What a Donald Trump presidency may look like domestic issues

At a time when most other candidates have put forward detailed descriptions of their policies regarding major foreign and domestic challenges (from dealing with Russia to reforming education), Trump has not.

Trump's statements on matters of public policy are, by design, vague. He hasn't specified what "winning" in the context of trade relations with China would entail; nor how his plan to "bomb ISIS and take their oil" would be operationalized.

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My intent in writing this article is to present a argument as to why Donald Trump could make for a better president than his critics would ever consider. There would be downsides to a Trump Presidency primary in the area of foreign policy. For reasons of limitations of space, I will save the topic of a in depth look at a potential Trump foreign and military doctrines for another time.

Before I get started one point is worth making: the USA has enjoyed a range of successful Presidents from very varied backgrounds. Perhaps this is one of the only contestants in American History from George Washington to the present. Let me present the reader with just one example of 2 highly regarded Presidents spanning different eras in Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (More commonly known as FDR.)

Abraham Lincoln father was barley literate and nothing remotely in his background suggested he was destine for greatness. Lincoln as history records went from being a small town lawyer to member of Congress. As President Lincoln was Commander in Chief during the American Civil War. Lincoln saved the Union and in the process issued the Emancipation Proclamation abolishing slavery.

FDR came from what today would be called a well to do family. Space doesn't permit me to cover his political career in its entity. FDR's entry into the Washington Beltaway came when he served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Woodrow Wilson administration. The USA entry into WW1 may well have made FDR's cabinet post more important than anyone would have foreseen.

Skipping ahead some years. The defining moment of his life came in 1921 , FDR would never walk again after contracting Polio. From this experience came a greater degree of empathy with every day people. After winning the 1936 presidential election FDR would lead his country out of the worst of the Great Depression. Upon the USA entry into WW2 he would play a large role paving the road to a allied victory.

FDR and Lincoln will now leave my commentary. I ask the reader forgive my detour as I felt FDR and Lincoln are a good way of making my point. I will now come back to Trump.


My characterisation of Trump is that he is a crass reality TV version of Theodore Roosevelt with a cup of Lyndon Baines Johnson (More commonly known as LBJ) thrown into the cake mix. Teddy Roosevelt enjoyed a political punch up just as much a political fight. LBJ wasn't afraid to use what amounted to bullying to get his legislative agenda through Congress. I will come back to these qualities in a moment.

I am going to take a educated guess at the kind of policies Trump would persuade Congress to pass into law. Before I go on any further I will touch upon Congress. I have long thought members of the House of Representatives have done nothing but run for re-election. This must be seen along with how the voice of the everyday Americans has been ignored at the expense Corporate special interest lobby groups who have been buying elections.


In a recent interview Australia's former Ambassador to Washington Kim Beazley, commented members of the House and Senate spend most of their fund raising. For me at least this reinforces my view that the members of Congress have failed to perform their constitutional duty as a legislative body. The way the issue of illegal immigration has been left on the vine back ups my point.


Speaking of immigration if there was ever a issue in which no one side of the debate will get all they want this would be the issue. Trump and his supporters couldn't have the 10 million or so illegal aliens deported. On the other side of the coin the status qua can't go on for a list of reasons that is to long to go into any detail. I believe that the best way to get immigration reform is for it to be lead by someone who takes a tough stand on the issue. Trump certainly fits the bill.

I am reminded of the expression “Only Nixon could go to China " (watch around the 4.06 mark for the famous line.) President Richard Nixon build his early political career on being rabidly anti Communist. As a fierce anti Communist Nixon was was able to open the doors to China without being labelled a Communist sympathiser or even a closet Communist. As history records this was no mean feat.

So staying in the same vain Trump would be ideal to strike a immigration reform package with Congress. By taking his tough stance no one could accuse him of being for amnesty or weak on illegal immigration. Just what the reform package would consist is or would be mostly speculative. I would say that there would be a massive crack down on those firms who hire illegal aliens. Those illegal aliens who are granted a visa would have face some kind of penalty/ way of earning a visa and be free of a serious criminal record.

Any immigration reform success is depended on existing and perhaps new laws being forced. I believe a historical parallel is how Theodore Roosevelt wasn't afraid to enforce The Sherman AntiTrust Act. Trust-Busting was a hall mark of Roosevelt's presidency. I see no reason why Trump wouldn't follow a similar path to ensure illegal immigration is knocked out with sledge hammer.


Trump would enjoy wearing political boxing gloves not unlike in the manner Roosevelt once did in his time. In my view Trump enjoys starting and conducting feuds whether it be against Political Rivals or Megyn Kelly. Trump's opponents who have come to love to hate or despise him have been caught up in his gloves on mantra. As president I would foresee Trump wearing boxing gloves or wielding a sledge hammer towards any opposition in his way.

Health Care would be the other issue where a bridge between opposing factions could be built by someone could act as the political engineer. The wreckage of the failed Obama Care reforms could be rebuild from the ground up. The exchanges could be turned into access points where consumers can access the best prices and suitable health care plans. People who genuinely can't afford private sector health insurance would be covered under existing government programs.

To engineer the health care bridge would mean winning the war against vested special interests (Private Health Insurers and the legal industrial complex) and the political idealogical divided. Such a task could well be beyond a Mr or Mrs nice person president. Trump in a manner reminiscent of LBJ could persuade reluctant members of Congress to back his health care agenda. Trump would drum up public support via hosting rallies and dominating the media cycle as he does now.

I would have liked to have covered how the renewal of existing and new infrastructure projects would benefit from a more business/private sector approach. Again I must factor in space constraints. What I will say is that Trump is the only Presidential front runner who I could foresee doing the horse trading necessary to get the necessary funding and legislation passed through Congress.


By writing this article I hope to provide the reader with a balanced view of what a Trump Presidency could accomplish in turning the USA around from the downward slide it has been on in recent years. I can see merit in a one term Trump presidency. Trump could resolve much of the US domestic crises in the manner described above. In 2020 with the USA back on the rails the time would be right for more of a unifying figure and not the bulldoze all in my way approach of Trump.

Author Interview: Roger Moorhouse : The Devils' Alliance Hiter's Pact with Stalin 1939-1941

Below is my interview with author RogerMoorhouse. Roger kindly lend me some of his time to chat about his book The Devils' Alliance Hiter's Pact with Stalin 1939-1941. If you haven't already check out my review of this must read title. Roger's replies to my questions appear in the red text below. Note to the reader I have deliberately left the formatting in tact so Roger's answers are left unedited.  

Can you introduce yourself and the other books you have written to the listener?

I am a freelance historian specialising in modern Germany and Central Europe. I studied at the School of Slavonic Studies of London University and went on to work as senior researcher to Professor Norman Davies.

As well as a co-authored book with Professor Davies, I am author of three solo books, Killing Hitler (2006), Berlin at War (2010) and my new book The Devils’ Alliance, which has just been published in paperback in the UK. The Devils’ Alliance is about the Nazi-Soviet Pact – in my opinion one of the most fascinating and least-understood episodes of World War Two.

Clearly the borders drawn up under the Nazi-Soviet Pact (hereafter the Pact) would end up defining the Cold War era. In light of this can you explain briefly the importance of this to people who are to young to recall the Cold War?

Well, the borders are important and they aren’t. The main frontier drawn up by Hitler and Stalin through inter-war Poland would be more or less precisely restored (unilaterally) by the Soviets in 1944, and is Poland’s eastern frontier to this day. So, in that respect it is perhaps peculiar to think that that line on the map is a direct result of Hitler and Stalin’s negotiations in 1939. It is even more remarkable to consider that the state of Moldova is itself a product of the Pact – it approximates to the Romanian province of Bessarabia, which was claimed by Stalin under the Pact and annexed in 1940. So, the modern map still bears the scars of Hitler and Stalin’s collaboration.

