The Marines Counterinsurgency and Strategic Culture Lessons Learned And Lost

The Marines Counterinsurgency and Strategic Culture Lessons Learned And Lost (Georgetown University Press, 2018) is an unusual but informative history of strategic lessons learned and lost in Marine counterinsurgency campaigns in the Banana, Vietnam and Iraq Wars.



Johnson's work suffers from the raw and untidy output from Cultural Topography Framework [1]. Specifically, American and Marine cultural influences over counterinsurgency campaigns are the book's mindset. Johnson's wild structure ruins the typical chronological, topical focus and narrative found in mainstream titles.


The nature of Johnson's work precludes a traditional short to a medium summary. These reviewers first and predominant instinct is to place the book in the unreadable category. However, this runs counter to this reviewer's lifelong argument for constructive criticism and feedback.


Unusually, this reviewer acted as an editor. In the editorial mindset, the reader organisers events in their order of timeline appearance. In continuing this theme, the individual filters out the topics not relevant or of interest to them. For the sake of the reader, this reviewer duplicated the editorial review approach, below.

Johnson's passive writing style is to the detriment of the reader. This reviewer accepts Johnson passive writing style in emphasising on analysis of her subject matter. Nevertheless, the overuse of this writing style removes the emphasis on subjects of importance to the reader.


Reading Johnson helped this reviewer's understanding of American and U.S. military, cultural weaknesses in counterinsurgency and nation-building campaigns. In the context of American culture, an aversion to counterinsurgency. Americans distrust civilian and military decision-makers abilities to steer the effective use of military power. This distrust in ill-informed policymakers was born out of their failure to foresees the protracted nature of Banana, Vietnam and Iraq Wars.


American civilian and military leaders are not required by their public to prove a nuanced or refined view of the world. Civilian policymakers and elected officials careers do not face backlash or punishment for lacking analytical skills or historical knowledge in their fields of expertise. American culture's insular nature hidden behind ignorance of history and international cultures. Marines cultural insensitivity has repercussions beyond alienating local people, affects on relations with allies, and obstructs self-evaluation.


The Marines identity and roles are born from their positions in conventional and small wars. The Marines involvement in WW1 overshadowed their presence in the Banana Wars. For the Marines, The Battle of Belleau Wood was pivotal in establishing the Marines perceived separate identity from the U.S. Army. Craig Cameron notes Belleau Wood as the Marine Corps's"rite of passage to maturity": A respected foe had granted recognition of the Marines institutional distinctness whose performance made them a representative of the United States, separate from the Army[2]."



In 1930 Commandant Ben Fuller assumed command of the Marines coming from nearly twenty years of the Banana Wars. Fuller's tenure oversaw the debate between Marine supporters of amphibious operations and small wars practitioners. The supporters of amphibious orientated Marine Corps felt retaining their separate identity from the Army and navy was of paramount importance. Under Commandants John H. Russell and Thomas Holcomb, this amphibious oriented doctrinal approach overcame recent small wars experiences.

Underlying the Marines presence in the Banana Wars was racism, conditioned by American Culture and compounded by ignorance of local customs [3]. Paternalistic racism with the "for your own good" mentality provided the Marines cognitive justification of unseating local sovereign governments, their strict and cohesive measures and ongoing presence to administer countries.


Across the Banana Wars, this racism and gross mistreatment of local people negatively affected the Marines intelligence-gathering capabilities, but this was not obvious to Marines serving in theatre. Marines failed to perceive the strategic outcome from mistreatment of local populations. The local populations' grievances caused by Marines acted as recruiting calls for insurgents.

Johnson's analysis of Paternalistic Racism, "for your own good" mentality is the gold plate standard. The reader need not look any further for an outstanding instance of the intellectual argument behind paternalistic racism. Racism is morally re-pungent, but the capacity to intellectually outlay the failings of Paternalistic Racism acts as a model for the reader to follow.



The Marines Combined Actions Platoon (CAP) [4] program stands in contrast to their roles in the Banana Wars. Several official histories of the CAP cast the program's origins to the Marines Banana Wars experiences. However, William Corson, one of the programs directors, challenged the idea that the CAP program was born out of lesson from the Banana Wars. Notable, the CAP Program operated outside of General William Westmoreland's "big unit" war.

Ideally, Marines who volunteered, came recommended from their commanding officer, passed proficiency tests and had been in theatre for two months. However, motivations and reasons for Marines joining CAP encompassed commanders removing unwanted Marines from their units, to those who wished to leave combat zones.


The non-linear nature of Johnson's framework returns the reader to the Banana Wars. In their role occupiers, the Marines created and administered central governments, eroding the authority of local government bodies. American thinking at the start of the 20th century was, as in the present day, was that the majority of [nation] state problems solved with economic cures.


The Marines first approach was on material offerings and not positive contact with local populations. Strangely, American cultural perception and expectations of enormous material outlay replaced positive interactions among local communities. Disdainful and often abusive treatment alienated local communities. In place of understanding the consequences of their actions, perceived the locals as ignorant.

Civilian and military decision-makers measuring their countries' altruism by the material gifts on offer, dispensing them through service with an emphasis on efficiency, presents a cultural formula of physical accompaniments as their primary objective. The decision-makers instincts towards tangible successes compounded by measures taken out of military necessity.

Out of this military necessity, Marine officers overcame travel handicaps, high rates of disease and poor communications. The Marines focus on efficiency, action-oriented tasks accomplished without local participation, feed positive stories to the American Public.


American civilian and military overseers never understood the fallacy of efficiency material approach undermined their own strategic aims of stable democratic government. Blindly, the Marines laid the physical and figurative roads for local police and military forces to govern their respective republics. After the Marines withdrew, Haiti politically and economically crumbled. In the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, stability remained under long term dictatorships.


The U.S. Army's institutional resistance to CAP, limited the program to five provinces, within I Corps, a Marine Operational area. The CAP program's personnel numbers peaked at 42 officers, 2050 enlisted men, 2 naval officers, 126 corpsmen, and approximately 3000 Popular or Regional Force members. The majority of CAP Marines served under [U.S.] Army command and in army style. Curiously, Johnson does not inform the reader what constitutes "Army style".

One of the CAP program's goals was the empowerment of local hamlets. There is no evidence of the Marines empowering local people to counter the central and corrupt government of South Vietnam. Contrary, the [unintentional ]American military effort in Vietnam aimed to set the conditions for centralised conventional military forces that enabled dictatorships in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.


In the words of Victor Krulak, an early advocate of CAP:

"The Combined Action Program's basic concept was to bring peace to Vietnamese villages by uniting local knowledge of the Popular Forces with the professional skill of the Marines... The Vietnamese knew who the guerillas were and where they hid; the Americans knew how to kill them".[5]


This concept for CAP was alongside advocates for a population-centric approach to fighting or securing villages. Unintentionally and ironically, CAP Marines protected local people and property from South Vietnamese forces, creating local loyalties, and not acting on behalf of the Republic of Vietnam.


