“Comments by Labour MP Phil Goff that the incoming Clark government in 2000 simply followed a decision by the outgoing National government in 1999 to purchase 102 LAV III armed personnel carriers (APC) is, at best, trifling with the truth” said Max Bradford, National’s Defence Minister in 1997-1999.
Mr Goff’s comments were made in response to criticism that the Labour government’s decision to commit over $750m to purchase the LAVs was foolhardy, given that only 11 have seen deployment since their purchase in 2002 (see RNZ report (1) below).
“In 1998, the National government made a decision to purchase only 35 LAVs, which was seen as sufficient at the time. The purchase included a number of LAVs as maintenance and recovery vehicles, so there were fewer than 35 available for combat purposes” said Mr Bradford.
“Although National decided in principle to 102 vehicles at the time, we had serious doubts that 102 were ever to be needed, hence the decision to buy only 35 as replacements for the M113 APCs. There was a serious need for other defence force equipment replacements ahead of the full LAV purchase.
These included:
a third frigate for the Navy, which never proceeded and only now are the implications being fel
new helicopters to replace the 15 or so Iroquois, eventually replaced by 6 NH90s
replacements for the A4 Skyhawks: the Clark government scrapped the air combat wing,
to help pay for the 102 LAVs
replacements for the then-aging Hercules, which only now
is being considered
replacement of the then VIP transport aircraft with 2 Boeing 757s
“When the Clark government announced the decision to buy 102 LAVs, there was considerable criticism at the time. Indeed, the purchase process was the subject of an Auditor-General Office thorough review and report to Parliament. The Auditor-General found serious shortcomings in Labour’s decision on the LAVs. Now Labour’s chickens coming home to roost”
“I am disappointed that Mr Goff should seek to shift the blame for a stupid Labour government decision in 2000 to proceed with the purchase of 102 LAVs, as the responsibility rests solely with the Clark government, not National. Certain very senior officers in the Army at the time have to share the responsibility for poor advice and a poor decision.
We should be thankful that the problems within the hierarchy of the NZDF at the time have now been fixed and I trust the public can now rely on the integrity of the Defence Force to give the appropriate advice to the government today in a difficult international environment.”
“Today’s geopolitical landscape certainly isn’t the “incredibly benign strategic environment” that Helen Clark confidently stated in 2000 should apply to defence procurement decisions, so we must get the very best defence advice nowadays” concluded Mr Bradford.
As far as I know this is a public statement from former Defence Minster Max Bradford . I have reproduced it in full in the interests of highlighting the way successive governments have either guttered the NZDF or done to nothing what so ever to repair the damage inflicted by Phil Goff and Helen Clark.
Max's statement first appeared on Kiwi Blog. I can be reached at the email address listed on the Contact and About page if Max has any issue with his statement being reproduced in this article.
A lack of a 3rd or 4th Anzac Class frigate would highly likely leave the RNZN without a combat capable warship available in the event of a emergency situation. If both HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha are being upgraded or are in port for maintenance/resting the crews , New Zealand , our trade routes and interests over seas are left defenceless.
A major red flag concerning the NH90's was how they weren’t deployed to Vanuatu. The NZDF assistance to Vanuatu in the wake of Cyclone Pam was well covered by the New Zealand Media. The question is how much does the NH90 handicap reduce the NZDF amphibious capabilities?
Space doesn't permit me to give the reader a comprehensive answer. The answer may be compared to trying to start a car that has a flat battery. A part of modern day amphibious operations is using helicopters to air lift troops from (in the NZDF case HMNZS Canterbury ) to the sea ports and airfields in the area of operations. The troops who land directly on the coast link up with the units that were airlifted at the start of the operation. If the NZDF had to mount a stand alone amphibious operation , does it have the helicopters needed to air lift troops?
Before I address Max's next point I need to explain my reasoning to the reader.The RNZAF and the RNZN are the 2 services that are the most integral to the defence of New Zealand and our commerce. By far the bulk of New Zealand's commerce is transported by sea. In the event of a limited conflict breaking out in Asia between China and Vietnam a clear threat will exist to trade routes that New Zealand relies on for our exporters and imports.
When the Chinese invade the central pacific the NZDF role will be the defence of New Zealand . Defending commerce aka escorting the oil tanker that is bound for New Zealand becomes a part of the coming war. The question becomes how far will the Chinese advance beyond the Central Pacific? If the reader would like me to address this point in a future article leave a comment below.
The RNZF and RNZAF will be integral to escorting commerce , ASW and MCW in conjunction with our allies/coalition partners. The same goes for injecting any Chinese expeditionary force that are taking part in their invasion of the Central Pacific.