Regarding the Cold War, the most important frontier was not the Polish one, however, it was the East-West divide through Germany – the line of the Iron Curtain, from Travemünde to Trieste – which divided the capitalist west from the communist east. But that is another story.

Can you outline to the listener how the Nazi and Soviet Propaganda machines struggled to explain the Pact to their respective peoples? To what degree even in absolute dictatorships does public opinion matter?

Both the Nazis and the Soviets had spent most of previous decade before the signature of the Pact insulting one another. Indeed, both had made popular and political capital out of portraying the other as diabolical, sub-human and so on. For each of them, the other was the ultimate political bogey-man. So, one can only imagine what went through the minds of the ordinary Soviet and German people when the pact was announced in August 1939.

To some extent, given the brutal nature of both regimes, there was a lot of deferential thinking in evidence – the idea that “The Boss must know what he’s doing, and who am I to question him?” So few, on either side, dared to criticise the Pact openly. The Nazis came closest to open protest – it was said that the garden of the Nazi Party HQ was strewn with Party badges after the Pact was announced.

Neither side did much in the way of explanation – the new line was given and that was that. The Soviets tried to place agitators in town squares to explain and answer questions, but it proved too difficult. How do you defend the indefensible?

Curiously, public opinion does matter in a dictatorship. Every dictatorial system needs a degree of consent to be able to function: an absolute dictator who had no supporters would not last long. Also, there are few legitimate ways to vent dissent in a dictatorship (unlike in a democracy), so it is actually all the more imperative that the dictator carries at least a healthy proportion of his people with him.

Nazi Germany was very much a “consensual dictatorship” – had Hitler carried out a free plebiscite on his rule in 1939, I have no doubt that he would have scored about 80% or more. So public opinion matters – it has to be massaged and influenced; the people have to be carried along. This is why the Pact was such a problem for both the Nazis and the Soviets, as they struggled to rationalise it. I devote a chapter to this issue in the book – it is a fascinating subject.

Stalin expected a stalemate (aka WW1 trench warfare) when Hitler turned westwards towards France and the Low Countries. When the Germans won outright over France how much of Stalin's thinking was thrown off balance?

Yes, Stalin – like everyone else – was expecting a rerun of World War One in 1940. And, like everyone else, he was surprised when it didn’t happen.

Stalin’s rationale in signing the Pact in 1939 had been that Germany would thereby turn westward and attack the Western Powers. For Stalin, this would be win-win – his two geopolitical enemies fighting out a bloody and protracted conflict. So, when that didn’t happen, and Britain and France were swiftly defeated, he had to think again.

This is what led to the visit of the Soviet foreign minister to Berlin in November 1940 – it was effectively an attempt to reset the basis of the Nazi-Soviet relationship, to define new strategic goals. That ‘reset’ failed – and by the end of the year, Hitler would give the order for Operation Barbarossa – the attack on the Soviet Union. But Stalin, crucially, could not imagine that Hitler would attack him. He thought that the economic and strategic deal that he gave Germany was so good that Hitler would have to be mad to attack him. This was why he was taken by surprise in June 1941. So, the defeat of the British and French did prompt a partial Soviet rethink, but Stalin still did not imagine that he was next on the menu.

On page 54 you describe how the Soviet and Nazi occupation policies were virtually identical. Is it fair to say both regimes had the goal of removing anybody who could remotely mount a resistance movement? Also can you outline out Poles in vain tried to head to the Nazi or Soviet occupied areas for a chance of better treatment?

It is certainly curious to note the uncanny parallels between Nazi and Soviet occupation policies in occupied Poland. But we have to remind ourselves that both Berlin and Moscow were fundamentally antithetical to the existence of Poland, and both wanted it wiped from the map. Without this substantial territorial “carrot” I doubt whether it would have been possible for the Nazis and the Soviets to come to terms at all.

So, once in occupation of Poland – and the two divided the country almost in half – they set about destroying it; suppressing any independent thought and removing oppositional elements (real or imagined). For the Nazis, the criteria applied were racial – Poles and Jews were their primary targets – while for the Soviets class/political criteria were foremost – they targeted landowners, the middle class, anti-communists and so on. Those differences aside, the methods applied – repression, execution and deportation – were rather similar.

Tragically for the Poles caught in either zone of occupation, conditions were often so bad that they imagined that they would be better off in the other zone – and then often encountered desperate people travelling in the opposite direction.

Poland in this period is a dark mirror, reflecting – in two perfect examples – the hideous, brutal nature of 20^th Century totalitarianism.

The UK Communist Party was taking directions from Moscow. Before reading the book I hadn't known about the experiences of British Communist Harry Pollitt. What can tell about the reader about Harry's fight with his fellow Communists and his conscious?

Harry Pollitt is an interesting fellow. He’s probably the only communist in this story for whom I felt a modicum of respect. He was leader of the British Communist Party in 1939, when the Pact was announced, and he exhorted his followers to support the Poles in their defence against ‘fascism’. However, just after he made that proclamation, the Soviets invaded Poland too, and denounced the government in Warsaw as crypto-fascist and declared Polish resistance to be anti-Soviet imperialism. This, of course, left Pollitt out on a limb. But he stuck to his principles – he was removed from the leadership of the Communist Party, of course, but he maintained throughout that he had been right - which he had been. He was brought back to the leadership after Hitler’s attack on Stalin in 1941.

I admire him (a little) because he was secure enough in his own beliefs to defy the Kremlin – which was no mean feat for a card-carrying Communist.

Can you tell the listener a little about the proposals for Operation Pike? Also for the benefit of those who are newish to WW2 history , can you explain how the majority of public opinion still favoured the Soviet Union at the time?

Operation Pike shows how the Nazi-Soviet Pact completely turned political assumptions on their heads in 1939-40. It was an Anglo-French plan to launch air raids on the Soviet oil-fields of Baku and Batumi in the Caucasus, with the intention of thereby hurting Hitler’s Third Reich. It was insane. Neither Britain or France were actually at war with the USSR in 1940, but they were nonetheless seriously planning to bomb Soviet territory as a way of hitting Hitler. It is testament to the way in which the Nazi-Soviet pact had so completely shifted all political preconceptions in western capitals. Also, it shows how the west was well aware in 1940 that the Soviet Union stood in the enemy camp – it was only with Hitler’s invasion of June 1941, that Stalin became an ally of the west.

Notwithstanding this development – much western opinion, particularly on the left, was still broadly sympathetic towards the Soviets in 1940, seeing them as part of the solution to Nazism, rather than part of the problem. This is peculiar, given that – as I’ve noted – the USSR was essentially a German ally at that time, and had become very much part of the problem. It shows the tribal nature of politics and the fact that the ordinary voter hadn’t realised that the earth had shifted a little on its axis in August 1939.

On page 175 you talk about Germany having 2 Billion Reichsmarks of debt. What was the economic significance of this situation?

I wrote that Germany in 1938 had a 2 billion Reichsmarks cash-flow deficit, which is not quite the same thing as a debt. Still, it was proof that the German economy under the Nazis had become very imbalanced and was seriously overheating, with too many resources being pumped into capital projects and rearmament and too little going to the consumer section or in wage rises – which in turn would then have eased the Reichsbank’s cash flow crisis.

The wider significance is that there is an economic argument for the outbreak of war in 1939, which – though it doesn’t trump the other drivers of war – is nonetheless quite persuasive. Germany goes to war – in part – in 1939 to avoid having to address this imbalance and to get its hands on what it most grievously lacks: the raw materials of its neighbours. In this respect the Nazi-Soviet Pact – with its important economic counterparts – played a vital role.