CAP members witness the folly of large scale Civic Action projects: The reader glances Johnson employing the instance of a new hospital minus medical supplies, medical personnel and no food for patients. Unsurprisingly, this folly did nothing to further the communities support for CAP or The Republic of Vietnam.


In villages, CAP Marines frustrations at locating village officials and approval for civic action dictated their actions. So research into teach availability was absent. They often build schools without teachers. After waiting for weeks or months, their impatience at securing supplies (building materials) from the Republic of Vietnam government channels, Marines scourged supplies from localities to complete projects.

Upon entering the construction phase, Marines encouraging villages to supply labour. This approach failed, for the Marines impatience at the slow progress, they completed the works from start to finish. The local communities felt left out, and not upset by the Viet Cong destroying completed works.

Some Marines learned lessons from the hubris of large scale civic action projects. Embracing the local spirit of CAP, these Marines embarking on small scale domestic projects. One CAP unit built a grain storage unit, denying the enemy access to food, allowing the storage of food for the time in twenty years, and earned the gratitude of local villages.


In their adjusting to smaller-scale projects, CAP Marines falsified their reports to satisfy the expectations of larger-scale projects. Marines donated money to send the children of villages to school, buy bicycles and buy radios. In thanks, they received fifteen to twenty invites in a day to eat with villages. The communities sought to return the favour by reliving Marines of their regular daily diet of C Rations.


CAP Marines embracing smaller-scale projects in two separate manners. Firstly, neighbourly tasks for villages and Popular Forces, recognisable to the reader, teaching kids to swim and platoons raising money to send kids to school or hire teachers. Marines secured agricultural equipment, and they often assisted villages in agrarian work. Secondly, some Marines sought out dentists, for medical care was the most appreciated form of civic action. Unsurprisingly, CAP Marines involvement with smaller-scale projects was the most rewarding. In their perceptions villages regarded their efforts as genuine.


Johnson describes CAP Marines existing in a steady state of ragged disrepair, their uniforms filthy from night patrols. They lived and slept in the bush. Little of the American basket of plenty was available to Marines, and this characterised their lives. They did not employ massive amounts of firepower in engagements against the Viet Cong. Their restraint in not using the most abundant resource available to them earned the graduate of locals.

What strategic benefits did the villages gratitude yield? Johnson argues the more straightforward discussion is the backlash not generated. CAP Marines did not undertake projects the locals are unable to maintain, nor did they destabilise their villages with the inflow of goods and money.

Among the short term advantages of civic action was improvements in intelligence gathering and processing. CAP Marines superior knowledge of local terrain, often they knew the ground better than the enemy, and intermixing with village life provided intelligence windfalls. Receiving material gifts did not motivate the villagers who supplied actionable intelligence. The Marines relentless patrolling to establish security, a well developed sixth sense and neighbourly civic action encouraged warm and informative relations with communities.


Unintended self-preservation, instances of CAP Marines behaviour towards villages foiled plans to kill them. A former Marine returned to his (CAP) village decades the Vietnam War ended. Friends of the Marine confessed to previous Viet Cong membership. Why did they not kill his squad?

The perception of them as "good kids" was from this medical treatment and respectful behaviour towards communities. This view of the CAP squad saved their lives. For this passage of her work:

Johnson falls back on the reflections from a CAP veteran in place of her conclusions in patches of her work.

In their relationship with the Marines, military logic and personnel ties overlapped. Military, the presence of CAP protected members of the Viet Cong from U.S. Army's search and destroy missions.

The majority of CAP members time spent planning aggressive patrols and ambushes in the vicinity of their villages. Tactically: Patrols and ambushes aimed to prevent Viet Cong members from infiltrating and remaining in communities.


Unfortunately, this section of the book highlights the absence of topical flow among and between paragraphs. Sudden changes in topic disrupt the logical flow in and between paragraphs: entire issues or points of interest to the reader to start and finish in a single sentence.

The reader either ignores these sentences or falls back on their existing knowledge. A single sentence is not sufficient to explain topics or points of interest to the reader. In one instance, Johnson offers the reader:

The aggressive and geographically constrained patrolling style of the CAP Marines yielded several benefits. Villagers responded first and foremost to a clearly demonstrated ability to provide security. When Marines succeeded in protecting them, villages tended to open up.[6]

Johnson does not elaborate on the nature of the intelligence gathering by Marines who provided security in villages.

                                                                                                                                         
The readers who are new to the field of Army and Marine counterinsurgency history may undertake further research into the topics raised in Johnson's narrative. However, these readers may find these topics and their non-linear order akin to a maze with no exit. If the reader finds the maze too unrewarding, they may reconsider their desire to read the book.


This reviewer recommends two titles to the reader, who wishes to undertake prior research to reading Johnson's work. Williamson Murray's America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue, is intellectually engaging and smooth reading. In short, Murray dissects past and present U.S. Military-strategic and political successes and failures. Effectively, the reader glimpses historical lessons learned and re-learned [7].


Thomas Richardson's Destroy And Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966- 72, is the second title [8].The reader's understanding of Johnson's findings will increase in two matters. Firstly, the overall political and military conditions in the Republic of Vietnam. Secondly, the incorrect rationale behind economic development policy cures and their outcomes.


Johnson demonstrates the strategy of a civil action, enhancing the Republic of Vietnam government's legitimacy failed. Overall, the American perception of civic action increasing the legitimacy of host governments is an unchallenged strategic fantasy. CAP produced unintended improvements in force protection and intelligence gathering.


CAP Marines past on the benefits of civic action to cooperative to local government officials.

However, the legitimacy of the Republic of Vietnam government was not enhanced. The goodwill and gratitude generated by civic action did not transfer to local or national governments and followed the Marines home.


Johnson's sites content from the Marine Corps Gazette and Small War Manual to gauge the level of institutional interest in current small wars, lessons learned, experiences, and perceptions of Marines. The Gazette echoes mission accomplished in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The absence of articles covering counterinsurgency experiences and doctrine conveys this impression.

The first article on Haiti resembled a travel brochure. Topically, the material contained advice for Marine officers and their families relocating to Haiti and no military content.


The Marines counterinsurgency campaigns on Hispaniola did not result in institutionally learned lessons. Marines experiences shattered the perceptions of success and ease of efforts in counterinsurgency efforts and state-building. Their lessons derived from breaking existing perceptions remained local.


Smedley Butler embraced the culture of Marines lacking formal education, and he believed too much formal education was detrimental to fighting spirit. In Haiti and The Dominican Republic, the training and education of Marines remained in theatre.


In place of counterinsurgency doctrine, Marines learned from their experiences and informal mentorship. Marine officers learned and re-learned the same lessons in the Banana Wars. Counterinsurgency practitioners recognised the weaknesses or deficiencies in institutional learning and the absence of doctrine.


For a time, articles on preparing for the next counterinsurgency conflicts appeared in the Gazette. Major E.H Ellis, Major Samuel M. Harrington and Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, the most significant proponents of separating counterinsurgency characteristics from their conventional war counterparts. Specifically, this is the reason for separate training in counterinsurgency tactics and operations was required.