In a future war the Army's movements will be constrained by a couple of factors. The RNZAF air lift capabilities will determine the number of troops and the quantity of supplies that can be flown to destinations in the South Pacific. The limitations of NZDF Joint Amphibious Task Force combat capabilities fall beyond the scope of this article. The limitations will either see the Joint Amphibious Task Force destroyed by enemy action or never set sail.
Now that with all that in mind the Labour government axed what is commonly known as the RNZAF air combat wing. The logic employed by the government of the day can only be called insanity of the highest order. Any Minster of Defence that advocates removing the RNZF ability to provide air cover to the Army and Navy should be carted off to a lunatic asylum. The same goes for the current government who have failed address this capability gap.
Staying with the last Labour government they opted to upgrade the C-130's for one simple reason. By in effect adding bubble gum to extend the life of the aircraft they were able to ensure that a future government foots the bill for their replacement. This may backfire on former Defence Minster Phil Goff and Labour. Labour may well been returned to government by voters when the time comes for the payment and delivery of the C-130's replacement aircraft.
Can the public really trust the NZDF to give the government of the day sound advice? Before the reader feels outraged at my question they should take a step a back for a moment. To my knowledge in 2001 none of the NZDF senior commanders questioned the wisdom of scrapping the air combat arm of the RNZAF. Nor has any senior NZDF Commander since that time.
The reader may argue that senior NZDF commanders may have argued against the actions undertaken by the last Labour and lack of action from the current government. Did any of the NZDF commanders advise Goff against the policy and procurement decisions his nutty ideology demanded? If they did make such objections why didn't they make them public at the time or after they retired?
The the defence policy's of successive government's can only be described as lunacy. The reader ought to bear mind that Max has only touched the surface. My aim in future articles will be to go below the surface and to the depths of the insanity. These articles will come after I have concluded the series on New Zealand role in the fight against Isis. I have been delayed in finishing up the series due to personal issues.
The idea that New Zealand backyard was incredibly benign strategic environment and would remain so was the greatest lie Helen Clark ever told. The planning and funding for China's massive naval build up would have been well under way. In between 2008 -15 the People's Liberation Army Navy submarine and surface fleet was greatly modernised/expanded.
China's ongoing military build up and tension over territorial disputes with neighbouring countries has happened under John Key's watch. Yet because on defence policy he shares his predecessors ideology he is blind to how the international situation is heading for global conflict.
The first duty of the New Zealand government is the defence of the realm. Thanks to the warped left wing ideology of Clark and now Key the first duty of the government is now seen as pandering to the Useless Nations in order to get a seat on the Security Council.
Countless causalities will be incurred by the NZDF in future conflicts/wars because of the lunacy of successive governments. Coupled with the NZDF lacking the combat capabilities necessary to defend the South West Pacific against a would be aggressor and I am left with some very serious concerns.
Make no mistake the next generation always pays the price for the mistakes of current political leaders. The historical parallel is how the failed peace after WW1 would see the next generation pay a heavy price in blood. I really do wonder how the kids who still in school will fare with the burden the current generation is leaving them. Now they aren't old enough to buy alcohol. In 5 to 10 years they will face the kind of situation there WW2 forefathers did ; cleaning up a bloody mess.
Political commentator Martin Bain joins Luke in the refurbished studio.The upcoming UK general election is discussed over coffee. Find out what political issues matter the most to voters the world over and more in this in depth discussion.
Following on from Part 1 in the series I will examine how New Zealand could have pursued alternative strategies in the war against Isis. In this instalment in the series I will take a glance at how New Zealand could have opted to provide support to the Kurds who are fighting Isis in Iraq and Syria.
The title of this article stems from The Winds of Change speech made by Harold Macmillan in South Africa. In the present day I believe the Arab Spring and the rise of Isis in Iraq and Syria represent “The Winds of Change” drifting through out the Middle East. The Kurds in Northern Iraq have weathered the storm well in comparison too their fellow compatriots in Iraq and Syria.
In post Saddam Huessein Iraq the Kurds enjoyed semi autonomy in the Northern Part of the country. From 2004 - 2007 Iraq was embroiled in sectarian violence;subjected to whims of Al-Qaeda and any number of insurgent groups. The Kurdish areas of Iraq stood out as a Medium security environment that escaped the worst of the senseless bloodshed.
Starting in the 1970's Kurdish separatists (the most commonly known of these organisations being Kurdistan Workers Party or the PKK) waged a campaign for a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq , Syria , Iran and southern Turkey. Crucially the separatists claims never gained international legitimacy. In the wake of the territorial gains by Isis the international community perception of the Kurds changed from rogue separatists to freedom fighters.