German tooling/machinery was used to assemble Soviet T-34 Tanks. The Guns of ex German Cruiser Lützow would fire on advancing German troops. Does this symbolise the reluctant economic relations between the two powers the pact brought about?

I think the story of the Lützow, which crops up throughout the book, is very symbolic of the economic relationship between the Nazis and the Soviets; upon which the political relationship was largely based. The Lützow was one of only a few German capital ships in 1940, and so (though unfinished) its sale to the USSR was highly significant, and showed how seriously the Germans took the relationship. Later, as German engineers were required to supervise finishing the vessel in Leningrad, delays on the Lützow became symbolic of the wider deterioration of relations. So the Lützow became something like a bellwether for Nazi-Soviet relations. And then finally – in 1941 – it ended up firing German shells, form German guns, at advancing German troops. Poetic.

Relations between the Nazis and Soviets were not entirely reluctant either – both sides had long coveted what the other had; the Soviets’ raw materials and the Germans’ finished technological wares, and the economic relationship that began in 1939 was seen (by both sides) as a long-awaited boon. The problem was that the headline figures were difficult to realise in practice, particularly as the Soviets routinely obstructed fulfilment of the treaty terms. The frustration with the economic relationship was one of the drivers of Hitler’s decision to invade in 1941.

On page 215 a RAF bombing raid allows Molotov to point out to a rambling Ribbentrop that the British were not yet defeated. Aside from the seriousness of their discussion, when you were researching the book were you at all amused by the incident?

Not really I’m afraid – it is an anecdote that I have known for a long time, so it barely raised a smile! There is not much humour in this book unfortunately. It is a very dark period. But I don’t like po-faced history, so I like to find the humanity in the story. One anecdote from the book that did make me smile – was this: a Polish woman was being deported to Siberia by the Soviets (that’s not funny), and she had something of a breakdown when they came at dawn banging on her door (that’s not funny either). So, her toddler bravely stepped in to do the packing for her (that’s also not funny). But, when she finally got to Siberia, she found what he had packed for her two year sojourn in a frozen wilderness – a French dictionary and some Christmas decorations. (that is darkly comic).

Can you describe Winston Churchill's reaction upon hearing Germany had invaded the Soviet Union?

He was delighted. He knew that now Britain was no longer alone and that the Soviets would absorb much of the German pressure. The German invasion of the USSR meant that Britain was saved. He had a cigar – even though it was breakfast time!

Book Review: The Devils' Alliance Hiter's Pact with Stalin 1939-1941

The Devils' Alliance Hiter's Pact with Stalin 1939-1941 (Penguin Random House UK , 2014) by Roger Moorhouse is a terrific must read book. In this review I will offer highlights from the book followed by my commentary. Direct quotes from the book will appear in italics.

My intent is to approach this book review from the standpoint of current events. The reader will find my commentary is tilted towards currents events in the Ukraine and future projected events in Western Europe. I will touch upon the atrocities committed by the Soviets and Nazis during the time frame covered by the book.

I will start off my review by mentioning the key players involved with the Nazi-Soviet Pact (hereafter the Pact). The two main actors are of course Adolf Hitler (1889 -1945) the Nazi Dictator of Germany and Joseph Stalin (1878 – 1953) the ruler of the Soviet Union. Both Hitler and Stalin require no further introduction to the reader.

Joachim Ribbentrop (1893- 1946) was a former Champange Salesman dressed up as Hitler's foreign minster. Arrogance and vanity put his fellow high ranking of the Nazi regime off Ribbentrop. Signing the pact was the high point in his career as Germany's Foreign Minster. Ribbentrop's Soviet counterpart was Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890 -1986).

At the heart of the Pact was a secret agreement/protocol (hereafter the Protocol) that saw Germany approve the Soviet territorial expansion into Eastern Europe. Poland was to be divided between the Germany and the Soviet Union. Eastern Poland and the Baltic States were in the swath of real estate the Soviets virtually gained in one stroke. The Soviets also claimed Finland as part of their sphere of influence ( Refer to the Winter War below.)

Hitler and Germany's motivations for seeking the pact were driven by economics and geopolitics. Hitler had to secure his Eastern Flank. The author conveys to the reader how Nazi Germany's idealogical/racial thinking was directed towards the Soviet Union. The than present day re-imagining of the old Drang nach Osten (Eastwards expansion/colonisation) was the idealogical driver behind Hilter's actions.

The humiliation from Germany's defeat in the first world war looms large. Historians have placed the majority of the historical documentation on the victors of WW1 imposing the Treaty of Versailles on Germany. I am not going to dwell on the humiliation felt by the German people in the wake of Versailles as it has been well documented elsewhere.

The territorial loss Germany accepted under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was no less humiliating than the later ground lost under Versailles. Under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Germany had seceded a considerable amount of real estate to Russia. At the time Germany and Russia had very compelling reasons to sign the treaty. The Bolsheviks had to end their countries involvement in the on going conflict because they knew a fight was in hand to defeat the White/Czarist regime. Germany's military situation warranted the transfer of the large number of troops from the Eastern to the Western Front.


Germany's economic position at least in the short term had to be addressed. By 1939 Germany had what we would today call a large government deficit. Germany's deficit amounted to two billion Reichmarks in 1930's money. The Reichsbank managed the early period of the crises by printing money without any thought to the inevitable inflationary effect. In 1938 the New York Times reported a inflationary spike or hammer in inflationary spike was coming. The hammer's handle was the 40% increase in money in circulation in the past year.

I believe the German economy was in the position where either Hitler took the country to war or face complete economic collapse. Naturally as a dictator Hitler didn't take kindly to the Reichbank advising him to renew Germany's economic focus on export markets. Hitler's response was to sack the director of the Reichbank Hjalmar Schacht. This proved to be Hitler's thanks to Schacht for engineering Germany “economic recovery.”

Concurrently the Soviet Union economic needs and exports aligned with Germany's own requirements. The Soviet Union under Stalin had industrialised to a extent that nobody under the Czarist regime could have imagined. Still the Soviet's had struggled to develop and import components like machine tools the wheels that keep industrial plants running. Also the Soviets had encountered the same difficulties with military technology in areas like aviation.

Hitler and his hierarchy were aware of the effects the Royal Navy's blockade had on the acute food shortages Germany suffered during the first war. When Germany engaged in total warfare against Poland and Western Europe a source of foodstuffs that wasn't subject to the Royal Navy's blockade was a necessity. The Soviet Union was a exporter of foodstuffs at that time and shared a land border with Germany.


On 20 August 1939 3 days before the signing of the Pact a commercial agreement was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union. In today's terms the two nations had signed a trade agreement. Under the trade agreement the Soviets pledged to supplying 180 million Reichmarks of raw materials. In return Germany would provide 120 Reichmarks of industrial equipment. A credit line of 200 million was extended to Moscow backed by the German government with a 4.5% interest rate to be repaid by 1946 in raw materials.

In late October 1939 a Soviet economic mission toured Germany to draw shopping list of military hardware. The Soviet delegation arrived with empty suitcases to fill up with consumer goods that weren't available at home. The Germans without held the true state of their aviation and other military related technology from the Soviet delegation. Despite touring many sites including BMW in Munich, Mersserschmitt in Augsberg , Junkers in Dessau and Focke-Wulf in Bremen.

The delegation wasn't shown the Focke-Wulf 190 (Still under development at the time) and the new jet engine technology that was being worked on by Junkers and Heinkel. German businessman travelled to Moscow only to find they hit a wall of Soviet red tape and the suspension of trading applications. Concerning the trade agreement Soviet negotiators sensed they had the upper hand knowing Germany needed the commercial agreement more than they ever did. I believe knowing what we do today about the state of the German's economy there is every reason to think the Soviets were really on the eight ball.

