successive governments have guttered the NZDF and turned it into a UN Peacekeeping/Police force has been well documented elsewhere. My intent is to highlight the consequences of this ill-advised policy.


My view is successive governments have left New Zealand in a extremely vulnerable to the prevailing winds in Asia and the South Pacific. In the first instance the NZDF is really becoming confined to low intensity operations in the South Pacific and even that could become open to question. In the second instance the NZDF would be almost powerless to act in the event of a medium to high intensity conflict breaking out in Asia. Put another way New Zealand would be at the mercy of events.

As if any further problems were needed the NZDF has very few options to put on the table when playing a role in a coalition. I believe this has been reflected in how the NZDF isn't in a position to supply naval or air combat units to the coalition whose aim is to roll back Isis . Supplying ground troops as instructors to the Iraqi Army was the only route open for New Zealand to join the war against Isis.


I now want to turn my attention to the recent spectre of Fiji purchasing arms from Russia. I will come back to how this unfortunate event occurred shortly. Russia could be said to be mischief making in the South Pacific. If one accepts the shipment of arms is as much intended for internal security as overseas peacekeeping the nature of the Frank Bainimarama regime must come under the spot light.

Bainimarama could well prove to be the Robert Mugabe of the South Pacific. How did a would be head of a coconut republic slip right under New Zealand noses? After the 2006 coup New Zealand was corned into following Australia's and the international communities lead in imposing sanctions on the Bainimarama regime.

Space doesn't permit me to go into how and why sanctions are not a effective diplomatic tool. In brief if the reader wants to see how meaningless sanctions are they only need to look at Iran and North Korea. North Korea is currently sustaining a Nuclear Program even through they are under UN sanctions and Iran did so uninhibited for many years. Now that alone should tell the reader something.

All Australia and New Zealand accomplished by imposing sanctions was to push Fiji into the arms of Russia and China. The option of a stand alone military intervention by New Zealand wasn't available. To what extent the option wasn't on the table due to a lack of political will or the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities is perhaps open to debate.

Certainly I would argue the military intervention option would have been dicey at best in the event the Fijian Army decided to stand and fight on the beaches. The point I wish to make is that no future or current government can exercise military/diplomatic options that aren't available to them. Why does New Zealand find it self in such a dangerous position?


My argument is Kiwis live in a South Pacific bubble of their own creation. New Zealand is a factory for the world's best Rugby coaches. Beyond the Rugby field critical/strategic thinking is absent around the country. How the media/6PM news will give coverage to the All Blacks before world events is a symptom of the South Pacific bubble. I love New Zealand dearly and it pains me greatly to know that one day the bubble will burst.


Now I come to Kim Beazley. Before I go on any further I wish to make one point about Beazley. In the modern era the 2 Labor political figures I have most time for are Bob Hawke and Kim Beazley. Sure I have my share of ideological differences with Beazley. By the same token I respect how a serious intellect is coupled with his political views and in this regard Hawke and Beazley are alike.

I believe the astute observations Beazley offers concerning his time as Australia's ambassador to Washington in the above interview are also the kind of discussion that are missing in New Zealand outside of academic circles. The reader will be rightfully asking what does this have to with the topic? I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment.

I believe Beazley is both a strategic/critical thinker as well as being a key Australian Labor Party Figure. Beazley's time as Minster of Defence in the Hawke Government is worth a glance. None of what Beazley and his successors in the Defence portfolio achieved could have been done without critical/strategic thinking.

Around the time Beazley served in the hot seat , Australia's Defence outlook moved towards defending the Northern Air- Sea Gap. Notable the Anzac Class Frigates , Collins Class Submarines and F-18 fighter jets were all acquired or at least committed to during the time of the Hawke Government. The acquisitions would replace ageing military platforms (e.g Oberon class submarines) and contribute to the strategic outlook of the time.

While Beazley was Minster of Defence , New Zealand was at the beginning of the many self inflicted wounds ( The first being New Zealand's anti American Nuclear Ban) that in due time would lead me to write this very article. The kind of clear thinking Beazley offers the listener about American culture ,government and general foreign policy aims was missing in the fourth Labour government and never came back. The  fourth Labour government was lead by Prime Minster David Lange (1942 - 2005) and his successors.



My argument is as follows. Public debate and discussion around Australia's current strategic outlook and future defence projects (e.g Collins Class Submarine replacement) is sound and to be encouraged. By the same vain the decisions made in the Hawke era should also be debated. In particular the axing of the Naval Air Arm by not replacing the Aircraft Carrier HMAS Melbourne deserves attention.

By relying on ground based air power Australian defence planners are taking a calculated strategic risk. Such a calculated risk relies on a firm strategic outlook and the required military hardware and infrastructure: in this case the likes of F-18's and airbases in Northern Australia. I will leave why I think the risk factor involved with land based air power is greater than made out to be for another time.



In the case of New Zealand, the complete absence of any kind of coherent strategic direction towards the Asia Pacific and the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities makes such discussions nearly impossible. In other words without a sound defence and diplomatic strategies New Zealand is inviting a unstable Asia Pacific region (think a unstable East Timor) and aggression by a foreign power (read the Chinese.) In my opinion this is a far cry from risk management. Australia's use of land based Air Power is one instance of  risk management in defence planning as opposed to a outright reckless policy vacuum.

Ultimately the blame for New Zealand's strategic isolation must fall with voters. Stay with me while I make a topical detour. A survey of the priorities of voters at the last General Election didn't reveal any surprises. Domestic issues like the economy and education got top billings. In political terms John Key and National understood what was on the minds of voters the best and the final election result was a reflection of this fact.

Issues like I have addressed in this article will never get a look in with the majority of the voting public because short -sightedness is a Kiwi trait along with Rugby being the unofficial national religion. One of the reasons I started The Lens of History Blog and Podcast was to bring a issue like New Zealand's strategic isolation to the attention of the general public. In writing this article I hope to have taken a step forward towards accomplishing my goal.

Ultimately the voting public will have set up a cycle in which they are responsible for not holding successive governments to account for their fool hardiness. The end result of the fool hardiness will come back to haunt New Zealand. The only question in my mind is to what degree or scale does our strategic isolation come back to bite us?