Kurdish forces have proved to be the only genuine stumbling block in the way of Isis completing a take over of Iraq. Why did the Kurds not melt away like the regular Iraqi Army did in the face of the enemy? The answer that will spring to mind with many readers is the Kurds are fighting tooth and nail for their own survival.
Another dimension exists as the Kurds are also fighting for their own homeland. A historical parallel is when the Jews in the British Mandate of Palestine were struggling for statehood. In the Jewish campaign for statehood between the end of WW2 and the passage of UN Resoultion 181 (the creation of the modern day state of Israel) , terrorist tactics and illegal migration were employed. The rest as they say is history.
Why didn't John Key and his cabinet opt to send troops to act as trainers/advisers to Kurdish forces? I believe the answer is complicated by how Key is wearing blinkers that prevent him from seeing how the Winds of Change have changed the Middle East forever. In fairness I should point out that the rest of the international community is in the same boat.
The results of the damage inflicted by the Winds of Change are that Iraq now only exists as a sovereign state on a map. Isis sole interest is spreading its tyranny across the world. A unified Iraq isn't a part of Isis aims. By unofficially partitioning Iraq along ethnic/religious, Isis will be able to subdue the population.
Purely from a military stand point in my view the coalition's policy of opting to try and resurrect a dead patient (the Iraqi Army) instead of a heavyweight boxer (the Kurds) is a very unfortunate mistake. In order to continue with the discussion I am going to assume that it would have been possible for the NZDF to work with the ADF and other coalition military forces in support of the Kurds. If you disagree with this assertion , feel welcome to leave a comment on the article.
What obstacles stood in the way of New Zealand opting to go the Kurdish route in the war against Isis?
The Kurds are land locked. A lack of seaport would have made resupplying coalition and local forces a logistically challenging. When the NZDF deploys beyond the South Pacific logistics do come into play. When New Zealand deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan Kiwi troops plugged into the logistical supply chain of our coalition allies. Clearly where ever the NZDF deployed in Iraq they had to able to plug into logistical support.
Staying with logistics any efforts to strength the Kurds would be at the whim of our coalition partners. New Zealand lacks a home grown defence industry that can support the peacetime NZDF , little alone a would be wartime army in the Kurds. Essentially New Zealand would have no say over how Kurdish forces were equipped. The full implications of relying on off the shelf Military hardware will not be seen until New Zealand faces a national emergency (read the Chinese going on the Warpath.)
In the real world there is no such thing as Rambo. Leaving front line troops without native air cover from the RNZAF in a high intensity area of operations is simply a non option. Due to political correctness demanding that Kiwi troops never face combat just how many causalities were incurred in Afghanistan due to a sole reliance on coalition air forces for tactical air strikes , will never be discussed. Let me point out to the reader how New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team served in a Medium security environment.
Another point I wish to raise with the reader is how Isis and its rival Iranian backed Non State actors seek to meet their ends. Isis is acting like a conventional army. A conventional army seeks to meet its aim via territorial gains. Insurgencies seek to undermine the legitimacy and authority of government's while gaining control of local populations. The War in Iraq has shifted from a counter insurgency too more of semi conventional in nature. Events have moved well past the point where training the Kurds in counter insurgency doctrine would have been a productive aim.
In spite of the obstacles some options deserved to be discussed. Key's disgraceful political dance around New Zealand's role in war against Isis, came at the expense of such discussions. I believe that training Kurdish forces in New Zealand would be a sound idea. Why wouldn't it be better to train the Kurds away from the war zone?
Improving or creating the Kurds Special Forces capabilities is the option that springs to my mind. Partnering with our Australian allies would have been the only prequest. By partnering with Australia sufficient manpower would be available to train Kurdish Special Forces . The different climate and terrains of Australia and New Zealand offer ideal training grounds to any Special Forces selection courses and training exercises.
The Australian and New Zealand SAS could act as trainers/advisers to the new unit. A Kurdish Special Forces unit modeled on the SAS is a realistic aim. New Zealand would have a greater say over how a small special forces unit is trained and equipped than it would over the regular Iraqi Army. The role of our coalition partners like the USA would to supply the equipment for the unit with little or no cost being incurred by the Australian and New Zealand governments.
Author Kelly Mitchell joins Luke Herbert on the couch for a chat about his book Invested to be Molested: Why you should fire your Financial Advisor NOW! Kelly other works are also discussed in the program.
Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant General Tim Keating says there will be 16 specialised trainers in Taji and the rest made up of logistics and protection personnel.
