New Zealand Defence White Wash 2016

But ‘Asia’ isn’t a single actor wielding power. It’s a grouping of many states with conflicting strategic objectives. ‘Power’ isn’t a measure of size but rather a state’s willingness to use it. The White Paper points to the enduring nature of terrorism, resource competition, WMD proliferation and information technology as features shaping New Zealand’s strategic outlook. It’s an odd list, producing policy gems like ‘the adoption of technology has a number of advantages in the military context’, but missing other factors such as the rise of Asian nationalism, climate change and any serious discussion of military technology trends.

ASPI Article  

This blog entry was delayed by a combination circumstances including yours truly moving house. I have been wanting to address the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2016 (hereafter White Paper) since it's release 2 months ago. I feel Peter Jennings offers the best analysis of the White Paper's failings. My intention is to summarise my thoughts on why the White Paper is a white wash.

In previous articles I have covered deficiencies in the NZDF concerning a lack of high end combat capabilities. For this reason I have chosen to cover other matters in this article. The same goes for for more specific topics like roles of Air and Sea Power in New Zealand's security. My intention as per usual is to to offer the reader a fresh perceptive they won't find anywhere else. If the reader would like me to expand upon any of the issues I have raised , please feel free to leave a comment below.


From my standpoint: New Zealand lacking a coherent defence strategy is what shines through the contents of the White Paper. For a moment I will follow this line of thinking. What reasons/symptoms of the aforementioned lack of strategy? Space doesn't permit me to provide a detailed and complete answer. Some glaring symptoms can be examined in brief.

The refusal to acknowledge China's role in heightened tensions around territorial disputes in Asia is glaring. To what extent denial is behind the blinkers worn by the New Zealand Government as opposed to a lack of strategic thinking is worthy of debate. In writing this article I hope to spur on such a debate amongst the public and academic circles.

Staying with nation states, did anybody else notice how the contents of the White Paper defied New Zealand's geography? Let me explain my point: Any threat conventional military threat (read China) to New Zealand will come from Asia. Put another way interstate warfare is unlikely to originate from the Antarctic in the time frame covered by the White Paper.


I believe defending New Zealand in the event of a wartime emergency is a blind spot in current defence thinking. It is only fitting that I finish up with a symptom of such a dangerous blind spot. New Zealand's defence ties with countries like India , Japan and Indonesia either barley rate a mention or they don't at all. In fact Indonesia is omitted all together.

Who in their right mind would think neglecting defence ties with our security partners in Asia is a good idea? Has New Zealand placed a over reliance on the International Rules Order at the expense of diplomatic and military ties with the Asia – Pacific region? Certainly I would make the case , New Zealand has placed all it's cards in the falling house known as the International Rules Based Order.

The contents of the White Paper is a reflection how little public and political interest there is in New Zealand's defence and foreign policies. There can be no no doubt the lack of debate around the White Paper stems from disinterest. I can only foresee the level of interest increasing in the event of New Zealand facing a wartime emergency at which times all of our chickens will be coming home to roost.

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 2

Invest in forces housing and ‘value added’ benefits for service personnel

As public sector pay restraint appears to be here for good, the RN needs to find other ways to offer the best possible quality of life for its service personnel to aid recruitment and retention. Ensuring that new service housing is built or existing stock brought up to a consistently high standard should be a priority. At the same time this investment would provide work for a construction sector that may face challenges as the economy adjusts to Brexit. The MoD should be able to get the best possible prices for work which would need to be carried out at some point in the futures in any case.

Save The Royal Navy Campaign Article 

Welcome to Part 2 of my look at what issues would be faced in the event the Royal New Zealand Navy was expanded. In Part 1 I covered the potential pitfalls when acquiring new vessels. I have covered why the RNZN is to small in previous articles. For the reader who isn't familiar my reasoning can be found concerning the importance of Sea Power to New Zealand security. And why Warship numbers and capabilities are also vital to the RNZN.

In Part 2 I will turn to the issues of Recruitment and Retention of RNZAF personnel. Compared with part 1 the reader will find a more general approach to the topics at hand. I won't make the claim of covering every aspect of maintaining and in the event it happens expanding the RNZN. As per usual I welcome any feedback from the reader.


