America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue by Williamson Murray (Hoover Institution Press, 2017) explains the importance of military history to past,current and future events. The book is essential reading for informed/concerned citizens, future military and civilian political leaders.

Through out the book, the topical nature of analysis changes quickly in each chapter. The author begins work's by explaining how historical events cannot provide a accurate forecast of where, when and how future wars will unfold, but they can provide a intellectual foundation, for thinking about the future.


Equally, the way commentators, who have or do forecast trends towards a more peaceful world with fewer wars taking place have not delved into history books. These contemporary commentators commit a multitude of 'sins.' Mistaking the lack of great power conflict (aka WW1/WW2) during the Cold War, ignoring post colonial wars in places like Vietnam and Rhodesia to not understanding the extent of humans to commit folly. Interestingly, through out history, the same mistake has been repeated by others, who made miscalculations.

Intellectually, chapter 2 is where the author began to engaged me. The character of war is shaped by social and technological changes through out time, yet the nature of war endures. I will comeback to the character of war in a moment. The military theorist and quasi historian, Carl Von Clausewitz, who articulated the nature of war (hereafter nature), fame has outlived people's ability to adsorb historical lessons.

Across five “military- social revolutions” [as found on page 50], the character of war was reshaped, and with the most recent development, the advent of Nuclear Weapons (the nuclear age) is upon us all. In short, from the emergence of modern nation state to industrialised warfare, the character of warfare will be forever evolving. However, the nature of war, whether it be unexpected consequences or things not going to plan will remain the same.

Skipping ahead to chapter 4 in the book allows me to share my own thoughts with the reader. Let me explain. My thoughts were connected to a lifetime of reading, for much of my knowledge about 20th century history comes from book reading. How the author explains, the same mistakes committed by US military and political leaders, during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars is illuminative. This illuminative experience was intellectually reinforcing in that my existing knowledge was supplemented by new learning's.


Chapter 5 entitled; The American Problem could have equally taken the titles ' The importance of Professional Military Education', 'Intellectually preparing for the next war' and 'The Art and Science of educating'. A sound Professional Military Education (PME) prepares military personnel for future wars. The aim of PME is to ensure lessons are learned in a classroom environment and not during the next war. Yet despite the obvious value of bloodless classroom learning experiences, the US military has learned lessons on the battlefield, leaving a trail of coffins. The legacy of the Iraq War is draped over the coffins.

Institutions who provide PME curriculum, (Staff and War Colleges) that do not intellectually challenge their students, do not hold any educational worth. A PME curriculum constructed around the use of strategy, examination the employment of joint forces ( all three services combined) at the operational level; and lastly the process sitting governments use to acquire defence equipment is a useful model to follow.


The sheer weight of crushing bureaucracy on the US government's National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and military is comparable to a terminal cancer (my comparison). The bureaucratic expansion of the National Security Council (NSC) has encumbered that organisation with a majority of staff who do not speak a second language. The CIA is also burdened by 13% of analysts, who do not speak the second language. The outcome is members of the NSC and CIA analysts who lack the basic knowledge required to asses threats to US and global security.

A supersized combo of legal constraints on Rules of Engagement, bureaucracy and unmanned drone strikes cloud US political and military leaders judgement. The low cost in political capital and non existent front-line military causalities from unmanned drone is (once again!) clouding minds with the false notion that wars can be won without 'boots on the ground'.


Curiously, the Appendix listing potential trouble spots, indirectly influenced my thinking on, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Specifically, a moral question not covered in the book: Is it moral for democracies to engage in total warfare before they are attacked? I feel pointing out to the reader, how the author, provoking me into questioning such a moral and political question is important. Comparatively, I have found few works that are so provocative and intellectually engaging at the same time.

The old adage that you can not argue with history is proven by the author through out the book. As such, the book is must read for everyone from concerned citizens, military personnel regardless of rank, and future political leaders. New Zealand cannot afford to let the aforementioned adage go ignored. Yet by enlarge Kiwis are ignoring the foundations of the author's thesis at our own peril.