In their preference for action over education, the Marines development of counterinsurgency doctrine slowed. However, circumstances doomed their efforts to create counterinsurgency doctrine. Firstly, as noted above, the Marines amphibious doctrine emerged over small wars capabilities. Secondary, Marines preference for serving in WW1, the costliest and destructive conventional war to date, they viewed counterinsurgency operations and tactics as beneath them. Not unexpectedly, Marines veterans of WW1 displayed no interest in counterinsurgency operations.

In the timeline of U.S. involvement inWW1 (1917-18), Marines focus on overseas service was on the Western Front. Marine recruits who enlisted in 1917 expected to serve in France. Marines serving in Haiti felt cut off from the fighting on the Western Front. Second-string Marines remained in Haiti, and they understood the best Marines are shipping out to France.


Smedley Butler, the commandant of Haitian Gendarmerie, felt the humiliation of serving in Haitian backwater. His Marines felt frustration and degradation. The Marines feelings of degradation flowing from their perception of fighting a second rate foe. A tendency to oversimplify their enemy, regarding them as bandits and not proper foes.

Incorrectly, the Marines subscribed the insurgent's motives to predatory and criminal intentions. The Marines flawed analysis obscured the motivations of insurgent recruits. Nor was consideration given to the tactics required to defeat the insurgency.


The Marines' bandit mentality was glaring in the Small Wars Manual. Major E.H. Ellis, a contributor to the Small Wars Manual, did not recognise the logical fallacy inherent in the idea of criminal bandits enjoying the widespread support of local people.

The majority of the assessments in the Small Wars Manual covered the lopsided causality rates in favour of the Marines. Marines who served in the later Vietnam War did not benefit from this focus on uneven causality rates.


Furthermore, Marines entered Caribbean theatres of war without small wars and counterinsurgency doctrines. They had access to the [U.S.] Army Landing Force Manual. In disregarding the manual's advice on small patrols, they opted for conventional military operations. Their familiarity with existing operational norms triumphed over the manual's recommendation.


Marines garrisoned significant population centres in Haiti, The Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and adopted an operationally defensive posture. Initially, the Marines conventional operations (mostly) did not end in disaster, nor was the "bandit problem" solved. Johnson characterises these efforts in the form of a traditional of troops moving in columns. Another unsuccessful approach was forcefully relocating local people.

Curiously, Johnson does not draw parallels to the forceful relocation of people in the Malaysia Emergency and Vietnam War. Arguable, furthering the reader's understanding of why the approach of forcefully relocating is unsuccessful outweighs the broad scope of Johnson's work. The reader who is not familiar with the forceful relocation of people may not understand why the approach failed. No explanation behind this unsuccessful the method is offered by Johnson.


After careful consideration, this reviewer has chosen to omit details either not directly related to the narrative or do not require further explanations not found in Johnson's work. However, in this reviewer's judgement, there is one point in her work that is worth expanding upon, briefly. The reader who is unfamiliar with the Vietnam War may not understand why the focus on lopsided causalities rates was not the basis for sound strategy [9].


General William Westmoreland, the commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam, never resolved the intellectual puzzle of fighting simultaneously conventional and counterinsurgency campaigns. The consensus of historians and military writers was to dismiss "body count" as an ineffective metric among counterinsurgency strategies. In short, the inaccurate and inflated body count statics provided false data towards an approach unsuited to counterinsurgency campaigns [10].

Westmorland's attritional strategy made sense for the Vietnam War's conventional front lines and battles. This reviewer argues, the relationship between the host country and coalition forces is the foundation of Small Wars and counterinsurgency campaigns. This observation makes sense in light of Johnson's analysis of the Marines track record in the Banana Wars.

The Marines primary challenge was locating and inflicting causalities on the bandits. Tactically, small aggressive patrols sought to encage the bandits and employ superior firepower to emerge victoriously.

In 1933, Colonel Utley, small wars doctrinal supporter, advocated for small patrols in the Small Wars Manual. Utley passionately advocated for relentless small patrols, the military situation permits. Marine patrols are denying irregulars access to fertile agricultural areas and forcing the disbandment of guerilla groups.


Johnson notes the Marines institutionally forgot and re-learned the merits of small patrols in the Vietnam War. CAP Marines did not carry Utley's article in their back pockets. Nevertheless, Johnson's above inexplicit characteristic is a symptom of the undercooked nature of her work. The findings of her research reflect the unrefined finished product.


Johnson does not discuss the willingness of local people to serve in militia, armies and combat insurgencies in service of their governments. In short, this reviewer argues, metrics for measuring the success of counterinsurgency are not impactful if local communities and visiting forces do not meet two conditions.

Firstly, if local people are unwilling to fight for their government, there are flow-on effects: Government corruption and cronyism undermined public confidence in the Republic of Vietnam [10]. Unwilling to fight for their government, (many) South Vietnamese adopted a passive attitude towards the outcome of the war.

Secondly, if there is a weak relationship between the local population and visiting forces, then the insurgencies recruitment numbers will increase. The groundwork for the rise of 'political backfire' may lay the conditions unintended consequences. This reviewer regards the rise of dictatorships in the wake of the U.S. interventions among the Banana Wars is an example of political backfire.


In the analysis of the tenants of Mission Command, Johnson reveals the uneven nature of her book. Johnson's explicit comparison between the decentralised Marine leadership in the Banana and (CAP) Vietnam Wars provides a stark contrast to the reader. The reader finds a small but crisp picture of leadership woes in the Banana Wars. Her previous analysis is patchy in sections, as noted above.

Johnson's direct comparison illuminates the importance of enlisted to middle-ranking officers leadership styles: In Haiti, Major Clark H. Wells acted on his own accord. In disobeying Colonel John Russell's orders, Wells continued the brutal practice of Corvée [11]. Unsurprisingly, Russell's actions sparked a renewed revolt in the local area.


 Marine Sergeant's commanded and self-administrated CAP platoons. CAP leader's autonomy permitted self tasking and innovations. Their assessments of tactical and local conditions formed the basis of community-based projects and patrolling patterns. Among the innovative culture, killer teams actively sought out suspected Viet Cong members.


Out of touch Marine commanders in rear areas abolished killer teams. CAP Marines who participated in killer teams lobbied for their retention. Under the guise of security teams, the killer teams modus operandi returned to the field.

Mission Command in CAP style units falls on the Marines developing Non Commissioned Officers. Johnson briefly mentions the risk of granting autonomy to men aged 19 to 22. Historically, a minority of CAP members committed unspecified acts of caprice.


In the present, insufficient investment in preparing junior leaders opens the Marines to risks. In counterinsurgency environments, these risks entail Marines committing hostile acts against local communities.


At this junction, this reviewer untangled the outcome suggested in the book's title. Marines in combat environments re-learned strategic and tactical lessons from past wars. For Marine journals, the articles offer no instructional value beyond the interest of their contemporary authors.


Johnson leaves the reader to assemble the reasons for the Marines losing institutional knowledge. The Marines preference for action over education is one piece of the puzzle. Additionally but not exclusively, Marines serving in war zones reflect contemporary societal attitudes.


What impact do American cultural norms have on the Marines training up and coming leaders? Johnson leaves the answer to this question unasked and undocumented. Her omission represents a gap in her narrative and not new research avenues.