To what ratio current personal and new recruits would crew new vessels is depended on a number of factors. The type of vessel entering service and the proportion of current members of the RNZN required would be some of the factors involved. A more precise analysis won't be possible until the day comes when Kiwis wake up to how much they really needed the RNZN before a emergency broke out. The same goes for financial costings involved with what this very article covers.

I now come to the matter of Recruitment and Retention. Fundamentally I believe the Recruitment of new and retention of current personnel has been overlooked by the current RNZN and New Zealand Governments. I can not stress enough the importance of this matter to the RNZN whether or not expansion ever takes place or not.

Let me make a slight side diversion. When I read the article from The Lens of History's friends at the Save The Royal Navy Campaign, the way the issues crossed over with the RNZN stood out to me. I whole heartily endorse the view of John Dunbar raises. For the sake of remaining topical I will focus on Defence Force housing.

For the sake of the international reader I would like to point out house prices in Auckland hover around the 7 hundred thousand to the 1 million dollar mark.  Members of the RNZN based at the Devonport Naval Base are at the coal face of unaffordable housing in New Zealand. I find it hard to believe Auckland housing prices aren't having a negative effect on the RNZN ability to retain personnel.

I believe there is a mandate for for a renewed focus on Defence Force housing. The New Zealand Government and the NZDF drifting away from providing housing is very short sighted. Exposing members of the defence force to the forces of “market” rents and housing prices may well take the cake for short sighted-ness!


Recruitment is a area I feel is lacking in attention in debate and discussion. The RNZN like the RNZAF and the Army compete with the private sector for the best and brightest people. I believe a 2 fold approach should be taken to NZDF recruitment and promoting awareness/benefits of a military career.

The first measure would be to expand the Limited Service Volunteer Program. The expanded program would be in placed in Universities , Polytechs and other training providers. Students placed in the program would be introduced to military life and undergo a fitness program. At the end of the program students would be given the option of enlisting as a Army or Navy reservist or the regular full time military.

1 or more charter schools modelled on the Australian Army Apprentice Scheme would form the 2nd measure. The schools would be open to individuals who are unemployed as well as secondary students. Under the charter school model school leavers would have the assurance of a secure military military in the years ahead of them.

Maintaining and Expanding the Royal New Zealand Navy Part 1

There is an urgent need to resolve delays in the Type 26 Frigate building programme. Clearly, the MOD needs to ensure value for money – but increasing the flow of money into shipbuilding in the short term to support the economy is a real consideration. Bringing forward construction of Type 31 frigates in parallel with the Type 26 construction to enable a sustained increased level of shipbuilding would also be beneficial, and see an increase in surface escort numbers which can be sustained in the longer-term.

Save The Royal Navy Article

This article is angled towards a reader @GardinerWira who thought rightly Kiwis would want to know the cost of bringing the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) up to a adequate strength . I was delayed in writing this article by circumstances on my home front. On the positive side of things the article by John Dunbar proved to very timely and topical.

I am going to break the topic into 2 parts. Part 1 will covers some of the pitfalls the New Zealand Government and the RNZN would need to avoid. In Part 2 I will take a look at issues around crewing the new vessels and retaining personnel.

The reader will note how I am not offering precise figures/costings. A outlay of costings would have meet with difficulties due to the variables involved. Such variables include up front capital costs , ongoing operational costs , choice of vessels , cost overruns at the construction stage and so on. The reader can take the matters I raise and apply them to the RNZN of today even if they don't support my ideas.


Now I will turn attention to the pitfalls that can apply to buying naval vessels or even new acquisitions for the Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force. The New Zealand government's record in the area of defence acquisitions is lousy to say the least. Space doesn't permit me to go into detail around the debacle around Project Protector and Army LAV's . Suffice to say the public should question the competence of the current and future governments/defence bureaucracy to be entrusted with tax payer dollars and the future of the armed forces.

Clearly a return to basics involving acquiring the right kind of and volume of equipment is desperately needed. A suitable number of vessels that can meet operational requirements isn't a given. Nor is avoiding cost over runs at the construction/purchasing stage guaranteed. I am now going to turn the matter of avoiding cost over runs.