The author outlines how Germany was already facing pressures on the supply of foodstuffs and oil before the invasion of Poland. After the subsequent victories Hitler's military juggernaut wracked up in the low countries and France many observers mistakenly inflated the amount of Soviet supplied fuel in use by the Wehrmacht.

One author suggested : Gurderian's tanks operated largely on Soviet Petrol as they dashed for the sea at Abbeville, the bombs that levelled Rotterdam contained Soviet guncotton and the bullets that strafed British Tommies wading to the boats at Dunkirk were sheathed in Soviet cupro – nickel. At this time Soviet delivers of fuel and military supplies were only be delivered to Germany in a trickle.

How the ex Kriegsmarine cruiser Lützow came to symbolise the unease and strained relationships the pact had formed comes across in the book and my interview with the author. Under the Pact the the partially completed Lützow was transferred to the Soviets for completion and eventual operational service. Space considerations mean I will leave these parts of the book to the reader. 

Before I go on any further I will touch upon the Winter War. The author touches on the Winter War as it ran concurrently to a part of the time frame covered in the book. Under the Pact Hitler acknowledged Finland would under the Soviet spear of occupation. Finland geography offered the advantages of a Arctic like Winter and defensible terrain. Baltic States like Estonia didn't enjoy these advantages and they have very little real estate to military fall back upon. I will come back to the Baltic States in a moment.

The Winter War is worth sticking with for a moment. The performance of the Soviet Army stood out for me in the book the reasons for this will become clear to the reader. Ill-equipped Soviet soldiers found themselves fighting against well prepared defensive positions in temperatures of minus -40C. There is no denying in a twist of historical irony: What be-felled the Soviet Army cold weather experiences would hit the Wehrmacht during Operation Barbarossa.

Stalin's purge of the senior Soviet military commanders was now coming back to haunt him. 85% of the Soviet Army's top brass had fallen victim to the purge. The remaining 15% and the officers who replaced the dead were Stalin loyalists. A doctrine based around WW1 frontal assaults , poor leadership and a training regime all hampered the Soviet Army.

The author covers how Soviet forces stuttered into a stalemate in Finland under the command of General Alexsei Vinogradov. For his troubles Vinogradov was court martialled and executed by the NKVD. Vinogradov replacement Marshal Semyon Timoshenko restored a sufficient degree of military competency to bring about a successful offensive against Finish forces.

The Winter War ended when Finland accepted Stalin's fairy moderate terms. Finland seceded Karelia including the city of Viipuri to Moscow. The Hanko Peninsula at the Western end of the Gulf of Finland was leased to the Soviets for use as a naval base for a 30 year period. Finland escaped a Soviet Puppet government/Soviet Occupation something that has gone unnoticed by scholars.


Chapter 3 Sharing the Spoils is where the reader will find how Germany and the Soviet Union sliced up the map of Eastern Europe. I will deal with Nazi and Soviet atrocities later on below in this review. Estonia was the first country to feel the weight of the Pact. Stalin's play for Estonia was based on the claim that countries government was unable to “keep order in its country.”

The Soviets perceived the Polish Submarine Orzel escape from Tallinn as a “provocation.” The Red Air Force violated Estonia Air Space while undertaking reconnaissance and Red Army amassed on Estonia's eastern border. Confronting this situation was the Estonian Foreign Minster Karl Selter. Selter was in the unenviable situation of meeting with Molotov in late September of 1939.

Molotov demanded Estonia join the Soviet Union in a “Mutual Assistance Pact.” Of Course in reality agreeing to the Pact would mean Estonia would be caving into Soviet occupation. As the Soviet play book demanded Molotov in the fashion of a theatre actor read from a memorised script that contained lines like: “We are not going to force Communism on Estonia.” and“ Estonia will retain her independence , her government , parliament, foreign and domestic policy, army and economic system.”

Molotov responded to Selter rejecting Soviet demands by move onto Act 2. Molotov response to Shelter was “The Soviet Union is now a great power whose interests need to be taken into consideration... If you do not want to conclude a mutual assistance pact then we will have to guarantee our security in other ways , perhaps more drastic , perhaps more complicated. I ask you: do not compel us to use force against Estonia.

I like how the author states: If Selter had the impression of being of being a mouse caught in the claws of a playfully malevolent cat , he would not have been far wrong. Selter stalled for time by requested leave to discuss the proposal with his government. Molotov tried to have him undertake the conversation via a phone call. As Selter was leaving the meeting Molotov told him “ I advise you to yield to the wishes of the Soviet Union in order to avoid something worse.”

The Estonian government had signed a Non Aggression with Germany in 1939 . In what seemed not a unreasonable expectation the Estonian government requested diplomatic assistance from Germany. When no assistance from Germany was forthcoming Selter was instructed to obtain the best possible terms from the Soviets. In the final agreement the existence of Estonia's sovereignty was fatally undermined by permitting Soviet military bases on their bases on their soil.


The other Baltic states saw the writing on the wall and would also fall under Soviet domination. Molotov would use the same tactics that were so successful at extending the Soviet umbrella. Specifically: The incident of a Junior Red Army Officer being kidnapped and dying in mysterious was the provocation to place the cross hairs over Lithuania.


In more “normal” times the disappearance of a Red Army solider wouldn't have amounted to more than a newspaper story. The way the German war machine was tearing through France in May – June of 1940 was no ordinary time. French and British Armies were in retreat across France ruling out any assistance to Lithuania from those countries. Like they were falling under a domino effect , Lithuania would fall under Soviet Control.

Under the terms of the Pact Germany accepted the Soviet Union's territorial hegemony over Eastern Europe. Notable elections were used by the Soviets in the Baltic States to legitimatise their occupation. Only candidates who were pro Soviet were permitted to stand in the elections. The other candidates were removed from the ballot and arrested. The results of the elections were announced in Moscow before the polls closed with around 97% of the “votes” in favour of Soviet puppet leaders or just outright occupation.

I will cover a few other matters of great importance before I move onto the atrocities that were committed under the Pact. Reading the book I was struck by how Stalin was eyeing the take over of Western Europe. Stalin was relaying on a WW1 stalemate developing in France and being able to capitalise on the France ,United Kingdom and Germany running out of manpower. Soviet forces could have than over run Germany , the Low Countries and France.

The fall of France threw Stalin's grand master plan into the English Channel. Stalin was caught off guard and never understood the magnitude of how balance of military power had shifted after the Fall of France.

As a WW2 buff I was fascinated by General Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974) role during the time the pact was in effect. In Moscow during the winter of 1940 the temperate was -38.8C , Zhukov perhaps got a even frostier reception at a high command conference.

In contrast to previous years , Stalin had ordered the conferences remit to be expanded to cover all aspects of Red Army doctrine , organisation and training; consequently invitations had been sent out not only to the members of the high command , but also to many others including members of the military districts as well as army divisional and corps commanders.

A total of 270 Red Air Force and the Red Army Commanders were expected to be represented at the Conference. Stalin himself didn't attend the conference. Andrei Zhdanov a confederate at the Politburo of reported the proceedings to Stalin every evening.

Six speakers outlined the failings of the Red Army that had been put on displayed during the start of the Winter War. Zhukov advocated for the Red Army a strategy/doctrine similar to blitzkrieg. Perhaps it can be said Zhukov advocated for a Modern mechanised Army as much as he could without running the risk of arrest and execution by the NKVD. Lieutenant General Filipp Golikov who will pop again later was a vocal critic of Zhukov's ideas.


