Destroy And Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966–72

Destroy and Build Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-72 by Thomas Richardson (Cambridge University Press, 2017) is the latest edition to the Australian Army History Series. The book is must read for students of the Vietnam War and the origins of contemporary counter-insurgency doctrine.

The book centres on challenging the existing orthodoxy around, the Australian Task Force (1ATF) Pacification efforts and military control over Phuoc Tuy province (Phuoc Tuy or the province ), during the Vietnam War. In 2002, Governor- General Michael Jeffery summarised the orthodoxy by stating: 'We Australians had everything under control in Phuoc Tuy province''. In challenging the existing orthodoxy, the author has debunked , any notion of the 1ATF being wholesale in control of Phuoc Tuy by 1970.


In chapter one, the Cold War back drop to pacification looms large. Forming the background to Pacification, the Cold War ideological battle ground(Communism vs Free World capitalism), looms large. The Cold War backdrop would not be complete without the competing US and Soviet interests in third world nations (hereafter third world) newly interdependent from the old colonial order.

The aim of pacification was economic development/industrialisation of the third world, the resulting increasing levels of prosperity would eradicate poverty, and remove the fertile ground Communism exploited. The grievances of rural Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Society were not accurately understood by western obverses, they wanted a fairer share of the pie, and not a larger pie.


Chapter 2 en-lighted my ignorance about Phuoc Tuy, in 1966, the year 1ATF arrived in GVN. Phuoc Tuy was strategically important due to having access to Vung Tau, RVN's's second largest port behind Saigon. Phuoc Tuy would allow for the 1ATF to have operational independence by fighting a 'self contained' war to a degree. Phuoc Tuy was not a large province.

Geographically, Phuoc Tuy was dominated by the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai hills, collectively known as the Nui Dinhs or 'the Warburtons' by Australian soldiers. The Nui Dinhs proved a fairy straight forward infiltration route via rice paddy's into the town of Baria, and a cave system adjoined by man made tunnels provided cover from air strikes and artillery fire. The high ground in the Long Hais overlooked the western half of the population, and shared the characteristics of the Nui Dinhs.

Yet, much of Phuoc Tuy was not hilly. Elsewhere, in the province, the rubber plantation at Long Tan and village of Binh Ba were future battle-sites, while the Nui Dinhs and Long Hais were would remain logistical hubs for the NLF. Due to space considerations; the importance of the road network to the local economy is best left to the reader explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores the complexities of local population demographics.


Superficially, the grievances around of land ownership, or the brutal Communist methods/suppression would explain the support for the PLF in Phuoc Tuy, however, this ignores complexities among local population demographics. These complexities encompassed , the economic diversity of the province, a families' history of fighting French colonial rule, and past heavy handiness ( the To Cong program) of South Vietnamese government. As the reader, I commend, the author, for bringing Phuoc Tuy to' life'.

Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism are behind, the constant failings responsible, for the RVN becoming a de facto failed state. The Government of Vietnam (GVN, think government of South Vietnam) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AVRN) were dogged by institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism, and like all bodies infected by such diseases their effectiveness was reduced. This disease infected, the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), who were chiefly responsible, for security in Phuoc Tuy. The RF/PF were akin to Army reservists or local militia.

The weaknesses of the RF/PF and AVRN remained a constant. Each time the 1ATF would depart a village or cease patrolling/ambushing in a area , the RF/PF or less often South Vietnamese Army failed to maintain the improved security situation, or pressure on the enemy's activities. In the chapter entitled 'Bereft of their Australian strongman': November 1971-January 1973, the reader, will find this disease, culminates in the loss of any security/pacification gains made by the 1ATF.

The other constant is in regard to members of the population in Phuoc Tuy, who were opposed to the NLF, but at best were Lukewarm(pun intended) towards the diseased GVN Institutional/systemic corruption and cronyism prevented the GVN from winning over these Lukewarm people, and thus the war.


The ATF1 mission was to restore security in Phuoc Tuy , permitting the South Vietnamese government to regain control of the province. In 1966, Phuoc Tuy was firmly under NLF control, reflecting the security situation in much of GVN. Pacification efforts centred around Revolutionary Development (CORDS) and other non military civic action could only take place when ,the security, situation improved.

The author encapsulates the operational, strategic and tactical dilemma faced by the Australians and American in Vietnam. This ongoing dilemma was as follows: from the ATF1 perceptive, their was not enough manpower to sustain operations against the NLF's more conventional units (mostly the D445 battalion) and conduct operations aimed at cutting the NLF's links to local population.


I should pretext my next comments for the reader. I am the son of a Vietnam veteran. In 1969, my father served with 5RAR, during Operation Esso, he was badly wounded by a mine incident, and evacuated home. This is why a passage on page 133-134 struck a cord with me. The passage covers , the 1ATF operating in the Long Hais.

Specifically, constructing a bunker system around Dat Do, patrolling around the Long Hais and CORDS in Dat Do. The NLF heavily mined areas likely to frequented by Australian Army patrols in the Long Hais. This mine laying effort resulted in twenty Australian soldiers Killed in Action and 119 wounded. Despite the heavy causalities, the 1ATF, goal of injecting or denying the NLF's logistical rice supply was successful.


The reader will have noticed , how I have chosen to skip over the Ted Offence, this is because I wish to focus on other topics covered by the author. This is a strength and not a weakness of the book.

A long term American goal was the use of democratic elections to legitimatise South Vietnam in the eyes of the international community and it's own people. In the same time frame, flawed analysis driven by computer modelling and wishful thinking,saw a unrealistic and 'rosy' view of the security situation in Phuoc Tuy.

The author effectively covers the electoral process for Senate and lower house elections. The AVN banned the Communist and neutral political parties from taking part in elections. In the 1970 Senate election and 1971 Lower House elections showed voters in Phuoc Tuy were capable of making informed decisions at the ballot boxes. Neither, did these informed choices reflect the lack of participation in the political process. The diversity of Phuoc Tuy was reflected in the way people voted in both legislative elections.

Voters were unified in cynicism in the electoral process. This reader found the October 1971 Presidential election , which Thieu won unopposed, not only justified voter cynicism, yet also displayed a figurative upper cut to the GVN's own jaw. Prior to the presidential election, the outright rigging of lower house election results, in Phuoc Tuy was publicly confirmed. President Thieu resorted to amending electoral laws to prevent 'peace', comprise' and his chief rival Nguyễn Cao Kỳ from winning the, October 1971, presidential election.

I have only covered a fraction of the fanatic content in the book. By covering a fraction of the author's content, I have focused on two focal points:

How my family history relates to the book means a great deal to me on a personnel level. This does not not preclude a more rational overview of the book. During the time 1ATF and Pacification efforts took place in Phuoc Tuy , the ills of the GVN and South Vietnamese Army prevented any pacification efforts from having any lasting successful impact.