My intention isn't to pick on the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) I do want to highlight how a potentially good selection of design isn't the same as getting a vessels delivered on time and on budget. Essentially the Hobart Class AWD have been a classic case of mismanagement and a terrible Corporate/Business Corporate/Business model.

Casting a glance beyond Australia how the Royal Navy's Type 26 Frigate Program could said to be struck in the mud. Space and the need to stay topical means I won't go into the issues faced by the Type 26 Frigate Program. What I want to convey to the reader is how beyond Australia huge issues exist with Navies acquiring new vessels.

Essentially I would argue whether it be the replacement of the RNZN Anzac Class Frigates or undertaking a restructure of the navy the choice of ship builders shouldn't automatically follow on from the design choice. I believe old fashion saying of buyer beware applies to the situation.


The main pitfall that nobody is talking about is how New Zealand is solely reliant on Military Off the Shelf hardware. The failure to develop shipyards and strengthen the local defence industry over the last 2 decades is coming with a heavy price. A localised defence industry with a focus on Research and development would have place New Zealand well as global events take a trend for the worst.

The New Zealand Defence Force could have had access to lower cost high end military equipment that is interoperable with our allies/coalition partners. The same military equipment would have also found ready export markets around the world.

Questions hang around like the smell of seaweed drying out on a beach. For me at least one question is how the RNZN/Department of Defence could take a design like the Type 26 Frigate from the design table to operational service without any major hiccups?

Book Review: War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft

War by Other Means by Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris (Harvard University Press 2016) . War by Other Means Geoeconomics And Statecraft is a examination of Geoeconomics squarely aimed at Policy Makers and Academia. The primary focus of the book is China's use of Geoeconomics as a tool of State Craft.

Quotations from the book appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book.

The opening of the book is a look at the definition of Geoeconomics. The term of Geoeconomics is used extensively in US foreign policy circles. Scholars aren't in agreement concerning a precise definition of Geoeconomics. On page 20 the authors urge the following definition: The use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations' economic actions on a country's geopolitical goals.

The remainder of the chapter 1 is devoted to how there hasn't been a great deal of debate among scholarly circles around Geoeconomics. As far back as 1970 Susan Strange recognised in the studies of international economic relations were focused on politics and not economics.

Nation states as varied as China and Qatar have seen Geoeconomics take a resurgent path in international relations. I will come back to China a fair bit in this review. My take from current events/opening of the book is Russia's actions in the Ukraine is representative of the resurgence of Geoeconomics as a tool of foreign policy.

I feel the point or discussion around Geoeconomics not being a Zero Sum ( Winners and losers) game could have received more attention from the authors. Put another way the outcome of a Nation State use of Geoeconomics isn't always Black and White. The use of military action to achieve a objective can be said to be successful or failure.

The Iraq War is widely regarded has having been a gross miscalculation . Viewed from the standpoint of achieving the objective of turning Iraq into a democracy , the war was a failure. I believe a historical parallel to the Vietnam War. The political and public fall out from the Vietnam War is akin to what has occurred in the wake of the Iraq War. As the reader all of this sprung to mind. As such the fall out is for another discussion.


Historical examples of the successful use of Geoeconomics by the US have been forgotten. Chapter 6 is entitled US Foreign Policy And Geoeconomics in Historical Context. I will leave Chapter 6 and much of the other content to the reader. For the purpose of this review I will touch upon the role State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) have in Geoeconomics. SOE's can be used as a tool of State Craft in the Geoeconomics Chess Board.


Geoeconomics is distinct from foreign (or international) or economic policy, mercantilism and liberal economic thought.

Early on I was struck by how relevant this passage of the book is to New Zealand. In the manner of Academia the authors argue Geoeconomics is confused with a reinvented form of Mercantilism . Others mix up Geoeconomics with the liberal (Market orientated) economic school of thought. Adam Smith a noted liberal economic thinker understood the limits of economic logic: what was/is mutually beneficial in economic terms might not be so in political terms. According to Smith , “the wealth of a neighbouring country “ might be dangerous in war and politics. “


From page 37: The emergence of new generation of state capitalists- significantly larger , wealthier, more global, less democratic and more sophisticated than their predecessors – raises important questions for US Foreign Policy.