"A training mission like this is not without risk. Because of that a force protection element will be part of the deployment to support the training activities carried out at the base," he told a news conference.
This is the first of a
four part series of articles that covers New Zealand's military
contribution to the war against Isis. In part one I will examine the
decision made by Cabinet to deploy troops to Iraq .
In part two and three
of the series I will outline strategies/Military deployments that I
believe would have had a greater impact in combating Isis. The
alternatives I will put forward are build around the NZDF training
,equipping and fighting alongside the Kurds and the taking part in
the defence of Jordan. The respective strengths and weakness of each
alternative will be examined. Why the coalition won't come close to
defeating Isis and the coming wider war will be the subject of the
last installment in the series.
Paul
Buchanan
is correct about the decision to deploy the NZDF to Iraq had already
been made before yesterdays Cabinet meeting. The John Key lead dance
around the decision to send troops to Iraq was nothing short of
disgraceful. When Isis was taking over Iraq Key should have been
straight with his electorate about the imperative for the NZDF to be
deployed to Iraq.
In
order to allow for the rapid deployment of troops Key needed to show
some spine. Key could have focused on the sheer brutality of Isis.
Also how Isis take over of Iraq and Syria has given them the world's
largest terrorist base should have been put in focus.
The
fabricate of the Iraqi Army melted away at the first sight of Isis.
In short the Iraqi Army is institutionally too far gone to serve as
anything more than a force that exists on paper. The Iraqi Air Force
wasn't yet prepared
to provide tactical air support for local ground forces. More on
air cover below.
Committing troops in an
advisory/training role with the Iraqi Army that is beyond repair is
very unwise. Two clear alternatives were completely ignored by Key.
The most obvious choice would have been to send trainers/advisors to
support Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq. Dispatching troops to Jordan
the next frontier in the fight
against Isis would have been the second alternative. I will go into
greater depth about these alternatives in part 2 and 3 of this
series.
The only worse
decision Key could have made
would have been to withhold forces from the fight all together. Why
should have New Zealand joined the coalition and risk the lives of
NZDF personal in futile effort to train the Iraqi Army?
A
plausible scenario exists in which the people of Iraq can be trained
to provide a degree of security for their local communities. I
believe that many of recruits of joining the Iraqi Army will be
members of local militias. After they have completed their training
and been issued with equipment the members of the local militias
would desert the Iraqi Army. Upon returning home the deserters would
look to protect their homes and families from Isis and other
terrorist organisations.
Kiwi military and
security analysts have failed to discuss how the RNZAF lack of a air
combat wing (the Skyhawk's that were canned by the previous Labour
government) has played a role in restricting New Zealand to a purely
training role in the war against Isis. We are only just beginning to
see outcome of the spineless Key's government failure to restore the
RNZAF combat wing.
The other factors that
has relegated New Zealand's contribution to a training role is Key's
lack of political will to deploy the SAS in a front line combat role.
To what extent the RNZAF inability to provide native air cover for
our ground forces and Key having no back bone as Prime Minster were
behind the decision to deploy troops in a “Non Combat” role ,
will have to be determined by the history books.
Mr. Secretary, let me just reiterate what His Majesty the King, says repeatedly: This is our war. This is a war that has to have a Muslim/Arab stand, but without the support of our international friends, our partners in the coalition, we cannot do it and we cannot eradicate this evil. It is truly a third world war by other means.
The King of Jordan and is government have been preparing their country for war. The war will be for the very survival of the the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The reader may want to factor in how Isis poses a direct threat to Jordan in the face of there take over of Iraq and large chunks of Syria.
I find it hard not to see the ghost of Winston Churchill present in Abdullah II King of Jordan. Unlike Britain, Jordan does not have the English Channel as a barrier for against any would be invader. Just like Churchill, King Abdullah is looking to inspire his people to fight against a relentless foe.
What was Jordan's foreign minister Nasser Judeh signalling with his comment concerning the fight against Isis being a world war? The first phrase of the war has started. Isis are creeping closer to Jordan. Replacing casualties lost in combat and logistics are holding up Isis advance.
Seen from the view point of a western observer, I would argue that Jordan has already been thrown to the wolves. President Barack Obama has decided that rhetoric directed at Isis will be his main weapon in defeating this monstrous tyranny. The people of Iraq are the victims of Obama's take very little action and talk a lot of rubbish strategy for combating Isis.
The key event to watch in Jordan is general mobilisation. I will be observing the difficulties Jordan has training and equipping an expanded wartime military with great interest. To what extent Jordan can equip a rapidly expanding military with a modest industrial base may well be the deciding factor in the Battle for Jordan.