In a brief summary, the ills also ensured the RVN nation state had no viable future, and the author's narrative largely ends with, the 1971 ATF draw down from Phuoc Tuy, and in 1972, the failure of the AVRN efforts (Operation LAM SON 79) in the province. By 1972, the People's Liberation Armed Forces switched to conventional military efforts, for the NFL had failed to ferment a popular Communist revolt in the province/wider RVN.

The author has produced a book which earns pride of place on my book shelf, for both reasons of rational/logical analysis of the intended subject matter, and my own personnel family history as described above.

Australia and New Zealand's strategic blindness

Daesh-linked militants swept through a southern Philippine city, beheading a police chief, burning buildings, seizing a priest and his worshippers and raising the flag of Daesh, authorities said Wednesday. President Rodrigo Duterte, who had declared martial law across the southern third of the nation, warned he may expand it nationwide.
As details of the attack in Marawi city emerged, fears mounted that the nation could be falling into a growing list of countries grappling with the spread of influence from Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
background

Strategic blindness is staring New Zealand in the face , thanks to political leaders who display the symptoms of blindness towards the Asia-Pacific. I draw the comparison to a lack of vision because New Zealand fails to recognise threats to security in the Asia-Pacific, yet remains committed to the against ISIS in Iraq. This article will focus on the threat posed by ISIS in the Southern Philippines.

I will return to the Southern Philippines in a moment, but first let us take a glance at the Indonesia occupying East Timor (1975 – 1999). In 1975 when Indonesia occupied/colonised East Timor, like so many conquerors before them, they walked into the trap of favouring the stick over (economic) carrots. Also in 1975, Australia and New Zealand abdicated our regional responsibilities by green lighting Indonesia's actions in East Timor. This hand-wringing only ended with the Australian lead intervention, the International Force For East Timor (INTERFET), restored security after Indonesian colonial rule in East Timor ended.


Threats from ISIS and other Islamic Extremist groups in the Southern Philippines may alter New Zealand's security environment in unexpected ways. Let's explore the ways how New Zealand's security environment may be driven by events on Mindanao. The fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations, opening up strategic 'gateways' (hereafter gateways), offering the reader strategic forecasting.

These 'gateways' start with the threat of or all the fall of Mindanao to ISIS or other Islamic terrorist organisations (hereafter the fall of Mindanao). Now I will turn to the first 'gateway'. By using the threat or the fall of Mindanao, the Chinese would have the pretext to unilaterally intervene, not unlike the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

There is every reason to think by intervening on Mindanao, the Chinese ,would repeat the moral social and economic blunders made by Indonesia's effort to colonise East Timor. Until East Timor's independence, the Indonesian flag flying over that nation had no negative impact on Australia's security. However, the Chinese, occupying Mindanao would be calamities, and akin to the Fall of Singapore. The change in Australia and New Zealand's security/strategic outlook would be permanent, unlike the defeat of the Japanese in WW2 (1941- 1945).

The second 'gateway' stays in the shadow of East Timor without the dark clouds mentioned above. By leading the next INTERFET (hereafter coalition), Australia would act as a responsible middle power, and put ghosts from 1975 to rest. Operating in medium to high intensity (warfare) environments,the coalition, would aim to restore security on Mindanao.

As coalition partners, the potential roles of Indonesia, China and Japan are worth a glance. In light of Japan's WW2 history and Indonesia's ties with East Timor mentioned above, the chance for those nations to be seen as genuine liberators of people, strikes me as fascinating. Instead of playing the role of outright occupier, the Chinese, would make a welcome contribution to the coalition. Units from Japan Self Defence Force and People's Liberation Army could serve alongside each other. Delicious historical irony does not ensure that such occurrences will take place.

Australia and New Zealand's level of military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines deserves more public discussion. Increasing Australia military and diplomatic ties with the Philippines, increases regional security, by in effect keeping our hands on the steering wheel. Likewise, the same goes for New Zealand.


Logically, the following question must be posed: why are Australia and New Zealand's efforts focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq, and not in the southern Philippines? Attempting to answer this question from a New Zealand perspective; leads to more questions. If the reader would like me to explore these questions , feel free to leave a comment, below.

How New Zealand is suffering from strategic blindness is evident, if not the underlying causes. The willingness of Australia New Zealand's political leaders to place our regional security at risk is also stark. History does not take a particular course without under currents acting as driving forces. Do not ignore the forces which are defining our time.

Book review: Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction

Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction Editors Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr (Georgetown University Press 2016 ). The book is aimed at undergraduate and graduate students who are undertaking courses in Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Technical and Academic jargon is avoided to make the subject matter accessible to students of international relations.

The book excels at introducing Asia-Pacific Security Studies to the reader. Each chapter is authored by a academic with expertise in the particular field. In the introduction, Traditional and Non Traditional international relations theories are summarised, and act as a warm start to the book. Through out the book, the terms appear in bold can be found in the glossary.


Two chapters from the book stood out for me. Chapter three entitled: Are Japan and India Potential Members of the Great Power club? by Dr David Envall and Professor Ian Hall captured my attention. Envall and Hall encapsulate the internal and external challenges facing Japan and India, in a informative manner. My own status; self confessed WW2 buff, always transfers my mind across modern day (Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrival to the present day) Japanese history.

Chapter seven Maritime Security – Will Asia's Next War Occur at Sea? Specifically, the table listing disputed territories in the East China Sea and South China Sea, is useful for reference purposes. One of my reading habits is to reference information from books , on a as needed basis.

Among the nations involved in the maritime territorial disputes, the forces of Nationalism burn hotter than the obvious value of the islands in disputed territories. The fires of nationalism bring additional investments in military spending, from the governments involved in the territorial disputes. Chapter seven also takes in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the origins of the maritime territorial disputes, and other aspects relating to the topic.

The book excels at meeting the aim of providing students with a introduction to Asia-Pacific Security studies. The more general reader like me will also find the book useful, gaps in my knowledge are filled in by the contributing scholars/authors. I hope Asia-Pacific Security Studies scholars are empowered to write book titles; taking their cue from the from the chapters in Asia-Pacific Security An Introduction, the future of such book titles looks promising.

Book Review: Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk

Scales on War: The Future of America's Military at Risk by Maj. Gen Bob Scales, USA (Ret.) ( 2016 Naval Institute Press ) is compulsory and compelling reading for military professions , concerned citizens and aspiring political leaders.

The author Major General Bob Scales (Ret.) delved into his experiences as a Vietnam Veteran and his background as a scholar to construct a thesis on the historical ups and down of the US Army and how to win future wars. In doing so the US Army will avoid bumps in the road which lead to perfectly avoidable battlefield causalities.