And from page 54: Twenty years ago state owned enterprises (SOE's) were little more than domestic employment vehicles. Ten years ago there was wide spread scepticism about whether these firms, saddled with bad debt debt and inexperienced leadership, could succeeded beyond home markets. Today they include some of the world's biggest companies , backed by some of the globes largest pools of capital and can claim over half the world's top ten IPO's over the last six years.


In the present day state backed firms account for 30% of foreign direct investment ( hereafter FDI) in emerging markets. SOE's remain grossly inefficient in comparison to their private sector counterparts. Efficiency and operating on a for profit basis is in no way the aim.


Now I can turn to the thread of SOE's. In April of 2011. President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff made Beijing her first overseas trip. Strengthening ties with Brazil was on the mind of Chinese President Hu Jintao and SOE airlines were his means of doing so. The stated owned Chinese airlines placed orders for 30 Brazilian Embraer planes plus options for option for 5 more with 3 airlines.


The above example is only mentioned briefly in the book. I feel the brief mention is never the less very illustrative of how the Chinese make use of Geoeconomics in foreign policy circles.  Could the Kiwi reader ever imagen their government exercising the same Geoeconomics lever via Air New Zealand?!


For the second thread I will move away from SOE's. In China's arsenal the use of SOE's isn't the most brazen lever they employ from their Geoeconomics tool box. The Chinese government understands only the use of military force to resolve territorial disputes will invoke the US – Japan Alliance. China's relationship with Japan is described as “Politically cold and economically cool. “ China Geoeconomics aims are to back up their claims to the Diaoyu/SenKaKu Islands and weaken the US – Japan Alliance.

 Economic retaliation is the name of the Chinese game. In 2001 China reduced the import quota for imported Japanese Cars by 40 to 60%. Specifically China was objecting to Prime Minster Junichiro paying his respects in the Yasukuni Shine. Testimony concerning Japan's Gem Warfare experiments in WW2 had also taken place at this time.


The Kiwi reader will find the references to the Trans Pacific Partnership (hereafter TPP) to be very topical. The TPP is covered in the chapter entitled America's Geoeconomic Potential. To summarise: the TPP was conceived to revive a dying round of Doya talks at the World Trade Organisation. Using the TPP to combat China's use of Geoeconomics was never a consideration.

The original name for the TPP was Trans Pacific Economic Partnership. The newly minted Obama Administration changed the agreement name to what it is known as today. In changing the name the Obama Administration signaled to China and the rest of the globe the TPP wasn't a foreign policy objective.

The book covers how from the time of Nixon admiration to the present Geoeconomics slipped away from the American Foreign Policy establishment/Policy Makers minds. I feel the reader is best served taking in this when they read this and the other material in the book. The book will succeed in reaching the planned target audience and as such the authors will have achieved their aims.

France wins the bidding for the Collins Class Submarine replacement program

Only last month, the Joint Committee for Parliamentary Accounts and Audit examined yet another multi-billion dollar project that was delayed by 3–4 years when paper-based down-selection proved inadequate. At the hearing Defence officials advised that the lesson on preview T&E had been learnt, the new T&E policy would ensure a repeat was unlikely, and that, interestingly, the current restructure of Defence should only strengthen use of this preview T&E policy.

Keith Joiners's article 

DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, a derivative of its Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine currently under construction in France, has turned out to be the winner.
Because of the endurance and long range stipulated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the French have selected the Barracuda as their design reference. The Shortfin Barracuda will be equipped with four diesel alternators to generate electricity, a >7 megawatt permanent magnet motor and ample battery storage. 

Article 

Article 

I just wanted to touch upon the announcement of the chosen bidder for the Collins Class Submarine Replacement at this time. I do want to give a brief look at the Japanese failed bid. Overall I will leave the details for future blog entries. Also I am aiming to avoid a technical/geeky discussion around the merits of each design that was submitted to the Competitive Evaluation Process (hereafter CEP).

My aim as always is to provide content for the general reader as much as the military enthusiast. Note to the reader Keith Joiner's article was written before the outcome of the CEP was made public.