Johnson applies her framework to the Iraq War across a single chapter. The same observations and critiques of her work mentioned above apply to the penultimate instalment of the book. However, one point representing new doctrine and new lessons, slip under the radar.


Johnson presents the far-sighted Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak, who created the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). Krulak championed Marine innovation in between The Gulf War and 9-11. Remarkable, the Marines focus on training for conventional military operations did not obstruct Krulak's aims.


The MCWL served to incubate new battlefield ideas. The tenants of Krulak's vision embraced military operations other than war. From the soup, the concepts of the Three Block War and strategic corporal emerged. In arising from conceptual development, Marines turned to for guidance during stability operations in Iraq [13].


The forward-thinking Marine leaders of the 1990s followed their predecessors in recording lessons learned in journals. The lessons entered doctrine and training for future overseas operations. Nevertheless, individuals and not the institution of the Marines broke the cycle. In this reviewers estimation, the assimilation of knowledge broke the historical cycle of experiences, lost and re-learned in operational service. Johnson's sometimes jumbled and inexplicit narrative is behind this estimate.


General James Mattis credits his success in counterinsurgency operations to his Marine background. In embracing Marine culture, he received training on the CAP program and received a reprint of the Small Wars Manual. The Three-Block War and strategic corporal outlies was compulsory reading for officers. Beyond reading, the Marines' extended boot camps and training in urban counterinsurgency warfare shaped Mattis's career.



The First Battle of Fallujah fought on the ground and in the propaganda sphere. The insurgents crushed the coalition in the media narrative stake. During "Major Operations, media reporters embedded with Marine units filed positive reports. The withdrawal of the majority of embedded reporters ended the feed of these news stories. Nevertheless, in placing the seeds of defeat, the people behind the reduction in reports ignored standing advice.


In 2002, in the Marine Corps Gazette, specific instructions on Marine interactions with the media appeared. In short, the time Marines spend with journalists is not wasted. An unaware journalist covering the Marines is not an annoyance. Answering their questions is the opportunity to mould their outlook and make a lifelong impression upon them.


The Marines returned to drawing from the lessons from their battlefield experiences. Days into the battle, media outlets are supporting the insurgent's broadcast images of dead children. The insurgent's propaganda machine attributed the deaths to the Marines. Deprived of the means to counter the flow of false information, they lost the fight for political leaders support.



The Iraqi Governing Council and coalition governments grew deeply fearful of public backlash generated by the insurgent's propaganda. Out of this fear, coalition governments pressured decision-makers in Washington, D.C into withdrawing the Marines from Fallujah. In the withdrawal of Marines, American political leaders cave into the threats from coalition partners to leave Iraq.



In preparing for The Second Battle of Fallujah, the Marines actively recruited unbiased and credible members of the press. In their command centres, Marines explained their targeting process to these reporters. Additionally, ninety journalists from sixty news outlets received invites to join the Marines on the front line. Johnson does not specify the details of the targeting process. The reader, who is not familiar with her description of the targeting process is out in the cold.



In summary, the extracts from Johnson's work in this review reflects the diamonds in the rough. The researcher who is seeking new leads on pitfalls in counterinsurgency campaigns finds a gold mine on offer. Also, the addition of notes at the end of each chapter favours students and researchers. They do not have to search for references at the end of the book.

Furthermore, there is sufficient undeveloped material for a three-volume history of Marines counterinsurgency campaigns. The potential transformation of the raw subject matter into a multi-volume work is an opportunity for aspiring historians. Johnson's work is not suited to the general reader, and they are unlikely to weather the storm of her work's pitfalls.




[1] The following article provides a comprehensive overview of Cultural Topography Framework not available in the book. An overview of Cultural Topography Framework: Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis
Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berret (July 2011)


[2] Jeannie L. Johnson, The Marines Counterinsurgency, And Strategic Culture (Georgetown University Press, 2018). See Page 59.


[3]A Lecture by U.S. Naval Academy professor Aaron O'Connell. The lecture covers the background to the Banana Wars. The motivations and roles of three U.S. Presidents in the Banana Wars. The backgrounds to the U.S. Marines interventions on Haiti, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua are covered in the lecture. Paternalistic racism is also discussed later on in the lecture.


[4] Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam  by Major Christopher Reynolds, United States Marines
A brief background to the origins of CAP is available on Pages 6 – 7.

[5] Jeannie L. Johnson, The Marines Counterinsurgency, And Strategic Culture. See page 193.

[6] Ibid, P193.

[7] Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue (Hoover Institution Press, 2017).

[8] Thomas Richardson, Destroy and Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-72 (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[9] Analysis of Westmoreland's body count strategy A fresh look at the motivations behind Westmoreland's attritional strategy.

[10] A Strategy of AttritionWhy General Westmoreland Failed in 1967 by Major Gregory P. Escobar, United States Army
A look at General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition during Operation City Junction.


[11] Corruption in the Republic of Vietnam An introduction to the role institutional corruption played in the Republic of Vietnam's downfall.

[12] Instead of paying taxes, Corvée employs people in brutal physical labour.




[13] Three-block war and strategic corporals An overview of Krulak's three-block war and strategic corporal concepts.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Thirteen Days on an atomic knife edge, October 1962

The Cuban Missile Crisis by Phil Carradice (2018) (ISBN: 9781526708069) is a factual road map of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Personnel recollections add the human dimension to the outlay of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Military history students will find the book a useful guide to the events which took humanity to the brink of nuclear Armageddon.



One of the lessons I have learned from reading military history is how perspectives differ from those who witnessed historical first hand and those who read about them in history books. In short, this is why I appreciate the input of the author's personnel recollections. From Carradice's recollections, I was interested in how the crisis become sole topic of conversation among Primary School students. Decades later the events of 9-11 would dominate conversations among my fellow high school students and teachers.


In 1898, Cuba was granted 'independence' from Spanish colonial rule. Coming on the heels of the Spanish American War, the 1899 Platt Amendment, cemented future American Cuban commercial interests, and the ongoing lease Guantanamo Bay naval base. Come 1959, Fidel Castro's Communist guerrilla's overthrew the corrupt, pro- American dictator, Fulgencio Batista.

The alliance of Castro's Cuba and Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union was convened the long standing Monroe Doctrine . I feel that the Monroe Doctrine has been sufficiently documented elsewhere, so no further comment is required. If President Kennedy ignored the threats to National Security and U.S. Interests posed by Communist Cuba, his re-election chances would have declined dramatically.


Vast political idealogical differences aside, Kennedy and Khrushchev's stark contrasting backgrounds are worth touching upon. Before reading the book this reviewer was broadly aware of the Kennedy family's internal dynamics in propelling John F Kennedy (1917-1963) to the presidency.

In the affluent, “Ivory League” Kennedy family, JKF was the vehicle for his father's Joseph P. Kennedy's presidential ambitions. Sadly, JFK wore the shoes of his older brother, Joseph Kennedy Jr, who was killed while flying with the Army Air Force in WW2. JFK's charisma, film star good looks , family wealth, and influence played roles in his eventual ascension to the presidency.