Direct quotes from the book will appear in italics. Below is my highlights from the book. At the time of writing I have been unable to secure a interview with the author. Scales's underlying argument has multi facades. Each chapter represents a facades as he builds his case for how future US Army (hereafter Army) and Marine infantry units should be trained and equipped for the wars of the future.

In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I will in layman’s terms call nasty surprises. Nasty surprises equally unnecessary battlefield causalities. In Iraq and Afghanistan the enemy enjoyed the element of surprise in tactical situations. Reversing the situation so the enemy is caught unawares will prevent battlefield causalities. The reader will understand the significance of this in a moment. My reference to "nasty surprises" later on in the article is a tie into this fundamental underlying issue.


I am fascinated by how the author intellectually builds his case for the American Era of War, around Colonel Hiromichi Yahara (1902 - 1973 , other sources say 1981). Like the author I feel it is worthwhile to spend a moment on Yahara. Yahara was someone who was,intellectually gifted and deeply cerebral. His tall presence came with a patrician manner which along with his other traits set him apart form his Imperial Japanese Army contemporaries.

Scale's argues what he calls the American Era of War had it's beginnings towards the end of WW2. The year is 1945 and the scene takes place on Okinawa. Under the Shuri Castle in the Japanese Command Cave. Yahara is in the presence of 2 Lieutenant Generals Itsura Usijima the commander of the 32nd Army and Ismau Cho his chief of staff. Scales's describes Cho as arrogant , stupid, cruel and impetuous.

If Ned Flanders is the anti Homer Simpson ,Yahara was anti of Cho and other mainstream Japanese Army Officers of their day. Reinforcing his character was the fact Yahara had served as a military Attaché in the USA . The majority of the rest of his time had been spent as a Staff officer.

Cho was the atypical Japanese Army officer of his day. Arguing over Tactics Usijima is occasionally interrupted by Cho. The argument centred on the best tactical approach for defending Okinawa. Should the defenders meet the US onslaught from the outset or hunker down and defend the island from the bunkers , caves and tunnels?

By thinking about Okinawa as the springboard for the US invasion of Japan, Yahara mind was thinking on the strategic and not the lower tactical level. This will make more sense to the reader a bit later on. Yahara understood Japan stood no chance of a outright victory over the US's vast industrial and military muscle. So he turned to the enemy's weakness.

Yahara correctly perceived the American public's mood. For the American Public was growing wary of the causalities incurred during the advance on the Japan. Yahara reasoned if during the final reckoning (The Allied invasion of Japan ) if the defenders could inflict enough casualties , public support for for the war in the US would dwindle.

Once public opinion turned against the war , Japan would be in a position to secure to secure a favourable peace deal. Retaining the Emperor 's divine right to rule and avoiding American occupation would have been seen as decent peace deal in light of the military situation. The dropping of the Atomic Bombs brought the war to a close before Yahara's strategic thinking could play out , for now. Yahara lived long enough to see his intellectually laid out foresight play out during and by the US withdrawal from Vietnam.


In Chapter 4 the author touches upon how adversary’s successfully adapted to US Military supremacy. In a move off the beaten track the author turns his attention the Chinese Civil War in the years of 1946 – 1949. Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) and his Marshals undertook adapting the doctrine of the WW2 wartime guerilla war to fighting a conventional war against a numerical and technologically superior enemy. Mao divided his forces into small units and placed his focus on area control.Dividing his forces maintaining and small unit cohesion became a corner stone of Mao's small unit doctrine.

The Chinese would put the lessons they learned during their civil war to good use in Korea. After the Chinese Army was hammered and their logistical bases destroyed by American Air Power they faced the need to evolve again. Logistical facilities were moved to north of the Yalu River putting them out of the reach of American air strikes.


On the ground the Chinese soldiers avoided daytime movements and they remained dispersed until it was time to attack the stagnate American lines. What was an acceptable human
toll to China was unacceptable to the United States. The result was operational
and strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled victory. (emphasis mine).

In the next 20 years the Vietnamese operational and tactical hand book came from Mao's forces methods in Korea and the Chinese Civil War. Against their Round 1 opponent the French the Vietnamese scatted their small unit forces which also had the benefit of allowing them to live off the land. To bring about victory the Viet Minh did need to mass their forces under the umbrella of fire power (The Battle of Dien Bien Phu). By timing the build up of troops correctly the Viet Minh were able to bring their build up and make the first move before the French could bring their advantage in fire power into play.


The other intellectual heartland of the book is the historical evolution or shifts in warfare. As the reader will have noted I have chosen to take my review in this direction. In the chapter entitled : The New Age of Infantry the author furthers his argument by outlining historical periods and shifts in warfare. The general reader will find this section to be very useful background information. For reasons of space I will mostly move my focus to the latest epochal in warfare.


In terms of the historical shifts in warfare on page 54 the author makes the following point which I feel is critical. Epochal shifts in warfare are rare and don't happen overnight.

The arrival of the atomic age heralded the end of the age of industrial warfare , citizenly military and conscript armies. As the author points out WW2 was the last war of the industrial age warfare. I will come back to WW2 in a moment.

Precision long range weapons like missiles are gradually ending the era of Blitzkrieg or mass armoured columns and infantry support in vehicles. The author does back up his assertion by sighting a couple of notable incidents involving tanks. For the sake of space I will leave these incidents to the reader.

Coming back to Vietnam precision weaponry started the process of eroding the era of Blitzkrieg era of warfare. The last hold outs of the inter state and technologically updated and localised versions of the aforementioned era came in the Middle East. The Israeli victories in the First Arab–Israeli War , Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War tells the story , so to speak. If one is looking for the icing on the cake the US lead coalition defeat over Iraq during the first Gulf War will do nicely.

Now I come to the kicker. In unconventional conflicts Vietnam, UN intervention in Somalia, Post 9-11 Afghanistan , Post Saddam Iraq the US ended up on the losing side. Israel became a cropper in Lebanon.


War in Two Epochs McChrystal And Patton is the chapter which brings my attention back to WW2. The author sets out to demonstrate how the wars Generals Patton and McChrystal fought were as different as their personalities. The reader who is familiar with military history will already be familiar with Patton. If not I do feel the more general reader will soon catch up at lighting speed (Pun intended.)

No two generals could possibly be more diametrically opposite than George Patton and Stanley McChrystal. Both graduated from West Point and shared a passion for reading military history, but similarities end there. Patton was an acerbic, bombastic, narcissistic, self-promoter whose skill
as a warrior made him immortal. In contrast, McChrystal’s personal life and active service accentuated the motto of his special warfare clan: the “silent professionals.” As different as they are in time and temperament, both generalssymbolize transformational epochs of the U.S. military art. Patton is the past; McChrystal represents the new age.