I will start off with my glance at the Japanese Bid. Did then Prime Minster Tony Abbott's support for the Japanese option undermine the later CEP Process? Let me explain my reasoning behind the question. How could have the Department of Defence selected a version of the Soryu Class submarine without the appearance of political favoritism overriding the CEP process?

My concerns are 2 fold at this point in time. Firstly I wonder how sound the CEP was in light the political climate in Australia? There is every reason to think the Malcolm Turnbull was under all sorts of pressure to announce subs would be build in South Australia. The announcement would have been intended to shore up votes at the Federal Election which is due sometime this year. Could the timing of the announcement sacrificed a sound CEP?

Secondly my concerns are fairly in line with avoiding the problems that were encountered with the development and construction of the Collins Class Submarines. I like the case made by Keith Joiner for a sound Testing and Evaluation (hereafter T&E) Process. The process must take place early on in the development of the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A before the first of the class enters sea trials.

I believe the focus of public discussion and debate should be around the way to establish and operate the best T&E process in the world. Also with the 12 Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A's to be build locally the focus must be on modernising  shipyards and associated industries. I would make the argument for 3D Printing and Robotics being at the heart of the technological revolution around civilian and military industries.


Lastly I would say restoring public confidence is equally as important implementing a sound T&E process. In order to restore public confidence I would first bring to the public's attention the strategic value the Collins Class Submarines have offered Australia. I would do the same for the Collins Class Submarines accomplishments such as "sinking" United States Navy Aircraft Carriers during exercises.   Despite the well documented issues , I believe Australians should take great pride in the RAN's fleet of Collins Class Submarines.

I would bring forward the launch of the first new submarine by around five years. This would negate the need to upgrade the Collins Class Submarines , give Australia more military options in the Asia – Pacific and ensure the project remains in the minds and eyes of the public.

A look at why Warship numbers and capabilities matter

As ships cannot remain on station indefinitely, a small navy cannot sustain long-term operations with sufficient numbers on the frontline. Many naval operations last months or even years and require a sustained rotation of vessels. An approximate rule of thumb says 1 ship on station requires 3 vessels; one on the frontline, one in transit and one in refit or undergoing training. Supposedly less maintenance-intensive new platforms and creative approaches to crew rotation may mitigate this slightly but not enough.
Full Article

Fundamentally I believe Peter Sandeman and The Lens of History's friends at Save The Royal Navy Campaign have written the kind of article that will be of historical importance. I would argue the historical importance comes from in light of how Russia is on a war footing. In Asia the People's Liberation Army Navy will exceeded the United States Navy in size by 2020. In the lead up to 2020 and beyond tensions around China's territorial ambitions, which are to numerous to document here will be on going.

I am going to orientate my commentary towards the Royal New Zealand (RNZN) and Royal Australian Navies (RAN). On this basis I may detour slightly from the points made in the original article. In a break from normal departure I will adapt the main points from the source article under subheadings.

The argument I would make is the ability of the RNZN to operate in medium to high intensity environments out to 2030 will be a large determining factor in New Zealand's security and future. Geography dictates how sea based commerce destine for the South Pacific and New Zealand must pass through Asia.


Capabilities / Sword Point of adversaries
Chinese Anti - Access/Area Denial (hereafter A2/D2) capabilities must be at forefront of Australian and New Zealand naval planners thinking. The Sword Point of Chinese technology and A2/D2
doctrine is anti shipping missiles. Sea Mines are also a key force multiplier in the Chinese arsenal. A more detailed look at Chinese A2/D2 capabilities and how they can be counted is for another day.


Only one vessel can be in one place at one time

I will now turn my attention to the RAN. No direct replacement exists for the Adelaide Class Frigates. 3 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (hereafter AWD) will enter service around 2017 – 2020. The AWD do represent a huge leap forward in operational capabilities and technology. However 3 vessels cannot take the place of what was originally half a dozen Adelaide Class Frigates.

On the basis of two vessels being in port for maintenance only one AWD will be at sea or available for operational duties. The reader may want to consider for instance how a single AWD can't be on convoy duty and be apart of a amphibious task force at the same time. From the Kiwi stand point the Air/Missile Defence role is a specialty capability the RNZN doesn't and won't posses in the foreseeable future.