Curiously I am remind of the fate of Rhodesia in the 1970's. In its own way Jordan is facing international isolation just like Rhodesia did in the fifteen years after UDI. Communist backed terrorists operating from Zambia and Mozambique swarmed over the border in Rhodesia. Jordan is facing the same kind of onslaught from Isis from neighbouring Iraq and Syria.
How long will Jordan be able to economically sustain a wartime economy? In time Jordan could face economic ruin from the costs of the war. I do think that unlike Rhodesia they have the population buffer that will prevent economic difficulties, that can arise when the military age population leaves their civilian jobs for front line duty.
Will Jordan share the fate of Rhodesia with Isis in the place of the Chinese Communist backed Robert Mugabe? Watch this space.
Author Andrew Carr joins Luke Herbert on the Lens of History couch for a chat about his book Winning The Peace Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific. Winning the Peace (published January 2015 by MUP Academic) is available to order (hardback, paperback and ebook) from mup.com.au
Winning the Peace is based on the author's thesis on Australia’s foreign policy from 1983 to 2013. In 2013 Australia’s National Security Strategy declared that 'active middle powers are increasingly influential in the region” And set to a national ambition “to influence and shape our regional and global environment to be conductive to advancing Australia's interests and values. In the book the author sets to test out those claims.
Winning The Peace Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific is an excellent read. The book will appeal to both the general reader and students of Political Science and International relations. I applaud the author for opening the inner workings of Australia’s foreign policy to keen observers such as myself.
The introduction and Conceptual Framework chapters are the book's starting line. The following chapters cover History of Australian Foreign and Defence Policy;Australia and Irregular Migration and Australia,Weapons of Mass Destruction and Trade Liberalisation. The “answers” to what Andrew Carr set out to find are found in Chapters entitled Can Middle powers promote Norms? and Conclusions.
I found the section of the book covering History of Australian Foreign and Defence Policy to be of greater value than its size or intended role in the book. One historical nugget I didn't know about is: Billy Hughes being labelled a “Pestiferous Varmint” after he influenced the discussions on reparations from Germany, the fate of Germany’s ex colonial possessions in the Pacific and Australian representation at the League of Nations at the Versailles conference in 1919.
The issue of the Australian government policy of dealing with Irregular Migration will remain controversial for the foreseeable future. If you have strong feelings positive or otherwise towards the so called Pacific Solution or just the issue I would invite you to put aside your biases before you read on.
My own impression starts with the Keating Government role in starting to develop the regional framework that was starting to become the Norm. After a policy back flip which the Howard government would execute the regional approach would be the Hall Mark of preventing the arrival of Irregular Migrants via sea to Australia.
During the Hawke government Australia’s National security concerns were focused on the Cold War and Irregular Migration wasn't a concern. By the time Keating becomes Prime Minster Irregular Migration is on the radar. Some ASEAN nations sought to Securitise transnational crime. While drug trafficking was recognised as an issue requiring regional co-operation since the 1970's. In the mid 90's ASEAN began to expand the agenda to include ,terrorism ,piracy, money laundering,human trafficking and people smuggling.
So what of the policy back flip by John Howard that perhaps went rather unnoticed? After he was elected Howard stated.
“ If there is any difference on the part of my government with our predecessors in government, it lies in my objection to the impression that was sometimes given in the past that Australia had to pursue an Asia-only policy and downgrade the weight it gave to associations with Europe and the United States. My own view has always been that Australia does not need to choose between her history and her geography.”
Essentially Howard put the regional framework and the foundations for its expansion to one side in favour of the historical alliance with the USA. The events of 9-11 would coincide with a rising number of irregular migration arriving by boat capturing the publics attention.
Since the called “Pacific solution” will be well known to the reader I won't cover it in this review. Rather I will touch on the 2002 Regional Ministerial Conference on people smuggling,trafficking in Persons and related Transnational Crime more commonly known as the “Bali Process.”
Spearheaded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and foreign minster Alexander Downer the Bali Process was the regional forum that shifted Australian foreign policy back towards the foundations of the regional framework that I mentioned above. A number of important policy success such as the extradition of people smugglers from Sweden and Egypt were gained from the first meeting of the “Bali process”.
I feel the approach of the Kevin Rudd , Julie Gillard and Tony Abbott government's towards Irregular Migration is well documented in the book. The Kevin Rudd , Julie Gillard and Tony Abbott government's are fairly contemporary. In this book review my desire to avoid commenting on the current Australian political scene. This is why I will now leave the topic of Irregular Migration.
Australia's role in the prevention of the proliferation and possession of chemical weapons signifies the country role as a middle power. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1992 had humble origins. Its origins lay in the Australia group. The Australia group started out in 1985 with representatives from twenty five nations meeting regularly at the Australian embassy in Paris. At these meeting Australian officials set out to persuade other nations of there agenda .