For reasons of space I have chosen mostly to focus this review on the future of warfare and not the sound historical cases and arguments made in the book. Hence McChrystal's command of US Special Forces in Afghanistan will take up most of my written ammo supply. McChrystal's war was non-linear and fought in and around local populations.

By comparison under Patton the Third Army saw the US Army finally master Armoured Warfare. In pathering the road for the crushing of the German War Machine , Patton's GI's took causalities as per par the course. McChrystal had to over come the weakness in the US capacity to wage war first identified by Yahara.

In 2003 McChrystal was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command (hereafter, JSOC). McChrystal united a whole host of Special Operations entities including the CIA and US Marine Special Operations under the same roof. In order to bring about the unified command structure , McChrystal was a victorious in a old fashion turf war.


Interestingly the author's description of how JSOC forces took down enemy infrastructure reminded me of the Vietnam War Phonenix Program. The seeds which grew into the JSOC taking down terrorists networks took years to reach fruition. I will split the fruit in half. In one half is the pinnacle of small-unit warfare. A serving member of US Special Forces is like good wine and cheese the product of years of development.

Before his earning his stripes a special forces solider will have undergone specialist training and psychological refinement. He will also know his buddies like no one else. In Afghanistan McChrystal's small special forces teams successively operated at specks on a seemingly vast map.

The other half of the apple is the growth of McChrystal's career from West Point to JSOC. I must say the author gets points from me for invoking one of my historical figures in T.E. Lawrence. Lawrence is referenced in relation to the 19th Century British Army practice of dispatching offices to overseas outposts. In the day these postings may well have been to the far reaches of the British Empire.

Lawrence was one such individual. Pre  WW1 Lawrence's time spent Middle East gave him knowledge and the experience which would later to serve him in good stead. For as history so duly notes Lawrence became the famed leader of the Arab Revolt. Modern American Army Officers like McChrystal gain much from overseas postings not unlike their international historical forefathers once did.


Effectively the sweetest fruit ripening was McChrystal's JSOC overcoming what the author call's the Curse of Colonel Yahara. US causalities in the Vietnam and Korean Wars had reaped a bitter harvests. I will come back to the sweet fruit in a moment.


The future belongs to the next Yahara , Petraeus or McChrystal and not a Douglas Haig . The business of practising war belongs to professionals and not gentlemen who like to play the role of British or other nationalities Army Officers.

Identifying and growing the next McChrystal is some of the author's strongest works in the book. Come chapter 19. Scales's lists and gives examples of the kinds of leadership genius styles which can be exhibited by Army Generals. The leadership styles are strategic, Combat , Political, Institutional , Anticipatory and Seers And Doers. Combat and Anticipatory geniuses win wars , hence they occupy the narrative.

The Anticipatory genius forecasts the next war accurately. In doing so they make their force ready for the next war. Anticipatory genius are the seers with the Combat Geniuses being the doers. The doers employ the crafted forces without incurring unacceptable high casualties rates to the American Public.

I believe how the author proposals to rectify the Army's institutional flawed method of selecting junior officers for stardom is one of the most important parts of the book.. At the rank of Captain Platoon and Company Commanders is where tactical geniuses are identified as being destined for higher ranking stardom. The underlying problem is great tactical skills (e.g reading the battlefield) and strategic genius are not related.


A skilled strategic or Anticipatory thinker won't make convoys of trucks run time in the way someone like General William Westmoreland (1914-2005) once did in support of Patton's Third Army (My comparison). In a short the tactical genius will fight the current war in a brilliant manner. At the same time the Anticipatory thinker will be preparing for the next war. By identifying and promoting Anticipatory geniuses , the Army can avoid the pitfall of planning to fight the next war like the last one!


The other forms of leadership shouldn't be discounted. If a sporting team needs a balanced and complete roster the future health of the Army needs the best of all the leadership geniuses. These people must also be strategic thinkers.


Future talent identification should take place in the search for the pool of officers in line for promotion to the rank of Major. Selecting officers on the basis intellectual merit and who show a genuine interest in scholarship early on in their careers is a part of Scales's prescription. The Army must filter out officers who undertake higher education for getting their “ ticket punched” for the purpose of advancing their careers.

Someone like General David Petraeus who takes to academia like a duck to water should be the gold standard for promotion. Intellectualism can not be the sole judge of character. Other characteristics must be taken into consideration to ensure the next General Douglas MacArthur isn't climbing the ranks (my Comparison). 

My interest was peaked on page 116. Once again early identification is on the menu. Only the focus is on successful command relationships and operational staffs. Historical command peers/relationships have spanned from Lee – Jackson , Grant- Sherman in the Civil War to Hindenberg - Ludendorf in WW1. Despite spanning 40 odd years of warfare common denominators can be found in all the examples of successful Command Peer relationships.

The denominators are synergy stemming from communications and understanding reaching a perfect level in the channels of the great Command Peer relationships. How to harvest the sweetest fruit at the Small-unit/Battlefield level is covered through out the book. A successful harvest would mean the Army would no longer fight wars in a fair manner. For reasons of wanting to retain a workable structure I will summarise below what is proposed below.


Adopting Special Forces methods of selection , training and psychological preparation for regular infantry is the foundation of the author's proposals. Crap canning the Army Policy of rotating personnel on a standard basis would allow for greater levels of unit cohesion. Non Commissioned Officers and junior officers benefit from a masterful understanding of their peers. In this manner a developing Command Peer Relationship shares much in common with sweetening small-unit combat.

Off the shelf technologies available from Walmart and not works of Sci-Fi would make swing the tactical advantage back to the small-unit infantry of the future. The use of cameras providing live feeds of the battlefield from the perspective of the infantrymen would be useful in real life. The more causal reader may associate such a idea with the hours they spend playing Call of Duty (my comparison).

In real life if those in Command and Control centres saw the battlefield literally through the eyes of the participants they may make better decisions. These decisions surround making the speedy and correct decisions concerning the employment of supporting artillery and air power.


Sensors found in home security systems detect movement. The same kind of sensors which set off car and house alarms could also prevent ambushes. Radio Controlled Drones with cameras in use by hobbyists controlled by soldiers is the way seek out every hiding place from above.

In close combat situations detecting enemy movements prevents what I called “nasty surprises” above. I hope veterans and anyone currently serving in the military will forgive me using a layman’s term. By reversing the Tactical Situation in favour of the infantrymen of the future the level of unnecessary battlefield causalities will be greatly reduced.