Khrushchev (1894- 1971) was born in the tiny Russian village of Kalinovka. Poorly educated, growing up on a small land holding, Khrushchev would go on to survive Stalin's 1930's purges. In WW2, he was present at the Battle of Stalingrad, earning him a badge honour. By the time of the crisis he was First Secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet Union.


The author's observation on page 32 is astute: In hindsight, it is difficult to see what Khrushchev hoped to achieve by placing nuclear missiles on Cuba. He must have known the USA would react, but he firmly believed that Kennedy was weak.

Misleading first impressions was behind Khrushchev's incorrect assessment of Kennedy. Khrushchev formed his misjudgement of Kennedy at the Vienna Conference in 1961. Nor is it known conclusively today, if the cocktail of medications Kennedy was taking, or political naivete was responsible for his poor performance at the Vienna Conference. Interestingly, the unopposed construction of the Berlin Wall, did nothing to alter Khrushchev's assessment of Kennedy.


The division of Germany was at the centre of Khrushchev's geopolitical motives behind the decision to place Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. Berlin, centre stage of Cold War geopolitics, knew no geographical boundaries. I will come back to geopolitics lacking national borders in a moment.

Specifically, the removal of U.S troops from Berlin was Khrushchev's goal. In his grand ploy, Khrushchev was to announce; the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba, in front of the UN General Assembly. In exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Berlin, the Soviets would removal nuclear weapons from Weapons. This ploy, of course, relied on the element of surprise.


Upon receiving CIA, and military intelligence reports, the JFK administration refused to believe, Soviet nuclear weapons (hereafter nuclear weapons) presence on Cuba. Satellite observation over Cuba was also utilised. The resumption of Lockheed U2 flights , suspended since the downing of Gary Powers, provided the CIA with reconnaissance photos of suspected nuclear weapons sites.


On Sunday, 14 October, 1963, CIA photos experts concluded, R12 and R14 Ballistics missile sites were under development in Cuba. Additional evidence supporting their conclusion was provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Russian double agent working for MI6 and CIA. Penkovsky was suspected of being a triple agent by spying for Russia.


One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the author's look at Executive Committee of the National Security Committee (EXCOMM). EXCOMM consisted of nine members of the national security council and five co-opted members. Interestingly, Adlai Stevenson, the Democrat presidential candidate who twice lost to President Eisenhower, and later U.S. Ambassador to the UN, sometimes attended EXCOMM meetings.

To resolve the crises, The Joint Chief of Staffs were in favour of military options. Immediate air strikes on the nuclear weapons sites, or following on air strikes, the invasion of Cuba were options open to Kennedy. Stand alone air strikes weren't guaranteed to completely destroy the nuclear weapons sites. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, was the leading advocate for the invasion of Cuba.


Taking the crisis through diplomatic channels or to the UN General Assembly as a way of pressuring Khrushchev into removing nuclear weapons from Cuba was not seen as a viable option. Under international law blockading nations states constitutes an act of war, so the option of blockading Cuba wasn't straight forward.

Unbeknown to EXCOMM, the presence of R-12 missiles on Cuba, would have inflicted further causalities on invading American forces. Yet Kennedy's choices was between blockading or invading Cuba. However, a quarantine of Cuba in International Waters wouldn't violate international law or consistent of an act of war. Kennedy, after careful and deliberate considerations, opted to quarantine Cuba.

The quarantine was designed to pressure Khrushchev into removing nuclear weapons from Cuba. By design the quarantine was designed to stop the flow of arms into Cuba. This was demonstrated early on by the following incident: The carrier USS Essex and the destroyer USS Gearing tried unsuccessfully to intercept the tanker Bucharest . The Bucharest was permitted to proceed, for her cargo didn't consist of arms.


Military, the USAF was also at the heart of the crisis. B-52's armed with nuclear weapons, were posted in range of the Soviet Union. The deployment of the B-52's was to show the Soviets the seriousness of U.S. Intent, and not necessary undertake offensive action. Yet when I reading the book, this deployment was neither disturbing or remarkable, during the time of heightened international tensions.


However, I was troubled by the author's account of Soviet Foxtrot- Class Submarine B-59. Under the command of Valentin Savitsky, B-59 was about 100 miles south of Bermuda on the northern edge of the (quarantine) exclusion zone. The Pentagon warned that any Soviet submarine located by hunting [USN Anti Submarine Warfare] groups would be called to surface, and face practice depth chargers. Tactically, the aim was to force Soviet submarines to the surface and interrogate the crews.

The USN's Anti Submarine Warfare “cat and mouse” efforts forced the B-59 to surface. Low batteries, the build up of CO2 levels and 120 degree heat, ensuring she was in a bad way. Savitsky knew nothing about the crisis, having not been in contact with Moscow, for he knew WW3 was underway. The B-59 carried conventional and nuclear torpedoes, nor was the presence of nuclear torpedoes known to the Americans.

In the event of Soviet Navy submarines were at risk of damage from enemy action, the employment of nuclear torpedoes was authorised. However, the employment of nuclear torpedoes (hereafter torpedoes) required the authorisation of three officers. Savitsky discussed following his standing orders with Political Officer Ivan Semonovich and Vasily Arkhipov. Semonovich and Semonovich, supporting the use of torpedoes, leaving the fate of humanity, in the hands of Arkhipov, who vetoed the idea.

Admittedly, this reviewer views the incident with the benefit of historical hindsight. Still, a few brief observations are worthwhile. Undoubtedly, Arkhipov brave stance saved humanity from nuclear Armageddon. Authoritarian by nature, the Soviet Union, wasn't known for producing independent thinkers or individuals with moral courage. Yet Arkhipov display of moral courage is the model for how military and civilian leaders should act in an crisis.


Now I shall touch upon the resolution of the crisis. On Friday, 26 October the State Department received two letters from Khrushchev. The first letter offered to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for the U.S. pledging not to invade Cuba. However, the second strange message was long, strange and emotional.

But as the author notes, the second letter was coherent and was written by Khrushchev himself. At the end of second letter, Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter Missiles (hereafter missiles) from Turkey. Khrushchev gambit was over, but he looking for a way out of the crisis of his own making.

Turkey was strongly opposed the removal of the missiles, for they represented national prestige. The real fear of Soviet Invasion was another reason why Turkey opposed the removal of the missiles. Notable the obsolescence of the missiles left the option of their secret withdrawal open to Khrushchev and Kennedy. On Sunday, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for the secret withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.


This reviewer wishes to focus on the author's characterisation of Khrushchev legacy: Khrushchev must have known the consequences when he pulled the missiles out of Cuba. He had come to prominence during the Stalinist era, a time when political failure meant immediate and harsh consequences. Yet knowing how his actions would be interpreted he went ahead, not for the good of Nikita Khrushchev, but for the good of mankind.