The British Government's response to the Soviet Unions participation in the Pact and later occupation of Eastern Poland was complicated by public opinion. The feeling among the general public was of sympathy and the UK government forming a closer alliance with the Soviet Union could have stopped Hitler's aggression. Not everyone shared in such sentiment. One individual by the name of “Chips” Channon was of the thought the Soviets were engaged in a grand conspiracy and the globe was committing suicide.

Before I read the book I wasn't aware of the extent of the favourable British public opinion towards the Soviet Union. I was aware the sentiment had been around. Thanks to the author I now have a better understanding of the public mood in the years leading up to WW2. My feeling is that historians have subconsciously ignored the Pro Soviet public opinion because it is difficult to reconcile with actions of the Soviets under the Pact and even later on in the Cold War.


I will now turn my attention to the atrocities committed by the Nazis and the Soviets during the time of the Pact. I wish to stress that I in no way wish to diminish the atrocities by not giving them a great deal of space. For some reason many authors haven't documented the population movement that took place as the Soviets and Nazis consolidated their hold on Poland. Jews, a minority of communists fled the Nazi controlled areas under the illusion Soviet Poland would provide them with a sanctuary.

In fact a remarkable symmetry emerged between the occupation policies adopted by the Nazis and the Soviets, with both sides using very similar methods for dealing with their respective conquered populations. Just as the Germans were effectively 'decapitating' Polish Society in the west , so the Soviets were doing the same in their area of occupation. : measures adopted against the racial enemy in one half of Poland were virtually indistinguishable from those applied to the class enemy in the other.

Below I will take two examples of the atrocities. From the above paragraph the reader I trust will have gathered that both Nazism and Communism employed the same kind of tyranny.

On page 55 the reader will find details of the Soviet murdering Polish POW in Katyn. Out of 400,000 Polish POW's the Soviets screened out 15,000 for execution by the NKVD. A screening process took place designed around interrogation and political screening of individuals. The prisoners mistakenly thought they were being screened before being released.

Similarly on page 45 the reader will find how the Nazis started to commit atrocities before the Polish campaign was over. Special units – Einsatzgruppen followed front line units in committing war crimes under the old guise of cleaning up resistance. Later on Special Squads as they become known would become synonymous with the Russian Front.

I will now turn to what a eyewitness would recall.

The first victims of the campaign were a number of boy scouts, from twelve to sixteen years of age, who were set up in a marketplace against a wall and shot. No reason was given. A devoted priest who rushed to administer the Last Sacrament was shot too... Among the [other] victims was a man whom I knew was to ill to take part in politics or public affairs. When the execution took place he was too weak to stand, and down , they beat him and dragged him again to his feet. Another of the victims was a boy of seventeen, the only son of a surgeon who had died the year before... We never heard of what the poor lad was accused.

I will now jump ahead in the narrative to the Soviet reaction to the Pact in the Post War world. In the book the author covers this very well in the chapter Epilogue Life After Death. Stalin never admitted to having made any mistakes in signing the Pact or misreading Hitler's intentions. Starting with his address to the Soviet People after the German invasion had began Stalin would sell the idea the he couldn't have turned the Pact down. Stalin the master of diplomacy had brought a extra 17 months of peace.

The Pact vanished from view until the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (More commonly known as the Nuremberg Trial) placed senior members of the Nazi regime on trial for war crimes. The prosecutors knew the defendants would raise the Pact as a “You did it too” , Primary School playground like defence. While evidence relating to the Pact was inadmissible the prosecutors still avoided raising the topic in the court room.

Rudolf Hess's defence counsel tried to raise the Pact and was meet by the howls of the Soviet Chief Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko : 'We are examining the matters of the crimes of major German war Criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies other states.' Rudenko than declared the Protocols to have been forged. At the same trial the Soviets tried to pin the Katyn Massacre on the Germans. The American Prosecutor threw out the Soviet claim because of a lack of evidence.

Soviet histories/text books on WW2 never mentioned the Protocols until the 1960's and even than it was only mentioned in passing. Mikhail Gorbachev polices of Glasnost and Perestroika brought great social and economic changes to the Soviet Union. As the tide of change flowed the doors opened to the Soviets admitting responsibility for the Katyn Massacre in 1990.


In 1989 the legacy of the Protocols was like a pot boiling over. In Estonia and Lativa were banners proclaimed the illegality of the Soviet occupation or just stated the date 23 August 1939. At the same time in Šiauliai Lithuania demonstrators covered coffins with the countries pre Pact flag. On the 23 August 1989 two million people formed a human chain that linked the 3 capitals of Tallinn , Riga, Vilnius the largest mass protest the Soviet Union had ever seen.

In a communiqué to the UN the significance of the Pact was made clear and in part stated: 'The Criminal Pact has to be voided! The essence of the Hitler- Stalin Pact and its secret protocols was imperialist division of the spheres of interest between two great powers. On the basis of this criminal deal, the Soviet Union unilaterally violated all international treaties concluded with Baltic republics, infringed on the historic right of the Baltic nations to self determination , presented ruthless ultimatums to the Baltic republics, occupied them with overwhelming military force, and under conditions of military occupation and heavy political terror carried out their violent annexation. . . The Hitler-Stalin Pact is shaping the Europe Today. (Emphasis mine.)


As historians have widely noted Stalin would ignore all the signs of the coming German invasion of the Soviet Union. IMO Stalin's misreading Hitler's intent is both a fitting conclusion to historical events and the book. Stalin's approach was to utilise the economic relationship with Hitler to appease his fellow tyrant and for a time his approach appeared to be fruitful.

The territory the Soviet Union gained under pact saw their pre war defensive line hundreds of Kilometres behind the lines. The Soviet Union's extensive logistical and infrastructure hampered a half hearted effort at constructing new fortifications along the new frontier. By the spring of 1941 bountiful sources of intelligence were flowing in concerning the German military build up along the border with the Soviet Union. The intel was presented to Stalin by the same Golikov who was critical of Zhukov.

Stalin turned to a poker players bluff. Stalin's aim was to deter Nazi military aggression by showing off the Soviet Unions military industrial capacity. Stalin invited the German military attaché and other senior personnel to tour arms factories in the Urals and Western Siberia. Tank and aircraft factories were on the itinerary. Specifically the the T-34 tanks and Petlyakov Pe-8 long range bomber plants.


Underscoring the dysfunction and the Red Army ill preparedness for war was shown in War Games. Witnesses would have seen Zhukov give a hiding to General Grigory Kulik a survivor of the purge. Kulik opposed Armoured Warfare on the grounds it was a product of fascist ideology. Kulik also favoured horse drawn artillery. Kulik was a bully who kept his job because of his ties to Stalin.

In spite of the Red Army's flaws Zhukov still made the case for a pre-emptive strike against the German forces amassing on his countries western border. It's unknown if Stalin ever laid eyes on the plan. Train loads of troops were arriving to reinforce the new Soviet defensive lines. In the best of Soviet traditions the troops were really just making up numbers as officers and material were absent. At any rate I am of the view Zhukov was more was making a realistic appraisal of German intent than presenting a feasible operational plan.

Now I will turn to Stalin's reaction to the initial opening of Operation Barbarossa. Operation Barbarossa the largest invasion in history commenced after 3.15am on the 22 June 1941. Soviet Forces at the front lines knew the scale of what they were confronting before the morning was out. The same cannot be said for Stalin and his cronies.

Indeed when reports first came in of the German attack , Red Army Troops were instructed not to resist. On the vital South Western Front for instance General Dmitry Pavlov had ordered that while 'provocationist raids by fascist bandits were likely' there was to be no response: the attackers were to be captured but the frontier was not to be crossed. It was a order that came from the very top. When Zhukov telephoned Stalin early that morning to ask permission for Soviet Forces to return fire he was told: 'permission not granted. This is a German Provocation. Do not open fire or the situation will escalate.