Scale's gently points out why Army Generals performed poorly in the Post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . Generals McChrystal and David Petraeus aside , why did under perform? The answer lays in a old edict. Armies will always prepare to fight the next war like they did the last one. In short a host of otherwise able senior military Army figures had spend their careers preparing for the next Gulf War. Naturally such preparation failed them in the counter insurgence , security focused environments.

Chapter 10 entitled The Human Dimension is where I will next turn my focus on. Some aspects of the chapter are best left to the reader and for discussions among Military Professionals. Bearing this in mind I feel the best idea is to cover what the author deals with The Crucible of Courage. Scale's informs the reader how small units can individually and collectively maintain a strong tank full of courage. Below is a few points of interest I have selected a few points around the tank of courage.


Soldiers must see and sense in such a way that there are no surprises.
Know Your Enemy. Knowledge of the enemy is enhanced by on the battlefield by courage, audacity, cohesion and the ability to manoeuvre freely. Advantages can be gained by a soldier’s ability to intuitively read body language and the surrounding battlefield. Some soldiers will have a gift which allows them to “see” the battlefield. Others will be excel at correctly reading the body language of local populations.

Small-unit leaders must possess “cognitive clarity.”

 A well tuned ability to make sound decisions under pressure and ignoring the urge to wait for information before acting on a decision are factors in cognitive clarity. Deadening emotional highs and lows permits a individual to make decisions in ambiguous situations caused by the nature of the battlefield/what I just mentioned a moment ago.

My Commentary

I wish to applaud the author having a writing style which deeply engrossed me as the reader. The ultimate compliant I can pay the author for his writing style is as follows. I felt like I was in the cave with Colonel Yahara witnessing his bosses argue in a rage. The way the author packs in so many different factors through out the narrative without adversary effecting the narrative is the other great strength of the author.

My commentary also reflects the fact I was unable to secure a interview with Scales. Not securing a interview affected the highlights I selected from the book and my commentary. Not being able to raise questions with the author left me to form my own thoughts about the book. One point I wish to make is my below commentary is in no way meant as any disrespect to the author.

The following question are what I will build my commentary around. How might the American Era of War play out specifically for Australia and New Zealand? Assuming for a moment the author is incorrect about the future of Warfare , does his thesis still hold value? Let me explain how the 2 questions tie in with each other.

I will refine my second question to kick off my thoughts , as they relate to a future inter state war in Asia. Once the worst has happened what happens to the intellectual , strategic and tactical school offered up in the book? Don't throw away Scales's book , just yet. For the sake of discussion I will assume events have unfolded in a way most people never expected.

Fundamentally I believe the paradigm would shift to where Australia and New Zealand (hereafter ANZAC ) become the underdogs. As the underdogs the aims of the ANZAC military forces would be undercut the advantages of a numerically superior enemy who can project fire power on land , sea and in the air.

There is every reason to think the small-unit tactics successfully employed by our enemies could be used against the Chinese. Consider the following. The need to tie down large number of enemy troops , gather intel and cutting enemy communications could be meet by guerilla warfare. Ironically the tactics employed by ANZAC lead guerilla movement would mirror those of our Post War adversary’s. In other words the strategy of fighting not to win via a decentralised small-unit guerilla war.

The reader may be thinking I have misunderstood the Curse of Colonel Yahara , not so. I chose my words in the above paragraph with deliberate care. I think it is fair to say a dictatorial regime like China doesn't worry about the public's reaction to battlefield causalities. To encapsulate my point. The same power/state authority which allows Chinese leaders to ignore their citizens could prove their undoing.

For Chinese civilian and military leaders could succumb to the blood lust of conquest. So if like Hitler Napoleon and the Imperial Japanese Empire in WW2 the Chinese over extend their reach , a new page in history will be written. The Australia and New Zealand era of warfare will have began. 

I would consider General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885- 1946) fighting not to win on Luzon to be a historical parallel. In 1945 Yamashita had withdrawn his forces to the mountains on Luzon. The nature of the terrain favoured the defenders. Yamashita was successful in his aim of tiring down large numbers of US troops so they couldn't be used elsewhere. I do wonder if Yamashita was ever a associate of Yahara?

Note to the reader: I am in no way suggesting what I have outlined replaces the strategic requirement to secure the Air and Sea Lanes in the South West Pacific. The conventional warfare aspects of future inter-state wars in Asia or elsewhere fall beyond the scope of this article.


The strategic logic behind the Australia and New Zealand era of war could equally apply to the next war in Europe. If one doesn't put all their eggs in the Nuclear detergent basket , that is. And when Russian conventional land and air forces would overwhelm the NATO defenders by their sheer numerical advantage. I am sure the reader is intelligent enough to work out the rest for themselves.


Before I return to the contemporary New Zealand Army a slight diversion is in order. What I have coined as the Australia and New Zealand era of War isn't confined to land lovers. There is every reason to believe the fierce underdogs would also look give the enemy a blood nose beyond the sea shore. If the reader is looking for some inspiration Naval wise I do have a book recommendation for them. The book is entitled The Sea Devils Operation Struggle and the great raid of World War Two by Mark Felton.

For the next section I invite the reader to assume Scales's thesis about the future of warfare is correct and I am clearly in the wrong.

I now come back to the contemporary New Zealand Army. I came across a fascinating article in the NZ Army Journal (Third Edition November 2016) entitled Disruptive Thinking in the NZDF – Yeah right! By Staff Sergeant Matt Aslett.

Aslett attended a informative presentation from the US CENTCOM Asymmetric Warfare Group , hosted by the NZDF Adaptive Warfighting Centre (hereafter AWG). 1 of the presenters commented on how the AWG is comprised of disruptive thinkers. Aslett asked himself, what is disruptive thinking? Where does disruptive thinking fit in with today's military?

Not unlike Scales, Aslett opinion is traditionally disruptive or unorthodox thinkers struggle in the military. A in build conservatism, conformism and rigid rank structures (all military norms) work against against unorthodox thinkers. Career advancement stems from fitting into a narrow mould which stems from selection boards and training courses who turn out students in the image of their instructors.

Aslett points out those who are unorthodox thinkers are perceived as “rebels” or “revolutionaries”. David Stirling the founder of the SAS ,. T.E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate the founder of the Chindits were all “rebels.” As such these men would not fare well in present day military. The status qua will remain unless those who select military leaders shift the emphasis creative thinking over more conservative process thinking.

I now leave Aslett's article and return to my commentary. What are the main risks to the New Zealand Army on future deployments? Does rebuffing “rebels” increase the risk of Kiwi troops taking battlefield causalities? Space and time doesn't permit to go fully into these questions. In short the answer to the first question is fairy straight forward.


I believe the greatest risk to kiwi troops on a overseas deployment (enter location here) would be a sudden shift from a low- medium to high intensity warfare environment. Let's use New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team formerly deployed to Afghanistan as the template for a future overseas deployment. The environment will probably urban instead of the rugged undeveloped terrain of Afghanistan/Central Asia.