This reviewers desires to see greater levels of discussion and debate surrounding Khrushchev's motives in starting and ending the crisis. Was Khrushchev the ruthless pragmatist, who was behind the start and of the crisis, or did circumstances and not design dictate his actions? Alternately, was he genuinely motivated by the perceived foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union, of course, this was the removal of U.S. Troops from Berlin? Did he end the crisis out of sparing humanitarian nuclear holocaust? All these questions warrant further examination, and the author deservers credit, for placing the opportunity to debate Khrushchev's motives and character in the public domain.


For students of Cold War history, the book comprehensively maps out the crisis. As noted above, thought provoking questions arise, and the legacy of the book may well lie in the debate and discussion around those questions. There is no finer legacy for any author then to have their works further people's understanding of historical events by generating debate and discussion around their chosen subject matter.

The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 by John Kiszely

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 by John Kiszely (Cambridge University Press, 2017) (ISBN number: 978-1-107-19459-5) is a strategic autopsy of the British involvement in the fall of Norway during WW2. 

Kiszely's esteemed book proves that critical thinking, flexible thinking and military innovation , underpin, victory or defeat in military campaigns. The author encapsulates the systematic failures of military and civilian decision makers and the bureaucratic/ineffective strategic decision-making apparatus, committed by the British, in the author's perfectly self described fiasco.

In sporting terms, how two sporting teams perform is dissected by the author. The professional German team out thought and outplayed their British opponents. Admittedly, the nature and character of war does not include level playing fields, unlike, sports leagues, who would not schedule two grossly mismatched teams.


Today, the U.K. Armed forces (hereafter armed forces) are facing a fiscal climate comparable to the experiences of their 1930's counterparts. By the way of airpower and amphibious capabilities: I will explore the implications of the budgetary climate facing the present day armed forces as they relate to the Norway Campaign, below.



In the inter-war wars, the Armed services, planning- preparation, logistics and the majority of equipment was unchanged from the last war. Specifically, planning- preparation, logistics and equipment for amphibious operations was unchanged since the WW1, Gallipoli Campaign.
This lack of investment in amphibious operations reflected in the dangers and delays in Operation Hammer, the plan to land British troops at Narvik in response to the German invasion of Norway.

In the present day, the armed forces amphibious capabilities are under threat from further defence cutbacks. Before reading the book, I was aware of the possible axing of amphibious capabilities, nevertheless, I could not escape my bewilderment that such a eventuality could take place. If strategic and soft power arguments for retaining amphibious capabilities win out over budgetary cut backs is unknown at the time of writing.


The author notes on page 229; Luftwaffe control of the Third Dimension (control of the air) was the deciding factor in the British defeat. This reviewer's understanding of airpower was reinforced by the author's comprehensive analysis of German airpower's integration into combined arms.

The Luffwaffe group, the Condor Legion flew in the Spanish Civil War from 1936-38 and used as test bed for tactics, and rotations of pilots gaining combat experience. Lessons from the Condor Legion's time in Spain were integrated into German training and doctrine. Integrating the Luffwaffe and German Army in planning and combat operations (tactical air strikes by Stuka dive bombers) bore dividends in Poland .

A full assessment of the RAF and Luffwaffe role in the Norway Campaign appears in the book. The RAF never assimilated lessons on airpower from the Spanish Civil War. The RAF's doctrinal inflexibility (remaining welded to Trenchard 's strategic bombing doctrine) ignored the Luffwaffe's development of Close Air Support enabled by improvements in communications.

The decision makers underestimated or were ignorant of the effects of German Airpower. Warships of the Royal Navy, who experienced Luffwaffe air attacks received no air cover from the RAF. The Royal Navy's losses were low in comparison to the threat posed by Luffwaffe air attacks. Also British ground forces witnessed the destruction of Namsos by Luffwaffe bombers.

Returning to the present, Russian Condor Legions are active in Syria and Ukraine. Airpower and cruise missiles are the spearhead of the Russian intervention (hereafter Syrian Condor Legion) in the Syrian Civil War. Incorporating lessons from Russia's Syrian Condor Legion into innovation by military and civilian decision makers can prepare for the ongoing changing character of warfare. However, if this military innovation process fails, defeat not, unlike, seen by British in the Norway campaign.


The author's definitive strategic autopsy of the British involvement in the Norway Campaign will earn a place on military professionals and students of military history bookshelves. The lessons from the author's examination of the anatomy this campaign offers military and civilian decision makers a cautionary tale. The impact of the lessons from the book are not new, but current and future decision makers have the opportunity to learn them in their own time.

Logistics in the next conventional war

In contrast, a degree of risk was accepted in placing large quantities of supplies forward in relatively small areas at unprotected corps and theater logistics bases to support offensive operations. The loss or denial of one of these log bases could have significantly impaired the offensive capability of ARCENT and Marine Central Command ground forces. Fortunately, our intelligence estimates correctly viewed enemy disruption of these bases as unlikely, especially in light of our overwhelming air superiority.

 Full article

In the above article, Chris Paparone, Colonel, US Army retired, writes about logistics during the Gulf War. My intention is to frame my commentary around Paparone's analyse of logistics during the Gulf War with the next conventional war (hereafter next war) in mind. The specific details concerning the location and nations involved in the next conventional war falls beyond the scope of this article. However, the reader may wish to consider, how the next European War (Russia invading western Europe), plays out strategically and logistically.

The length of the next war will determine how much, if at all, the character of logistical support evolves to meet battlefield conditions. In an 'long war', logistical capabilities will evolve to meet new operational and strategic demands. Let me explain. In WW2, the character of logistics continued to become parts of the fabric of modern warfare. Specifically, D-Day provides a window into the character of logistics at the strategic level. Until battlefield constraints (The Battle of the Atlantic) were overcome, D-Day remained theoretical in the minds of British and American military planners.

A short war would not last enough to alter the character of logistics, and any lessons would face examination after the war finished. As such further analyse of logistics in an short war is not required in this article. The character of logistics in the next 'long war' will evolve, and turn theoretical operational, technological, transportation, and battlefield medicine concepts into reality.

In the next war, will large quantities of supplies capable of supporting brigades, placed in forward areas, in a scaled down version of what occurred in the Gulf War? For a moment, let us assume there are sufficient quantities of supplies in theatre to warrant such a eventuality. To what extent unmanned systems and more traditional (manned) aerial resupply methods, offset the requirement, for the presence large quantities of supplies in forward areas only poses more questions. These questions on logistical resupply from forward areas could cover topics from camouflage to the dispersal of supplies.

Will the option of deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support exist in the next war? In short, the answer is no. If logistical demands driven by high intensity combat operations and attrition are not meet then front line ground forces would face destruction in combat. No amount of prewar training or acts of battlefield courage can overcome logistical failings. Munitions, fuel, water, and spare parts are the 'wheels' ground forces operate on.

Deliberately deploying ground forces without adequate logistical support, and ground forces facing inadequate logistical support due to enemy action are not mutually exclusive. During the next war, United States and coalition air and naval supremacy is not assured. This (probable) absence of air and naval supremacy requires military planners to factor in disruptions to logistical supply chains-resulting in restrictions on ground forces' combat capabilities. I will come back to these logistical restrictions on ground forces in a moment.