My Commentary


Before I come to my focus of how the Pact still resonates with current and future events I would like to touch upon a couple of things. As promised I wish to give some space to the atrocities committed by the Nazi and Soviet during the time the Pact was in effect.

I actually wrote my thoughts on the Nazi atrocities last. My desire is to present the reader with a fresh angle on historical and current events. I racked my brain concerning a meaningful comment which would do the magnitude of the blood shed justice. I may not be able to accomplish such a lofty goal.

During the fall of Poland Neville Chamberlain's (1869 – 1940) government pursued a policy of dropping Propaganda leaflets over Germany. The reader may well be inclined to wonder what in the world my point is? As a military response to Germany's flagrant military aggression the dropping of leaflets was like somebody trying to get drunk on non alcoholic Beer. I make this judgement before I factor in the atrocities. Once the atrocities are taken into account the historical situation comes across even worse!

Doesn't such a line of criticism suffer considerable shortcomings? On the basis the obsolete state of French Air Force and Army which rendered any success offensive action impossible , the only fair answer is yes. The same observation can be made of British Expeditionary Force (not to be confused with its WW1 counterpart.) Chamberlain's misjudgement of unfolding events is for another time (pun intended) and article.

Broadly I would make the well known case that by adopting a do it nothing policy , the French would ultimately pay the price of outright defeat military defeat in June 1940. Back tracking to the time of Pact. The Nazi occupation Apparatus was able to commit Crimes Against Humanity and devote considerable amounts of resources to doing so without any fear of enemy action. Seen in another light since the threat of French tanks rolling eastwards wasn't around Germany had a free hand to occupy Poland/commit mass atrocities.

For me the first thought that sprang to mind is how the Katyn and other Soviet atrocities are less well known than those performed by the Nazis. I think the answer is that as one of victors the Soviets were able to write their own version of the history books. The way the Soviets were able to deny the existence of the protocols from the Nuremberg Trial to nearly the end of the Cold War, allowed them to dictate the historical perceptions of the Pact.

I feel the matter also goes beyond the time frame covered in the book. Before the death of Stalin in 1953 the naïve pro Communist left wingers saw the Soviet Union as a workers paradise. After Stalin's death the reality of life under a Communist dictatorship was opened up to the world a lot of the aforementioned people wore egg on their faces.

To comeback to the context of the topic: who would want to admit they were ever in favour of a Anglo – Soviet Alliance after Communism true colours were revealed? Now I have come to one of my focal points in my commentary. The sentiments around a United Kingdom – Soviet Union Alliance still has plenty of relevance in the present. Let me take a moment to explain.


At the time of writing Vladimir Putin is actively pursuing a policy of support for the Assad Regime in the Syrian Civil War. Putin has sold Russian involvement in the conflict as waging a no holds barred war against ISIS. Astute observes have noted in reality Russian air strikes were targeted against the splinter groups who oppose the Assad Regime.

I would say a fair degree of misplaced public sentiment/support exists for Putin's military actions in Syria. In short the stance of Western governments on Russia's involvement has been at best muddled. Western Governments are okay with military action against ISIS while opposing the idea of Assad remaining in Power.

The same international governments are opposed to Russia's de-facto invasion of Ukraine. A burst of public opinion came out against Putin after the shoot down of flight MH17. The actions of Russian backed separatists bringing down a airliner was rightfully condemned by the International Community.

A obvious , yet largely unnoticed inconsistency in the opinions of Western Governments and public opinion is clearly at work. I believe a historical parallel exists between public/Western Government Support for Russia's involvement in Syria and historical attitudes towards the Soviet Union. The same kind of naïvety that saw support for the idea for a United Kingdom – Soviet Union Alliance as a counter to Nazi Germany is now at work. I will come back to this in a moment.

A detour into Post War Western Europe and the Marshall Program is worthwhile at this point. Stalin's attempted to prevent the Marshall Program from being implemented came to mind. In my Opinion Stalin saw the derailing of the reconstruction of Western Europe as the last chance to complete the Communist take over he had envisioned during the time of the Pact.


How Putin perceives the fall of the Soviet Union is the key to understanding his motivations behind his moves on the geopolitical Chess Board. I believe the humiliation felt by the Russian people during the fall of the Soviet Union mirrors that felt by Germany after WW1. If you replace the Treaties of Versailles and Brest-Litovsk with the fall of the Soviet Union you are left with the same kind of emotional sentiment in a authoritarian culture.

Further more restoring the Pre 1989 borders/Soviet Union and making Russia a player on the world stage once again requires territorial expansion. The first step in Putin's land grab is the Ukraine. How Putin used a rigged referendum to annex the Crimea is reminiscent of Stalin's actions in the Baltic States. There is every reason to think that Putin is using a updated version of Stalin's strategy that is covered in the book.

Looking into the near to medium future I expect that Putin is or will turn Russia's attention to the Baltic States. Putin with the knowledge of the low voter turn out at elections in the Baltic States (e.g Estonia ) will use referendums as his key weapon. By the use of agitators and sponsoring Pro Russian groups Putin can engineer referendums on the future sovereignty of the Baltic States.

By in large due to the low voter turn out only those who are in favour of a return to the days of the Soviet Union will turn up at polling booths. Putin's Russia will regain the Baltic States without having to resort to the use of military force. By not resorting to the use blunt instrument that is the Russian military action Putin outsmarts NATO. Members of NATO are obliged to come the aid of a member state in they event of invasion by a hostile power (read Russia). Those same members states are not obliged to come to the aid of a people who are befallen by low voter turn out and referendums.

During the years before the Pact the German economy had been on a war footing. Hitler used arms production to combat high levels of unemployment brought on by The Great Depression. How the Nazi regime accomplished a massive military build with thinly veiled economic cascade has been well documented elsewhere. For a moment I am going to stay with how Germany was on a war footing.

In a pre television and internet age the actual state of the German economy was a closely guarded State secret. Now with the admitted benefit of hindsight. I believe the structure of the German economy serves as a template for modern day pre war economies. Let me be clear by war , I am referring to Total Warfare. I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment.

Putin and the members of the oligarch would loved to have the luxury of disguising the terminal illness the Russian economy is presently digesting. Essentially Putin is overseeing a wartime economy closely resembling its Pre war German counterpart. In full view of international observers Russia is pouring money into military modernisation programs.

I believe Russia's attempts at hegemony over the supply of Natural Gas to Eastern Europe could be said to be the same kind of economic life line Hitler was seeking from a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. The key historical lesson the reader can take away is that a war time economy is on a sort clock. A race takes place between competing the planned arms build up and economic pressures. By 1939 time on the clock was running out for Germany. Economic circumstances were going to force Hitler to go to war sooner than later.

The reader may be wondering, how long did the German economy have left on the clock before outbreak of WW2? I am unable to offer the reader a precise answer. The way Hitler pragmatically went about securing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union suggests time was close to running out. I would be interested in finding out the readers thoughts on this point , feel free to leave a comment below.


My conclusion is as follows: Putin faced a decision either face the consequences of a economic cave in (likely a 2nd Civil War) or go to war against NATO. Since the Russian economy is on a war footing Putin has chosen the path that doesn't seem him at risk of being deposed. In my estimation the Russian economic clock runs out around 2020-25.

Poland and Germany won't be a easy territorial gain like the Baltic States. To complete his goal of restoring Russia to its former glory Putin will have to send his war machine into Poland. I believe the historical parallels I mentioned above mean Putin is or will play the Hitler's Germany did in the last war. I have no doubt after Russian forces have occupied (enter location here) Putin's occupation policies will mirror Stalin's in every bloodshed eddy way.