By 1992 negotiations had stalled. Foreign Minster Gareth Evans took the bold and risky step of tabling the Australian draft of the text for the Convention. Australia had secretly negotiated the text with the US government. After some good work from the unheralded heroes otherwise known as diplomats and the support of governments in South East Asia , the Chemical Weapons Convention was cemented.
The Treaty of Rarotonga ( more commonly know as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone )was born out of the Hawke government's aim of promoting anti nuclear proliferation while maintaining good relations with the Reagan admin and future US political leaders.
Australia set out to reassure the United States that the treaty wouldn't restrict the passage of nuclear weapons. The goal of the Australian government was to prevent nuclear weapons from being stationed and tested in the South Pacific. As a middle power Australia was able to override the objections of small South Pacific nations who desired to follow New Zealand's lead on banning Nuclear Powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear weapons.
The notion that Australia bullied the smaller South Pacific nations into ratifying The Treaty of Rarotonga is unfounded. IMO the fact that those countries would rely on Australia for there defence in the event they were threatened by a foreign power suggests they had nothing to bring to the bargaining table.
In 1984 the Labour government lead by David Lange outlawed nuclear powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand waters. As a response the Reagan admin cut defence and intel ties with New Zealand. New Zealand was left out in the cold (no pun intended) until New Zealand contribution to the War in Afghanistan saw defence and intel links restored.
For the rest of this section of the review I will touch upon how I feel about the issue as someone who lives in New Zealand. I wish to convey to the reader what effect the death of critical thinking has had on New Zealand foreign policy. New Zealand's UN centric and anti Nuclear foreign policy has been accepted has a kind of religion. Anybody who applies rational logic which inevitable leads them to question one of the country unofficial religions (the other one being Rugby) is seen as a heretic.
I believe that the history books will outright condemn New Zealand foreign policy for sacrificing the country's security for what is at best misplaced principals. The assertion that there is no evidence that New Zealand actions had any notable impact on global or even regional Non Proliferation or Non possession is factually correct.
I will leave the final word to Alexander Downer: “nuclear weapons still exist in spite of the Canberra and Rudd Commissions. I'm a bit sceptical about what they can ever achieve. They're good domestic politics,it makes you look as through you here in Australia are going to rid the world of nuclear weapons. If you believe that , than clearly you'd believe anything.”
The chapter on and Trade Liberalisation offers the reader a valuable insight into Australia's economic interests. Reading about the foundation of the APEC forum brought back memories. The memories of first learning of APEC via the six o’clock news reporting on the attendees wearing the fashions of the host country.
The Hawke government undertook a two prolong approach to promote and frame trade liberalisation as the norm. By unilaterally liberalising trade Australia could be seen as a credible advocate or in other words leading by example. Hawke arguments for promoting trade liberalisation were pragmatic and based on the fact it suited Australia's economic interests. This can been seen in contrast to the moral/idealogical arguments made by Reagan and Thatcher.
As a middle power the task of persuading the USA and the EU to remove agricultural trade barriers was seen as near impossible. The Hawke government would take the coalition building approach by developing the Carins group.
In 1986 the Australian government invited fourteen countries to Cairns (Australia) to discuss forcing agriculture back onto the agenda at the Uruguay round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks. Exceeding any expectations the Carins Group placed agriculture liberalisation on the table and obtained significant reductions in export and other subsides.
Can middle powers promote Norms? The question falls into two three categories Acting alone, Coalition and multilateralism and Cooperation or a conflict with a great power. Afterwards the author covers how Australia's foreign policy performed within the conceptual frame work explained earlier on in the book.
What sprung to mind as I read about Australian foreign policy promoting norms by Coalition and multilateralism is how as a middle power Australia could act as the founder or leader of a international lobby groups. The Australia group would help to lay the seeds for the Chemical Weapons Convention without undue expense to the Department of Trade and Foreign Affairs and by logical extension the tax payer.
The role Australia played in negotiating Chemical Weapons Convention is a clear example of Australia playing the role of a lead actor at a institutional forum. The willingness of the United States Government to work with a junior partner is acknowledged. Credit should go to Australia for undertaking the role of drafting the text and kick starting the stalled negotiations.
I found the impact of the Cairns group efforts on Trade Liberalisation to be a good example how a middle power can promote a Norm by forming a coalition of like minded nations. Its kind of like if someone was to have badly cut themselves and you set out to stop the bleeding. Australia unilateral approach was like placing a band aid on the cut. The coalition approach is akin to stopping the bleeding with bandages. Sufficient pressure was placed on the cut by the multilateral/bandage to stop the bleeding.