I am going to raise the issue of battlefield medicine from a logistical standpoint. Specifically, can existing levels of medical supplies,practices and personnel cope with the next war? The American Civil War (1861-65) (hereafter Civil War) provides us with a historical precedence where existing preparations for medical care were ill-prepared for the volume of battlefield and non battlefield (disease) casualties. In short, the Civil War, unexpectedly lasted longer than 90 days, and this is why existing battlefield medical infrastructure was overwhelmed at the start of the war.

The historical parallel to battlefield medicine in the Civil War serves two purposes. The Civil War at first provides us with a historical basis to pose the following question: Could the ghost of the Civil War, who witnessed ill-prepared battlefield medicine infrastructure and personnel appear in the next war? A complete hypothetical answer to this question is for the reader to ponder. I am prevented by space and topical considerations from answering this question. However, the question contains a inherent warning, for as the Civil War demonstrated, the length of wars can exceed expectations.

Topically, readers may ask why or how I selected battlefield medicine as a subject of logistics. My interest in the Civil War aside, my goal is to provide the reader with subject matter to think about. Also, I was able to frame the prospect of the duration of the next war in a useful historical context.

At the strategic level, the severity of logistical restrictions on ground forces, caused by losses in combat at sea , in the air, and on the ground will dictate the outcome of the next war. In light of advancements in unmanned systems and 3D printing there is a danger that the nature of logistics in warfare is forgotten. Put another way, regardless of exciting technological progress, the nature of modern day logistics will remain the same. Ground forces, who face no logistical restrictions will always defeat those facing such constraints.

The ghost of WW2 German tank production

But a long war today would be totally different. In fact, after about nine months of intense peer conflict, attrition would grind the U.S. armed forces down to something resembling the military of a regional power.  The Army, for example, would be armed primarily with infantry weapons with heavy firepower coming from gun trucks and a trickle of modern equipment acquired from struggling domestic production and whatever logisticians could scrounge up on the world market. This state of affairs arises because the U.S. government has not thought seriously about industrial mobilization. It is far easier to bask in warm memories of World War II than to face the harsh choices that mobilization preparation entails.

Full article 

Correction, I was informed that 28 is the surge number for M1 Abram production, that the figure beggars' belief is not surprising.  

I have never lost my interest in 'long inter-state' wars. My interest in this kind of warfare spans from lifelong interest in WW2 and 20th century history. The reader can judge for themselves, if my historical grounding makes me biases towards the topic or not. What I will freely admit is the way my historical grounding influences my strategic outlook in the present.

Space does not permit a comprehensive look at banishing a ugly and scary historical ghost, which I will describe below. As such, I have ignored the following plausible eventuality: During the next long war, the M1 Abrams tank designed is axed in favour of a less technological sophisticated and cheaper (aka 'mass production friendly') tank design. In effect, my focus is on the foundations (industrial capacity/output) and not what the eventual building resembles ( the M1 Abram or future tank designs).

My next comparison is purely in terms of industrial capacity, and not issues of morality or culture. In terms of industrial capacity, the United States of America is grossly ill-prepared for a future 'long inter-state' war, not unlike the Axis Powers in WW2. Specifically, during WW2, the ghost of Germany's inadequate industrial output has been well documented by historians. The same goes for the way Germany was crushed by industrial output from the United States of America.

In the present, the projected monthly M1 Abrams production figure of 28 is pathetically low. On the basis of the production figure increasing by the tank factory operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, tank production could reach approx 96 per month.

In a twist of historical irony, present day projected M1 Abrams tank production (hereafter tank output) is a historical ghost. Let me explain. In WW2, German tank production could be described as woeful [Sample production figures ], so woeful they failed to keep up with attrition rates (losses in combat). Ironically, like their WW2 German counter parts, American tank production cannot keep up with attrition, in the next war. Interestingly, the same root cause , technological sophistication and high production costs, gives birth to a historical ghost. The ghost of WW2 German tank production (hereafter historical ghost); haunts present day tank output.


Banishing this historical ghost, who haunts me and any sane military planners, requires expanding the industrial base, so a increased monthly tank output can take place. Why reinvent the tank tread? This is my philosophy behind the answer to that question. In WW2, the American automotive industry was retooled to meet wartime demands for industrial mobilisation. The retooling of the American automotive industry formed a part of industrial mobilisation, and the resulting industrial output proved to be a war winner.

In the present, I can see no reason why, the current American automotive and other manufactures, should not embrace tank production. Additionally, the benefits of decentralising tank production are worth noting. Decentralising tank production reduces the likelihood of enemy action ceasing tank production by destroying a single or small number of factories. Geographically decentralising, the manufacture of tank components and tank assembly, would also see the manufacturing sector profit.

The expansion of current day tank output would or will present new challenges, yet there is equally opportunities for advancing manufacturing and transport logistics. In short, 3D Printing can reduce stress on current or create new supply chains, and localise the manufacturing process. Can existing factories fully support current and future advancements (think robotics and artificial intelligence) in tank output? I will come back to this question in a moment.

Cost issues aside, converting existing factories to tank output should pose few difficulties. However, conceptually this approach denies tank output, the potential advantage of portability/decentralisation. For a moment, recall how during WW2, American war industries were not subject to enemy action, this will not be the case in the next war. The permanent nature of existing civilian and military manufacturing and industrial plants provides a fixed target for enemy action.


The advantages of portability in tank and other wartime production ties in with the requirement for the above-mentioned decentralisation. Since the notion of a portable tank factories is conceptual, there is still a requirement to expand potential and existing tank output, across the existing manufacturing/industrial base. Any answer to my above question must factor in a balance between research and development into 3D printing/manufacturing advancements and utilising the existing manufacturing base and emerging technologies.

Laying the foundations to banish historical ghosts requires intersecting U.S. Military, private sector and government interests to works towards the common goal of increasing tank output. Above all else, a belief in redefining 'the possible' must drive our thinking surrounding tank production, industrial mobilisation, and the eventuality of 'long inter-state' wars.

The North Korean Problem

This analysis recommends war. It is shocking to put to print. However, with North Korea’s inexorable advance towards developing a nuclear-tipped ICBM, we enter the realm of bad choices. On balance, war on the peninsula is the least bad alternative. There are some months left for a brilliant diplomatic breakthrough that turns North Korea from the brink – these avenues must be energetically and exhaustively pursued. This analysis is presented on the fair assumption that such initiatives will fail.

Crispin Rovere's article 

China is the key deciding factor in resolving the 'North Korean problem'. China can undertake military action against North Korea, green light United States military (hereafter U.S. Military) action against North Korea, or maintain the status qua, Let's start with the status qua and move on to the alternatives in a moment.


Regretfully, China may be using North Korea as a device to test the resolve of the western powers. Specifically, China may want to test the resolve of Australia, South Korea, Japan and the United States. By testing the resolve of those nations,China, is looking to see how much 'lee way' of sorts, potential or current adversaries can take advantage of in the future. In short, by allowing the North Korean nuclear weapons program to go unchecked, Russia, Iran and China may become embolden to start World War 3.