Murphy's Law can happen / Forces in reserve

I would venture the RNZN has a shortage of frigates/ vessels that can operate in medium to high level warfare environments. So I think it could be said that Murphy's Law isn't even required for New Zealand naval planners to be caught off guard. If a unexpected event in Asia was to occur there is a very good chance the RNZN would be in no position to respond.

Explaining the necessity to keep naval forces in reserve would demean the reader and mean I would have to cover the same ocean I just did in the above paragraph. Instead I will make the following argument: the structure of the RNZN is more geared towards the role of a Coast Guard than deterring a foreign power from undertaking military aggression and for combat purposes. The RNZN has a critical shortage of frigates and Sealift/amphibious vessels.

For a moment I will place the focus on HMNZS Canterbury . The RNZN entire Sealift and amphibious capacity/capabilities rest with a single vessel. In the event HMNZS Canterbury is lost in combat or laid up in dry dock a vacancy sign will hang on-board the navy's Sealift and amphibious capabilities.

One of the fundamental issues the RNZN faces is a shortage of combat power. Out of the entire surface fleet only the HMNZS Te Mana and HMNZS Te Kaha the navy's 2 Anzac Class frigates are capable of operating in hostile seas. At the time of writing HMNZS Te Mana is undergoing a planned upgrade making her unavailable for operational service for a considerable amount of time. The absence of a 4 frigate navy is inexcusable and I will come back to this point later on in the article.

The reader may be wondering how a small force like the peacetime RNZN could be large enough to have vessels in reserve? I would regard this as a text book military question. I believe one answer lies in having multi role vessels instead of dedicated Off Shore Patrol Vessels (hereafter OPV). Multi role vessels could perform Mine Clearance and Anti Submarine Warfare and act as sort back stop that could be called upon in a emergency.

At present the RNZN's OPV's and HMNZS Canterbury are only suitable for operating in low level environments like peacekeeping , fishery patrols and disaster relief. The essential issue in my mind is the requirement for vessels to be able to switch from low level to high intensity environments. By not having this underlying requirement successive New Zealand governments and naval planners have made yet another epic bungle.

Planning for Combat Losses

I will now come back to the RAN. The decision to only opt for only 3 AWD's indicates there is no consideration given to the effects of loses in a future war. In all but the kinds of low level environments mentioned above losses from enemy action are inevitable. Such inevitability was shown in the Battle of the Atlantic and later on in The Falklands War.

The Australian government will have the opportunity to avoid making the same mistake when a decision is made on the number of replacements for the 8 Anzac Class Frigates currently in service with the RAN. 8-10 vessels would be the optimal number to ensure there isn't another short fall in vessels and would allow the RAN to sustain modest losses to enemy action. 

Maintaining a Deterrence/ Presence

The value of the RNZN being able to dispatch and maintain a frigate on station was demonstrated in recent history. In 1973 HMNZS Otago was dispatched to act as a presence/protest against French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific. HMNZS Canterbury (a Lender Class Frigate) also performed the same duty. In effect the Labour Government of the day was willing to give the French the proverbial middle finger and rightfully so.

Current and future governments would only be able to mount such a presence/protest subject to the availability of HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha. Sending a OPV to perform the same role would only see New Zealand laughed at on the International Stage. I would suggest to the reader the RNZN undertaking a Freedom of Navigation Patrol in the South China Sea would be the current day equivalent of protesting French Nuclear Testing.

Incidentally I believe the perfect example of not having a presence and or suitable vessel available is the RNZN's absence from Exercise Bersama Shield . Put another way Exercise Bersama Shield and other like it can demonstrate the effects of the RNZN not maintaining the bottom line of having four frigates in service at one time. If the scenario of China invading Malaysia/South East Asia happens for real surely sending a single Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion is as good as leaving the country at the mercy of events?

As a final thought , I would point out that the fact Chinese military planners will be fully aware of the issues covered in this article. To what degree the RNZN partnered with the RAN is failing to provide a sufficient deterrent to future Chinese aggression is a subject and debate by itself. However I would note the RN is facing the same kind of question over its head. Russian military planners like their Chinese counterparts will be just as aware of the their potential adversary’s (the Royal Navy) shortfalls. The only question can be just how severe will the consequences turn out to be for a country like New Zealand?