Upon reflection the idea Putin is looking to go one better than Stalin and place a Russian flag over Paris isn't as crazy as it first may seem. From Putin's standpoint what better way could there be of righting the feeling of national humiliation than to fulfil Stalin's unrealised vision?


Final Thoughts

The actions and motivations of Stalin and Hitler during the time of the Pact can be better understood by the reader thanks to Roger Moorehouse's very timely book.

Most regrettable is how the current crop of Western Leaders have failed to learn the lessons from the time of my grandparents generation. The failure to learn from history is seeing it replayed like a bad remake of a Hollywood film.

The Lens of History: Episode Fifteen Author Justin Oldham returns to the studio

Author Justin Oldham returns to the couch to chat about his new book Showdown at the Kodiak Starport. Find out how the book ties in with real life events and locations. What makes Luke compare WW1 Zeppelin Raids to Space planes?

A look at policy making in New Zealand

New Zealand is a policy-taker not policy-maker,

Source


Note to the reader: For the sake of this article I am going to simplify the norms/process of policy making into three stages. Stage one Norm emergence/Norm Entrepreneurship , Norm Cascade/Norm Diffusion and Internalisation/Socialisation. In layman terms somebody or a group of people come up with a new idea to meet (enter the issue here) , the matter is debated and lastly the concept is implemented. (Source , P15 .)


I hope Political Science graduates will forgive my oversimplification. My goal is to bring the subject matter of this article into the public arena. I am not out to earn a degree in Political Science.
Also I want to explain to the next generation why they bore the brunt of the mistakes that are being made today.


I have to thank a twitter conversation with @SarahRoseNZ for the idea to write this article. It is fair to say that I don't always agree with Sarah on current events and issues. What I can say is that she has a good gauguage on the dairy farming sector in New Zealand.

Tim Groser has let the cat out of the bag by stating New Zealand is a policy taker and not a policy maker. Groser was talking in relation to the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The readers feelings towards New Zealand joining the TPP, will play a role in how they feel about taking and not making policy. My perspective is the New Zealand government would jump into a lake if all its friends (fellow members of the TPP) were doing so.

Those who in favour of New Zealand joining the TPP argue , not signing on the dotted line will see has excluded from the projected economic benefits the deal will bring in the long term. Surrendering ground on Medical Patient laws to US drug companies is the trade off we make for the claimed benefits. I have a few beefs with this argument to put it in mild and polite terms.

There are two underlying issues for me that I will touch upon. Firstly the supporters of the TPP act under the assumption no other routes exist for New Zealand to booster access (lower trade tariffs or removal tariffs) to overseas markets. I believe this is a false hood because of the availability of forums like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC ) and the Cairns Group.


New Zealand's political leaders and policy makers have become lazy. In there laziness they have neglected the opportunities to present our case for unimpeded access to overseas markets. The New Zealand economy effectively liberalised in the 80's and 90's. So New Zealand should have gone to the negotiating table/ existing forums without having to make any concessions. I don't know if this is can be called policy making or just good sense.

My other objection to the TPP is how the agreement throws away New Zealand's sovereignty and national ID. Certainly I believe the TPP is a step towards a Asian style European Union. As such New Zealand runs of risk of becoming the next Greece , after becoming locked into a eventual single currency Union. Space constraints prevent me from going into the matter of a Asian style EU any further.

In the past when New Zealand governments have overseen the implementation of policy they made two mistakes that have gone unrecognised. The first mistake was the Fourth Labour Government failing to explain the Free Market reforms (known as Rogernomics in New Zealand) to the public. Rogernomics was the right policy medicine for the economic ills of the time. The public who was a recipient of the medicine felt they were bystanders who hadn't been consulted.

Political instability plagued the Labour Party/New Zealand government during this time and was a contributor to its flaws. The legacy of the Fourth Labour Government has been tarnished by its failure to bring the public along with them in difficult social and economic times. New Zealand never fully embraced Rogernomics until the people born in the 1980's and 1990's grew into adulthood. Today the majority of Kiwis wouldn't go back to the interventionist school of economics.

The Fourth National Government would go onto to repeat the mistakes of its Labour predecessor. The full impact of the Fourth Labour and National Government's on the public's minds is reflected in New Zealand's electoral system. At the 1992 Referendum on New Zealand's electoral system , Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) was the winner. The majority of the public's support for MMP was reaffirmed by a comfortable margin in the 2011 Referendum.

Critics of MMP have sighted the fact the nature of proportional representation/minority governments prevent the implementation of reform or even just maintaining good policy. According to the critics minor political parties (who National and Labour need to form a government) can block legislative changes. Evidence for this claim can be said to go both ways.

In the 90's New Zealand and the ACT Party and New Zealand First opposed the RNZN obtaining a third frigate , the effects of which are only now just being felt. So this may be said to be an example of how MMP directly had a negative effect on defence policy. The introduction of Charter Schools a ACT Party policy is an example of how MMP has had a positive effect on policy making.


Now I wish to move onto the second mistake successive governments have made. No instruments were put in place to measure the projected outcome or the actual outcome after a policy has been implemented. How the Resource Management Act (RMA) caused a nation wide shortage housing shortage/unaffordable housing illustrates this failure perfectly. No thought was given to reforming or scraping RMA until the cost of housing became a national crises.

What bothers me is that things didn't have to be this way at all. In 1983 Bob Hawke became the Prime Minster of Australia. Hawke's great strengths were everything his Kiwi counterparts in this era would never even strive to. Hawke enjoyed a great affinity with voters. Hawke's had a great talent for explaining the nature and need for economic reform to the Australian people.

A lot can be said of Paul Keating during time as Treasure under Hawke and his subsequent time as Prime Minster. Certainly the Hawke government never shoved reforms down the throats of the electorate overnight , like Finance Minster Roger Douglas (he bears his name to Rogernomics) did in New Zealand. I believe Hawke understand the pre-set conditions that were required for the implementation of a successful reform agenda while carrying public support with them.

Firstly the need for reform had to be around and secondly a comprehensive policies that can solve the issues at hand. Thirdly the public had to understand how the reforms package would work , lend their support to the package and fundamentally perceive it as being fair. Hawke left a template for future Australian political leaders (including current Prime Minster Malcolm Turnbull) to follow in times of major reform. New Zealand's current and future political leaders have no such template to follow.


At the time of writing Local Government New Zealand is advocating for the RMA to be replaced or rebooted. The RMA must be one of the worst bits of legislation that was ever enacted in New Zealand. Current or future governments will have to tackle RMA reform. The question in my mind is can they avoid the terrible mistakes of the of their predecessors?

Elements of the socialist left in New Zealand have never accepted Rogernomics and would like New Zealand to return to the Muldoon era. National is still scarred by the electoral unpopularity of their government in the 1990's. How will the current and future governments overcome these obstacles? Watch this space.

A look at New Zealand's ties with India

Four years ago the New Zealand government unveiled the first of its ‘NZ Inc’ Country Strategy Papers ‘Opening Doors to India’, which set the goal of having India as a ‘core trade, economic and political partner’ by the end of 2015.  That time is now up but it is clear the intended goal remains far from met. Indeed, it’s not even close.  As a participant in a recent track two dialogue organized by the New Zealand India Research Institute and the Observer Research Foundation put it, the relationship today is warm but ‘a little bit empty’.  For all the platitudes about a shared tradition of parliamentary democracy and Commonwealth heritage, and our mutual love of cricket, the relationship looks shallow almost across the spectrum. 

 Full article  

I have been wanting to cover New Zealand's relationship with India for a while. David Capie's very good article provides the opening for my below commentary. My prediction is even if Capie doesn't realise it yet , the subject material of his article will be of some historical importance. I will split my commentary into two parts . In part one, I will give my take on defence ties between the two nations. In the same vain part two will see me take a glance at the trade and diplomatic relationship.