The cause of the shift is less important than what the consequences would be for the troops on the ground. My argument is a force which is trained and equipped for low – medium level peacekeeping would be nigh on wiped out once the shift has taken place. If such a occurrence takes place the number of causalities would exceed those from the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars put together.

For the sake of not wanting to get bogged down in analysing the New Zealand Defence Force I have chosen to leave issues like the RNZAF lack of "air strike" capability for another time. I in no way wish to diminish the importance of air cover and artillery support. The subject matter is covered by the author in the book and as such is best left to the reader.

I believe 2 factors would greatly negate the risk of Kiwi troops facing a military disaster. Both factors are shared with the Australia and New Zealand era of war. Ensuring the next T.E. Lawrence prospers in the NZDF will ensure better understanding of future wars from the root causes to how to find the road to victory. Secondly Scales, Special Forces orientated prescription must be adapted for the New Army.

Once prescribed , not only would Kiwi infantry be better prepared for unexpected turn of events they would break the curse of Colonel Yahara. New Zealand's political and military leaders would have a greater range of options available to them . In a conflict along the lines raging in Syria or Iraq terrorist networks could be brought down during or after a conflict has taken place. Put another way Kiwi Troops could switch between combat and peacekeeping roles as a situation demands.


Didn't I just say the factors were shared with a worse case scenario war in Asia? SAS type Commandos/Special Forces type troops deployed in small-units would be ideal for waging a guerilla warfare against enemy occupation troops. To encapsulate my point the Army which intimately knows counter insurgency/terrorist network doctrines will equally know how to turn the chess board around. By turning the chess board around additional time may gained to prepare defences in the South West Pacific and Northern Australia.

In conclusion I believe the value of the book goes far beyond the author's thesis and even the Curse of Colonel Yahara. We can only fail to learn from history at our peril. If New Zealand fails to prepare for future storms in our backyard or in the wider world the price paid will be in blood. The sheer cost of the price will be beyond what the majority of people ever envisioned.

A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part 2

Full report

Welcome to part 2 of my article entitled A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood. Part1 allowed me to provide the reader with a overview of the source material from which I made select commentary. My commentary was aimed at energy security from a Japanese perceptive. I also touched upon other topics including fossil fuels and the rise of Liquefied natural gas (hereafter LNG).

In part 2 I will turn my attention to Deep Sea Mining (hereafter DSM) . I am going to take the liberty of shifting much of my focus away from Asia to the South Pacific. When I do turn my attention to Asia how DSM will effect the dynamics of the region will be my focus. My thanks go to Anna Powles for pointing me the right direction when I was researching DSM.


Note to the reader I had originally planned to cover Timor – Leste and alternative energy sources in this article. For space considerations I will cover those topics in the next 1 or 2 instalments of the A look at energy security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood series. I ask the reader to forgive me for not breaking down the South Pacific into more accurate geographical regions. As DSM will take place in all the regions I have chosen to take a broader perspective.

If the reader isn't very familiar with DSM I would invite them to check out the following resources on minerals found on the sea bottom: Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts ; Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides and Manganese Nodules.


Generally speaking the South Pacific will be vulnerable to legal and illegal DSM practices. Australia and New Zealand's neglect of our collective backyard will become more stark. Space doesn't permit me to go into more details concerning the neglect. , My thoughts on the entrance of China and other non traditional state actors into the South Pacific can be found in a earlier article .

A look at how DSM operates is in order. Starting from the sea floor the extraction of minerals is as follows: disaggregating mineralised material ; transporting the material to the surface and dewatering the material. The effect of the filtered sea water return to the ocean will extend beyond the mining site. Transportation via ship to a processing plant or market place is the end point.

Environmental management plans/regulations will serve as any nations framework for dealing with DSM. 2 factors are now worth a mention. A good regulatory frame work will or does balance out commercial and environmental issues. A lack of enforcement of regulations has numerous effects from environmental pollution to undermining a nations sovereignty.

Tying into these considerations is revenues from mining taxes and royalties. Corruption , illegal mining and a poor tax regime can play roles in the ups and downs of nations gaining the economic benefits from any kind of mining.


The merits of mining in tourism areas has been debated in New Zealand. If Open pit mine would be a eye to foreign tourists in New Zealand the same will apply to Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. The energy security and economic independence offered by DSM may act like a lure. If the lure is to great , Rarotonga's reputation as pristine tourist destination may well be ruined. Since this is a no brainier I will now shift my focus northward.


Asia provides different dynamics to the South Pacific. In Asia the abundance of natural resources at the sea bottom looks set to harden China, the Philippines , Taiwan , Vietnam , Brunei and Malaysia's competing territoral claims in the South China Sea. Whereby in the South Pacific states will wrangle with matters such as environmental regulations , in Asia defining nation states borders is already the order of the day.

I believe any consideration towards the outcome of the South China Sea's dispute must factor in energy security. The sovereignty of the nations involved , the natural resources on offer and national pride are all on the line. DSM and other forms of mining look set be a test of national sovereignty in sometimes contrasting ways.


New Zealand will face the coming challenges directly and on a strategic level. In the direct sense preventing illegal DSM in territorial waters , forming sound environmental regulations and tax regimes are all obvious stand outs. I will come back to a local perspective in 1 tick.

The biggest unspoken risk is if New Zealand is caught completely off guard and unable to police our own territorial waters including Marine Reserves. If New Zealand's defence outlook wasn't so half baked the risk would have been largely migrated by sound defence policy.

I fear New Zealand in general is ill prepared to accept the reality of rising tensions in Asia. Ignoring the effects of DSM would be perfectly in line with people burying their heads in the sand. Kiwi's from the person on the street to Prime Minster John Key are living in fairy land , when it comes to a meaningful discussion around the emergence of China as a economic and military power.


I believe the abundance of natural resources made unlockable by DSM may influence the course of a future war in Asia. A case in point is the reserves of Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides (hereafter SMS) minerals in the Bismarck Sea. If the Reserves of SMS could turn Papua New Guinea into a mini Saudi Arabia China will have a reason to cast their eyes beyond the South China Sea.

If a wartime scenario in which the Bismarck Sea becomes a factor eventuates , events will overtake Australia and New Zealand. Military the Chinese would include controlling the Bismarck Sea as a objective along with blockading or invading the Indonesian mainland and Papua New Guinea. If the worst happens New Zealand's failure to come grips with energy security in the South Pacific will have had consequences beyond most people's wildest imaginations.