New Zealand's Strategic Isolation

When sanctions were lifted, there was a clear expectation on the part of Washington DC, Canberra and Wellington that Fiji would come in from the cold and relations would go back to how they were. A series of high level visits by Western powers in December 2014 revealed how out of step the West had become with Fiji. The billboards around Suva depicting the Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi during their respective visits were visual reminders that, during the sanction years, Fiji had built new strategic partnerships. What this means for military to military cooperation is that there is a whole new cadre of RFMF officers who received their staff course education in Russia, China, or India, for example, and have no ties to Australia and New Zealand; a point lamented by former senior RFMF officers. These officers have built their careers on these new relationships and this has changed both the culture and the trajectory of the military. As a consequence, Australia and New Zealand’s strategic relevance to Fiji has diminished.

Full article

Another Article  

In principle at least this emphasis works for New Zealand. The promotion and strengthening of strong global rules has been a standard plank in Wellington’s external policy for many years. New Zealand is, after all, the good global citizen now sitting on the Security Council. And we should not be shocked if the language on global rules in New Zealand’s forthcoming Defence White Paper bears some resemblance to Australia’s. But nobody would expect a kiwi attempt to replicate the Turnbull government’s ambitious force structure proposals, let alone its eagerness to raise Australian defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP. Canberra knows this all too well. ‘We recognise that New Zealand will make its own judgements on its national interests’, the Australian White Paper reads, ‘and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may not always reflect Australia’s.’ 

Full article 

I have been wanting to write a article on New Zealand's strategic isolation for quite some time. Recent events have given me the opening to write up the grave dangers New Zealand's face as Asia and the rest of the globe enters restless waters. In covering these events I will tie them into how the land of the Long White Cloud is in danger of being left stranded high and dry.

This year saw the release of the latest Australian Defence White Paper. As I read through the White Paper what I view as the credibility gap in the New Zealand Defence Force's (hereafter the NZDF) combat capabilities. How successive governments have guttered the NZDF and turned it into a UN Peacekeeping/Police force has been well documented elsewhere. My intent is to highlight the consequences of this ill-advised policy.


My view is successive governments have left New Zealand in a extremely vulnerable to the prevailing winds in Asia and the South Pacific. In the first instance the NZDF is really becoming confined to low intensity operations in the South Pacific and even that could become open to question. In the second instance the NZDF would be almost powerless to act in the event of a medium to high intensity conflict breaking out in Asia. Put another way New Zealand would be at the mercy of events.

As if any further problems were needed the NZDF has very few options to put on the table when playing a role in a coalition. I believe this has been reflected in how the NZDF isn't in a position to supply naval or air combat units to the coalition whose aim is to roll back Isis . Supplying ground troops as instructors to the Iraqi Army was the only route open for New Zealand to join the war against Isis.


I now want to turn my attention to the recent spectre of Fiji purchasing arms from Russia. I will come back to how this unfortunate event occurred shortly. Russia could be said to be mischief making in the South Pacific. If one accepts the shipment of arms is as much intended for internal security as overseas peacekeeping the nature of the Frank Bainimarama regime must come under the spot light.

Bainimarama could well prove to be the Robert Mugabe of the South Pacific. How did a would be head of a coconut republic slip right under New Zealand noses? After the 2006 coup New Zealand was corned into following Australia's and the international communities lead in imposing sanctions on the Bainimarama regime.

Space doesn't permit me to go into how and why sanctions are not a effective diplomatic tool. In brief if the reader wants to see how meaningless sanctions are they only need to look at Iran and North Korea. North Korea is currently sustaining a Nuclear Program even through they are under UN sanctions and Iran did so uninhibited for many years. Now that alone should tell the reader something.

All Australia and New Zealand accomplished by imposing sanctions was to push Fiji into the arms of Russia and China. The option of a stand alone military intervention by New Zealand wasn't available. To what extent the option wasn't on the table due to a lack of political will or the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities is perhaps open to debate.