In the period covered by the book successive Australian governments enjoyed strong relations with the USA in spite of differences surrounding Trade Liberalisation and stopping the proliferation of Weapons of Mass destructions.
Notable with the Treaty of Rarotonga Australia went against the wishes of the USA without steeping on its core interests. I believe that the policy stance of the Lange government in effect removed New Zealand from the round table of policy discussions. Rather than join our Australian cousins in a constructive diplomatic relationship with the USA Lange sold out to the anti nuclear movement.
Below is my commentary on the author's conclusion's. My commentary is diffusion on the subject material covered in the book. I have included the reluctance of Australian government's to act as a Norm stabiliser below for the purposes of this review. In the book Australia's role as a Norm stabiliser is covered in the chapter preceding the author's conclusions. I don't dispute the author's assertion that Australia is a regional power. My commentary is build around this assertion. I now invite the reader to have a cup of tea and read onwards.
In the time period covered by the book Australia's alliance with the United States acting as the foundation of the country security was and is a long accepted Norm. Any discussion has to take place within the frame of work of Australia relying on the United States of America as a security guarantor.
Even before I read the book I found John Howard's notion that Australia doesn't have to choose between its geography and history, to be a head scratcher. In my opinion the fact Indonesia and not the United States was Australia's key partner in the Bali Process is proof that geography trumps historical military and diplomatic ties.
I do understand that the reader is bound to argue that domestic politics in the United States was the reason for their lack of Norm entrepreneurship and diffusion in Irregular Migration in the Asia-Pacific regions. Domestically in the United States the debate around securing the country's border with Mexico and immigration controls is a contentious issue.
The reader can avoid the controversy surrounding Irregular Migration and examine my argument from the stand point of other policy issues . The drugs trade; terrorism and environmental issues all appeared on the Keating Government's Cooperative Security menu. Fill free to order what ever meal takes your fancy.
I concur with the author reasoning that during the time period covered by the book Australia's peacekeeping efforts in East Timor ,the Solomon Islands and Bougainville were driven pragmatic necessity. Australia is the only country in the region who can respond as they lead nation or stand alone to security challenges in the South Pacific. Indonesia developing military capabilities would be best covered in a separate article.
The sanctions imposed on Fiji after the 2006 amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. The failure to punish Fiji for the coup may be due to the fact that no threat was posed to Australia by the events that took place. Australia may be willing to talk tough but is unwilling to back it up with punitive action.
In the years since East Timor's independence from Indonesia the country has remained institutionally weak . Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers have never remained in the country long enough to allow for the country to develop the institutions and constitutional framework the backbones of flourishing stable democracy's .
Behind the scenes the Australian and New Zealand governments policy aim should have been to facilitate the foundations of East Timor as a nation.By permitting East Timor's political leaders to take credit for political progress they would have gained public confidence. At present the people of East Timor are at risk of succumbing to factional infighting. Factional infighting could undermine the government of East Timor in events that would mirror what has occurred in Iraq , minus the Islamic extremist elements.
A scaled down version of the Marshal Program should have been the template for the construction of the infrastructure such as schools , roads , ports and railway lines. Infrastructure such as ports and airports can also double as military installations. Australia and New Zealand would have reaped considerable economic benefits from old school nation building in East Timor.
Strategically East Timor is ideally situated to provide Australia and New Zealand greater access to its neighbourhood via a permanent military presence. By operating out of East Timor the NZDF and ADF would have faster response times to any unexpected events in Asia. Australian military planners have long sought to ease the challenges of protecting Australia's interests in the event of a local conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
The risk of East Timor falling prey to Non State actors has yet to be discussed at least publicly by the governments of East Timor , Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand .East Timor's proximity to Indonesia could deter any would be terrorist organisations from entering the country. I believe that if East Timor ever was in danger of becoming a terrorist haven Indonesia would not hesitate to reoccupy the country.
This must be balanced out against how East Timor's growing pains make the country an attractive target for Non State Actors. As Mali showed the world in 2013 countries with weak government's make easy prey for Islamic extremists. Only a French led military intervention (Operation Serval) prevented the Islamic extremist take over of Mali.
Ultimately Australia and New Zealand unwillingness to project economic and military power fits into the norm of political correctness. The fear of being ignorantly labelled “imperialists” by the radical left wingers has prevented a successful frame work for a stable democratic and pro western East Timor from being created and implemented.