In part 1 I mentioned Geoeconomics being a factor in the global LNG Market. There is every reason to think China will use DSM as a means of exercising Geoeconomic levers. Chinese State Own Enterprises (hereafter SOE's) will legally or illegally establish DSM sites at the bequest of their government. I would urge the reader to factor in the MO of Chinese SOE's into their thinking around energy security.

In New Zealand SOE's are expected to run on a commercial basis. China uses SOE's for aims that in no way involve making a profit. 2 instances of how China uses SOE's is worth highlighting. The first is taking over a strategic asset in the Port of Darwin with the intent of weakening Australia's ties with the USA. In a less subtle move China has placed a Oil Rig in Vietnam's territorial waters . China's motives for the placement of the Oil Rig appears to be something along the lines of possession of real estate is nine tenths of the law.


Now for this next section I am going to assume New Zealand will be able to weather the DSM storm. What options are available to New Zealand and Australia to ensure our South Pacific neighbours can do the same? Clearly the ideas I present below will not form a complete answer. As per usual I do want to provide the reader with food for thought and matters for debate.

Is the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (here after PPB) and it's planned replacement a token gesture or a program that never overcame obstacles like so few days spend by vessels at sea? In a near empty tool box the PPB sits at the disposal of participating nations. More on these points below.

My argument is the PPB is one of the core capabilities which should be expanded to strengthen the participating nations maritime capabilities. Law enforcement and maritime surveillance are also examples of core capabilities. By building up the capabilities of smaller states to defend their sovereignty New Zealand can kill two birds with the same stone. Improved relations with our neighbours and a more stable backyard would be the benefits.

Turning the PPB into a ocean going program would be no small feat. Logistical support in the form of Replenishment and repair at sea would fall onto the RAN and RNZN. The number of patrol vessels in the PPB would be increased as to ensure one is always available to meet any unexpected contingencies. To summarise under my kind of plan the PPB would be modelled on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (hereafter RFA). If the reader would like me to expand upon my thoughts on a South Pacific RFA , feel free to leave a comment below.

The reader may be wondering how on earth Australia and New Zealand could ever fund the capital and operational costs of a South Pacific RFA? Reorientating foreign aid budgets away from ad hoc infrastructure projects in the region and towards the PPB wouldn't require any new additional spending. Japan has the financial muscle to pay for the new PPB bases and supporting infrastructure. The historical irony of Australia and New Zealand urging Japan to invest in defence related infrastructure in areas they tried to conquer in WW2 is not lost on me (think the Battle of the Bismarck Sea).

Effectively my expanded PPB/RFA would give the participating nations excellent maritime patrol capabilities. The new maritime patrol capability would act as the centre piece of efforts to build a sense of self reliance among South Pacific nations. By playing a role in providing greater levels of security and stability the conditions for a South Pacific renaissance will be in place. Successfully dealing with DSM and illegal fishing operations/management of Fisheries would be all positive by-products of the new age.  

In offering my thoughts on DSM's role in energy security in the Asia- Pacific I have only really scratched the surface. I will leave the reader with my final thoughts. If the New Zealand government and foreign policy establishment leave our engagement with the Asia – Pacific as the status quo there will be a heavy price to pay.

In terms of DSM at best the price will see our Pacific Islands cousins pillaged by legal or illegal means. At worst combined with strategic blindness New Zealand will stumble into a war. The war starts as a high intensity conflict in the South China and sea and soon engulfs Indonesia , Australia and New Zealand.

A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighborhood Part 1

link to full report


A good overview of energy security in Asia turned out to be well timed. The report was authored by Andrew Pickford of the Perth USAsia Centre. Incidentally I listen to the Perth USAsia Centre Podcast . I recommend the reader tune into the podcast if they are interested in the prevailing winds carrying us into the Asian Century. For some time the topic of energy security in Asia- Pacific has been fermenting in my mind. I will come back to my thoughts , below. As per usual quotes from the report or other external sources appear in italics.

On page 2 the author sets out a definition of energy security. For space considerations I will mostly leave this section to the reader. I do feel sticking with the idea of uninterrupted availability of appropriate forms of energy at affordable prices is very sensible. The general reader who watches the price of petrol at the pumps may empathises with the author's straight forward approach.


I appreciated reading the historical background to Oil's role as a commodity in 20th century history. As a kid I first read about the value of Java (now a part of present day Indonesia) as the key Oil producing area of the world. My reading was naturally related to WW2 history. Staying with the influence of my early reading : the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a oil exporting nation planted seeds in my mind.


The seeds had me wondering. How did the US go from a exporter of oil to a net importer? Why did Saudi Arabia emerge as a oil power house after and not before WW2? My intent isn't to answer these questions. The point I wish to make is how history books grabbed my attention. I hope the coming generations are captivated in the same manner I was and still am today by the ties between historical and current events. Enough of my of tangent.

My commentary will follow the structure of the report. I believe the author has done well in forecasting likely strategic shocks which could affect energy markets. Outside of foreign policy circles the reader may be wondering just what consists of a Strategic Shock?

In a essay entitled Strategic Shock: Managing the Strategic Gap by Colonel Peter Jarrell Lane United States Army; the following definition appears on Page 9 : If such scenarios are sufficiently plausible and sufficiently worrisome— posing a credible and serious threat to American security—then senior national security decision makers should devote time and resources to address them. —Andrew Krepinovitch1 Military Futuris

Now I turn to themes for the next 20 years. In my opinion the forecast concerning fossil fuels remaining the dominant source of energy is sound. For now I will stick with Liquefield natural gas ( hereafter LNG or natural gas). In today's Geoeconomics , Geopolitical and energy markets natural gas is the big mover. For reasons of space I will conserve LNG for part 2 of A look at Energy Security in New Zealand's extended neighbourhood.

Coal remains the energy source of choice in India. Will coal become obsolete as a energy source? I expect coal will become obsolete in a time period 50 – 70 years beyond the time frame covered by the author. I make this prediction on the basis of 2 factors. The amount of time India will take to evolve as a first world country is the first factor.

Alternative Energy is the wild card in future energy markets. If alternative energy matures as a technology before the time frame I mentioned above the apple cart will be over turned. If the apple cart is overturned not only India but the rest of the globe will experience a energy revolution. A alternative energy revolution is naturally the second factor. I will return to Alternative Energy sources in part 2 of this article.


Technological Innovation isn't confined to efforts to weaning energy sources off fossil fuels. The reader may have come across instances of Smart Grid technology without giving even thinking about it. I count myself in the category of coming across the use of Smart Grid tech at work and not blinking. My electricity provider plans to move towards a automated reader system. For the customer/power consumer the only noticeable change will be never seeing someone employed as a meter reader again.

Such instances of automation offer clear advantages (more accurate power bills) and come with the risk of technical faults. Under the banner of technical faults I would include IT failures and deliberate disruptions caused by hacking or other means.