India faces the same challenges as many developing countries. What sets India apart is the scale of the challenges due to the countries population and landmass. Corruption , a civil service who operates like it did before globalisation and extending education to poverty stricken areas. India discourages or deters foreign investment. The lack of foreign investment is a handicap India will have to address if they are to achieve sustainable economic growth.

Some people would view these challenges as negatives. I take the view they present New Zealand with opportunities for the private , Non Government Organisation (NGO) and government sectors to play a small role in Partnering with India in what has been termed the Asian Century. India's emerging middle class is at the Coal Face of the world's largest democracy.

Geography sees India sandwiched between Pakistan , Central Asia and China. Pakistan is a unstable if not a border line failed state. Central Asia/”The Stans” act as land route or barrier to the Middle East. China looms large both on India's borders and as a rising economic and military power. India's emerging middle class is coming into this backdrop as I write this article.


One of the many lessons from the International Force For East Timor (INTFERNET) is the value of mutual understanding between the New Zealand and Australian armies. 1RNZIR under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Burnett ONZM , plugged seeming less into the Australian lead INTFERNET Command Structure. Burnett's battalion common understanding with the Australian Army and not common protocols and procedures was why 1RNZIR was Plug n Play ready. The years of the two armies Officer exchanges , attending each others Staff Colleges and so on , paid off handsomely.

India is a emerging Naval Power and a large contributor to UN Peacekeeping operations. India can said to be expanding its footprint globally and in Asia. Aside from greater levels of mutual understanding , other clear benefits are to had by deepening defence ties between the NZDF and the Indian Armed Forces. Joint training exercises, sharing of operational experiences and improved capabilities (E.g. Indian Armed Forces Peacekeeping and NZDF Anti submarine warfare.) would be on the menu.

Naval and maritime patrol operations is where I foresee New Zealand and India military cooperation/Joint Operations taking place. The NZDF and law enforcement could conduct training exercises with its Indian counterparts. New Zealand's contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations is at its lowest levels in over twenty years. Specialist Peacekeeping Operations is the NZDF's niche capabilities that no other military in the world can match. Surely it would make sense for New Zealand to develop India's Peacekeeping capacity and capabilities?


I do now need to shift my focus to New Zealand's economic ties with India. A more in depth look at the potential benefits of improved defence ties is for another time.

New Zealand's main exports to India are commodity products. In my opinion this reflective just how reliant New Zealand remains on dairy exports. Although they have been lowered trade tariffs still remain a barrier to Kiwi commodity exports. Why hasn't New Zealand looked for other export market opportunities to India? What non traditional areas could New Zealand look to set exploit in such a populous country?

New Zealand prides itself on producing innovations in areas like IT or design fields. To the best of my knowledge Kiwi innovation has yet to find its way to tackling issues like sanitation and access to clean drink water in India and the other parts of the developing world. It's not like the issue of expanding sustainable levels of sanitation hasn't been highlighted and discussed in recent years. In 2011 the Bill Gates Foundation ran a competition that sought the best design of toilet that would deliver safe and sustainable sanitation to billions of people who don't have it world wide.

Do Kiwis have the business sense to couple with the culture of innovation to meet the market for sustainable sanitation? What kind of business model will be employed? Who will work with the Indian government and NGO's to roll out the products to urban and outlying areas? Unlike with dairy exports the New Zealand government won't be making much effort to open other doors. Individuals with a wide ranges of skills, backgrounds and values will have to lead the way in breaking down the doors that open to India.

In my view the neglect New Zealand's ties with India is reflective of how successive government's have viewed Asia. New Zealand views of Asia are predominantly centered around China's role as being Fonterra's number one customer. By the same token Kiwi's see India through the same kind of mirror.Sure Indian students provide revenue for high education outlets in New Zealand. Intrepid Kiwis travel to India as part of their Big Overseas Experience.


Beyond scholarly circles New Zealand engagement with India isn't discussed. Unless the general public takes a greater level of interest ,New Zealand's relationship with India won't improve in the areas of military ties and diplomatic relations. Public discussion of New Zealand foreign policy , diplomatic relations and military posture is by in large absent. The lack of public/voter awareness has permitted successive governments to make monumental blunders.

The current state of New Zealand relationship with India is one of those blunders. New Zealand cannot find any measure of security or a meaningful place at the diplomatic table until the blunder is recognised and corrected. New Zealand must find its security within the Asia-Pacific region. The security of New Zealand's maritime trade routes against threats from piracy , terrorism and medium to high intensity conflicts is depended on our relations with countries like India.

Another blunder made by the New Zealand foreign policy establishment is putting all their eggs in the UN Security Council basket. New Zealand wasted a decade of diplomatic resources on securing a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. The expense of pandering to the League of Nations , err I mean the UN is demonstrated by the lack of foundations in the New Zealand engagement with India. New Zealand could have accomplished a lot by building the foundations. Instead New Zealand will accomplish nothing, but blowing hot air while sitting on the Security Council.

New Zealand and the War against Isis Part 3

This article follows on from Part 2 in the series that covers New Zealand's role in the war against Isis. In this instalment I will look at the second alternative strategy that was open to New Zealand when joining the coalition's military efforts to combat Isis. The down and upsides of New Zealand joining in the defence of Jordan against tidal wave of Isis is covered below.

I will begin the article with the clear advantages offered by the “Jordanian option.” The first distinction that I believe is worth making is the fact Jordan is a internationally recognised state. Now the reader may be wondering why I would make such an obvious statement. From a diplomatic stand point the New Zealand government would have an easier time with the Jordanian option. Coming to the defence of a internationally recognised state fits comfortably within international law.

On the other hand arming and equipping the Kurds makes good military sense. In diplomatic/political terms Turkey and the Kurds are yet to reach an accord. In short Turkey and the Kurds are yet to realise that Isis is the real and common enemy. In part 3 I will cover this political migraine in greater depth.

The Jordanian Armed Forces has undergone the transformation from a conscript to All professional , well trained and motivated force. The Iraqi Army melted away at the first sight of the enemy. Instead of trying to revive a dead patient (the Iraqi Army) the NZDF would have become a junior coalition partner with one of the stronger military in the region.

Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.

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Logistics could well be the one reason why the Jordanian option wasn't ever open to the NZDF. When the NZDF deploys outside of the Pacific Islands region they plug into coalition partners logistical supply chain. If the logistical supply chain isn't available the means to keep air , naval and ground units resupplied isn't available.

The regular New Zealand Army remains a UN peacekeeping force at the time of writing. Barring any major policy shift in the coming Defence White Paper this policy will remain in place. Not having high intensity combat capabilities would rule the regular army out from front line duties in Jordan , Syria and Iraq. The NZ SAS would bear the combat load like they did in their first couple of stints ( 2001 and 2005) in Afghanistan.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force lacks air strike or combat wing capability (last seen with the Skyhawkes.) The SAS would be reliant on the Jordanian Air Force for air cover. I for one am opposed to the NZDF deploying anywhere overseas without native air cover.

The final obstacle is the lack of previous ties between the NZDF and the Jordanian armed forces. Interoperability between the NZDF and other nations defence forces is depended on policy decisions made by the New Zealand government. New Zealand devoting resources to winning a temporary seat on the UN Security Council was ill-advised. New Zealand would have been better served furthering diplomatic and military ties with a country like Jordan.

For having said of this I will still come back to Jordan in the last instalment of the series. Considerable diplomatic manoeuvring from the USA and the rest of the international community will be needed if a wider war in the Middle East region is to be avoided.