The fact that Australia and New Zealand have lacked the political will to ensure East Timor becomes a stable pro western democracy will have unforeseen consequences. I believe Australia and New Zealand reluctance to act as Norm stabilisers in East Timor is a historical turning point. Non state actors and foreign powers (read the Chinese) will perceive Australia and New Zealand as being weak for following Politically Correct Norms.
By showing weakness Australia and New Zealand have sent out party invitations to Non state Actors and the Chinese. In the time frame of 2020-25 the Chinese will bring Area Access/Area Denial to the party. Non state actors are already making their presence felt across the ditch.
A comparison of Australian and New Zealand government between 1984 and 1990 is useful when examining Trade Liberalisation in a Trans Tasman light. I selected the 1984 – 1990 time frame because it covers the time the fourth Labour government was in office. Under the fourth Labour government New Zealand would have three prime minsters David Lange,Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Mike Moore.
I would admit to be being unfair towards New Zealand for selecting such a narrow time frame. Considerations of space and my desire to compare the Australian and New Zealand governments at that time are behind my decision to select the 1984-1990 time frame.
As Prime Minster Hawke led a consensus government. When Hawke argued for Trade Liberalisation he did so from the stand points of Australia’s economic interests. If the arguments Hawke made to the Australian public and the international community in favour of reducing tariffs were a tree , than the roots and the trunk were his formidable intellect.
Hawke understood the Australian public would accept Trade Liberalisation if they understood why the need for reform existed and they believed that in the long run the outcome would be fairer on them. Fortunately the Australian voting public was able to take this norm for granted until the Howard Government's industrial relations reform package (known as Work Choices) and the ensuring years up to the present.
In the Shaky lsles Lange would be the first Prime Minster in the chaotic fourth Labor government. Finance Minster Roger Douglas was the architect of Trade Liberalisation and the other free market economic reforms of the 1980's. Since Lange had more influence over the menu in parliament's cafeteria than he did his own Minster of Finance he can take little credit for Trade Liberalisation in New Zealand.
Douglas motives were purely ideologically. When it came to undertaking economic reforms the distance between the norm undertaken by Hawke and the way the Kiwi voting public were just by standers is the distance from the Sun to Pluto. In the arena of foreign affairs, Lange successors in Palmer and Moore can said to have been care taker Prime Minsters and as such fall beyond the scope of the book.
Diplomatically New Zealand never positioned itself as a world leader in Trade Liberalisation until the Helen Clark government secured the New Zealand – China and other bilateral Free Trade agreements. Did the political instability of the fourth Labour government prevent New Zealand from promoting itself as a leading example of Trade Liberalisation? The author's Kiwi counterparts and historians have yet to address this question.
I would certainly argue that in between the years 1984 – 1990 New Zealand cashed in on the efforts of the Hawke government. New Zealand had nothing to do with the foundering of APEC and the Cairns group. A series of fortunate circumstances allowed New Zealand foreign policy to have an opening in the field of Trade Liberalisation.
The APEC Forum allowed New Zealand to act as a Norm Diffuser at the Ministerial level. By joining the Cairns Group New Zealand participated in lobbying the USA and Europe to reduce agricultural subsides.
For the benefit of the international since the 1990's dairy exports have been the back bone of the New Zealand economy. Up until the 1990's New Zealand main exports had been wool and lamb. Reducing and the outright removal of tariffs and agricultural subsides was and continues to be of far greater importance to New Zealand than it does Australia.
Lastly I wish to raise a point that hasn't been discussed in the book or in Australia. What occurs in the event a foreign power are in a position to or have military threatened Australia and the United States fails to meet its obligations as a security guarantor?
The absence of Norm entrepreneurship and diffusion on this question is worth examining. The signing of the ANZUS Treaty saw the Australian foreign policy establishment begin to frame the country role in the new post war order. The challenges of the Cold War/Nuclear Age had already emerged and were at the forefront of the Australia’s mind.
At the same time historians were beginning to document the events which saw John Curtain's government switch its security focus from the UK to the USA (see chapter 3). The fall of Singapore would leave a bitter legacy in the annuals of Australian military/political history that would last until the new millennium.
The divided between the Norm entrepreneurs ,diffusers and Norm stabilisers in foreign policy and historians in and outside of academia was in place. Had such a divided not been in place would the Fall of Singapore have served as the catalysis for Australia’s foreign policy? Put another way could the bitter legacy from the Fall of Singapore acted as the catalysis for Australian foreign policy alongside or in the place of ANZUS? I will leave the reader to consider the implications of these questions.
As we enter what has described by as the Asian Century , Winning the Peace is essential reading for understanding Australia's role as a Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific region. Reserve a place for Winning the Peace on your book shelf or in your Kindle.