I now return to Strategic Shocks. In this commentary I am going to combine Strategic Shocks and Structural/Economic Shocks. I hope Foreign Policy nerds will forgive this trespass in the name of maintaining a reader friendly style of writing.

Outside of Japan and Germany Nuclear Power is very radiant (Pun intended). In Asia China leads the charge of adopting Nuclear Power. Logic would suggest the charge will play a role in the next generation of Nuclear Power reactors going from a laboratory to power plants. Since by the nature of a dictatorial regime public opinion is a non factor , I will leave China for part 2 of this article.

The questions in my mind is the effects of Japan closing down Nuclear Power Plants. Will Japan be more susceptible to the perils of relying on imported Energy Sources? Will Deep Sea Mining make Japan more or less energy independent? These are only some of the questions which come to mind. My commentary now becomes Japan centric. Dealing with Saudi Arabia and Iran would have taken the topic away from New Zealand's extended backyard.

I believe Japan's history is worth revisiting for a moment. Below is my take on modern Japanese history from the stand point of energy security. Japan's history from Commodore Matthew Perry (1794 -1858) arrival to the present day has undergone several distinct periods. In the space available, I would say Perry trigged the law of unintended consequences on a grand scale. As historical events turned out the consequences wouldn't be felt in Perry's lifetime.

Following Perry came the Meiji Restoration period which included rapid industrialisation. The sudden burst of the industrial revolution brought about a thirst for natural resources. As the reader will be well aware Japan is a country completely devoid of natural resources. Historians regard the Russo – Japanese War as the turning point which marked Japan's late entrance in the race for empire.

By the time of The Great Depression, simultaneous occurrences were taking place which are relevant to my argument. A growing population was placing additional pressure on imported resources whether it be supplies of food , oil and coal to list just a few examples. The process of radicalisation a by product of the dire economic conditions was in full flight.

These factors would culminate in Japan' entry into WW2. How the Imperial Japanese Empire rose to great heights and fell between Pearl Harbour and the dropping of the Atomic bombs has been well documented elsewhere. For all the blood shed and rubble (formerly known as Japanese cities) the same fundamental problem remained unsolved. As a nation state Japan was still entirely depended upon external sources/imports of natural resources including those for energy security.


For obvious reasons the coming of the Atomic Age is best remembered for the Mushroom Clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I would argue the value of Nuclear Power to Post War Japan has gone widely under appreciated. Let me explain my reasoning. People outside of Japan may not understand the extent of just how far that country is devoid of natural resources. The Baby Boomer and later generations of Japanese are to young to remember the ruin WW2 brought to their country.

In the case of Japan Nuclear Power's is more than just a source of clean renewable electricity.
Indeed as a energy source which is not reliant on a continuous external fuel supply , Nuclear Power is very valuable! Consider for instance how Japan or for that matter New Zealand's source of petrol would cease if the supply of fuel oil was interrupted or ceased. I do not mean to suggest Nuclear Power has made giant leaps in Japan achieving energy independence. As the saying goes a small amount of progress is better than none.


I now come to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster (more commonly known as Fukushima ) and how it will effect the future of Nuclear Power. Can public opinion sustain a downturn in the use of or complete removal of Nuclear Power?

I believe the answer to this question must be taken over the long term. Before I offer the reader my answer to the above question I will make a detour. The detour will relate to my personal experiences during and after the Canterbury Earthquakes. My intention is avoid the reader thinking I am trampling over Japanese public opinion in a heartless manner. I ask the reader to bear with me for moment.

A strong range of emotions still come to mind when I ever think about the earth moving under my feet. The trauma from the string events leading up to and after February 22 2011 has long since subsided. My memoires of meeting people who were adversely effected are never far from my mind. What stood out for me is how trauma was a shared experience with countless other people.

I would also argue options or “luxuries” undertaken in the wake of the quakes wouldn't be available in Japan. The Zoning Decisions undertaken by the New Zealand government were one such luxury. Japan's topography and population density would have probably made the same kind of approach to post disaster recovery impractical if not impossible.


So my following conclusion/forecast is done with the utmost respect to the Japanese people. Phrasing out Nuclear Power isn't a luxury available to Japan. For any replacement of Nuclear Power would increase Japan's dependency on imported energy sources. I expect the Japanese government will eventually approve the use of next generation Nuclear Power technology.

Perhaps it could be said Japan's politicians aren't in a position to govern by opinion polls. Current New Zealand Prime Minster John Key has turned governing by opinion polls into a art form. Only time will tell us what ill side effects New Zealand will suffer from our politicians having the option of governing in such a poor fashion.

Jeremy Corbyn welcomes the next war

Jeremy Corbyn has called for Nato to be "closed down", it emerged today as defence chiefs warned his comments about the organisation are "weakening western civilisation”.

Lord Roberson, the former Labour defence secretary and Secretary General of Nato, said: "It beggars belief that the leader of the party most responsible for the collective security pact of Nato should be so reckless as to undermine it by refusing to say he would come to the aid of an ally.

"Even in its darkest, daftest days in the past the Labour Party stuck to its commitment to Nato and to the defence of any ally attacked.

Full article 

Article 

Why am I doubling down on Jeremy Corbyn and have yet to so on Donald Trump? Trying to avoid any sense of political favouritism is why I will start this article by answering such a question. For a while I have been considering what Donald Trump's foreign policy would resemble in practice. I don't yet have a treatment for Charles Lindbergh , err Donald Trump and the America First Movement MK2. My treatment program for Trump will have to wait for another time.


Now I will come back to Corbyn's comments concerning NATO. How can I best sum up my immediate reaction/thoughts to what Corbyn had to say ? In polite terms, unkind would be a apt description. Before writing this article I took upon some time for reflection. I wasn't very successful in the sense of finding constructive way of expanding upon my below thoughts.

The only conclusion I can draw is Corbyn's comments are recklessly irresponsible on a grand scale! Inviting the next European War is the only realistic consequence of Corbyn and his supporters mindset. Like other reasonably minded people I view such recklessness in a broader international context.

Vladimir Putin and his military advisors must be gleeful at a would be UK Prime Minster advocating for the dissolution of NATO. I would say Corbyn actions have reinforced my forecast for a coming European War. I will come back to my forecast in a moment. Beyond the invasion of the Ukraine going unchecked , Corbyn is providing the greatest incentive for the Russians to commit future military aggression against Western Europe and the UK.


As to why Russia is on a war footing the reader can find my reasoning in past articles. I covered the historical/present day motivations behind Putin's aims in a previous article . Is history doomed to repeat in the wake of unlearned historical lessons? What should more moderate and responsible Labor MP's do to repute Corbyn's foolishness?