Another more pragmatic as oppose to sinister motives may explain China's current stance on North Korea. Russia shares a modest border with North Korea. Russia may view any potential Chinese annexation of North Korea as territorial threat. In short, Russian fears of their south eastern flank facing a renewed Chinese threat would create another global 'flash point'. Put another way, the risk of a Russia -China War (echoes of the Cold War) would have increased.


I now come to the first of the possible scenario which see's China annexing North Korea, after green lighting, the United States lead coalition or stand alone war (hereafter war) against that country. Let me explain why I think this is the smartest from China's standpoint. Assuming China green lights, the U.S. going to war, they can stand by and watch the fallout.

In North Korea, the fall out would consist of the country having been reduced to rubble, by the spectre of total warfare. Politically, the fallout would fall at the feet of the Trump administration. The extent of the political fall out and the consequences for the Trump administration falls beyond the scope of this article. While the political fallout is ongoing ,China, could occupy and rebuild North Korea in their image. In effect under this scenario, China, can manipulate the 'North Korean Problem' to there perceived advantage.

The last scenario is China stand alone invading , occupying and rebuilding North Korea in their image. This scenario is arguable the best and least likely scenario. If China, deems the continual existence of North Korea as a nation state is not in their interests, the following question must be asked: Why would China not let President Trump take all the political fallout?

Remember, China's political and military leaders do not answer to freedom of the press or to the mercy of public opinion. However, President Trump does have to answer to freedom of the press, American public opinion, and face any political fall out from a preemptive (total) war against North Korea. Hence, this is why, this last scenario is the least likely.


I foresee the status qua remaining in place until the following occurs: North Korea invades South Korea in concert with the use of nuclear weapons against that country and Japan. The exact way events would play out is for another topic all together. Such a eventuality would represent a watershed moment in our history. 

All roads lead to the eventual destruction of North Korea in physical terms and as a nation state.
If the second and third scenarios mentioned above occur without the support of Japan and South Korea , the U.S. Military, would face unexpected logistical challenges (,think the return of Mulberry harbours). Beyond the spectre of total warfare, for military, strategic and diplomatic reasons, the 'North Korea problem' is not easily solved.

Neither can the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of China annexing North Korea be ignored. A authoritarian and paranoid Russia would not welcome Chinese territorial expansion along their own borders. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin would face a historical strategic choice: Does Russia maintain a strategic westwards European focus on the Ukraine and the Baltic States or cast their strategic eye towards Asia?


Looking away from Russia, the consequences of China annexing North Korea are hard to gauge in this space, but should not be ignored. China would demand the withdrawal of U.S. Military forces from South Korea and Japan. China would argue that with the threat from North Korea is now non-existent, so there is no any reason for U.S. Military forces to remain stationed in Japan and South Korea.

In the event China pressures Japan and South Korea, the level of public support in those countries for a continuing U.S. Military presence is speculative. Space does not permit me to go into the other potential consequences or side effects from China annexing North Korea.

There are no 'good' options for resolving the 'North Korean problem'. Australia and New Zealand must make a realistic strategic assessment of our predicament. Yet in a General New Zealand election year, the difficult strategic situation, is not being widely discussed in the media or by the general public. This lack of discussion around the 'North Korean problem' worries me.

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue

America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue by Williamson Murray (Hoover Institution Press, 2017) explains the importance of military history to past,current and future events. The book is essential reading for informed/concerned citizens, future military and civilian political leaders.

Through out the book, the topical nature of analysis changes quickly in each chapter. The author begins work's by explaining how historical events cannot provide a accurate forecast of where, when and how future wars will unfold, but they can provide a intellectual foundation, for thinking about the future.


Equally, the way commentators, who have or do forecast trends towards a more peaceful world with fewer wars taking place have not delved into history books. These contemporary commentators commit a multitude of 'sins.' Mistaking the lack of great power conflict (aka WW1/WW2) during the Cold War, ignoring post colonial wars in places like Vietnam and Rhodesia to not understanding the extent of humans to commit folly. Interestingly, through out history, the same mistake has been repeated by others, who made miscalculations.

Intellectually, chapter 2 is where the author began to engaged me. The character of war is shaped by social and technological changes through out time, yet the nature of war endures. I will comeback to the character of war in a moment. The military theorist and quasi historian, Carl Von Clausewitz, who articulated the nature of war (hereafter nature), fame has outlived people's ability to adsorb historical lessons.

Across five “military- social revolutions” [as found on page 50], the character of war was reshaped, and with the most recent development, the advent of Nuclear Weapons (the nuclear age) is upon us all. In short, from the emergence of modern nation state to industrialised warfare, the character of warfare will be forever evolving. However, the nature of war, whether it be unexpected consequences or things not going to plan will remain the same.

Skipping ahead to chapter 4 in the book allows me to share my own thoughts with the reader. Let me explain. My thoughts were connected to a lifetime of reading, for much of my knowledge about 20th century history comes from book reading. How the author explains, the same mistakes committed by US military and political leaders, during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars is illuminative. This illuminative experience was intellectually reinforcing in that my existing knowledge was supplemented by new learning's.


Chapter 5 entitled; The American Problem could have equally taken the titles ' The importance of Professional Military Education', 'Intellectually preparing for the next war' and 'The Art and Science of educating'. A sound Professional Military Education (PME) prepares military personnel for future wars. The aim of PME is to ensure lessons are learned in a classroom environment and not during the next war. Yet despite the obvious value of bloodless classroom learning experiences, the US military has learned lessons on the battlefield, leaving a trail of coffins. The legacy of the Iraq War is draped over the coffins.

Institutions who provide PME curriculum, (Staff and War Colleges) that do not intellectually challenge their students, do not hold any educational worth. A PME curriculum constructed around the use of strategy, examination the employment of joint forces ( all three services combined) at the operational level; and lastly the process sitting governments use to acquire defence equipment is a useful model to follow.


The sheer weight of crushing bureaucracy on the US government's National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and military is comparable to a terminal cancer (my comparison). The bureaucratic expansion of the National Security Council (NSC) has encumbered that organisation with a majority of staff who do not speak a second language. The CIA is also burdened by 13% of analysts, who do not speak the second language. The outcome is members of the NSC and CIA analysts who lack the basic knowledge required to asses threats to US and global security.

A supersized combo of legal constraints on Rules of Engagement, bureaucracy and unmanned drone strikes cloud US political and military leaders judgement. The low cost in political capital and non existent front-line military causalities from unmanned drone is (once again!) clouding minds with the false notion that wars can be won without 'boots on the ground'.


Curiously, the Appendix listing potential trouble spots, indirectly influenced my thinking on, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Specifically, a moral question not covered in the book: Is it moral for democracies to engage in total warfare before they are attacked? I feel pointing out to the reader, how the author, provoking me into questioning such a moral and political question is important. Comparatively, I have found few works that are so provocative and intellectually engaging at the same time.

The old adage that you can not argue with history is proven by the author through out the book. As such, the book is must read for everyone from concerned citizens, military personnel regardless of rank, and future political leaders. New Zealand cannot afford to let the aforementioned adage go ignored. Yet by enlarge Kiwis are ignoring the foundations of the author's thesis at our own peril.