Certainly I would argue the military intervention option would have been dicey at best in the event the Fijian Army decided to stand and fight on the beaches. The point I wish to make is that no future or current government can exercise military/diplomatic options that aren't available to them. Why does New Zealand find it self in such a dangerous position?


My argument is Kiwis live in a South Pacific bubble of their own creation. New Zealand is a factory for the world's best Rugby coaches. Beyond the Rugby field critical/strategic thinking is absent around the country. How the media/6PM news will give coverage to the All Blacks before world events is a symptom of the South Pacific bubble. I love New Zealand dearly and it pains me greatly to know that one day the bubble will burst.


Now I come to Kim Beazley. Before I go on any further I wish to make one point about Beazley. In the modern era the 2 Labor political figures I have most time for are Bob Hawke and Kim Beazley. Sure I have my share of ideological differences with Beazley. By the same token I respect how a serious intellect is coupled with his political views and in this regard Hawke and Beazley are alike.

I believe the astute observations Beazley offers concerning his time as Australia's ambassador to Washington in the above interview are also the kind of discussion that are missing in New Zealand outside of academic circles. The reader will be rightfully asking what does this have to with the topic? I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment.

I believe Beazley is both a strategic/critical thinker as well as being a key Australian Labor Party Figure. Beazley's time as Minster of Defence in the Hawke Government is worth a glance. None of what Beazley and his successors in the Defence portfolio achieved could have been done without critical/strategic thinking.

Around the time Beazley served in the hot seat , Australia's Defence outlook moved towards defending the Northern Air- Sea Gap. Notable the Anzac Class Frigates , Collins Class Submarines and F-18 fighter jets were all acquired or at least committed to during the time of the Hawke Government. The acquisitions would replace ageing military platforms (e.g Oberon class submarines) and contribute to the strategic outlook of the time.

While Beazley was Minster of Defence , New Zealand was at the beginning of the many self inflicted wounds ( The first being New Zealand's anti American Nuclear Ban) that in due time would lead me to write this very article. The kind of clear thinking Beazley offers the listener about American culture ,government and general foreign policy aims was missing in the fourth Labour government and never came back. The  fourth Labour government was lead by Prime Minster David Lange (1942 - 2005) and his successors.



My argument is as follows. Public debate and discussion around Australia's current strategic outlook and future defence projects (e.g Collins Class Submarine replacement) is sound and to be encouraged. By the same vain the decisions made in the Hawke era should also be debated. In particular the axing of the Naval Air Arm by not replacing the Aircraft Carrier HMAS Melbourne deserves attention.

By relying on ground based air power Australian defence planners are taking a calculated strategic risk. Such a calculated risk relies on a firm strategic outlook and the required military hardware and infrastructure: in this case the likes of F-18's and airbases in Northern Australia. I will leave why I think the risk factor involved with land based air power is greater than made out to be for another time.



In the case of New Zealand, the complete absence of any kind of coherent strategic direction towards the Asia Pacific and the NZDF's lack of combat capabilities makes such discussions nearly impossible. In other words without a sound defence and diplomatic strategies New Zealand is inviting a unstable Asia Pacific region (think a unstable East Timor) and aggression by a foreign power (read the Chinese.) In my opinion this is a far cry from risk management. Australia's use of land based Air Power is one instance of  risk management in defence planning as opposed to a outright reckless policy vacuum.

Ultimately the blame for New Zealand's strategic isolation must fall with voters. Stay with me while I make a topical detour. A survey of the priorities of voters at the last General Election didn't reveal any surprises. Domestic issues like the economy and education got top billings. In political terms John Key and National understood what was on the minds of voters the best and the final election result was a reflection of this fact.

Issues like I have addressed in this article will never get a look in with the majority of the voting public because short -sightedness is a Kiwi trait along with Rugby being the unofficial national religion. One of the reasons I started The Lens of History Blog and Podcast was to bring a issue like New Zealand's strategic isolation to the attention of the general public. In writing this article I hope to have taken a step forward towards accomplishing my goal.

Ultimately the voting public will have set up a cycle in which they are responsible for not holding successive governments to account for their fool hardiness. The end result of the fool hardiness will come back to haunt New Zealand. The only question in my mind is to what degree or scale does our strategic isolation come back to bite us?