But a long war today would be totally different. In fact, after about nine months of intense peer conflict, attrition would grind the U.S. armed forces down to something resembling the military of a regional power. The Army, for example, would be armed primarily with infantry weapons with heavy firepower coming from gun trucks and a trickle of modern equipment acquired from struggling domestic production and whatever logisticians could scrounge up on the world market. This state of affairs arises because the U.S. government has not thought seriously about industrial mobilization. It is far easier to bask in warm memories of World War II than to face the harsh choices that mobilization preparation entails.
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Correction, I was informed that 28 is the surge number for M1 Abram production, that the figure beggars' belief is not surprising.
I have never lost my interest in 'long inter-state' wars. My interest in this kind of warfare spans from lifelong interest in WW2 and 20th century history. The reader can judge for themselves, if my historical grounding makes me biases towards the topic or not. What I will freely admit is the way my historical grounding influences my strategic outlook in the present.
Space does not permit a comprehensive look at banishing a ugly and scary historical ghost, which I will describe below. As such, I have ignored the following plausible eventuality: During the next long war, the M1 Abrams tank designed is axed in favour of a less technological sophisticated and cheaper (aka 'mass production friendly') tank design. In effect, my focus is on the foundations (industrial capacity/output) and not what the eventual building resembles ( the M1 Abram or future tank designs).
My next comparison is purely in terms of industrial capacity, and not issues of morality or culture. In terms of industrial capacity, the United States of America is grossly ill-prepared for a future 'long inter-state' war, not unlike the Axis Powers in WW2. Specifically, during WW2, the ghost of Germany's inadequate industrial output has been well documented by historians. The same goes for the way Germany was crushed by industrial output from the United States of America.
In the present, the projected monthly M1 Abrams production figure of 28 is pathetically low. On the basis of the production figure increasing by the tank factory operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, tank production could reach approx 96 per month.
In a twist of historical irony, present day projected M1 Abrams tank production (hereafter tank output) is a historical ghost. Let me explain. In WW2, German tank production could be described as woeful [Sample production figures ], so woeful they failed to keep up with attrition rates (losses in combat). Ironically, like their WW2 German counter parts, American tank production cannot keep up with attrition, in the next war. Interestingly, the same root cause , technological sophistication and high production costs, gives birth to a historical ghost. The ghost of WW2 German tank production (hereafter historical ghost); haunts present day tank output.
Banishing this historical ghost, who haunts me and any sane military planners, requires expanding the industrial base, so a increased monthly tank output can take place. Why reinvent the tank tread? This is my philosophy behind the answer to that question. In WW2, the American automotive industry was retooled to meet wartime demands for industrial mobilisation. The retooling of the American automotive industry formed a part of industrial mobilisation, and the resulting industrial output proved to be a war winner.
In the present, I can see no reason why, the current American automotive and other manufactures, should not embrace tank production. Additionally, the benefits of decentralising tank production are worth noting. Decentralising tank production reduces the likelihood of enemy action ceasing tank production by destroying a single or small number of factories. Geographically decentralising, the manufacture of tank components and tank assembly, would also see the manufacturing sector profit.
The expansion of current day tank output would or will present new challenges, yet there is equally opportunities for advancing manufacturing and transport logistics. In short, 3D Printing can reduce stress on current or create new supply chains, and localise the manufacturing process. Can existing factories fully support current and future advancements (think robotics and artificial intelligence) in tank output? I will come back to this question in a moment.
Cost issues aside, converting existing factories to tank output should pose few difficulties. However, conceptually this approach denies tank output, the potential advantage of portability/decentralisation. For a moment, recall how during WW2, American war industries were not subject to enemy action, this will not be the case in the next war. The permanent nature of existing civilian and military manufacturing and industrial plants provides a fixed target for enemy action.
The advantages of portability in tank and other wartime production ties in with the requirement for the above-mentioned decentralisation. Since the notion of a portable tank factories is conceptual, there is still a requirement to expand potential and existing tank output, across the existing manufacturing/industrial base. Any answer to my above question must factor in a balance between research and development into 3D printing/manufacturing advancements and utilising the existing manufacturing base and emerging technologies.
Laying the foundations to banish historical ghosts requires intersecting U.S. Military, private sector and government interests to works towards the common goal of increasing tank output. Above all else, a belief in redefining 'the possible' must drive our thinking surrounding tank production, industrial mobilisation, and the eventuality of 'long inter-state' wars.
In the present, the projected monthly M1 Abrams production figure of 28 is pathetically low. On the basis of the production figure increasing by the tank factory operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, tank production could reach approx 96 per month.
In a twist of historical irony, present day projected M1 Abrams tank production (hereafter tank output) is a historical ghost. Let me explain. In WW2, German tank production could be described as woeful [Sample production figures ], so woeful they failed to keep up with attrition rates (losses in combat). Ironically, like their WW2 German counter parts, American tank production cannot keep up with attrition, in the next war. Interestingly, the same root cause , technological sophistication and high production costs, gives birth to a historical ghost. The ghost of WW2 German tank production (hereafter historical ghost); haunts present day tank output.
Banishing this historical ghost, who haunts me and any sane military planners, requires expanding the industrial base, so a increased monthly tank output can take place. Why reinvent the tank tread? This is my philosophy behind the answer to that question. In WW2, the American automotive industry was retooled to meet wartime demands for industrial mobilisation. The retooling of the American automotive industry formed a part of industrial mobilisation, and the resulting industrial output proved to be a war winner.
In the present, I can see no reason why, the current American automotive and other manufactures, should not embrace tank production. Additionally, the benefits of decentralising tank production are worth noting. Decentralising tank production reduces the likelihood of enemy action ceasing tank production by destroying a single or small number of factories. Geographically decentralising, the manufacture of tank components and tank assembly, would also see the manufacturing sector profit.
The expansion of current day tank output would or will present new challenges, yet there is equally opportunities for advancing manufacturing and transport logistics. In short, 3D Printing can reduce stress on current or create new supply chains, and localise the manufacturing process. Can existing factories fully support current and future advancements (think robotics and artificial intelligence) in tank output? I will come back to this question in a moment.
Cost issues aside, converting existing factories to tank output should pose few difficulties. However, conceptually this approach denies tank output, the potential advantage of portability/decentralisation. For a moment, recall how during WW2, American war industries were not subject to enemy action, this will not be the case in the next war. The permanent nature of existing civilian and military manufacturing and industrial plants provides a fixed target for enemy action.
The advantages of portability in tank and other wartime production ties in with the requirement for the above-mentioned decentralisation. Since the notion of a portable tank factories is conceptual, there is still a requirement to expand potential and existing tank output, across the existing manufacturing/industrial base. Any answer to my above question must factor in a balance between research and development into 3D printing/manufacturing advancements and utilising the existing manufacturing base and emerging technologies.
Laying the foundations to banish historical ghosts requires intersecting U.S. Military, private sector and government interests to works towards the common goal of increasing tank output. Above all else, a belief in redefining 'the possible' must drive our thinking surrounding tank production, industrial mobilisation, and the eventuality of 'long inter-state' wars.
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